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INTRODUCTION 
Locating French India in the historiography of decolonisation 
 
French India, referred to more commonly as Inde française and officially as Les 
établissements de français l’Inde or Les établissements français dans l’Inde, consisted of tiny 
territories, remnants of former trading posts established in the seventeenth century and scattered 
along the coast of India. There were Chandernagor located in West Bengal, Pondichéry and 
Karikal on the east coast or Coromandel coast (Tamil Nadu), Yanaon in Telegu-speaking country 
(Andhra Pradesh), and Mahé on the Malabar or western coast (Kerala). They covered a total area 
of 500 square kilometres and had a population, according to the census of 1948, of 362,045.1 In 
addition to these five territories, there existed eight parcels of land, called loges, covering an area 
of four square kilometres over which France also claimed sovereignty; these had a population of 
approximately 3,000.2 After seven years of negotiations, which first saw France handing over the 
loges to newly independent India in October 1947 (Accord de cession des anciennes loges 
françaises), then ceding Chandernagor in 1951 (Treaty of Cession of the Free Town of 
Chandernagor, 1951), the last four territories were finally transferred to the control of the Indian 
government on 1 November 1954. Eighteen months later, on 28 May 1956, both governments 
signed the Treaty of Cession (1956) though it took until July 1962 for the French Parliament to 
approve the ratification of the Treaty, and for France’s 300-year colonial presence in India to 
come officially to an end. Treaties and the negotiations that lay behind them all attest to the 
complexities associated with the withdrawal of France from her tiny Indian territories.  
While the choice of the word ‘transfer’ in the history of decolonisation has minimised the 
success of an independence movement, the term is suited to the particularities of French India for 
                                                          
1 Nagoji Vasudev Rajkumar, The Problem of French India (New Delhi: AICC,  1951), p.8 
2 Balveer Arora, ‘Les établissements français de l'Inde’, Revue française de science politique, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1968), 
footnote 4, p. 363. 
    
   
2 
 
two reasons.3  Firstly, French India did not attain independence; it was incorporated into an 
existing national entity that had earlier gained freedom from another European colonial power. 
The changeover of territorial sovereignty from France to India was the result of an agreement 
between two nation-states and the incorporation of French India formed part of India’s nation-
building process, involving the integration of the princely states of the subcontinent, former British 
India, and the colonial territories of Portuguese India and French India. Secondly, France’s 
withdrawal from India occurred in several stages, and was marked by two Franco-Indian treaties 
as well as a number of agreements directly related to the issue of sovereignty (the handover of 
the loges in 1947, the holding of referenda, the termination of a Customs Union Agreement, and 
the de facto transfer) before the de jure transfer took place in 1962.  
However, since the existence of the French Indian territories was the result of colonial 
rivalries on the subcontinent embodied in the two Anglo-French Treaties of 1763 and 1814 - 
which asserted British control of India and permanently marked French India’s singular territorial 
particularities – the history of French India is undeniably intertwined with that of British India. The 
first instance of France’s forced withdrawal from India can be traced back, after a short period of 
territorial expansion over the Deccan, to her first defeat at the hands of the British during the 
Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). Hence this event takes the process of France’s decolonisation of 
French India back to an earlier period that enables an analysis of short-, medium-, and long-term 
perspectives on France’s historical presence in India.4 An emphasis on Franco-British relations 
and their effects on France is important because when India gained independence in 1947 
France had long ago been relegated to a subordinate colonial power on the subcontinent. It was 
from this subordinate colonial position that France, after dealing with the British authorities as the 
dominant colonial power in India, had to face a new kind of authority, that is the government of an 
                                                          
3 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), p. 4. 
4 H.L. Wesseling, Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European Expansion (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1997), p. 117. 
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independent India that had just displayed its ability to negotiate India’s freedom from Britain, and 
whose foreign policy rejected the presence of any foreign possessions on what it considered its 
national territory.  
While these points stress the geographical, historical, and political complexities of French 
India, a conceptual problem arises when considering the specificities of the end of France’s 
colonial presence in India. Decolonisation is usually viewed from the perspective of either the 
national narrative of India as an ex-colony that achieved statehood, or the wider story of the 
breakdown of imperial systems in the world, whether British or French. Both narratives involve the 
interaction of three forces: the colony, the mother country, and the international arena.5 In the 
case of French India, neither of these narratives tells the full story, since French India did not 
achieve independence but joined a former colony. Hence on the one hand, the Indian national 
narrative, which has focused on diplomatic relations and the achievements of the Indian National 
Congress, has depicted a history from ‘above’, subjugating the local history of French India and 
specifically muffling those voices that were opposed to its merger with the new Indian nation-state. 
On the other hand, the wider French colonial narrative has underemphasised the causal effect of 
Britain’s withdrawal on peripheral foreign territories sharing common borders, language, culture, 
and religions with their neighbours in British India. It has also failed to highlight that France’s 
departure in 1954 and belated signing of the Cession Treaty (1956) in 1962, were themselves 
closely intertwined with local, national, and international issues.  
The most important of these issues were directly related to France’s war in Indochina 
(1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962), traumatic events that undermined any attempt at re-
imposing a colonial order in the post-war era, and which precipitated France’s decolonisation of 
her overseas empire. Both wars impacted the Franco-Indian diplomatic relationships and the 
future of French India, with the dates of the de facto transfer and the de jure transfer respectively 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 120. 
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taking place when France withdrew from her two major colonies. Decolonisation is usually 
understood as ‘a process by which colonial powers, whether voluntarily or by force, depart from 
their overseas possessions, and during which hard-won battles are waged between nationalists 
and metropolitan colonial powers’. 6  But the particularities of French India demonstrate that 
decolonisation, a process involving disputes and changes affecting a wide range of participants at 
various levels and in different regions, most often engages with intricately entangled politics and 
geographies.  
While the British decolonisation of India, the influence of Indian nationalism, and the 
trauma of partition have been extensively investigated, other important issues have not. The 
impact of two major events in Indian history – the Sepoy Rebellion (1857) and India’s rise to 
independence and its associated nation-building process – on the other two subordinate 
European powers in India, Portuguese India and French India, has been less discussed, if not 
entirely excluded from the scope of these analyses.7 Similarly, comparative studies of European 
decolonisation have left scholars uninterested in juxtaposing the speed of Britain’s withdrawal 
from her large Indian territory with France’s stalled fifteen-year process of disengaging from her 
five minuscule, defenceless, and scattered territories.8 By overlooking the small French Indian 
                                                          
6 James D. Le Sueur, ‘An Introduction: Reading Decolonization’, in James D. Le Sueur (ed.), The Decolonization 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 4; Martin Shipway, Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach 
to the End of the Colonial Empires (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 2. 
7 Jim Masselos, Indian Nationalism: A History (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991); Christopher, A. Bayly, Origins 
of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Claude Markovits (ed.), A History of India 1480-1950 (London: Anthem Press, 2002) which 
devotes a short chapter on French India, though there is no similar discussion on the end of Portuguese India; 
Sandrine Bègue has filled the gap with a doctoral thesis La fin de Goa et de l'Estado da India: décolonisation et 
guerre froide dans le sous-continent indien: 1945-1962 (Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios estrangeiros, 2007); Stuart 
Corbridge and John Harris, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004). 
8 Tony Smith, ‘A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 70-102;  Henri Grimal, Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and 
Belgian Empires: 1919–1963 (London: Routledge, 1978 [1965]); V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to 
Collapse: 1815-1960 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982); R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-
1981: An Introductory Survey (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1985); Franz Ansprenger, The Dissolution of the Colonial 
Empires (London: Routledge, 1989, [1981]); Raymond Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empire in 
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territories, authors of the general narratives have passed over the opportunity to integrate French 
India into the broader comparative study of the decolonisation of the subcontinent along with 
associated ‘local’ anti-colonial movements, citizenship and enfranchisement, and post-colonial 
cultures. 9  Likewise, studies centred on French decolonisation have been dominated by the 
colonial wars of Indochina and Algeria, the rebellion in Madagascar, the independence of former 
French African colonies, and the transformation of an extensive empire into ‘confettis de l'empire’ 
(remnants of empire).10 These works have generally failed to notice that parts of French India 
were the first territories of the French Union to secede from the new colonial framework created 
under the Fourth Republic (1946-1958). They have also neglected to investigate whether these 
cessions were constitutional and how they differed from other procedures of decolonisation, and 
to link the Franco-Indian negotiations and subsequent withdrawal agreements with the conflict in 
Indochina. Investigations of such issues would give the whole decolonisation process a more 
regional implication and also turn the spotlight onto the small French Indian population living in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Shipway, op.cit.; Martin Thomas et al., (eds.), Crises 
of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States, 1818–1975 (London: Hodder Education, 2008). 
9 While Catherine Candy and Mrinalini Sinha have provided an analysis of the development of women’s suffrage in 
India, historians of French colonialism have missed the opportunity to compare such development with the late 
enfranchisement of French Indian women in 1946. Catherine Candy, ‘Competing transnational representations of the 
1930s Indian franchise question’, and Mrinalini Sinha, ‘Suffrage and Internationalism: The enfranchisement of British 
and Indian women under an imperial state’, in Ian Christopher, Laura E. Nym Mayhall, and Philippa Levine (eds.), 
Women’s suffrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, nation, and race (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 191-207 and 
pp. 224-241 respectively. 
10 Xavier Yacono, Histoire de la colonisation française (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973),  a short 
volume that manages to briefly mention French India, p. 115; Jean-Claude Guillebaud, Confettis de l’empire (Paris: 
Seuil, 1976); Charles-Robert Ageron (ed.), Les chemins de la décolonisation de l’empire colonial français 1936-1956 
(Paris: Editions du Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986); Alain Ruscio, La décolonisation tragique: 
une histoire de la décolonisation française, 1945-1962 (Paris: Messidor, 1987); Charles-Robert Ageron,  La 
décolonisation française (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991) dedicates less than two pages on French India; Raymond 
Betts, France and Decolonisation: 1900-1960 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Yves Benot, Massacres coloniaux  
1944-1950: la IVe république et la mise au pas des colonies françaises (Paris: La Découverte, 1994); Bouta Etemad, 
Possessing the World: Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Berghahn, 2007, [first published in French in 2000]), misses the opportunity to mention that French Indian 
troops participated in the conquest of Indochina in the nineteenth and that French sepoys were recruited in North 
India until the end of the nineteenth century, pp. 40-2 , in addition it does not catalogue the French Indian loges; 
Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery (with Eric Jennings, Nora Taylor, and Noémi Tousignant), Indochina: An 
Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Martin Shipway, The Road to 
War: France and Vietnam 1944-1947 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
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Indochina.11 In sum, except for passing references in book chapters and articles, French India 
has remained noticeably absent from larger thematic and chronological studies on Anglo-French 
relations and French colonial policy, as well as developments under the Popular Front, and the 
Vichy regime. This absence is an important omission because the inter-war era was marked by 
the rapid rise of Indian nationalism, which, as it will be shown in this thesis, did not confine itself 
to the imaginary borders established as a result of Franco-British conflicts.12  
The rallying of French India to de Gaulle’s Free France Forces in June 1940 has 
nevertheless generated generous references. But the lack of in-depth analyses of the local 
conditions and particular characteristics of Anglo-French relations in India during the Second 
World War indicates that the end of French India has not been deemed worthy of inclusion in the 
post-war colonial narrative of Indian history. Indeed, French India has been relegated to the 
status of a ‘forgotten territory’, a symptom of the general amnesia that has affected French 
colonial memory.13 It is equally worth pointing out that while many biographies have been written 
of South Asian anti-colonial leaders such as Aurobindo Ghose, Mahatma Gandhi, Vallabhbhai 
Patel, Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinah, and significant French and British politicians 
and leaders such as Pierre Mendès France, de Gaulle, Marius Moutet and Winston Churchill, no 
                                                          
11 Nayan Chanda, ‘Indians in Indochina’ in K.S. Sandhu. and A. Mani (eds.), Indian Communities in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 31-45.  
12 Philip Michael Hett Bell does not list French India as one of the colonies that rallied to de Gaulle, France and 
Britain, 1940-1994: The Long Separation (London: Longman, 1997); Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (eds.), French 
Colonial Empire and the Popular Front (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Brocheux and Hémery briefly mention 
French Indians, op.cit.; Jean-Marc Regnault and Ismet Kurtovitch, ‘Les ralliements du Pacifique en 1940. Entre 
légende gaulliste, enjeux stratégiques mondiaux et rivalités Londres/Vichy’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et 
Contemporaine, Vol. 4, No. 49-4 (Octobre-décembre 2002), pp. 71-90; Catherine Servan-Schreiber aggregates 
South-Asia into her discussion, ‘L’Inde et Ceylan dans les expositions coloniales et universelles (1851-1931)’, in 
Pascal Blanchard et al., Zoos humains et exhibitions coloniales: 150 ans d’inventions de l’Autre (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2002), pp. 274-284; Jacques Cantier, ‘Les Horizons de l’après-Vichy: de la  « libération »  de l’empire 
aux enjeux de mémoire’, in Jacques Cantier and Eric Jennings (eds), L'empire colonial sous Vichy (Paris: Odile 
Jacob, 2004), pp. 335-63. 
13 Françoise Vergès, ‘Malaise dans la République: mémoires troublées, territoires oubliés’, in Pascal Blanchard et al. 
(eds), Culture post-coloniale 1961-2006, Traces et mémoires coloniales en France (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2006), 
pp. 72-3; Robert Aldrich, ‘The Colonial Past and the Postcolonial Present’, in Martin Thomas (ed.), The French 
Colonial Mind : Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialsim, Vol. 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 
pp. 334-56. 
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leading French Indian freedom fighter or other active participant in the Franco-Indian dispute has 
been the subject of a similar project. Numerous autobiographies of French Indian ‘nationalists’ 
have been written, but historians have been reluctant to offer a detailed assessment of the role 
that self-declared French Indian freedom fighters played during the period.14  
 When the history of ‘Greater France’ is considered, French India is discussed along with 
the French West Indies, Guyane, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Senegal, and Ile Bourbon (Reunion 
Island), all ‘vieilles colonies’ (old colonies) acquired during the first French colonial empire in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.15 The history of early French India, of the Compagnie des 
Indes, and of the great colonial figures who attempted to establish French influence in India from 
the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries has been explored at length, primarily by French 
historians and to a lesser extent by Indian historians.16 A selective bibliography on the relations 
between France and India compiled by the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (French National 
Library), its contribution to the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the de facto transfer of 
the French Indian territories in 2004, lists an impressive number of manuscripts and references 
on French India and its ‘bâtisseurs d’empire’, including Joseph-François Dupleix, the Comte de 
Lally, and François Martin. 17  This wealth of interest in the great period of French territorial 
expansion in India in the early modern period stands in stark contrast to historians’ general lack of 
                                                          
14 S. Geetha provides a list of freedom fighters’ unpublished autobiographies, Society and Politics in French India: 
Merger and Anti-Merger Alignments in the Mid-Twentieth century (Pondicherry University: Department of History, 
2008, unpublished PhD thesis), pp. 354-5. 
15 Maurice Besson, Histoire des colonies françaises, (Paris: Boivin, 1931); Jean Meyer et al., Histoire de la France 
coloniale: des origines à 1914 (Paris, Armand Colin, 1991); Jacques Binoche-Guedra, La France d’outre-mer: 1815-
1962 (Paris: Masson, 1992); Robert Aldrich and John Connell, France’s Overseas Frontier: Départements et 
territoires d’Outre-mer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of 
French Overseas Expansion (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1996). 
16 V. G. Hatalkar, Relations between the French and the Marathas: 1668-1815 (Bombay: University Press, 1958); 
Siba Pada Sen, The French in India: First Establishment and Struggle (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1947); Siba 
Pada Sen, The French in India: 1763-1816 (Calcutta: Mulkhopadhyay, 1958); Sudipta Das, Myths and Realities of 
French Imperialism in India: 1763-1783 (New York: Peter Lang, 1992); Philippe Le Tréguilly and Monique Morazé 
(eds) L’Inde et la France: deux siècles d’histoire commune, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles: Histoires, sources, bibliographie 
(Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995); Kuzhippalli Skaria Mathew (ed.), French in India and Indian Nationalism (1700-1963) 
(New Delhi: BR Publishing Corporation, 1999). 
17 Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Des relations entre la France et l’Inde: (XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles), Bibliographie 
sélective < http://www.bnf.fr/documents/biblio_France-Inde.rtf>, viewed 12 April 2012. 
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interest in the post-1947 era.18 The writing of French Indian history has indeed favoured the 
promotion of narrative associated with the former ephemeral French Indian empire over that of 
France’s demise in the face of determined Indian nationalist leaders. 
Journalists, public officials, politicians, civil servants, and those who lived during the 
negotiations leading up to the de facto transfer were the first to produce memoirs and first-hand 
accounts of their experiences, keen to leave their legacy in a post-colonial world unwilling to pay 
great attention to the last days of French India. Most of these voices were critical of the French 
authorities for holding onto their foothold in India, and for their mishandling of what seemed an 
inevitable outcome. Their accounts focused primarily on the Franco-Indian diplomatic 
negotiations, evoking with great nostalgia the abandonment of French India, and expressing 
anxiety over the disappearance of French culture in the former Indian territories.19  But both 
French Indian and Indian nationalist accounts have made certain their struggle was incorporated 
into the Indian nationalist narrative.20 In 1955, Alain Coret produced the first French academic 
article on post-1954 French India, in which he discussed the constitutionality of the cession of 
French India and condemned India for seeking sovereignty over the French territories. A contrary 
view was expressed by Balveer Arora, an Indian student undertaking doctoral research in political 
science at the Université de Paris-Sorbonne in the 1960s. Arora’s study emphasised the 
anachronism of France’s colonial presence in India and pointed out that Nehru, as head of the 
                                                          
18 Frederick Quinn, The French Overseas Empire, (Westport : Praeger, 2000); Guy Pervillé, De l’empire français à la 
décolonisation (Paris: Hachette, 1991); Denise Bouche, Histoire de la colonisation française: flux et reflux (1815-
1962), Vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1991).  
19 Georges Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1965); Arthur Annasse, Les 
Comptoirs français de l’Inde: 1664-1954, trois siècles de présence française (Paris: La Pensée Universelle, 1975); 
Georges Tailleur, Le premier maillon de la chaîne: Chandernagore ou le lit de Dupleix (Frontignan: Africa Nostra, 
1979). 
20 Rajkumar, op.cit.; Praja Socialist Party, Practical Politics: A Documentary Study of the French Indian Socialist 
Party (New Delhi: Praja Socialist Party, 1954); Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: September 1954 – 
April 1963, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1964); Varadarajulu 
Subbiah, Saga of Freedom of French India: testament of my life (Madras: New Century Book House, 1990); Ajit 
Neogy, French Decolonisation: Liberation movement and Indo-French relations 1947-1954 (Pondicherry: Institut 
Français de Pondichéry, 1997). 
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Indian government, muted the local French Indian voices in favour of the national cause.21 
Access to French archives in the 1980s, after the statutory thirty-year ban had expired, 
produced a number of specialised studies on French India. The major academic contribution 
came from Jacques Weber, whose five-volume doctoral thesis focusing on the nineteenth century 
filled a gap in scholarship on the period between the Old Regime and the First World War. Weber 
argued that the introduction of republican ideals contributed to the formation of the first anti-
French movement. Following Arora, Patrick Pitoëff re-opened the debate concerning events 
leading up to the cession of French India, while Hughes Jean de Dianoux, Jean-Charles Jauffret, 
Georgette David, and Michel Pousse concentrated their efforts on issues of territorial sovereignty, 
Anglo-French and Indo-French relations, economic development, population and citizenship.22 
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Marie-France Latronche meanwhile focused on the interest 
that Gandhi and the Indian nationalist movement generated in France between 1920 and 1960.23 
Considering the period after the de jure transfer, the American scholar William Miles has written a 
stimulating analysis on the social conditions of the small population of French nationals of ethnic 
Tamil origin (Franco-Tamils) in post-French India, while the Indian historians K.J.S. Chatrath and 
                                                          
21 Alain Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, Revue juridique et politique de l’Union française, Nos. 3-4 (juillet-
décembre 1955), pp. 577-742 ; R.H. Parker, ‘The French and the Portuguese settlements in India’ in The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1955), pp. 389-98; Alain Coret, ‘Le statut juridique actuel des établissements 
français de l’Inde’, Extrait de la revue juridique et politique de l’Union française, No. 3 (juillet-septembre 1957), pp. 
588-611; Arora, op.cit. 
22 Jacques Weber, Les établissements français en Inde au 19e siècle: 1816-1914 (Paris: Librairie de l'inde, 1988), 5 
vols; Hughes Jean de Dianoux, ‘Les Loges françaises dans l’Inde et au Bangladesh et les îles Spratly’, Mondes et 
cultures (Paris: Académie des sciences d’Outre-mer), Vol. 44, No. 3 (1984), pp. 537-622; Patrick Pitoëff, ‘L’Inde 
Française en sursis, 1947-1954’, Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-mer, Vol. 78, No. 290, (1991), pp.105-131; 
Georgette David, ‘Chandernagor et le Swadeshisme au début du XXe siècle: l’affaire Charu Chandra Roy’ in Revue 
française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Vol. 78, No. 290 (1991), pp. 89-103; Michel Pousse (ed), L’Inde, études, et images 
(Saint-Denis, La Réunion: L’Harmattan, 1993); Association: Les Comptoirs de l’Inde, Cinquantenaire du transfert des 
comptoirs à l'Inde, 1954-2004 (Coulommiers: Dualpha, 2005).  
23 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘L’inde et la France: connaissance scientifique et intérêt colonial’ in Association 
historique internationale de l’océan indien, actes de la conférence internationale - France-Inde 21-18 juillet 1986, Les 
relations historiques et culturelles entre la France et l’Inde XVIIe-XXe siècles  (La Réunion: Sainte-Clotilde, 1987). 
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Ajit Neogy explored Franco-Indian relations, and the Indian National Trust published a manuscript 
on the legacy of the French in India.24  
Other Indian scholars have also made important contributions. In the early 1980s, a new 
historical approach that came to be known as the School of Subaltern Studies was initiated by a 
group of Indian historians who set out to challenge existing scholarship on the grand narratives of 
decolonisation and promote a perspective of the bottom layers of society. Under their influence, 
numerous Indian scholars have helped to integrate the participation of non-elites in the fight 
against colonialism into the history. 25  Their use of local primary sources and interviews, 
unavailable to most European historians who are not familiar with the Indian languages (including 
Hindi, Bengali, Telugu, Tamil, and Malayalam in the case of the French Indian territories), has 
allowed for a fuller picture of the last days of French India to emerge. In addition, this 
methodology has challenged the centrality of the colonial repositories where ‘indigenes figured 
chiefly as the anonymous object of colonial administration’.26 While some historians of French 
India have focused on Pondichéry, J.B.P More has ventured further out to the periphery of French 
India to investigate Mahe (Mahé) and Yanam (Yanaon). More demonstrated that measures put 
into effect by the colonial administration, especially the introduction of land ownership for tax 
                                                          
24 K.J.S. Chatrath, India in the Debates of French Parliament: 1945-1988 (New Delhi : Indian Publishers Distributors, 
1994); William F. S. Miles, Imperial Burdens: Countercolonialism in former French India (Boulder: L. Rienner Pub, 
1995); The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, Reminiscences: The French in India (New Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1997); Ajit Neogy, ‘Chandernagore: Profile of a Subordinate Rebel 
French Settlement’, in K. S. Mathew (ed.), French in India and Indian Nationalism: 1700-1963 (New Delhi: BR 
Publishing Corporation, 1999); Marie-France Latronche, L’influence de Gandhi en France: De 1919 à nos jours 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999). 
25 K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.), Mapping Subaltern Studies and the 
Postcolonial (London: Verso, 2000); David Ludden (ed.), Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested 
Meaning and the Globalization of South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2002). 
26 Vincent Confer, ‘The Depot in Aix and Archival Sources for France Outre-Mer’, French Historical Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p.120; Tony Ballantyne, ‘Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation-State: Colonial 
Knowledge in South Asia (and Beyond)’, in Antoinette Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the 
Nation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 113-4. 
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purposes, had adverse effects on traditional social organisation.27 Also worth mentioning is the 
recent work of the British academic Jane Chapman, whose research on printed communication 
has uncovered the voice of French Indian textile workers and, more importantly, of women, who 
had until then been ignored. Chapman’s research, although not conducted under the aegis of the 
Subaltern Studies group, has certainly added weight to that investigative work.28  
The fiftieth anniversary of the end of French India prompted a new surge of French and 
Indian authors writing the history of French India. These scholars moved away from the world of 
national politics and the commonly accepted binary of coloniser/colonised, and pursued new 
areas of enquiry on France’s legacy in India. Their work has focused on topics such as the 
commonality of the French language, education, the urban landscape of French India, the 
administrative and judiciary systems, and colonial administrators.29 From this work emerged a 
                                                          
27 J.B.P. More, Political Evolution of Muslims of Tamil Nadu and Madras 1930-1947 (Madras: Orient Blackswan, 
1997); Kuzhippalli Skaria  Mathew (ed.), French in India and Indian Nationalism: 1700-1963 (New Delhi: BR 
Publishing Corporation, 1999); K.S Mathew and S.J. Stephen S.J (eds), Indo-French Relations (New Delhi: ICHR, 
1999); J.B.P. More, Freedom Movement in French India: The Mahe Revolt of 1948 (Tellicherry: IRISH, 2001); J.B.P. 
More, The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam: from French rule to integration with India (Puducherry: Madimchetty 
Satianarayanamurthy, 2007); for a criticism on the inconsistencies in depth and quality of the Subaltern School, see 
Ballantyne, op.cit., pp. 103-21; A. Suresh, Politics and Social Conflicts in French India: 1870-1939 (Pondicherry 
University: Department of History, 2010, unpublished PhD thesis); Geetha, op.cit. 
28 Jane Chapman,  ‘The Origins of a Public Voice for Marginalised Workers in French India, 1935-37’, Web Journal of 
French Media Studies, Vol. 8, (2010), http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/enframes.htm, pp 1-12; Jane Chapman, ‘Counter 
hegemony, newspapers and the origins of anti-colonialism in French India’, International Journal of Social Economics, 
Vol. 38, No. 2 (2011), pp. 128-139; Jane Chapman and Kate Allison, ‘Women and the Press in British India, 1928-
1934: a Window for Protest?’, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 38, No. 8 (2011), pp. 676-691; Jane L. 
Chapman, Gender, Citizenship and Newspapers: Historical and Transnational Perspectives (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2013). 
29 M. Chanmougassoudiram, ‘L’usage et pratique du français dans l’administration et l’enseignement à Pondichéry 
après le transfert’ in Association des Comptoirs de l’Inde, Cinquantenaire du transfert des comptoirs à l’Inde, 1954-
2004 (Coulommiers: Dualpha, 2005); David Annoussamy,  L'intermède français en Inde: secousses politiques et 
mutations juridiques (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005);  Sophie Lakshmi Dassaradanayadou, ‘Tamouls indiens: de 
Pondichéry à la France’, in Hommes et migrations: diasporas indiennes dans la ville, No. 1268-1269 (juillet-octobre 
2006), pp. 68-81;  Jean Deloche,  Pondicherry, past and present  (Pondicherry: Institut français de Pondichéry, 2007) 
CD, also available online <http://www.ifpindia.org/ecrire/upload/digital_database/Site/Pondi/data/fr_part1.html>, 
viewed 4 February 2014; Jacques Weber, ‘Gouverneur et historien de l’Inde française: Alfred Martineau (1859-
1945)’, in Patrice Morlat (ed.), Les Grands Commis de l’Empire colonial français (Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2010); 
see Mohamed Benrabah’s on the politics of language and francophonie, ‘’Open’ and ‘closed’ languages in the 
postcolonial era’, International Journal of Francophone Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 & 3, (2009), pp. 253-69; Anne Raffin, 
‘Imperial Nationhood and Its Impact on Colonial Cities: Issues of Inter-group Peace and Conflict in Pondicherry and 
Vietnam’, in Diane E. David and Nora Libertun de Duren (eds.), Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban 
Spaces (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011),  pp. 28-58. 
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focus on inter-colonial links, with studies on French Indians in Indochina, French Indian migration 
after the fall of Saigon (1975), South Indian communities in other parts of the former French 
empire, and créole food. These analyses emphasise the interconnectedness of the colonial 
enterprise and the varying impacts of the decolonisation processes on non-indigenous 
populations.30  
It is the work of a group of British academics in culture, language, and media studies, 
however, that has provided the most exciting new framework for understanding French India. 
These scholars have engaged with Edward Said’s seminal work on Orientalism (1978), which 
demonstrated that the West’s depictions of the Orient are wholly inadequate; rather than an 
accurate account of the Orient, these depictions for Said were the means by which the West 
imposed its power on the people it colonised. Kate Marsh and Ian Magedra, for example, have 
demonstrated that representations of the Orient are also defined in relation to ‘other’ Western 
powers. Their analysis of French-language representations of India has highlighted that 
Francophone Indian narratives developed in the context of opposition to Britain. They offer a 
triangular model that consists of the colonised (India), the subordinate coloniser (France), and the 
dominant coloniser (Britain), a model that goes beyond the theoretical framework of coloniser and 
colonised that has inspired early post-colonial discussion.31 Examining French India through this 
                                                          
30 G. Vidy, ‘La communauté indienne en Indochine’ in Sud-Est, (Novembre 1949), No. 6, pp. 1-16; Pierre-Jean 
Simon, Rapatriés d'Indochine: Un Village franco-indochinois en Bourbonnais (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1981); 
Singaravelou, Les Indiens de la Caraïbe: Croissance démographique et intégration économique des Indiens depuis 
1945 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987); Chanda, op.cit.; Sophie Blanchy, Karana et Banians: Les communautés 
commerçantes d'origine indienne à Madagascar (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995); Dassaradanayadou , op.cit.; Natasha 
Pairaudeau, 'Via l'Indochine: trajectoires coloniales de l'immigration sud-indienne', Hommes et migrations: diasporas 
indiennes dans la ville, No. 1268-1269 (juillet-octobre 2006), pp. 24-33; Natasha Pairaudeau, ‘Vietnamese 
Engagement with Tamil Migrants in Colonial Cochichina’ Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2010), pp. 1-
71; Lourdes Tirouvanziam–Louis, The Pondicherry Kitchen (New Delhi: Westlands Ltd., 2012); Ballantyne, op.cit., 
pp. 112-3. 
31 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994 [1978]); Ian H. Magedera, ‘France-India-Britain, 
(post)colonial triangles: Mauritius/India and Canada/India, (post)colonial tangents’, International Journal of 
Francophone Studies, Vol. 5, No.  2, (July 2002),  pp. 64-73; Ian H. Magedera and Kate Marsh, ‘Les cinq noms 
sonores: the French voice in the story of British India 1763-1954’, Journal of Romance Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), 
pp. 65-77; Kate Marsh, ‘Representing Indian colonization in the Parisian Press: 1923-54’, International Journal of 
Francophone Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (July 2002), pp. 74-84; Kate Marsh, ‘Gandhi and le gandhisme: Writing Indian 
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triangular model illuminates the historical dimensions of Franco-British relations in India, and 
especially the fact that France’s colonial discourse was partly defined by its own colonial failures. 
These failures triggered the creation of a colonial nostalgia that can be found throughout French 
colonial literature, exhibitions, and the narratives of French Indian history.32 Representations of 
India and French India in French colonial discussions portrayed the French Indian colonial empire 
as far more important than it really was. As will be shown in the present thesis, France stubbornly 
held onto this glorified view, thereby undermining any possibility of a swift and graceful resolution 
to the question of her presence in India after the British departure. 
Such a triangular configuration also challenges the tendency in Said’s work, as well as in 
the scholarship it inspired, to see the West as an ‘undifferentiated, omnipotent entity, imposing its 
totalising designs on the rest of the world without check or interruption’.33 In the case of French 
India, the presence of two rival colonial powers ensured a constant stream of opposition from the 
colonial rival as much as from the local population, which in turn used the particularities of the two 
adjacent colonial powers to evade reprisal from the other. Tools of power and knowledge such as 
political institutions, administrative systems, maps, censuses, and research institutes facilitated 
the control and acquisition of the colonial space, but within this space, as will be demonstrated, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Decolonisation and the Appropriation of Gandhi 1919 – 48’, Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 14, No. 1 
(February 2006), pp. 33-47; Kate Marsh, Fictions of 1947: Representations of Indian decolonisation 1919-1962 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2007); Kate Marsh,  India in the French Imagination: Peripheral Voices, 1754-1815 (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2009);  Kate Marsh and Nicola Frith (eds), France’s Lost Empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia, and 
la fracture coloniale (Plymouth: Lexington, 2011). 
32 Catherine Champion, ‘L'Imaginaire tropical. Le paysage indien dans les romans populaires français, 1860-1920’, in 
C. Weinberger-Thomas (ed.), L'Inde et l'imaginaire (Paris, Édition de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences 
Sociales, coll. « Purusârtha », 11, 1988), pp. 91-123; Patricia A. Morton, Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and 
Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris (Cambridge: MIT, 2000); R. Kichenamourty, ‘Pondichéry dans 
le roman français du XXe siècle’, in Jacques Wéber (ed.), Les relations entre la France et l'Inde de 1673 à nos jours 
(Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2002), pp. 249-59; Servan-Schreiber, op.cit., pp. 274-284; Kathryn Dale,  ‘A Celebration 
of Empire: Nostalgic Representations of l’Inde française in Chocolat Suchard’s Colonial Collecting cards of the 
1930s’, in Kate Marsh and Nicola Firth (eds), France’s lost empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia and la Fracture 
Coloniale (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 31-42. 
33 Dane Kennedy, ‘Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory’, in James D. Le Sueur, (ed.), The Decolonization 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 16. 
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claims and counterclaims were negotiated. 34  However, this triangular model and its use of 
representations nevertheless has its limitations, which the authors themselves acknowledge. It is 
Eurocentric, and it is also unable to accommodate an analysis of Indo-Franco-Indian relations 
after India’s independence. But from this triangular model, I suggest in this thesis, a new 
conceptual framework emerges that retains that model’s main features but also allows for the 
examination of national and anti-colonial tensions specific to French India.  
The new analytical framework triangulates India (the dominant national entity that by 
means of its anti-colonial struggle rose to become the successor to the former ‘dominant’ colonial 
authority, Britain), France (the ‘subordinate’ coloniser), and French India (the ‘subordinate’ entity 
that tackled both the coloniser and the Indian nationalists). This new triangular model 
accommodates the anti-colonial campaign against France as well as competing claims for 
territorial sovereignty by both France and India. It also takes into consideration an established 
methodology that distinguishes between ‘region’ and ‘nation’, two distinct realities of the 
subcontinent. 35  Indeed, this model is able to clarify the variance between Chandernagor, a 
French-Indian Bengali territory whose residents in 1949 voted almost unanimously in favour of 
merging with India, and the southern French Indian territories, where greater tensions emerged 
and demands for alternative solutions to merging with either France or India were canvassed. I 
posit that the new model encompasses competing forms of nationalism based on historical, 
institutional, geographical, cultural, social, and political factors, all of which ultimately impacted on 
                                                          
34 Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Pierre 
Singaravélou, L’École française d’Extrême-Orient ou l’institution des marges (1898-1956): essai d’histoire sociale et 
politique de la science coloniale (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999); Pierre Singaravélou, ‘Les Indianistes français et le 
« Greater India »’ in Jacques Weber (ed.), Les relations entre la France et l'Inde de 1673 à nos jours (Paris: Les 
Indes Savantes, 2002); Pierre Singaravélou, Professer l’Empire: Les “sciences coloniales” en France sous la IIIe 
République (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011).   
35  Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., The Dravidian Movement (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965); Sumit Sarkar, The 
Swadeshi Movement in Bengal: 1903-1908, (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973); P. Ramamurti, The 
Freedom Struggle and the Dravidian Movement (Madras: Orient Longman, 1987); G. Chandhrika, ‘Intellectual origins 
of Nationalism in South India’ in K.S. Matthew (ed.), French In India and Indian Nationalism: 1700-1963 (Delhi: BR 
Publishing Corporation, 1999). 
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the new state or ‘Union Territory of Pondicherry’ as it was later officially known. Even after French 
India become a new ‘Indian’ territory, peculiar colonial characteristics remained, and counter-
nationalist forces continued to challenge New Delhi’s nationalist grip on power well after the 
Franco-Indian de jure transfer of sovereignty in 1962. Hence the conditions of the transfer of rule 
in French India and the subsequent creation of the Union Territory of Pondicherry are the 
outcomes of specific regional, nationalist, and colonial tensions that were played out during the 
formation of the Indian nation-state. These, I will argue, emanated from porous colonial borders, 
conflicting territorial claims over French India, and the use of contradictory representations of 
what was French India designed to meet particular local and national agendas.36  
This thesis also contributes to the study of other anomalous annexations, former colonial 
territories such as West Timor (1949), Irian Jaya (1961), Goa (1961), Zanzibar (1964), Hong 
Kong (1997), and Macau (1999) which were merged into neighbouring independent states either 
forcefully or after a course of diplomatic negotiations.37 Here we need to differentiate between 
                                                          
36 Eugene F. Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India; the non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, 
1916-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press,  1969); Eugene F. Irschick, Tamil Revivalism in the 1930s 
(Madras: Cre-A, 1986);  David Strang, ‘The Inner Incompatibility of Empire and Nation: Popular Sovereignty and 
Decolonization’, Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1992), pp. 367-384; David Lowenthal, ‘Identity, Heritage, 
and History’, in John R. Gillis, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 41-60; Peter Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism: Essays in Modern Indian History (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998); Oliver Zimmer, ‘Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: 
Towards a Process-oriented Approach to National Identity’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 173-
93; Rajat Kanta Ray, The Felt Community: Commonalty and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Eric Kaufmann, ‘The lenses of nationhood: an optical model of identity’, 
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 14, no. 3, (2008), pp. 449-477; John Breuilly, ‘Nationalism and the Making of National 
Pasts’, in Susana Carvalho and François Gemenne (eds), Nations and their Histories: Constructions and 
Representations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 7-28; Robert Gildea, ‘Eternal France: Crisis and 
National Self-Perception in France, 1870-2005’, in Susana Carvalho and François Gemenne (eds), Nations and their 
Histories: Constructions and Representations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 139-156; Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay (ed.), Nationalism Movement in India: a Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bidyut 
Chakrabarty and Rajendra Kumar Pandey, Modern Indian Political Thought: Text and Context (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2009); Alice L. Conklin, ‘The Civilizing Mission’, in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert, and 
Christophe Prochasson (eds.), The French Republic: History, Values, Debates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2011), pp. 173-81; Steven J. Mock, Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri, Leftism in India, 1917-1947 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
37 West Timor was formerly known as Dutch Timor, Irian Jaya as Dutch New Guinea, Goa was Portuguese India, 
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former colonised countries such as Indonesia (West Timor and Irian Jaya), India (Goa), and 
Tanzania (Zanzibar), which claimed territorial sovereignty, and the territories of Hong Kong and 
Macau which were retroceded to a long-existing political entity, China, but whose transfer 
required intense negotiations.38  An analysis of the merger of French India also contrasts with the 
case of France’s other ‘vieilles colonies’ of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and La Réunion 
whose status were changed from colony to département in 1946, administratively incorporating 
these former colonial territories fully into France though local independent movements are still 
contesting France’s historical claims in those outposts.  
This thesis is organised into three sections. Part One, ‘Defining French India’, consists of 
two chapters that offer an account of early French India. Chapter 1 provides general historical 
background material, while Chapter 2 examines a number of geographical and territorial 
particularities of French India and through the analysis of culturally focused material that include  
maps, official reports, travelogues, and the Exposition coloniale internationale de Paris (1931), it 
argues that these various modes of representation were used to emphasise French colonial 
grandeur and heighten France’s colonising mission. I will demonstrate how this mythical depiction 
of French India was designed to construe French colonialism as preferable to that of its nemesis, 
Britain, and argue that this notion hindered any potential French withdrawal from India. Part Two, 
‘Competing Claims of Sovereignty’, which includes Chapters 3, 4, and 5, considers in turn how 
France, India, and French Indian residents contested territorial legitimacy for nationalist purposes. 
Post-war French colonial policy, which seemed to make any cession of territory inconceivable, 
faced harsh opposition from Indian nationalists, who had just won independence from Britain and 
                                                          
38 June Raye Verrier, Is West Papua another Timor? (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2000); 
Keith Suter, East Timor, West Papua/Irian and Indonesia (London: Minority Rights Groups, 1997); Akbar Keshodkar, 
Tourism and Social Change in Post-Socialist Zanzibar: Struggles for Identity, Movement, and Civilization (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2013); Robert Ash et al (eds), Hong Kong in Transition: The Handover Years (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 2000); Carmen Amado Mendes, Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations: 1986-1999 (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University, 2013); Bill K.P. Chou, ‘Local Autonomy Matters: One-Country Two-System Policy in 
Macao and its Implications for China’s Policies on Its Borderlands’, in Yufan Hao and Bill K.P. Chou (eds), China’s 
Policies on Its Borderlands and the International Implications (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), pp. 225-52. 
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then successfully merged former British India with the princely states to form a new nation-state. 
Meanwhile, local anti-colonial and anti-national movements in French India rejected the idea of 
merger with either India or France. Finally Part Three, ‘Towards the Union Territory of 
Pondicherry’, focuses on dual sovereignty, citizenship, and French cultural legacy, all of which 
were issues embodied in the Treaty of Cession. Chapters 6 and 7 assess the extent of French 
cultural influence in the territories and  explore how the various pre-transfer tensions crystallised 
the structures of post-French India into a new territory of the Republic of India, in which French 
cultural legacy had difficulty sustaining itself in the context of the changes generated by the 
withdrawal. 
 
A note on nomenclature 
When referring to French India until 1954, the French spelling of Pondichéry, Yanaon, 
Mahé, Karikal, and Chandernagor is used. When writing from an Indian context the following 
English spelling is adopted: Pondicherry, Yanam, Mahe, Karaikal, and Chandernagar, except in 
quotations. 
 
 
 
PART ONE 
 
 
DEFINING FRENCH INDIA 
 
 
 
19 
 
Chapter 1 
 
French India: a ‘vieille colonie’ 
 
As Frenchmen, our rights have been more than once written with the 
blood that has been shed on the plains of the Carnatic, and it is on the 
remains of our fathers and brothers, who fell while defending the glory 
and honour of France, that the fortifications of Pondichéry have been 
erected. (Cahiers des doléances des Citoyens de Pondichéry à 
l’Assemblée nationale, March 1790)1 
 
Most references to colonial India invoke British India, but other European powers – 
Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands – had also acquired footholds. Only Portugal 
and France that had set up their territories in 1498 and 1674 respectively managed to retain their 
small Indian possessions after India had gained independence from Britain in August 1947. The 
French Indian territories were scattered along the coast line of India with Chandernagor located 
in West Bengal, Pondichéry and Karikal on the Coromandel coast (Tamil Nadu), Yanaon in 
Telegu-speaking country (Andhra Pradesh), and Mahé on the Malabar or western Coast 
(Kerala).  They were five exotic names learnt by generations of French schoolchildren educated 
before and in the decade following the Second World War.2 The diplomatic negotiations between 
Paris and New Delhi over the future of French India dragged out until the changeover took place 
at the customs office in Pondichéry, the chef-lieu (administrative centre) of the French enclaves, 
on 1 November 1954. The event was attended by the Indian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, R.K. 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire de l’Inde Française à l’Exposition 
Coloniale et Internationale de Paris 1931, Quand l’Inde Française était à Paris (Paris: 1931) unpaginated.  
2 Raymond Dronne, Senator and later deputy, mentioned during parliamentary discussions that ‘tous les Francais ont 
appris sur les bancs d’école primaire les noms sonores des cinq comptoirs qui nous restaient en souvenir de 
l’immense empire de Dupleix,’ quoted in Marsh, Fictions of 1947, op.cit., p. 33. 
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Nehru, and a crowd of 30,000 people.3 On that day, the Indian Union flag was raised in 
Pondichéry to mark the de facto transfer of the French territories to the Union of India, an event 
which announced the end of three hundred years of French colonial presence in India and the 
success of India in gaining sovereignty over these tiny French enclaves.4 However, it would 
actually take until July 1962 for the de jure transfer to occur, and until August 1962 for the last 
legal instruments to be exchanged, thus legally marking the end of French colonial presence in 
India.  
However, the question of how France managed to remain on the subcontinent alongside 
the more imposing British presence requires analysis and explanation. This chapter provides an 
historical background to France’s presence in India, which evolved from a series of trading posts, 
first established by a commercial company, to becoming an old regime colony, and shows later 
how the  introduction of French republican institutions, embodied in the policy of assimilation, 
clashed with a highly traditional French Indian society. The chapter also explores the conditions 
imposed on France by the British so as to reduce it to a subordinate colonial presence in India, 
and how Franco-British rivalries impacted on the development of French India, reducing French 
territories to negligible strips of land. 
Origins of French India  
The Portuguese inaugurated the European-Asian maritime route to India, via the Cape of 
Good Hope, in 1498. Their initial mission was to defeat the Muslims who controlled the 
Mediterranean by creating alliances with Christians from the East, and to attack the Muslim world 
from the rear by naval operations in the newly-accessible Indian Ocean. While their plans to 
reconquer the Holy Land came to no avail, they succeeded in developing a lucrative spice trade 
                                                 
3 AFP spécial Outre-Mer ‘Les cérémonies du transfert’, 1 Novembre 1954, AOM, AGEFOM_896_2627. 
4 Ibid. 
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between the Moluccas (Indonesia), India, and Europe. The establishment of trading outposts 
along the African, Indian, and South-East Asian coastlines facilitated the development of a Euro-
Indian and intra-Asian maritime network.5 The Portuguese dominated the spice trade for nearly a 
century, until religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in Europe, saw the rise of the 
United Provinces or Dutch Republic (1579), and the foundation of Vereenigde Oostindishe 
Compagnie (VOC) or Dutch East India Company in 1602. Two years earlier England set up the 
English East India Company (1600), and both trading companies were motivated by the success 
of the Portuguese and the profits they had accumulated.6 The French were late comers in the 
Euro-Asian trade and their presence in India was the result of traditional commercial ventures 
combined with a policy of national grandeur initiated by the Louis XIV’s Minister of Finance, 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Inspired by the commercial achievements of the Dutch and English 
trading companies, Colbert created the Compagnie des Indes Orientales (the French East India 
Company) in 1664, at a time when Indian textiles and silks were increasingly dominating the 
Euro-Asian trade. The company failed in 1723, and was succeeded by the Compagnie des Indes 
Perpétuelles, which lasted until 1769. Both these companies had been set up under state 
control, but from 1769 on the East Indian trade was open to private individuals.7 Although the 
Danes and Swedes also joined the competition by forming their own trading companies, 
compared to the Dutch, English, and French, they were never important players in India. 
Meanwhile, Portugal had lost its earlier competitive advantages to the Dutch during the 
                                                 
5 Om Prakash, ‘The Portuguese and the Dutch in Asian maritime trade: a comparative analysis’, in Sushil Chaudhury 
and Michel Morineau (eds), Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in Early Modern Era (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.177-181; Claude Markovits, (ed), A History of India 1480-1950 (London: 
Anthem Press, 2002), p. 61. 
6 Markovits, op. cit., pp. 136-9; Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. xvi-xxv. 
7 Das, op.cit., pp. 29-30; Markovits, op.cit., pp. 5-8, 135-40; Philippe Le Tréguilly, ‘La présence française en Inde: 
aléas politiques et militaires’ in Philippe Le Tréguilly and Monique Morazé (eds) L’Inde et la France: deux siècles 
d’histoire commune, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles: Histoires, sources, bibliographie (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1995), pp. 33-48; 
Philippe Haudrère, ‘La Compagnie des Indes’ in Philippe Le Tréguilly and Monique Morazé (eds) L’Inde et la France : 
deux siècles d’histoire commune, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles: Histoires, sources, bibliographie (Paris, CNRS Éditions, 
1995), pp. 11-21; Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise, op.cit., pp. 79-80.  
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seventeenth century.8  
While Europeans had maintained a distinct superiority to Asians in the field of 
technological and navigational knowledge until the Industrial Revolution, this advantage was 
offset by the great variety of Asian – and in particular Indian – manufactured goods produced by 
a cheaper labour force that had developed sophisticated skills in handicraft.  European 
companies were ready to travel great distances to purchase these cheaper Indian goods, and 
since European products had little market demand in India, trading companies required large 
amounts of silver to acquire these goods. The success of this Euro-Asian trade could only occur 
with the concurrent arrival of the Spanish in the Americas (1492) and their exploitation of 
American silver mines. Although it originally arrived in Spain, the silver found its way to 
Amsterdam, which consequently became the European capital of the bullion trade that helped 
finance the Euro-Asian trade.9 
All of the European trading companies established outposts along the coastline of India, 
and these outposts eventually led to more permanent settlements.10 The foundation of 
Pondichéry as a commercial outpost is credited to François Martin, a Compagnie administrator, 
who landed in the port in January 1674 and undertook the transformation of this fishing village 
into a trading entrepôt. Chandernagor, located thirty-five kilometres north of Calcutta, was settled 
after a small tract of land along the Hooghly River was ceded by the emperor Aurangzeb to the 
representatives of the Compagnie in 1688. Mahé was established in 1720 when Captain Mahé 
de la Bourdonnais purchased a tract of land; Karikal was likewise acquired in 1739. Finally, 
although the French had been trading in Yanaon since 1731, their land rights were not 
recognised until 1750 (Map.1).11 
                                                 
8 Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise, p. xvi. 
9 Ibid., pp. 84-5. 
10 Besson, op.cit., pp. 86, 106. 
11 The original dates of settlement vary slightly between authors: Miles, op.cit., p. 2; Jacques Weber, Pondichéry et 
les comptoirs de l’Inde, après Dupleix: la démocratie au pays des castes, (Paris: Denoël, 1996), p. 12; Philippe Le 
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Map 1: The French Indian outposts – Pondichéry, Karikal, Chandernagor, Mahé, and Yanaon – and 
French expansion over the Deccan in the eighteenth century. Portuguese India: Diu, Daman, and 
Goa on the west coast; Danish trading post: Tranquebar. Source: Claude Markovits, A History of Modern 
India, 1480-1950, pp. 211. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Tréguilly, Philippe, ‘La présence française en Inde’,  op.cit.,  p.35; More, The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam, 
op.cit., pp. 9-16; Das, op.cit., p.30; for a historical overview of ancient Pondichéry see C. Premavalli, Education in 
French Pondicherry: 1674-1954 (Pondicherry: Pondicherry University, Department of History, 2001, unpublished Phd 
thesis), pp.101-6; French administration in India - the Conseil Supérieur des Indes - was first administered from the 
loge of Surat established in 1666 but was then moved to Pondichéry in 1701, it took fifty years for Pondichéry to 
acquire its status as an ‘permanent’ territory, Premavalli, op.cit., pp. 106-7, 111; The Indian National Trust for Art and 
Cultural Heritage, op.cit., p. 113. 
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France’s main aspirations in India were limited to a policy of mercantilism that benefited 
the métropole, and the Compagnie’s priority remained to pay dividends to its shareholders. 
Mercantilism was based on the establishment and support of a national industry through the 
promotion of commerce. It most particularly aimed at encouraging the importation of raw 
materials and the exportation of manufactured goods.12  As such, the Compagnie forbad 
territorial expansion, but it turned a blind eye to administrators who did pursue expansion as long 
as territorial gains favoured rather than impaired trade. French products for trade included wine, 
fabrics, flat iron, lead, and tin, while Indian goods carried back to France included cotton fabrics, 
especially muslins and silk clothes, opium, saltpeter (used for manufacturing ammunition), 
pepper, tea, cowry shells (used as money in Western Africa during the slave trade), alum, aloes, 
cardamom, rhubarb, lacquer, and woods used in cotton dyeing.13  
While the seventeenth century had been marked by French and Dutch rivalry over Indian 
trade, the eighteenth century saw increasing tensions between France and Britain for supremacy 
in India and access to her products. Joseph-François Dupleix (1697-1764), the Companie’s 
governor from 1742 to 1754, understood that trade success was closely linked with territorial 
expansion. The existing method of transporting gold and silver to buy Indian goods was risky 
because of pirates, shipwrecks, and the high cost of sea voyages.14 Dupleix therefore suggested 
to the Compagnie’s directors that territorial conquests followed by the setting up of an efficient 
local administration would greatly facilitate the raising of tax, thus enabling easier access to local 
currencies with which to purchase Indian goods. In 1749 he would establish greater French 
influence over the Carnatic and the Deccan through alliances with local rulers, thereby 
                                                 
12 Charles Woolsey Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 
1960), Vol. 1, pp. 19-26. 
13 Philippe Haudrère, ‘Le commerce’ in Philippe Le Tréguilly and Monique Morazé (edited by) L’Inde et la France: 
deux siècles d’histoire commune, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles: Histoires, sources, bibliographie (Paris: CNRS Editions, 
1995), p. 30; A. Ramasamy, History of Pondicherry, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1987), p. 189. 
14 Philippe Haudrère, ‘Le commerce’, op.cit., p. 30. Trade with India required large amounts of capital for the 
construction of large ships. An average return trip took up to two years, so ships were sent yearly to ensure a yearly 
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undermining British expansion. But his many setbacks and constant demands for further troops 
alarmed the Compagnie, which ordered his return in 1754, thus bringing to an end his dream of 
establishing French supremacy in India.15  
In any case, the landscape soon changed significantly, as the Seven Years’ War (1756-
1763) – which continued the earlier War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and set Austria, 
Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia against one another – marked a turning point in Franco-
British relations in India. This particular war can be seen as the first global conflict because it 
extended its arena from Europe to the colonial world, from North America and the West Indies to 
the Indian Ocean. It mobilised a large amount of capital and men for several years, and, more 
importantly, transformed what had been warfare based on dynastic houses or religious conflicts 
into battles between emerging nation-states.16 Britain’s success against the local ruler and his 
French allies at the 1757 battle of Plassey in Bengal signalled the growing political assertion of 
Britain in the region where most of the European trade traditionally took place, and ensured her 
future economic domination over her competitors.17 Moreover, the Treaty of Paris in 1763 (Article 
11) ended France’s first colonial empire, which shrank from a ten-million-square-kilometre 
domain to a number of small islands and outposts: Saint-Pierre et Miquelon off the coast of 
Newfoundland, the West Indian islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, Guyane (French Guiana), 
Saint-Domingue, St Lucia, Tobago, the island of Gorée off the western coast of Africa, Île 
Bourbon (La Réunion), and Île de France (Mauritius). The Treaty also retroceded the French 
Indian territories, which it referred to as comptoirs or établissements (outposts, territories, 
                                                                                                                                               
revival of goods, Philippe Haudrère, ‘La Compagnie des Indes’, op.cit., p. 12; Das, op.cit., p. 30. 
15 Philippe Le Tréguilly, ‘La présence française’ op.cit., pp. 37-44; Marsh, India in the French Imagination, op.cit., 
p.13; Jacques Weber, ‘L’Inde française de Dupleix à Mendès France’, Historiens & Géographes, No. 353 (juin-juillet 
1996), p. 209. 
16 David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), pp. 78-106. 
17 Prakash, European Commercial Entreprise, op.cit., pp. 313-4 ; Jacques Weber, ‘ L’Inde française de Dupleix à 
Mendès France’, op.cit.,  p. 209. 
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enclaves) as they were prior to the conflict.18 The prospect of a return to France’s previous, albeit 
ephemeral, influential position in India faded into the past as France’s military position was 
further weakened by conflicts with Britain in North America, which led to the Independence of 
thirteen British colonies (1776-1783), and in the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in Europe 
(1793-1815).19 
France’s dreams of colonial glory were thus left to fester. The 1763 defeat was felt as a 
loss of prestige and a great humiliation. It triggered a myth of the French Indian empire based on 
Dupleix’s former conquests, and the dream of revenge whereby France would reconquer the 
territories lost to the British and recover her former influence in India. The myth became part of 
the construction of the French national identity formed in opposition to the British, and helped 
shape sentiments and ideas about the colonial past in India that persisted until the twentieth 
century.20 In addition, revenge provided a potent means of uniting a nation.21 As part of this 
myth, Dupleix was given the role of ‘surrogate victim’, a colonial hero with whom the public could 
identify, and who died penniless and dishonoured by the monarchy.22 
Despite the Seven Years’ War, however, French trade in India continued to flourish. The 
volume of sales in the years 1765-6 and 1770-1 (the last year of the Company’s accounts) were 
brought to a level similar to the peak years of 1735-6 and 1744-5, establishing French trade in 
                                                 
18 Université de Perpignan,  Digithèque  des matériaux juridiques et politiques, Traité de paix de Paris (1763), 
<http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1763paris.htm>, viewed 24 March 2011; by the death of Louis XIV in 1715 the colonial 
domain consisted of an approximate area of ten million square kilometres comprising territories in North and South 
America, the West Indies, Africa and India, the overseas territories included in North America: Saint-Laurent basin 
and the region of the Great Lakes; in the West Indies: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Grenade, the Grenadines, Saint-
Barthélemy, La Tortue, Saint-Domingue, Tabago, Sainte-Lucie; in South America: Cayenne island, Guyana; in Africa: 
Saint-Louis, the coastline of Sierra Leone, the outposts of Guinée; in Madagascar: Fort-Dauphin and the island of 
Sainte-Marie. Bourbon Island; in India: Surat, Pondicherry, Mazulipatam; the outpost of Trinquebar in Ceylon, in 
Bengal: Chandernagor and Ougly, Kazumbazar, Cabripatam, Besson, op.cit., p. 123.  
19 Following the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, which concluded the conflict in North America and the independence of 
the thirteen colonies, Louis XVI did not attempt to have the Treaty of Paris (1763) revised; such a revision could have 
improved the condition of the French Indian territories, Le Tréguilly, ‘La présence française ..’, op.cit., p. 48; Das, op. 
cit., p. 12. 
20 Mock, op.cit., pp. 97-9; Marsh, India in the French Imagination, op.cit.; Bell, op.cit., pp. 78-106; Anthony Smith, The 
Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 200-2; Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1992), pp. 177-84. 
21 Gildea, op.cit., p. 140. 
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India in the eighteenth century as the third most important after British and Dutch trade. 
However, because of the high costs of sea voyages, the proceeds of these sales did not 
generate profits.23 Between the setting up of the trading posts and the end of the Napoleonic era 
(the Congress of Vienna of 1815),24 the French Indian outposts were occupied by France’s rivals 
on many occasions: by the Dutch in 1678, and again between 1693 and 1699, and by the British 
in 1763, 1783, 1793, and 1802.25 The fate of France in India was finally sealed with the Treaty of 
Paris (1814), which retroceded the territories to France but forbad the use of military power by 
the French.26 From then on, the remnants of the first French colonial empire – Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Guyana, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Senegal, Île Bourbon, and the French Indian 
territories – were referred as ‘les vieilles colonies’ to distinguish them from the new colonial 
possessions that were acquired from the 1830s onwards.  
The retrocession of the territories demonstrated how generous and conciliatory the 
British were after the end of France’s first Empire (1799-1814) under the leadership of Napoleon 
(1769-1821), and showed their support for the return of the French monarchy.27 Strategically, 
however, the Treaty’s prohibition on building fortifications and keeping a military force put an end 
to any possible French expansion in India and, as such, prevented territorial consolidation and 
compromised any economic prosperity that France might have sought in India. In addition, the 
British viewed the French trading posts as strategically useless and of minor economic 
                                                                                                                                               
22 Mock, op.cit., pp. 162-3. 
23 Prakash, European Commercial Entreprise, op. cit., pp. 307-8; Das, op.cit., p. 41.  
24 The Congress of Vienna (1814 and 1815) which sealed the end of the Napoleonic era (1799-1814) was attended 
by Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Congress aimed at re-establishing the old order. In the case of France, 
the monarchy was restored under Louis XVIII, frontiers on the European continent were redrawn and the fate of 
many colonies was decided, Tim Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, processes and results, (London, 
Routledge, 1998), pp. 1, 33.  
25 These dates indicate Treaties between France and Holland (1678), and France and Britain (1763, 1783, 1802), 
while 1793 marked conflict between Britain and French revolutionary forces in India.  
26 Université de Perpignan,  Digithèque  des matériaux juridiques et politiques, Traité de paix de Paris (1814), 
<http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1814paris.htm>, viewed 24 March 2011. 
27 South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, 4 March 1949, Confidential paper, AN, FO371/76086: relations 
between India and France and India and Portugal. 
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importance. As such, France was set to become a subordinate colonial power on the 
subcontinent. 
While the period until 1815 was fuelled with Anglo-French rivalries extended to the 
colonial arena, and in particular to India, the period between the Revolution of 1789 and the turn 
of the twentieth century saw a series of internal political turmoils and changes in French regime 
which greatly affected French India. The period re-enacted the political tensions of the Revolution 
and the Napoleonic era, and continued to pit monarchists, republicans, and Bonapartists against 
one another, leading to unstable governments and popular uprisings. The struggle for power was 
reflected by the family affiliation of the men who were called to head the new governments. 
However, despite the succession of governments, institutional changes that had been introduced 
by the Revolution, and more importantly by Napoleon, were not eliminated. Institutions that 
remained from this period included the Code Civil and law courts, which provided a new legal 
framework, the metric system, the secondary and higher education, and local government 
administration.  
Napoleon’s demise marked the return of members of the Bourbon royal family, and of 
efforts to introduce a constitutional monarchy that negotiated republican and monarchical ideals. 
The allied forces of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain fully supported the claim of Louis XVIII, 
brother of Louis XVI, to the throne. He reigned from 1814 to 1824 and was succeeded by his 
younger brother, Charles X, whose attempt to reinforce royal power caused an uprising in Paris, 
forcing his abdication in July 1830.28 Louis-Philippe, a descendant of Louis XIV, ruled during the 
period referred as the July Monarchy, until 1848 when, again, attempts at implementing a 
successful parliamentary system failed and another revolution, dominated by the growing 
working-class of Paris, gave way to the Second Republic (1848-1851). The short-lived Second 
                                                 
28 John and Muriel Lough, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century France, (London: Longman, 1978), Introduction, 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.  
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Republic was replaced by the Second Empire in December 1851 when a coup d’état, organised 
by Louis-Napoleon, nephew of Napoleon, led to him becoming Emperor and reigning until the 
French were defeated by Prussian armies in 1871. A Parisian revolution referred as the 
‘Commune’ then gave way to the proclamation of the Third Republic (1871-1940), which 
established a parliamentary regime based on universal male suffrage. The Third Republic 
marked the end of this series of monarchist and imperial regimes, and the end also of earlier 
failed attempts at founding a government that reflected the universal principles introduced by the 
Revolution. All of these political changes in Paris, starting with the Bourbon Restoration, would 
leave their mark on French India where concepts of modernity, and of inclusion and exclusion 
were introduced.29 
 
An Old Regime colony 
After twenty years of conflict, French India lay in ruins in 1815; Britain had asserted her 
influence over India and was determined to eliminate any possibility of France recovering her 
former glory. Britain’s supremacy was confirmed when the Danes, whose trade had been 
reduced by the 1780s, eventually sold their outposts to the British in 1845.30 The Dutch and the 
Swedish companies had wound up their activities in India by the early nineteenth century.31 The 
Portuguese, who had inaugurated Euro-Asian maritime trade, had by the seventeenth century 
lost their naval and commercial advantages to the Dutch, British, and French, but like France, 
Portugal retained only its former territories of Diu, Daman, and Goa (Map 1).32  
                                                 
29
 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1-56. 
30 Prakash, European Commercial Entreprise, op.cit., 312-3; Ole FeldbæK, India Trade under the Danish Flag 1772-
1808: European Enterprise and Anglo-Indian Remittance and Trade (Lund: Student litteratur, 1969). 
31 Prakash, European Commercial Entreprise,  op.cit., pp. 265-6, 349. 
32 Sandrine Bègue, ‘La valeur de l’ «exemple français » dans le conflit indo-portugais sur Goa (1947 – 1954)’, Outre-
Mers, Vol. 97, No. 364-5 (2009), footnote 2, p. 316.  
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The 1789 French Revolution first introduced the idea of the social and political 
assimilation of the natives into the Constitution of the First Republic (1792-1799), which made 
the colonies an integral part of the new Republic and therefore subject to the same laws as the 
mother country. However, the concept proved short-lived, and the Bourbon Restoration marked a 
return to an old-regime style of colonial rule based on administration by two men strictly 
appointed by Paris: a civil Governor who oversaw internal political affairs – the legislative and 
judicial administration – and external affairs, and an intendant général who managed the police 
force, finances, and commercial and maritime issues.33 The King’s new governor of French India, 
Count Dupuy, took possession of the territories in 1816, two years after their retrocession, and 
found them devastated by twenty years of conflict with the British.34  
During the following decade, French India struggled with corruption and budget deficits; 
one of the most important economic impacts of this period was the loss of revenue from the sale 
of salt and opium. Under pressure from the British who wanted to maintain their monopoly in the 
Carnatic, the French agreed to sell the trading rights in these two products to the British in 1815 
in exchange for a yearly indemnity of 400,000 rupees or 1,080,000 francs – often referred as ‘the 
million’. At the time, the French were pleased with the outcome but while the ‘million’ was 
appropriately listed as revenue in the budget of French India, the Ministry of the Navy and the 
Colonies from 1827 diverted this income to finance other colonies deemed more important, such 
as Senegal, Guyane, Madagascar, and Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. French India was thereby 
deprived of revenue that had been earmarked for its coffers.35  
                                                 
33 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 50; Sudesh provides in Chapter 1 a detailed discussion on 
the administrative organisation of the colony in the eighteenth century until the retrocession of 1814, but in essence 
the administration was authoritarian and natives had little participatory role in the management of the territories, 
op.cit. 
34 French Indian governors represented the French monarch and an old style of administration where justice was for 
sale, personal interests and monetary gains often preceded those of the colony, Weber, Les établissements français 
en Inde ..,op.cit., p. 231. 
35 Subventions to Senegal and Guyane amounted to 500,000 francs each, grants to Madagascar and Saint-Pierre 
and Miquelon, 60,000 francs and 70,000 francs respectively, and 70,000 francs were held as contingency funds, 
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French India was never compensated for this diversion of funds which significantly 
undermined the economic development of the Indian territories.36 The decision to divert the 
‘million’ points to a significant exploitation of the territories in favour of other colonies, and the 
lack of compensation showed that the French government paid little attention to the hardship that 
the diversion caused. Furthermore, French India could not compensate for this loss through an 
increase in trade because the régime de l’exclusif, based on the idea that the colonies were 
subordinated to the métropole, considered goods entering French ports from the colonies to be 
foreign, and therefore subjected to high import taxes. The system also mandated that all French 
colonial merchandise be sold in France, while the colonies could only purchase French goods.37 
Hence, goods exported out of French India could not be sold anywhere but in France, where like 
other colonial goods they were expensive and had a limited market.38  
The economic situation was further impaired when in 1817 the British imposed an 
economic blockade by introducing a double tax of 16% on the value of all products entering and 
exiting their territory. Britain’s decision was intended to weaken French India’s economic 
development, and perhaps to induce the French to either abandon or sell their territories, as the 
Dutch, Swedes, and Danes would eventually do.39 Dupuy responded by declaring French Indian 
ports tax-free in the hope that this measure would boost trade, but Pondichéry and Karikal 
nevertheless stagnated. In contrast to the earlier period of prosperity that the Compagnie had 
experienced, maritime trade was now limited to the immediate region and seldom reached the 
                                                                                                                                               
Ibid., pp. 239, 210; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 67. 
36 Despite numerous petitions, the ‘million’ was not returned to the budget of French India until 1931, the year of the 
International Colonial Exhibition but most symbolically, the year after the famous Salt March organised by Gandhi in 
March 1930, Jacques Weber, ‘La rente de l’Inde’, Lettres du CIDIF, Lettre No. 22/23 (2008),  Centre 
 d'Information et de Documentation de l'Inde Francophone, France, 
http://www.cidif.go1.cc/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=25:lettre-nd22&Itemid=3&layout=default, 
viewed 26 January 2014. 
37 Although during the Revolution, the system was abolished it was reintroduced under the Restoration, see Weber, 
Les établissements, op.cit., p. 376. 
38 Ibid. pp. 375-84 ; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 81. 
39 The Dutch abandoned their outpost in Chinsurah, neighbouring to Chandernagor, in 1826 while the Danes sold 
Tranquebar for 500,000 francs, Weber, Les établissements , op.cit., p.127. 
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Atlantic.40 Yanaon, Mahé, and Chandernagor were particularly badly affected, and they never 
recovered from the high tariffs and river transportation restrictions imposed by the British 
economic blockade.41  
Despite the diversion of the ‘million’ and setbacks caused by the British authorities, 
numerous developments in this early 1800s period indicate France’s strong intention to remain 
rather than withdraw and abandon the territories, as the British might have hoped. In 1826 the 
first French state school, the Collège royal, was opened in Pondichéry, the administrative centre 
of the region. The school was reserved for the education of the children of Europeans and 
French Indians of European descent. The following year a public library opened to promote 
French culture and education.42 Under the aegis of the government, a new boarding school for 
girls, established by the Soeurs de Saint Joseph de Cluny (Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny), 
provided education free of charge to a growing number of ‘topaz’ girls (the word defined persons 
of mixed descent, also sometimes referred as créoles).43 The textile industry was promoted with 
the setting up of the first factory in 1828.44 Administrative buildings were erected, and numerous 
general embellishments of Pondichéry were also undertaken.45 Clearly, France was determined 
to stay.  
                                                 
40 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 82-3 
41 Chandernagor had 7,000 textile artisans in the middle of the 18th century, there were only 2,606 in 1823, 400 in 
1839 and 50 a few years later. The population of Chandernagor went down from 45,258 in 1825 to 31,000 in 1850, or 
a decrease of 31.5% over twenty five years. Yanaon’s population went from 14,000 to 6,000 between 1815 and 1852, 
Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 86-7. 
42 Ibid., p. 57; education had been provided since the late seventeenth century by Jesuit priests who were later joined 
by Catholics nuns in the running of schools, A. Suresh, Politics and Social Conflicts in French India: 1870-1939, 
(Pondicherry University: Department of History, 2010, unpublished PhD thesis), pp. 47-8; the public library was 
initially opened to Europeans only though natives and créoles were only allowed by authorisation. The prohibition 
was removed in 1837 as it was realised that access to the library was one of the fundamental means for natives to 
acquire French knowledge, Premavalli, op.cit., p. 155. 
43 In 1844 the Sisters of Saint Joseph de Cluny began a school in Karaikal for young French girls and another for 
boys. Three more schools were opened in Karaikal for the Europeans, the caste Hindus and for the Harijans 
(untouchables) in 1851, Emiliana Emprayil and Benjamin Kanjiramelkunnel, ‘Education of Girls in French India’ in 
K.S. Matthew (ed.), French in India and Indian Nationalism: 1700-1963 (New Delhi: BR Publishing Corporation, 
1999), p. 331. 
44 Weber, Les établissements , op.cit., pp. 396-411;  
45 Governor Vicomte Desbassayns de Richemont (1826-1828) was responsible for the realisation of these projects, 
Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit, p. 58. 
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The July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe following the 1830 Revolution, saw the introduction 
of liberal reforms intended to give more autonomy to the colonies. Conseils coloniaux, elected by 
suffrage based on property qualification, and replacing the former conseils généraux, were set up 
in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, and the former Île Bourbon, which had been renamed Île de 
la Réunion in 1848. But French India continued to be ruled for another decade by a special 
regime based on the King’s ordinances. Hence, French India essentially remained an old-regime 
colony ruled arbitrarily by the Governor, the King’s representative, until an ordonnance organique 
of 23 July 1840 granted French India her first local representation.46  
The 1840 ordonnance conferred on the Governor the power to execute French laws, to 
implement decrees of the King and (later decrees of the President of the French Republic), and 
to apply arrêtés (a ministerial or administrative decision) and regulations of the French Ministries. 
The Governor ruled from Pondichéry and was assisted by personnel who included administrators 
who were in charge of the secondary territories of Chandernagor, Mahé, Yanaon, and Karikal, 
the Commissaire de la marine, who was the chief of the administrative service, the Procureur-
Général, responsible for the management of the judiciary, and an Inspecteur colonial who 
supervised public services.47 A Conseil d’administration, headed by the Governor and three high-
ranking civil servants, assisted with the administration of the territories. An Assemblée des 
Notables (local assemblies) consisting of nominated French and native members was set up to 
provide support in the management of local affairs. The governor selected a handful of notables 
to form the conseil général, a consultative body that participated in the administration and whose 
purpose was to advise on the colonial budget and express the wishes of the population. 
However, since the Governor chose the members of the conseil général, the organisation had 
little power to change an administration that remained highly centralised in the hands of the 
                                                 
46 Ibid., pp. 64-6. 
47 Suresh, op.cit., pp. 20-1. 
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Governor. Nonetheless, for the first time, natives were formally invited to participate in the 
governance of the territories.48  
The under-representation of local French Indians in the local assemblies of 1840 
triggered the first opposition movement, organised by wealthy local landowners sitting as 
members. Indeed, the minority of Europeans was vastly over-represented, with 39 members for a 
population of 975. The community of European descendants had two members for a population 
of 1,514, while the local population, which numbered 165,240 people, was granted only four 
members. The numbers pointed to a severe imbalance in favour of a small minority of the French 
and their descendants. However, the local notables declared that, since French Indians 
contributed in larger numbers to the payment of local taxes, they should be given a larger 
proportion of representatives.49 Although their claim went unanswered, it nonetheless 
emphasised the increasing tensions between a group of wealthy and powerful natives and the 
colonial administration that had imposed on them its legal and administrative systems. These 
notables, politicised by their first-hand experience of French institutions, formed the first 
embryonic group of dissidents that challenged the rule of a minority of French colonisers and 
rejected the Christian values that they epitomised.50 These first dissidents were few in number, 
however, and represented a group of privileged land-owners with little connection to the much 
larger population of poor, uneducated, and landless natives. It would take until the 1880s, when 
a new, expansive wave of republican institutions clashed with the structure of French Indian 
society, for socio-political tensions to become more acute. 
                                                 
48 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit, pp. 64-6. 
49 Most of the local budget came from property taxes with up to 48% of the harvest being used to pay taxes. There 
were in 1825 about 837 French Indian property owners, 73 of whom could be considered ‘wealthy’; 262 were 
‘comfortable’ while 502 were poor, Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 65-6, 73-4, 88-9. It is 
believed Piramassamy organised a clandestine ‘anti-French’ party which was responsible for the Karikal riot of 1845, 
Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p. 615. 
50 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p. 224; Suresh, op.cit., p. 22. 
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French Indian society and parliamentary representation 
Since 1714, when Governor Dulivier’s opposition to the celebration of a Hindu festival 
causes the temporary exodus of a large number of the Hindu population of Pondichéry, French 
policy towards the indigenous population was one of non-interference with local customs. This 
policy translated into a legal regime of exception, whereby local Indians were judged according 
to their customary laws, or Mamool (tradition), while Europeans were subjected to French law. 
French judges were assisted by a consultative committee on Indian jurisprudence consisting of 
members of different castes, with their role limited to ensuring sentences were given in 
conformity with customary law. In cases of litigation between castes, the Governor could 
determine the sentence. Hence, French Indian society continued to be ruled overwhelmingly by 
customary law, and any attempt at introducing reforms to improve social conditions was met 
with stern opposition.51 In 1845, the removal of a Hindu funeral pyre to the outskirts of town 
during an outbreak of cholera triggered riots in Karikal, confirming that religious matters were 
better left untouched. With both the police force and the company of sepoys in Karikal reduced 
because of budget restrictions, French authorities were forced to request military assistance 
from the British to put an end to the riots.52 France’s position in her own territories seemed 
vulnerable, and if she wanted to remain in India, she had to compromise with the local 
population. While the policy of non-interference with local customs guaranteed a high level of 
social peace, it also helped maintain the status quo.  
French Indian society consisted mainly of Hindus, Muslims, and Catholics. Although 
accurate figures are difficult to obtain due to the lack of civil records (until the introduction of 
civil registration in the 1880s), the majority of the population of Pondichéry in the 1830s was 
Hindu (87.6%), followed by Catholics (10.4%), and a small groups of Muslims (1.9%). In 
                                                 
51 Ramasamy, op.cit., p. 184; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit, pp. 92-9. 
52 One hundred and fourteen British soldiers assisted French troops to put an end to the riot. Weber, Les 
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Karikal, Hindus (77.9%) still formed the largest community but in a lesser proportion than in 
Pondichéry, and the percentage of Muslims (12.1%) and Catholics (9.8%) was greater. There 
were no Catholics in either Chandernagor (with 87.7% of the population Hindu and 12.3% 
Muslim) or Mahé (with 73.4% Hindu and 26.6% Muslim). No population estimates are available 
for Yanaon during the period.53  
Between 1880 and 1926, the relative size of the Hindu population increased across all of 
French India expect in Mahé, while the size of the Muslim population decreased, except in 
Yanaon where it remained stable; the Catholic population decreased across all of the French 
Indian territories during that period (Table 1). The overall population of French India, however, 
was far from negligible when compared with that of France’s other colonial territories. Even 
after the establishment of French colonial power in Algeria in the 1830s and the expansion of 
French colonial influence over French Polynesia (1842), Mayotte (1843), and New Caledonia 
(1853), the population of French India still amounted to nearly 220,000 inhabitants, the second 
most populous French colony after Algeria.54 During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
however, French India lost this population ranking when France acquired a vast range of new 
territories in Oceania, Africa, and Asia.55  
                                                                                                                                               
établissements, op.cit., pp. 614-5; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 72. 
53 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit, pp.31-2. 
54 It is important to note that the totals were most probably higher due to Indians refusing to comply with civil 
registration even when it was introduced under the Third Republic, Premavalli, op.cit., p. 205 
55 New colonies included Indochina (Vietnam 1860s-1880s, Cambodia 1862, Laos 1893); Tunisia (1881); Afrique 
Occidentale Française (1854-98), consisting of present-day Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso (formerly Upper 
Volta), Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Benin (formerly Dahomey); Afrique Equatoriale Française (1876-1912), 
comprising present-day Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Chad; Wallis and Futuna (1887); Comoros 
(1886); Madagascar (1895-96); Djibouti (1888); the Terres Australes and Antarctiques Françaises (late 1880s); the 
condominium of the New Hebrides (1906, Vanuatu); Morocco (1912), and the mandated territories of Cameroon, 
Togo, Lebanon and Syria (1919). Between 1843 and 1901, France also acquired concessions and extraterritorial 
rights in China, including Shanghai, Tien-Tsin (Tianjin), Hankéou (Hankou), Canton (Guangzhou), and a ninety-nine 
year lease in Quang-Tchéou-Wan (Guangzhouwan). Jacques Weber, ‘Un siècle de présence française en Chine 
(1843-1943)’ in Jacques Weber (ed.), La France en Chine, 1843-1943 (Nantes: Presses académiques de l’Ouest, 
1997), pp. 9-33; Léon Silbermann, Souvenirs de campagne par le Soldat Silbermann (Paris: Plon, 1910), pp. 145-75. 
 
 
37 
 
Table 1: Hindu, Muslim, and Catholic population in French India in 1880 and 1926. Source: Jacques 
Weber, Les établissements français en Inde au XIXe siècle: 1816-1914, p. 2728.  
 
Territory 
Hindus Muslims Catholics 
Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
Pondichéry 
1880 128,562 85.6 2,434 1.6 19,043 12.7 150,039 
1926 158,146 90.3 4,499 2.5 12,425 8.2 175,070 
Karikal 
1880 63,973 69 14,825 16 13,801 14.9 92,599 
1926 42,654 76 5,609 10 7,667 13.6 55,930 
Chandernagor 
1880 17,469 80 4,031 18.4 319 1.4 21,819 
1926 23,264 87.7 2,756 10.4 423 1.6 26,443 
Yanaon 
1880 4,259 94.2 173 3.8 88 1.9 4,520 
1926 4,754 95 190 3.8 48 1 4,992 
Mahé 
1880 5,315 73 1,617 22.2 340 4.6 7,272 
1926 7,302 64.6 3,562 31.5 436 3.8 11,300 
Total 
1880 219,578 79.5 23,080 8.3 33,591 12.1 276,249 
1926 236,120 86.2 16,616 6 20,999 7.6 273,73556 
 
Most French Indians were Hindus, and the Hindu socio-economic system is divided 
along four major Varna or caste groups: Brahmins (priests and religious teachers), Kṣatriya 
(warriors), Sūdras (labourers and artisans), and Vaiśyas (merchants, farmers). Only Brahmins 
and Sūdras could be found in French India. While Brahmins, Kṣatriya, and Vaiśyas were 
regarded as ‘clean’, Sūdras were considered impure and their function was to serve the upper 
three castes. All groups were subdivided in a number of jāti (communities). Alongside the four 
Varna existed another group formed by pariahs or outcastes, who by their activities were 
                                                 
56 It is necessary to add five Parsis and 318 Protestants of whom 161 lived in Karikal, 91 in Pondichéry, 63 in 
Chandernagor and 3 in Yanaon. Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p. 2728.  
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considered impure.57 
Christians formed the second most important religious group in French India. The first 
signs of Catholicism in India were attributed to a community of Christian Syrians in the fifth 
century in Kerala, while conversions in the modern era were associated with European trading 
and the work of Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Proselytising, a 
tool for cultural assimilation, was sanctioned by the French monarch, and formed part of a 
programme to civilise the natives through religion and education.58 Although only 1.5% of the 
South Indian population was Catholic in the nineteenth century, the percentage in Pondichéry 
and Karikal, as well as in Portuguese Goa, ranged between 10% and 15%, resulting in 
Pondichéry being referred as the ‘Rome of the Coromandel coast’. Most Catholics came from the 
Sūdra caste, and especially from the Vellaja sub-group, regarded as the aristocratic segment of 
the Sūdra and often engaged in liberal professions such as law and trade. Converted Christians, 
referred to in French as Choutres, were more likely to be educated, the result of the work of 
missionaries who set up the first schools to teach Christian doctrine to natives. Ultimately, 
Christians often found employment in the French public service as translators and clerks, 
occupying nine out of ten public jobs in the late nineteenth century.59 
The Muslim population was the least numerous group. The Muslims had arrived in India 
with the invasions of the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, as well as through Arab trading with 
the west coast of India in the eighth and ninth centuries. Most conversions to Islam in the south 
of India were the result of inter-marriages and forced conversions during the reigns of Aurangzeb 
(1618-1707) and Tipu Sultan (1750-1799). In addition, some lower-caste Hindus had joined the 
                                                 
57 Brahmans in French India were divided in two main groups, the Shivaiites (Shiva devotees) and the Vaishnavites 
(Vishnu devotees), while the Vellaja goup formed the aristocracy of the Sūdra caste, it was followed by numerous 
sub-groups. Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 36-8.  
58 Missionaries first arrived in Pondichery in 1675. Suresh, op.cit., p. 58 
59 Ibid., pp. 52, 62, 100. 
 
 
39 
 
Muslim faith to improve their socio-economic conditions.60  
Overall, the composition and proportions of the three communities in Pondichéry, the 
largest of the French territories, varied only slightly between 1830 and 1948, as shown in Table 
2. The Hindu population remained the most important, accounting for 85 to 90% of the 
population, with the Catholics ranging from 8 to 12%, and finally the Muslims from 1.9 to 3%. 
 
   Table 2. Hindu, Catholic, and Muslim populations in Pondichéry between 1830 and 1948. Source: 
Jacques Weber, Les établissements français en Inde au XIXe siècle: 1816-1914, p. 2727.  
 
 1830 1860 1880 1926 1948 
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Hindus 66,045 87.6 11,016 87.7 128,562 85.6 158,146 90.3 194,997 87 
Catholics 7,837 10.4 11,658 9.3 19,043 12.7 12,425 8.2 21,137 9.5 
Muslims 1,441 1.9 3,716 3 2,434 1.6 4,499 2.5 6,815 3.5 
Total 75,323 100 125,390 100 150,039 100 175,070 100 222,949 100 
 
The population was allowed elected representation under the Second Republic (1848-
1851) when the revolutionary principle of equality was revived and extended to the colonies. The 
idea of assimilating the colonies had first been expressed by Boissy d’Anglas, a deputy of the 
Third Estate in 1789 and later became deputy at the National Assembly. He declared: ‘Let the 
colonies be a part of our indivisible Republic; let them be controlled and ruled by the same laws 
and the same government; let their deputies called to this precinct [Paris] be mingled with those 
of the entire people’.61 Although he was primarily referring to the island colonies of the West 
Indies,62 the spirit of his call for assimilation extended to French India. All French Indians gained 
                                                 
60 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., pp. 554-5. 
61 Quoted in Jacques Weber, ‘Chanemougan, ‘King of French India’: Social and Political Foudations of an Absolute 
Power under the Third Republic’, Economic and political weekly, Vol XXVI, No. 1 & 2 (January 1991), p. 292. French 
India was first granted a deputy in 1790 but parliamentary representation lasted until the advent of Napoleon I as first 
Consul in 1799, Sudesh, op.cit., p. 67. 
62 Assemblée Nationale, Histoire et patrimoine, Les Départements d’outre-mer, Les bouleversements de la 
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the status of French citizens by a decree of 28 March 1848, and male citizens over the age of 25 
years or those who had resided in the territory for a period of at least five years, without 
distinction of caste, religion, and colour, were allowed to elect, by secret ballot, a deputy to sit at 
the French parliament in Paris.63 Since most French Indians were unable to speak or write 
French, and religious restrictions meant that Hindus could not travel outside of India, the 
candidate was likely to be French or of French descent, or a créole (mixed French-Indian 
ancestry).  
Introducing the republican idea of equality embodied in the right to vote, however, only 
exacerbated existing social divides, and resulted in the opening of caste wars in French India. 
The concept of equality caused great concern amongst French Indians, as it ultimately 
challenged the crux of French Indian society, based as it was on hierarchy and the segregation 
of castes. Even Catholic churches had partitions to separate high-caste from low-caste 
converts.64 It was inconceivable that the vote of a lower caste person be valued the same as the 
vote of a Brahmin. Incidents broke out in July 1848 when low-castes believed that the 
introduction of the suffrage would allow them to wear slippers like the Vellaja, their superiors. 
When a few of them appeared in public wearing slippers, the violent retaliation of the Vellaja 
resulted in the burning down of the low-caste quarters and the murder of several residents.65  
The electoral process also encountered problems. Despite registration being mandatory, 
French Indians did not register births and marriages, and penalties for non-compliance were 
                                                                                                                                               
Révolution française, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/outre-mer/bouleversements.asp, viewed 26 January 
2014. 
63 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., pp. 664-5. 
64 Although condemned by the Church, the practice was followed by missionaries and then priests who had realised 
the difficulties in forbidding converts to follow Hindu customs. Early attempts at banning Hindu practices amongst 
their converts had resulted in mass exodus. Premavalli, op.cit., pp. 132-4; Jacques Weber, La politique républicaine 
d’assimilation dans les comptoirs de l’Inde, Lettres du C.I.D.I.F, Lettre No. 5, (2008), Centre d'Information et de 
Documentation de l'Inde Francophone, France,  
<http://cidif.go1.cc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1592&Itemid=3>, viewed 13 November 2010, 
unpaginated.  
65 Weber, ‘Chanemougan’, op.cit., p. 292; attempts at fusioning castes was defeated by the traditionalists whose 
protests succeeded in maintaining the status quo, Suresh, op.cit., p. 91. 
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rarely enforced due to the French administration’s unwillingness to interfere with local religious 
customs, hence there were no accurate civil records to aid in the organisation of elections.66 
Jean-Baptiste Lecour, a merchant from Nantes, was elected deputy of French India on 9 March 
1849, but his seat was abolished only six days later when the number of seats in the French 
Assembly was decreased from 900 to 700. French authorities argued at the time that French 
Indians were not ready to exercise political privileges because their ancient religious practices 
would clash with the spirit of democracy. Indeed, since most voters were illiterate, they had been 
allowed to have their ballot paper marked in advance with the help of a person who could write 
on their behalf.67 Such a practice opened the door to numerous irregularities, fraud, and above 
all to the pressure that a high-caste candidate could place on low-caste voters. Violence and 
intimidation were not uncommon, and as a result French India earned the reputation of being the 
land ‘of electoral frauds’, ‘of electoral violence’ and the ‘country of elections without voters’.68  
Confronted by so many difficulties, this first attempt at elected representation in French 
India in 1848 raised the question of whether cultural assimilation, defined as mastering the 
French language and culture, should not precede political assimilation. Besides, Paris’ decision 
to withdraw the parliamentary seat showed the capital was unwilling to continue with the idea of 
electoral representation in her French Indian colony, despite the renewed spirit of republican 
idealism. Thus although in theory a parliamentary seat was first decided under the First Republic, 
                                                 
66 A civil registry was established in 1842, but by 1854 only 684 records had been made. Weber, Pondichéry et les 
comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 119. 
67 Ibid., pp. 103-5. Suresh states that the high percentage results for the other candidates also point to a number of 
irregularities, Joseph Hayes secured 100% of the votes in Mahé, Rohan had 99% in Chandernagor, Arokiassamy 
95.1% in Karaikal, and Lecour 97.5% in Pondichéry. Lecour had an alliance with high-caste notables, who sent large 
numbers of illerate and dutiful servants to vote en masse for Lecour, op.cit., p. 90, 92,  
68 Soudandiram (Liberté) 20 May 1938, 18 February 1939. Irregularities went from inclusion of British Indian names 
to the electoral lists. There were also problems with uneven distribution of electoral cards, unreliable civil registration 
resulting in dead people and absentees voting, and polling officers under the influence of the political masters. Food 
and liquor were freely distributed on the eve of elections, voters were paid to vote for a particular candidate, and 
muscle power was used to intimidate voters. There were three categories of polling stations where intimidation 
occurred: stations that did not open, stations where no one voted, and open stations guarded by police but where 
actual fraud took place in the form of ‘stuffed ballot boxes, false names, and false records’.. Parliamentarian and 
journalists’ protests and petitions against electoral malpractices came to no avail, Suresh, op.cit., pp. 147-50, 155, 
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and then a deputy was voted under the Second Republic, no deputy actually sat in the French 
Parliament during these periods. 
The Second Empire (1851-1870) offered some respite to these problems of suffrage by 
returning to an authoritarian style of colonial management. A Sénatus-Consulate ordinance of 
May 1854 stipulated that the colonies were to be ruled by decrees of the Emperor Louis 
Napoleon III, and no deputy was elected under his reign. But with the establishment of the Third 
Republic, assimilation once again dominated colonial policy.69 The principle of assimilation was 
based on the belief that French India, like the other vieilles colonies, had been associated with 
the métropole since the seventeenth century, a history which testified to French Indians’ level of 
‘francisation’, or adoption of the French way of life. It is unclear, however, what exactly 
constituted this ‘French way of life’ or how it was defined.70 The Third Republic also inaugurated 
a new era of relations between France and her colonies, although elected representation 
changed from region to region. A decree of 1 February 1871 called for the election of a deputy by 
universal male suffrage, that is by men over the age of twenty-one years of age born in the 
territories. If proof of birth was unavailable, evidence of residency for a minimum of five years 
was to be sufficient. A constitutional law of 24 February 1875 also called for the election of a 
senator. While no legislation existed that detailed the specific duties of a senator or deputy who 
represented the constituency of French India, the position bestowed prestige and gave direct 
access to the Minister, the only authority who could recall an uncooperative governor. The 
deputy could also use his position to lobby the government on behalf of the French Indian 
population and influence the implementation of programs and projects applying to the colony.71  
Candidates standing for representation had to be able to speak and write French, and in 
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the case of parliamentarian representation, they also had to be able to travel overseas. 
Unsurprisingly, eight out of the nine candidates in the 1871 elections came from the small 
minority of French residents and those of French descent; only one candidate was a native.72 
The two elected representatives also became members of the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies, 
based in Paris and consisting of elected representatives of the colonies, nominated members, 
and administrators. The role of the Conseil Supérieur was to provide advice to the Minister of 
Colonies on legal projects, decrees, and other colonial questions, but the role was limited by the 
fact that the Conseil had no legislative or budgetary powers.73 The election of representatives did 
not provoke much reaction amongst the French Indian population.74 Civil records were no better 
than they had been for the 1849 legislative election, with the result that ineligible men such as 
minors and British subjects were allowed to participate in the voting process, while many young 
men who were eligible to vote fled to British India in the belief that by voting they would 
automatically be enrolled in the army.75 The result, which was overwhelmingly in favour of 
Alexandre Panon-Desbassayns, comte de Richemont, raised strong suspicions that electoral 
fraud had again been committed.76  
The establishment of republican institutions continued with a decree of 13 June 1872, 
which created a Conseil colonial and five Conseil locaux, one per comptoir. The Conseil colonial 
consisted of five members from the colonial service and seven elected members from the 
Conseils locaux, who represented the three religious communities: Hindus, Muslims, and 
Christians. Each conseil local was to advise the Minister of the Colonies on matters relating to 
French India. The Conseil locaux were responsible for deciding the budget of the colony as well 
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as electing members to the Conseil colonial.77 Europeans and their descendants, who numbered 
approximately 2,854 out of a total French Indian population of about 240,000, elected half the 
members of each Conseil local, while the indigenous population elected the other half. However 
the number of members elected to the Conseil local differed across French India: eight members 
in Pondichéry and Karikal, six in Chandernagor, and four in Mahé and Yanaon, a system that 
favoured the more populous territories. Later that year, a decree replaced the Conseil colonial 
with the Conseil général, and increased the number of members to twenty-five, fourteen of whom 
were Europeans and eleven of whom were natives. Once again, the system favored the minority 
of French and their descendants.78 The extension of the administrative metropolitan system 
continued with the introduction of communes or municipalities (1880) and their associated 
conseils locaux.79  
Despite these reforms, the local population’s ability to change the status quo through 
their representatives was limited because colonial administrators sat on and dominated both the 
Conseil général and the Conseil Supérieur. Moreover both the Conseil général and Conseils 
locaux had only an advisory rather than an executive role. The plenary powers of the Governor, 
who had full decision making on the running of the territories and was only accountable to the 
Minister of Colonies, minimised the extent to which the self-government that the new institutions 
suggested could be implemented.80 Finally, the establishment of two electoral colleges, or the 
two-list system – one composed of Europeans and their descendants, the other of indigenous 
                                                                                                                                               
76 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 217-8. 
77 Coret, op.cit., pp. 587-9. 
78 Weber, ‘La politique républicaine’ op.cit ; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., p. 224. 
79 Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, op.cit., pp. 590-1. In 1880, five municipalities were established in French 
India: Pondichéry, Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon, Chandernagor. Pondichéry and Karikal had several municipal councils, 
four and three respectively, with one in each of the other territories of Mahé, Yanaon and Chandernagor. In 1907, 
municipal councils were increased to seventeen Pondichery (8), Karikal (6), and one for each of the other territories, 
Suresh, op.cit., pp. 72-4, 122. 
80 Suresh, op.cit., p. 84. 
 
 
45 
 
people – favoured the minority of whites who thereby continued to retain their hegemonic 
advantage.  
Alain Coret apologetically states that this system facilitated a ‘certain equilibrium’ in the 
pluralist and Indian society.81 But in reality the system continued a policy of division that was 
dictated, firstly, by the hierarchy and segregation of Indian society, and secondly by a colonial 
society which favoured the French and those of European descent over the natives. The 
maintenance of French authority and the dual electorate system limited the assimilation 
suggested by this re-introduction of suffrage. J.B.P. More has likened the two-list system to a 
form of apartheid because voters were differentiated on the basis of race.82 Thus, while the new 
form of representation did mark an evolution in the history of colonial relations between the 
métropole and French India, the setting up of the two electoral colleges would contribute to a 
deepening of social divisions in French Indian society, exemplified by increasing political violence 
and electoral irregularities. 
French Indian politics and renonçants 
Two types of legal status existed in French India, one based on French common law and 
applied to French citizens, the other based on local usages and customs – Mamool law –and 
applied to the indigenous population. The introduction of such a dual legal system had been 
understood since the early eighteenth century as necessary if France wanted to gain the loyalty 
of the population, as any interference with local customs was strongly objected to by indigenous 
people.83 The right to renounce one’s personal status – that is, for a French Indian to be tried in 
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court under French law rather than Mamool law – was recognised by the French authorities but 
rarely applied, and most indigenous French Indians were tried according to customary laws.  
The restoration of suffrage in 1871 – first introduced into French India in 1848 – shook 
French Indian society, and marked the end of the policy of non-interference. It also started a 
debate involving those opposed to assimilation, on both the French and French Indian sides. The 
question was: did French Indians qualify for the right to vote? And why should those who had 
chosen to retain their customary status and who did not speak French be allowed to participate in 
French institutions and be given the right to make decisions within a system that could not even 
judge them in legal courts? The assimilation debate was intensified by a group of French 
educated Sūdra, headed by Ponnoutamby Pillai – also referred as Ponnoutamby - a barrister and 
a high-caste Vellaja who adhered to the French assimilation principles and actively campaigned 
for a greater participation by the wider French Indian population.84 Ponnoutamby’s followers 
broke with tradition by wearing Western style shoes and adhered to the Code Civil by registering 
their marriages at the town hall. 85 They rejected French Indian social hierarchy and 
discrimination in favour of what was regarded as a more progressive French way of life, and they 
perceived the introduction of suffrage as a means to ‘franciser’ the population. Their view was 
sternly opposed by a coalition of conservative Hindus and Muslims headed by Chanenougam 
Vellayuda Modeliar – also referred as Nadou or Chanenougam – the leader of the Sūdra and a 
strong partisan of preserving traditional Indian social organisation.86  
In order to establish the eligibility of voters, civil records, as set out by the Code Civil, 
had to be improved. Since the imposition of the Code Civil over Mamool law could have triggered 
fierce reaction from religious communities, a compromise was reached. A decree of 24 April 
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1880 adopted the Code Civil, which stated that births, marriages, and deaths had to be 
registered at the town hall with local mayors acting as civil registrars. However, modifications to 
the decree were made to accommodate religious requirements, and ‘agents’ – usually 
representatives of the religious communities – acting on behalf of the mayor were allowed to 
issue marriage and death certificates. This compromise allowed the necessary religious 
ceremonies to take place.87  
The introduction of parliamentary and municipal representation generated increasing 
tensions within French Indian society. The minority of French residents, and those of French 
descent, believed that by giving greater power to the majority of French Indians, republican 
institutions would diminish their own hegemony. French Indians themselves were divided into 
those in favour of assimilation (headed by Ponnoutamby), and the conservatives who supported 
the status quo (headed by Chanenougam). While the assimilationists believed that the 
representational system would eliminate religious discrimination and ignorance, the conservative 
faction exploited the electoral process to thwart the assimilationists.88 Rather than rejecting the 
electoral system, the traditionalists realised that they would greatly benefit from taking it over. 
Thus, while they did not oppose the inclusion of eligible male Hindu voters on electoral lists, they 
ensured the maintenance of social segregation by organising a pandal – structure or tent – 
outside the polling booths to keep low-caste Hindu voters separate from those who were high-
caste. As part of their political maneuvering, the traditionalists maintained their influence over 
low-caste and illiterate Hindus by using intimidating tactics, such as inciting fear of an imminent 
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tax increase or a French attack on traditions, to obtain greater support at the polls and achieve 
political power. It was said that peasants voted ‘like a herd of sheep’ on the order of caste 
leaders.89 The divisions between pro- and anti-French positions in French Indian party politics 
evident during this period would continue until 1954. 
The conservatives were successful at the municipal elections of 30 May 1880. 
Ponnoutamby retaliated by obtaining a ‘renunciation of personal status’ decree of 21 September 
1881, which distinguished two categories of French Indian indigenous voters: on the one hand, 
those who had officially renounced their personal status and who could be included in the first 
electoral list reserved for whites and those of French descent, and, on the other, those who 
continued to be subject to the customary law. The process of renunciation, which added numbers 
to the first list of electors, involved a signed declaration by the applicant, the adoption of a 
French-style name to be entered into the civil registry, and the publication of the declaration in 
the Journal Officiel de l’Inde française (JOIF). It is worth noting that the application to renounce 
did not specifically require that the applicant speak French, and, as William Miles notes, the 
decree did not discriminate against caste, religion, or gender.90 An examination of issues of the 
JOIF reveals that women changed their legal status as part of a husband’s application rather 
than on their own; since women were not allowed to vote, there was little incentive for them to 
submit to the process as an independent applicant.91 Finally, the act of renunciation did not 
guarantee French citizenship for the applicant and his descendants, a point that would be hotly 
debated when the French withdrew in 1954. 
By renouncing Mamool law and embracing the French way of life, a renonçant met the 
ideal promoted by the Third Republic’s assimilationist policy. The essence of the policy was 
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summarised in the June 1885 edition of the French Indian tri-monthly, Le Trait d'union: journal 
des colonies françaises, organe de l’amitié franco-indienne, created with the aim of promoting 
overseas colonies, including France’s older colonies such as French India, to the French public. 
The paper strongly supported the expansion of republican institutions such as suffrage and 
education; one of its aims was to erase despised Hindu customs, a task the paper acknowledged 
would be difficult since the French Indian territories were virtually swamped by the neighbouring 
population of 200 million – mainly Hindu – inhabitants.92 The unnamed author of one article wrote 
that, ‘with time this personal initiative [renunciation] will convince the mass of Hindus in our 
colony of the advantages of European colonisation and that Hindu fanaticism will be replaced by 
the education and the wise government of the French Republic’.93 Not only did the comment 
emphasise the cultural superiority of the secular French Republic, but, above all, it dismissed the 
potency of Indian religions and culture. The author believed that a handful of renonçants would 
provide a model that could be replicated by other French Indians, and that the two key principles 
of assimilation – education and the extension of republican institutions – would eventually 
weaken, if not replace, local religious beliefs.  
When Ponnoutamby ‘renounced’, he took the name of Laporte (the door), a name 
associated with his refusal as a Vellaja to wear traditional slippers for which he was sanctioned 
by the governor. The case was eventually overturned by the Minister of Colonies on the ground 
that France respected local customs and would not penalise those who rejected them.94 Hence 
Laporte literally ‘opened the door’ for Vellajas to embrace European values without legal 
recrimination. Although the number of renonçants increased, they nonetheless remained minimal 
– the number only increased from 1,537 to 3,000 between 1884 and 1898 – and consisted 
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primarily of men who lived in urban communes.95 Moreover, the French Indian authorities refused 
to include renonçants on the first list of voters, as this would have reduced the majority of the 
‘white’ French and their descendants.96 Indeed, the number of renonçants greatly outnumbered 
the 572 European electors, while the number of electors on the second, ‘indigenous’ list stood at 
65,000.97 A decision of the Cour de Cassation on 7 November 1882 forced the French Indian 
government to allow renounçants to be included on the first list, but this was challenged by 
Chanemougam, who declared that, since French Indians had forefathers who had fought for 
France during the Franco-British wars, all French Indians should be included on the first list 
alongside Frenchmen and their descendants.98 Fighting alongside the French was evidence of 
French Indians’ allegiance to France, which in the eyes of Chanemougam weighed far more than 
a mere declaration of renunciation. Since France was unwilling to take assimilation as far as 
handing over all electoral power to French Indians, a decree of 24 February 1884 established 
three electoral lists.99 The first one consisted of Europeans and their descendants, whose 
number had slightly decreased to 570; the second list was for renonçants who numbered 3,000 
and the third was made up of the majority of indigenous voters, whose number stood at 
68,000.100  
The next fifteen years saw the emergence of two political alliances. The Hindu-Muslim 
traditionalists defended the ‘Indian idea’, campaigned to safeguard the status quo, and used 
party politics to mininise the effect of the extension of republican institutions. The French-créoles-
renonçants front worked for the ‘French idea’, a platform that supported the economic 
improvement of the lower castes and compulsory primary education across French Indian 
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society. The period continued to be dominated by intimidation, fraud at the polls, and fighting on 
election days, with constant political manipulation by Hindu-Muslim traditionalists to weaken the 
electoral power of the ‘French’ alliance and, more importantly, to eliminate the renonçants. By 
supporting the candidature of the Paris-based Louis Henrique-Duluc, who was elected deputy of 
French India in 1898, Chanemougam succeeded in obtaining a new electoral reform that 
eventually removed the second list consisting of renonçants.101  
A decree of 10 September 1899 returned to a two-list system, with the conditions for a 
renonçant to be enrolled on the first list becoming much stricter. The first list now included 
Europeans, their descendants, and those who had renounced for a minimum of fifteen years and 
who possessed a degree from a university or who had worked for a minimum of five years as a 
civil servant; they also had to demonstrate fluency in French. The result of these tough new 
conditions was that only seventy renonçants were included on the first list, compared to 3,000 
before the new decree. Those who did not fulfill the new conditions were relegated to the second 
list along with indigenous voters.102 The structure of this electoral system hardly changed until 
the Second World War, and thus does not need to be reviewed in detail.  
While renunciation was perceived in official sources as a testimony to the success of 
French civilisation, the decision to become a renonçant was also based on socio-economic 
concerns. The status facilitated access to positions usually reserved to French citizens, which 
meant employment opportunities in the French colonial administration and the military, especially 
in Indochina. Indeed, the colonisation of Cochinchina in the late 1850s, followed by the 
establishment of a colonial administration in 1867, relied on French Indian labour that came 
mainly from Pondichéry and Karikal. Soldiers and workers who specialised in food supplies were 
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used in the first stages of colonisation; French-educated assistants were then needed to work in 
the newly established colonial administration. Being a renonçant thus opened the door to a 
career in the colonial service in Indochina and, to a lesser degree, in the private sector, 
especially in the large commercial houses.103 However, it is worth mentioning that this 
specialised migration from French India to Indochina remained limited. Although it is difficult to 
establish their exact numbers, at its apogee in 1936 the French Indian community in Indochina 
had only around 2,000 members and was outnumbered by 4,000 British Indians who were 
involved in the commercial, agricultural, and financial sectors, mainly as shopkeepers, labourers 
in the rice fields, and money lenders.104 Though small in number, French Indians in Indochina 
nonetheless formed a new socio-economic group in French colonial society.  
Moreover, most renonçants were former out-of-caste Hindus who had converted to 
Christianity or Islam in order to break away from the constraints of Hindu society. Changing 
status seems to have been an easier step for them to make than for high-caste Hindus, whose 
peers frowned upon the change of status as it challenged local customs and the social 
organisation.105 The fact that orthodox Hindus avoided the renunciation movement strongly 
indicates their disapproval. Indeed, the movement never attained a significant proportion of 
adherents. There were no renonçants in Yanaon and Chandernagor, and only four in Mahé, 
partly because there were few out-castes and Indian Christians in these enclaves.106 Most of the 
renonçants lived in Pondichéry, which had the highest percentage of Christians, where 
employment opportunities in the administration could be found, and above all where secondary 
education was available.107 
But even in Pondichéry, after the initial peak in the 1880s, the number of renonçants who 
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registered over the next sixty years remained negligible.108 The most probable cause of this 
decline was that the process of renunciation involved a change in social and cultural ties to 
traditions to which Hindus in Pondichéry might have been unwilling to embrace.109 In addition, 
the death of Laporte, the leader of the assimilationists, in 1886 and the return to the system of 
two electoral lists contributed to the stagnation of the movement. While renunciation acted as a 
social equaliser and conferred on renonçants the same rights and privileges as the European 
French, their special status did not prevent discrimination or contempt from both the French and 
Indian communities.110 French colonial services in Indochina excluded French Indians from 
advancement to high-level positions, while Indians criticised the renonçants for seeking special 
favour from the French and benefiting from privileged positions in the colonial government. By 
changing status, renonçants were seen to support the colonial system and France’s institutions, 
thus forming a distinct colonial group. Brahmins frowned upon the changes that republican 
institutions were imposing, and hence condemned a process that elevated the social conditions 
of low- and out-castes.111 Above all, French colonisation facilitated the growth of such a socio-
economic group because it made access to education and economic opportunities possible. 
 
Economy and education 
It was under the Second Empire that French India reached its apogee. The regime of the 
‘exclusif’ was finally removed in 1860 at the same time that the British eased their policy towards 
the French and alleviated the economic blockade, causing an increase in French India’s 
commercial activity. The 16% tax on import and export goods entering or leaving British India 
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was reduced to 10% on imported goods, while exported goods attracted a 3 to 4% tax.112 Lower 
tax promoted the export of French Indian goods to France and her colonies, and the volume of 
trade increased four-fold, mainly from Pondichéry and Karikal; trade from Chandernagor, Mahé, 
and Yanaon contributed only minimally. The main exported goods were sesame (46.6%), indigo 
(24.2%), cotton materials (15%), groundnuts (7.3%), coffee (2.4%), and coconut oil (2%).113 
Napoleon III’s vision of imperial aggrandisement and his infrastructure projects in France 
was extended to French India. The French emperor, inspired by the British model, believed that 
economic modernisation was essential for France to remain a great power, and his regime. He 
provided a stable political environment in which economic expansion was possible. He 
encouraged the development of the transport network system with the extension of railways 
(1851-1869) and the building of the Suez Canal (1859-1869), and the renewal of Paris, which 
included the extension of the capital’s boundaries, the erection of new boulevards and public 
buildings, and the implementation of a water, sewage, and drainage supply system. Sectors such 
as banking, metallurgy and engineering, coal, and branches of the textile industry were all 
promoted under his leadership. In the colonies, he abandoned old mercantilist principles in 
favour of free-trade policies, putting an end to a system that had subordinated the interest of the 
colonies to that of the mother country.114  
Governor Verninac de Saint-Maur (1852-1857) followed the new economic impetus by 
lowering the property tax in order to incite small landholders to cultivate fallow land. His decision 
contributed to an increase in production and the purchase of more goods on which indirect taxes 
were levied. The overall result was an increase in tax revenue for the local budget, which had 
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experienced difficulties in previous decades. However, rather than supporting the governor’s 
initiative, and while all colonies received financial assistance from the métropole, Paris reduced 
its aid to French India, thus continuing to signal France’s lack of interest in her old colony.115 
Nonetheless, local revenues assisted with a vast programme of irrigation improvement, which, 
although Pondichéry never met all of its needs and continued to import rice from British India and 
Karikal, increased agricultural production in both Pondichéry and Karikal. The production of 
coconut trees, from which coconut oil was made for export, also increased in Pondichéry and 
particularly in Mahé.  
In addition, the road network was extended across Karikal and Pondichéry, a pier was 
constructed in Pondichéry in 1865 to cope with a sandbar that had made access difficult, and a 
quay was built in Karikal.116 Nevertheless, ships still experienced difficulties anchoring at 
Pondichéry due to the prevalence of strong winds that regularly swept across the area, and the 
lack of improvement and high cost of transferring goods from ships onto smaller boats would 
later result in the loss of business to new port facilities in Madras, Culladore, and Negapatam. 
While in 1890 88% of groundnuts produced in South India was exported via Pondichéry (against 
12% in Madras), for instance, the percentage in 1904-1909 would drop to 45% and continued to 
decrease thereafter.117  
Most sailing ships took between 100 and 120 days to reach India from Europe, via the 
Cape of Good Hope. From 1862 travellers could reach Pondichéry on the Marseille-Indochina 
line established by the French maritime company, Services maritimes des Messageries 
impériales (later known as Messageries Maritimes), although this was not a direct service as 
travellers had to change in Colombo (Ceylon) to reach their final destination. The introduction of 
                                                                                                                                               
Empires (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015) forthcoming. 
115 The success was such that the idea was modelled by the British Indian authorities in 1854, Weber, Pondichéry et 
les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 121-32. 
116 Ibid., p. 133-44. 
117 Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, op.cit., pp. 598-9; Sri Soudjanarandjani, 8 December 1932; L’Inde Illustrée, 
 
 
56 
 
faster steamers and the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869 eventually reduced the journey 
between Marseille and Pondichéry to twenty-two days.118 The construction of a railway line to 
join the British railway network was discussed from 1858, but the difficulty in raising the 
necessary funds, and in obtaining approval from the British authorities reluctant to facilitate the 
transportation of goods to and from the ports of Pondichéry and Karikal, resulted in a thirty-eight 
kilometre Pondichéry-Villupuram junction line having to wait until 1879 to be inaugurated. Only a 
third of the railway was situated in French India, with the remainder in British India. The addition 
of a small railway at the pier helped the transfer of goods to the larger railway network.119 A 
thirty-three kilometre Karikal-Piralam junction line was established in 1898.  
By contrast, no investment was needed in Chandernagor as the territory was already 
easily accessible by British rail. Mahé and Yanaon had no direct railway connection, probably 
because their small population and economy did not justify the large investment required to build 
a junction line to the existing British system.120 Although small, the Pondichéry and Karikal 
junction lines were the first of their kind in the French colonies. The Saigon line opened in 1899 
(Indochina), and the Dakar and Saint-Louis railway lines (Senegal) were completed in the early 
part of the twentieth century.121  
The abolition of slavery by the French government in 1848 had also contributed to the 
prosperity of French India. The emancipation of slaves resulted in an increased demand for a 
labour force to work on the sugar plantations of Martinique, Guadeloupe, La Réunion, and 
Guyane, as well as in the British colonies of Mauritius, British Guiana, Trinidad, Jamaica, the 
small West Indies islands, Natal, and Ceylan. Prior to this period, a small number of South 
                                                                                                                                               
July 1933. 
118 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 185-6. 
119 Ibid., pp. 144-9, 185; Trait d’Union, September 1951; Edmond Maestri, ‘Les établissements français dans l’Inde et 
leurs chemins de fer: 1858-1934’, in Michel Pousse (ed), L’Inde, études, et images (Saint-Denis, La Réunion: 
L’Harmattan,  1993), pp. 211-241. 
120 Ministère des colonies. Agence générale des colonies, Les Établissements français dans l’Inde (Paris: 1932). 
121 Maestri, op.cit., pp. 216-7. 
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Indians had migrated to work in these sugar cane fields, but since no accurate civil records 
existed only approximate figures can be provided. It is estimated that between 1842 and 1870 
approximately 879,628 indentured Indian workers left India for this purpose.122 Most were not 
French Indians of course, but some of the British and most of the French trade in South Indian 
workers transited via Pondichéry, Yanaon, and Karikal, and contributed to the increased 
prosperity of local merchants. Between 1854 and 1885, 24,147 Indians were shipped to 
Guadeloupe, 43,326 to Martinique, 8,416 to Guyane, and 63,573 to La Réunion, a total of 
138,462.123 
The apogee of French India came to an end with a number of commercial and financial 
events. The emigration of Indian workers had stopped by 1885 due to a number of factors that 
included a fall in sugar price, a decrease in the production of sugar in La Réunion due to the 
overexploitation of the land, and above all a restriction by the British authorities on Indian 
migration. Indeed, the development of the British Indian rail network, an increase in tea 
production in Ceylan and Assam, and the recovery of the textile industry in Bombay all required 
cheap local labour. This caused a severe slowdown in shipping and associated services in 
Pondichery, Karikal and Yanaon.124 In addition, natural disasters which affected the territories 
over a period of fifteen years – cyclones in 1871 in Karikal, floods in Pondichéry in 1872 and 
1874, droughts in 1876-77 on the Coromandel coast followed by floods in 1884 – badly affected 
the reserve funds of French India and resulted in a deficit in the local budget.125  
 The financial situation was worsened with the increase in expenditure incurred by the 
new administrative organisation introduced by the Third Republic, an increase that was 
concurrent with the depreciation of the rupee. Between 1870 and 1879, its value decreased from 
                                                 
122 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit.,  pp. 154-82; Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p. 2848. 
123 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., pp. 154-82. 
124 Ibid., pp. 176, 180-1 
125 Ibid., p. 270. 
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2.40 francs to 1.97 francs, which represented a decline by a fifth of its previous value. Although 
the French Indian local budget was established in francs, taxpayers remitted in rupees, while 
administrative personnel were also paid in local currency.126 The financial crisis led to the 
reduction of personnel and the establishment of a cadastre (land title register) by the colonial 
administration in 1913 in order to improve land tax collection. By contrast, British India had 
already finalised its own land register covering an area of three to four million square kilometres, 
by 1875; this compared to French India’s five hundred square kilometres. The financial crisis also 
triggered further resentment from Chandernagor and Karikal, whose residents complained that 
their local taxes were being used to support the administrative centre and demanded some form 
of decentralisation where local taxes would only be used for their own use.127 The financial crisis 
led to the indefinite postponement of important works of infrastructure, such as the improvement 
of the ports of Karikal and Pondichéry. The long-term impact of this delay was that steam ships in 
need of well-equipped ports for anchorage chose Madras, where facilities had been upgraded in 
1876, over Pondichéry. In 1885 French trade with Madras reached 24 million francs compared 
with 18 million from trade with Pondichéry, and the trend continued to favour Madras over the 
French Indian port.128  
Most of the working population of French India was employed across four categories 
(Table 3). Agriculture was the primary activity in the French enclaves, with rice the most 
important product, followed by millet and coconut.129 Karikal was the main supplier of rice, with 
an annual exportable surplus of approximately 7,000 tons during good years. Pondichéry only 
managed a production of 8,000 tons, which nonetheless did not meet its needs. Pondichéry, 
Chandernagor, Mahé, and Yanaon thus depended on the import of British Indian rice.130 The 
                                                 
126 Ibid., pp. 273-5. 
127 Ibid., pp. 276-7. 
128 Ibid., pp. 276-7, 281. 
129 Rajkumar, op.cit., p.8. 
130 Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, op.cit., p. 597. 
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production of rice became paramount in the years following the Second World War, as the 
shortages of rice in India put pressure on French colonial authorities to import an increased 
supply from Indochina.131  
The second most important category of employment was in textile production, which 
included both workshops and factories. Jute was manufactured in Chandernagor by a British-
Indian company, and cotton was produced in Pondichéry by three cotton mills, the Filature 
Savanna, the Pondichery Cotton Mill Limited, and the Anglo-French Beatle Company, which 
employed about 8,000 labourers and exported 5,000 tons of cloth.132  
The third category comprised fishermen, with the largest number found in Pondichéry, 
the most populous of the French Indian enclaves. Although a final category in employment, 
labelled ‘miscellaneous occupations’, does not specify the kind of occupations these persons 
were engaged in, we can assume that it included those working in administration, artisans, and 
servants. Suresh estimates that if in 1838 there were already 1,598 Indians and 113 Europeans 
employed in a wide range of government occupations in health, police, justice, and education 
services, their number would have increased markedly when municipalities were established in 
the 1880s, especially since 45 to 50 percent of the colonial budget was earmarked for civil 
servants’ salaries. 
 
                                                 
131 Établissements français dans l’Inde, le Gouverneur, Pondichéry, 18 mai 1946, personnel pour Amiral d’Argenlieu, 
AOM, F6: Télégrammes chiffrés à l’arrivée 1946-1947.                    
132 Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, op.cit., p. 598. 
 
 
60 
 
Table 3: Working population per professional categories and per establishment in French India, 
1954. Source: Alain Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, Revue juridique et politique de l’Union 
française, No. 3-4 (juillet-décembre 1955), p. 597. 
 
Professional 
categories 
Pondichéry Karikal Chandernagor Mahé Yanaon Total 
Agriculture 30,000 15,000 -- 4,000 2,000 51,000 
Textile 
factories 
8,100 -- 3,500 -- -- 11,600 
Textile 
workshops 
10,000 600 -- 300 300 11,200 
Fishermen 3,000 600 -- 100 -- 3,700 
Others 5,000 1,200 2,000 200 100 8,500 
 
The French colonial administration required French educated clerks, hence there was a 
need to set up educational establishments that could educate the local population alongside 
children of the French. Traditional Muslim and Hindu education was already established when 
Europeans came into contact with India. From the seventeenth century, Western education in 
French India was closely linked with the proselytising activities of missionaries, including those 
from the Capucin order, the Société des Mission Étrangères, the Jesuits, and the Ursulines. 
Missionaries established schools to provide elementary education, including the tenets of 
Christianity, to children of converted natives as well as to those of French settlers and other 
Europeans residing in India.133  
                                                 
133 Louis XIV authorised the establishment of missions in the French Indian territories. Schools were organised 
according to caste groups. The Capuchins were in charge of the Europeans while the Jesuits were responsible for 
the créoles and natives. Ursulines were the first to start the education of girls. In matters of employment, Christians 
were preferred over Hindus, hence the need to educate a group of natives to serve the Compagnie. Premavalli, 
op.cit., pp. 118, 121-2, 128-9, 136-7. 
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The specificities of Hindu society yet again dictated the separation of low-castes and 
high-castes, with separate schooling provided for each group.134 These early establishments 
disappeared after the Revolution when French India was occupied by the British, but emerged 
again after the retrocession. Under the Restoration, state and Catholic schools came under the 
aegis of the local administration, which funded their ongoing costs from the local budget. 
Between 1826 and 1870, a number of religious, state, and private schools were set up across 
the five territories to provide primary schooling for the natives, créoles, and Europeans, in both 
French and native languages.135 Schools were again segregated according to caste groups and 
along gender lines. The Collège royal (renamed Collège colonial in 1848), founded in 1826 in 
Pondichéry, provided secondary education only to children of Europeans and créoles until 
natives were allowed to attend in 1879.136 It was nonetheless the first secondary school to be 
opened in the colonies.137 An École de droit (Law School) was founded in 1838, with courses 
taught by judicial officers, while an École de Médecine (School of Medicine) was created in 1863. 
Diplomas issued by these two specialised schools, however, were only valid within the French 
Indian territories.138 At the same time, a teacher training college was established.139 The setting 
up of schools marked a definite forward movement in the acculturation of French Indians, even if 
the effort was modest in view of the number of children who actually benefited from them. 
Indeed, on the eve of the Third Republic in 1870, only 2,277 pupils had access to public 
schooling while 7,805 were taught in private institutions. The figure represented only 10% of 
approximately 100,000 children under the age of fourteen.140  
                                                 
134 Ibid., p. 135. 
135 Boarding schools were also set up,  ibid., pp.161, 1655 
136 The Collège colonial became the Lycée français in 1975, ibid., p.166. 
137 Paul Michalon, ‘Des Indes françaises aux Indiens français’, in Michel Pousse (ed.), L’Inde, études, et images (La 
Réunion: L’Harmattan, 1993),  p. 253. 
138 Apart from teaching the basis of medicine, the Medical School was particularly geared towards the management 
of cholera outbreaks and vaccination, Premavalli, op.cit., pp. 193-5. 
139  Ibid., p. 192. 
140 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde, op.cit., pp. 348-9. 
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Numerous efforts at extending public education were made under the Third Republic, 
including the secularisation of the Collège colonial, and two decrees, in 1893 and 1898, 
promulgated compulsory primary education. But several factors ensured there was little 
improvement. Funding was lacking, and traditionalists under the leadership of Chanemougam 
repeatedly obstructed the implementation of compulsory primary schooling on the grounds that it 
would have helped low-caste children to gain an education. Hence in 1922, the number of 
primary schoolchildren was 13,880, the same as in 1910.141 Apart from the fact that only 10% of 
children had access to primary education, most of their instruction was given in English or in the 
vernacular. The main reason provided at the time for this anomaly was that, compared to other 
French colonies such as the French West Indies or La Réunion, where ‘patois’ could not 
compete with the French language, French India had an old civilisation with traditions that had 
not yet been displaced by French colonisation.142 With regard to the increasing importance of the 
English language, it could be argued that the overwhelming presence of British India could 
already have constituted a deterrent to seeking an education in French. With little border control, 
work opportunities for educated French Indians would have been greater in British India than in 
the small and economically stifled French Indian territories. French language was so little known 
and practised that the administration was forced to allow local council meetings to be carried out 
in the vernacular, with a translation of the debates supplied for the administration’s records.143  
The failure of French education in French India demonstrates the strength of Indian 
civilisation, which could only with great difficulty be displaced by that of France, especially when 
a history of colonial neglect failed to provide sufficient funds to support the expansion of 
education mandated by the Third Republic. Finally, party politics helped maintain the 
particularities of French Indian society, which under the leadership of Chanemougam continued 
                                                 
141 Ibid., pp. 350-1. 
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to oppose the economic and educational improvement of the less advantaged socio-economic 
groups. Quite paradoxically, the introduction of party politics in French India created a Hindu 
movement that opposed French colonisation, since it was synonymous with economic progress 
and societal changes. 
Conclusion 
French India originated from a series of trading posts established by the Compagnie des 
Indes in the seventeenth century. While Dupleix managed to expand French influence over 
South India for a short while, and without official support, his recall and the concurrent Seven 
Years’ War marked the end of any dream of French territorial expansion in India. It also saw the 
dismantlement of France’s first colonial empire. By 1814 French presence had been relegated to 
five small, scattered, and defenceless Indian territories, while Britain increasingly asserted her 
authority on the subcontinent. The territorial and economic restrictions imposed by the British 
were designed to hinder any return to former French prosperity, and condemned the territories to 
budget deficits until the 1850s, when tax reforms triggered a period of economic development, 
including the improvement of port, irrigation, and road infrastructure. Steam-powered ships and 
the opening of the Suez Canal also contributed to French India’s economic revival until the 
1880s.  
Until the 1840s, French India, as it was now commonly referred to, remained an old-
regime colony tightly controlled by the King’s governor. The concept of assimilation, a 
revolutionary principle first exercised under the Second Republic and then reintroduced under 
the Third Republic, granted the old colonies the right to representation based on universal 
suffrage. But suffrage conflicted with the social organisation of French India. Social tensions 
                                                                                                                                               
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid., p. 232. 
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between two Indian groups – the first comprising Hindu and Muslim conservatives, the second 
renonçants who supported the secular republican idea of assimilation – resulted in electoral 
irregularities and political abuses. Far from being rejected by the most conservative faction, 
French electoral politics were in fact misused and became an instrument of oppression with 
which to maintain the social status quo. Hence the communal politics that ensued from political 
manoeuvring and civil unrest provided at the same time the basis for the first form of an anti-
French campaign. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Territorial Particularities and Representations of French India  
 
The cult of ancestors is the most legitimate of all. Our ancestors made 
us who we are. A heroic past, great men, glory, (I mean the real thing) 
that is the social capital on which a national idea formed….Yes, suffering 
unites more than joy. As far as national memories are concerned, 
mourning is more potent than triumph, because it imposes duties and 
dictates a collective effort. (Ernest Renan)1 
 
The territory ruled by the French is so small, smaller than a district that it 
does not deserve to be called a country. (Bombay Sentinel, 18 
November 1946) 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, French presence in India originated with Louis XIV’s 
commercial aspirations and a desire to outdo the Dutch and then the British. The recall of Dupleix 
by the Compagnie ended all attempts at territorial expansion, and ensuing Franco-British conflicts 
between 1754 and 1814 established British supremacy on the subcontinent while reducing 
France to a subordinate colonial power. The Treaty of Paris (1814) ensured that France was 
relegated to her former small settlements scattered along the Indian coastline, hindering any 
hopes of a return to past economic prosperity. For France, the loss triggered the construction of a 
myth of French India that helped transform painful memories of colonial losses into that of triumph 
associated with French grandeur. Above all, the myth provided the space where France, as a 
                                                 
1‘Le culte des ancêtres est de tous le plus légitime; les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes. Un passé 
héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire, voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale’, Ernest 
Renan, Œuvres Complètes, Vol. 1 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), p. 904. 
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coloniser, still played an important role in India, and where criticism of the British administration 
could be expressed. It also provided a means for the historical legitimation of French India.2 
In order to evaluate the extent of this myth, this chapter will first explore the territorial and 
cultural particularities of French India, which with its Lilliputian size stood in stark contrast to the 
construction of a French Indian empire based on the former colonial glories of Dupleix. Through 
the analysis of maps, official reports, travelogues, and newspapers, I will examine how the 
concept of French India was shaped and promulgated, and how these representations exposed 
conflicting ideas about French India. A study of the French India pavilion at the Exposition 
coloniale internationale de Paris in 1931, where France showcased the benefits of her civilising 
mission, will demonstrate that India, whose image was encapsulated in the pavilion, still remained 
a source of fascination and historical pride, and a means for national aggrandisement. 
 
The five comptoirs and the loges  
In 1947, British India covered an area of approximately four million square kilometres and 
had a population of about four hundred million. It thus dwarfed France’s Indian territories, which 
were ‘small, scattered and undefended’.3 Chandernagor was located in the former British colonial 
state of Bengal, while the other four territories were situated on the seashore in the former British 
colonial presidency of Madras, in the south of India (Map. 2). The total area of the French 
territories at their greatest extent came to approximately five hundred square kilometres; 
Pondichéry was the largest with about 300 square kilometres, followed by Karikal with 160, 
Yanaon with 30, Mahé with only 9, and Chandernagor with a tiny 4 square kilometres. The total 
population, according to the census of 1948, was 362,045, which included a European population 
of 781 persons, as shown in Table 4.4 However, it is difficult to define who was a European, as 
                                                 
2 Breuilly, op.cit.,  pp. 7-28. 
3 Miles, op.cit., p. 5; The Leader, Allahabad, 21 December 1948, Nehru clippings, NMML, R8787. 
4 Rajkumar, op.cit., p. 2; Miles, op.cit., p. 5; Étude sur les possessions françaises dans l’Inde 24 juin 1947, AOM, 
Inde, H23: Études sur les possessions françaises; Arora, op.cit., footnote 4, p. 363. 
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this category could include a person born in Europe, a person of European descent, or a person 
of mixed European and Indian descent, as well as French Indians who had embraced French 
culture and thus considered themselves European. Unsurprisingly, most of that population was 
concentrated in Pondichéry, which, with three cotton mills, was the economic and administrative 
centre of French India. The most densely populated of the French Indian territories was 
Chandernagor, with 5,111 inhabitants per square kilometre, followed by Pondichéry with 782, and 
Karikal with 518. Mahé and Yanaon averaged over 300 inhabitants per square kilometre (Table 
4). 
 
Map 2: French Establishments and loges in India. The loges also include factoreries (warehouse) and 
terrains (land). Loges are shown on the Map with the letter L, while factoreries and terrains are shown with 
the letters F and T respectively. Source: Ministère des colonies. Agence générale des colonies, Les 
établissements français dans l’Inde. 
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Table 4. Population and number of communes in each Establishment in French India in 1947. 
Source: Alain Coret, ‘La Cession de l’Inde française’, p. 596. 
 
Establishments Number of 
‘communes’ 
Population Inhabitants per 
sq.km indigenous 1,000 
inhabitants 
Europeans 
Pondichéry 8 227 654 782 
Karikal 6 70 42 518 
Chandernagor 1 46 85 5,111 
Mahé 1 18 -- 305 
Yanaon 1 6 -- 353 
Total 17 367 781 720 
 
In addition to the five enclaves, France had trading rights over twelve loges called pettah 
(meaning market) or small patches of land scattered along the Indian coastline that were remains 
of earlier trading posts where warehouses had once stood. However, documents in the archives 
of the Ministry of Overseas France (known before 1946 as the Ministry of Colonies) as well as 
official publications available at the Bibliothèque nationale de France provide conflicting 
information on the exact location, number, and status of these loges.5 The discrepancy indicates 
that even the French authorities had difficulty in maintaining accurate records of pettah, which 
were increasingly being engulfed by the population of British India. Most of these loges were in 
fact only ‘dots’ on a map, with no official French representatives, symbols, or even a flag to give 
any indication that the land was French. At the time of the Indian independence there was one 
                                                 
5 Service des contributions, chef du service à Mr le Gouverneur des Établissements français dans l’Inde, Pondichéry, 
30 Juin 1908, AOM, Inde, G38: Problèmes des frontières Pondichéry 1908; Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Mr 
le Ministre des Colonies, direction des affaires politiques, Paris, le 29 novembre 1938, AOM, Inde, G38: Problèmes 
des frontières Pondichéry 1908; Conclusion, AOM, Inde, H23, Délimitation du territoire de Mahé ; Press Information 
Bureau, Government of India, August 1949, AD, Inde, Vol. 14: Indépendance; Ministère des colonies. Agence 
générale des colonies, Les Établissements français dans l’Inde (Paris: 1932), unpaginated; Weber provides a list of 
the former loges, Balassore, Cassimbazar also named Seydabad, Dacca, Jougdia, Patna, Surat, and factoreries, 
Chopour, Kirpaye, Canicola, Monepour, Sermepour, Sola, Chaitgan or Islabad or Chittagong, Malda, Silhet, 
Goalpara or Gonara, Goretty, some had little use after the demise of the Compagnie, Les établissements, op.cit., pp. 
2688-90. 
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guard in Calicut, and in Masulipatam two orderlies who represented French power.6 A brochure 
produced by the French Ministry of the Colonies in 1932 mentions eight loges: Masulipatam on 
the east coast, Calicut and Soualy on the west coast, Patna, Dacca, Jougdia, Cassimbaza, and 
Balassore in Bengal (Map 2). The other patches of land are listed as factoreries and terrains, and 
comprise Goalpara, Sylhet (Silhet), Sirampour (Serempour), Chittagong, Goorpordha, Sola, 
Boinchua, Goretty (Geretti) in Bengal, and Chapra, Sorguia, Begoumsara, Pounareck, Fatoua 
(Map 3), and Surat on the west coast (Map 2).7  
However, when comparing the list of loges provided by the Archives Nationales d’Outre-
mer, Surat is considered a loge while Soualy was considered a terrain. Distinguishing these 
pieces of land has been a difficult task, since ministerial records and publication do not provide a 
clear definition of what constituted a factorie, a terrain, and a loge, but instead describe outposts 
as remains of former warehouses and places of trade. Even Jacques Weber, the most 
distinguished contemporary French historian of French India, has been unable to provide clear 
information; on a map of the ‘loges, factoreries, terrains’ published in Pondichéry et les comptoirs 
de l’Inde après Dupleix, Weber has omitted to specify that Fatoua and Goretty were terrains, 
while a map titled ‘possessions françaises’ shows Chittagong as a loge, which in fact, it is never 
referred to as such in the archives.8 The lack of clarity on this issue demonstrates that French 
civil servants were at pains to differentiate between France’s legal jurisdiction and the myth of the 
loges; the administrator of Chandernagor, a Mr Maureton, wrote with some sarcasm in 
September 1905 that the French loges seemed to be very ‘hydrophilic’, since Patna had been 
flooded by the Ganges, and Joudia by the sea. Georges Tailleur, the last governor of 
Chandernagor, rather apologetically mentioned that a ‘flou artistique’ (artistic blur) reigned over 
                                                 
6 Combat: Tribune libre, 8-9 May 1954.  
7 Ministère des colonies. Agence générale des colonies, Les Établissements français dans l’Inde (Paris: 1932), 
unpaginated. 
8 Wéber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., map no. 1 ‘les possessions françaises en Inde, 
XIXe et XXe siècles’, p. 20 and map no. 2, ‘Loges, factoreries, terrains français du Bengale’, p. 23. 
 70 
 
the Ministry’s service of maps and inventories.9  
 
Map 3: Chandernagor and loges in Bengal. Source: Ministère des colonies. Agence générale des 
colonies, Les établissements français dans l’Inde. 
 
 
 
The issue of the loges reveals the role that map drawing and inaccurate reporting have 
played in acquiring and apportioning colonial space, and how these functions had become tools 
to legitimise land ownership. The need to formalise territorial legitimacy, which also included the 
enumeration of colonial inhabitants, triggered a ‘cartographic anxiety’ to transform ‘fuzzy 
communities’ into colonial subjects.10 While the Ministry needed neither accurate records nor 
maps to seize colonial space and project the extent of France’s colonial power, its lack of 
financial resources, staff, and general interest in colonial affairs aggravated its inability to improve 
                                                 
9 de Dianoux, op.cit., p. 560; Tailleur, op.cit., p. 17. 
10 Sugata Bose and Sudipto Kaviraj quoted in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, ‘Nationalist Movement in India: 
Historiography and History’, in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed.), Nationalism Movement in India: a Reader (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. xvii-i. 
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the collection of precise information on the colonies. Appointment as Minister of Colonies (the 
Ministrer of Overseas France from 1946) was not a highly coveted post, and when a new cabinet 
was formed, the post was usually filled last and awarded to a person of mediocre talent. Poor 
leadership accompanied serious understaffing at the ministry; the central administration, located 
in the Rue Oudinot in Paris, had 133 employees in 1896. The number decreased in 1936 to only 
129, despite increased administrative responsibilities with the territorial acquisitions of the League 
of Nations’ mandates of Lebanon, Syria, Cameroon, and Togo; at its apogee in the 1930s, France 
and her colonial domain, referred to as ‘greater France’ (la plus grande France), was the second 
largest colonial empire after that of Britain, and encompassed 11 million square kilometres of land 
and over 100 million inhabitants. In addition, overseas administrators changed their post 
frequently and usually paid little attention to the work accomplished by their predecessors. 
Compared to British colonial administrators, who often stayed for their whole career in one 
country, the policy of high turnover emanated from a fear that the administrator might become too 
independent of superior authority, and resulted in a significant lack of continuity in the 
administration of French overseas colonies.11  
While the French government was struggling to list the loges, the most up-to-date 
information was provided by France’s rival, in the person of Colonel Edward Walter Fletcher 
(1899-1958), the British Consul-General in Pondichéry between 1945 and August 1947. During 
the transition period leading up to independence, Fletcher liaised with Major Atta-ul-Rahman, an 
Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of External Affairs and 
Commonwealth Relations. It is worthwhile reproducing part of a letter from Fletcher, in which he 
provides a better description of the loges than the French civil servants themselves were able to 
produce:  
 
                                                 
11 William B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1971), pp. 60-1, 123-4, 134-5. 
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From the voluminous files in the Consulate it appears that there are eight only viz, Calicut, 
Masulipatam, Balasore, Patna, Surat, Dacca, Kasim Bazar, Jugdea. Of the above Surat consists 
of two pieces of land and there is a French enclave named Geretti near Chandernagor but this, I 
believe, is recognized as part of Chandernagor. …Of the other Jugdea is under the sea and 
Patna has never been found. Dacca also consists of two pieces of land. The French maintain a 
police post, or rather shed, at Masulipatam and it appears that criminal matters are dealt with by 
the police who arrive first on the scene!! It is under the Administrator of Yanam and the Governor 
tells me that the Administrator visited it recently and was received with acclaim and a display of 
French bunting by the inhabitants. The serving of civil summons has led to endless squabbles in 
the past. There is apparently a French flagstaff and a minor French employee, known officially as 
the French Agent, but referred to by the Governor as the ‘’concierge’’. At Calicut there is a similar 
“concierge”. I do not know if there are any police at Calicut and I am finding out at Masulipatam 
there is usually one but I believe occasionally there are two. Calicut is dealt with by the 
Administrator of Mahé and Surat appears to be nominally under the jurisdiction of the French 
Consul, Bombay….Balasore is leased by the Government of India. No jurisdiction appears to be 
exercised by the French in Surat. In Dacca the French do not appear to have exercised any 
jurisdiction for over a hundred years. In Kasim Bazar the French have not exercised any 
jurisdiction [and]….the Iskitippah Islands are only sandbanks, which often change their position, 
are frequently covered by water, and have no value…12 
 
In this letter, Fletcher confirms that some of the patches of land had disappeared while others had 
simply been the product of some colonial myth. He clearly questions France’s jurisdiction over still 
other patches, since the British police were involved in dealing with some of the criminal matters 
                                                 
12 Calude Arpi, Pondicherry: The last months before India’s Independence. Perspectives of a British Consul General, 
August 15, 2005, <http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Interets_Britanniques.pdf>, viewed 26 
January 2014, pp. 26-7; Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (New Delhi: JN Memorial Fund 
Teen Murti House,1984),  Vol. 3, p. 412. 
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in those places. Moreover, by likening the French colonial representative to a ‘concierge’, he 
undermines any kind of legitimacy France might have over the loges. Compared to some French 
civil servants’ blunt admission that ‘no one knew exactly where the loges were’, Fletcher’s report 
to the representative of the Indian Interim government (2 September 1946 – 15 August 1947) 
shows that Britain’s record system was by far more efficient and accurate, and could easily be 
used to challenge the right to sovereignty of Britain’s old rival.13 After all, Fletcher was sharing the 
information with the Indian government that would soon be called to negotiate the future of other 
colonial powers, that is France and Portugal, on the subcontinent. The British policy of assigning 
their colonial administrators to one colonial territory, or province in the case of British India, for 
their entire career thus had a definite advantage over the French, making their administrators 
more familiar with the area and better at collecting precious information over a longer period of 
time. 
The loges provided few economic benefits for the French with the exception of 
Masulipatnam. In 1822, a bar was set up from which the French government collected a 
moderate amount of revenue from taxes on the sale of alcohol, but this revenue greatly increased 
between 1843 and 1851 due to a British regiment stationed nearby. The British authorities were 
concerned that ‘the French pettah …had become a refuge for dissolute characters of all 
descriptions’, and offered a yearly indemnity of 3,550 rupees (8,520 francs) in exchange for the 
closure of the bar and the cessation of alcohol production.14 The move was also part of an 
attempt to address the problem of intoxication in British colonial society which challenged the 
right of a superior civilisation to rule over Indians.15 
                                                 
13 Étude sur les possessions françaises dans l’Inde 24 Juin 1947, AOM, Inde, H23: Étude sur les possessions 
françaises. 
14 The negotiations first involved the possibility of exchanging the loges of Masulipatnam for British-held land in 
Pondichéry, but the convention of 31 March 1853 settled on a yearly indemnity, Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., 
p. 447. 
15 Harald Fischer-Tiné, ‘The drinking habits of our countrymen’: European Alcohol Consumption and 
Colonial Power in British India’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No. 3, 
(2012), pp. 383-408. 
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David Annoussamy mentions that the definition of a loge in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, compared to comptoirs, which implied land ownership, was a commercial 
facility on an area for which no land transaction had occurred.16 This definition is challenged by 
More, who mentions that the loge of Masulipatnam had been purchased.17 In any case, it is not 
necessary for the purpose of this discussion to establish the distinguishing particularities and 
history of all these tiny pieces of land, since the French Ministry eventually bundled them up 
together and referred to them all as loges in the course of diplomatic negotiations. In total, these 
non-contiguous loges covered an approximate area of four square kilometers and, according to 
the Ministry of Overseas France, had a population of between 2,000 to 3,000 in 1947. But the 
loges were not the only territorial particularities of French India. 
 
A patchwork 
When observing the location of the five main territories on a map of the subcontinent, 
several issues become readily apparent. The distances between the other territories and 
Pondichéry, the administrative centre of French India, seem remarkable: Chandernagor was 
1,905 kilometres from the capital, a distance similar to that between Paris and Algiers. To 
Yanaon, it was 840 kilometres and to Mahé, 635, while Karikal, the closest neighbour to 
Pondichéry, was 150 kilometres away.18 Such distances only helped deepen local resentment 
towards a colonial administrative centre that ‘paid little attention to them’, and this would 
eventually lead Chandernagor, Mahé, and Yanaon to rebel against the French authorities at the 
time of India’s independence and over the period of the Franco-Indian negotiations.19 
These distances made official travelling between Pondichéry and other far-flung 
territories difficult and infrequent. For example, in the early part of the twentieth century, it could 
                                                 
16 Annoussamy, op.cit., p. 21. 
17 More, The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam, op.cit., p. 8. 
18 Miles, op.cit., p.5. 
19 David, op.cit., pp. 90-1. 
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take up to three days to get to Chandernagor from Pondichéry by sea or by land.20 In 1950, to 
travel from Pondichéry to Yanaon one had to take the Madras Mail and travel overnight to 
Samalkot (Andhra Pradesh), then catch a train to Kakinada and cover the last few miles by car on 
a dirt road.21 On the other hand, in 1958 the Représentant français in Pondichéry (the title of the 
colonial administrator after 1954), Robert Morel-Francoz, described to his superior, the 
ambassador Comte d’Ostrorog , how difficult it was to reach Yanaon from Pondichéry because of 
the lack of bridges over the rivers Krishna and Godavery, probably swept away after the 
monsoon; instead he had to take a rather long detour via Hyderabad.22 This paucity of official 
visits only helped foment the general feeling of resentment from the local population, most 
particularly the Chandernagorians who did not like being ruled by people from the South. 
Viewing a map of the subcontinent also makes it abundantly clear that the French 
territories were surrounded by British India, and had to rely on British Indian infrastructure for 
transportation and communication. Under various agreements and conventions, and for an 
agreed monetary payment, the government of British India provided access to major 
communication services, the Post and Telegraphs, and the railways.23 Other essential services 
and supplies were also available from British India at a cost, including paddy, wheat, pulses, 
petrol, coal, kerosene oil, fuel oil, cloth, yarn, firewood, iron, steel, groundnuts, manure, fertilisers, 
sugar, paper, molasses, road materials, electricity for lighting and industrial purposes, coffee, 
cement, and machine parts.24 While this long list of supplies foregrounds French dependency on 
British Indian products, it similarly highlights the level of control that could be exercised by the 
British or, as would happen later, by the independent government of India. 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 89. 
21 Alfred-Alphonse-Léon Bigot,  Le Jardin botanique de Yanaon  (Pondichéry, Impr. de Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1950), 
p.10. 
22 Robert Morel-Francoz, Représentant Français à Pondichéry à Comte Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux 
Indes, 15 décembre 1958, a/s visite à Yanaon, AD, Vol. 340: Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
23 Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale, Carnet de documentation sur l’enseignement dans la France d’Outre-mer, 
Carnet No.15, ‘Les établissements français de l’Inde (Paris: Service de coordination de l’enseignement dans la 
France d’outre-mer, 1946), p. 8. 
24 Rajkumar, op.cit., p. 21. 
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Yet another aspect of this dependency related to defence. Since 1737, France had 
recruited local Indian men to form the armed forces, referred to after 1857 as ‘cipahis’ (sepoys), a 
name that was provoking to the English who had just faced rebellion from their own sepoy 
forces.25 Traditionally, most of these local troops were stationed in Pondichéry, Karikal, and 
Chandernagor, since Yanaon and Mahé were smaller villages and, it was believed, required less 
policing.26 Until 1885, decrees continued the tradition, initiated under the Old Regime, of allowing 
the recruitment of new sepoys from northern British India, a decision based on the smallness of 
the French Indian population. Not only was this custom introduced by Dumas, the governor of 
Pondichéry in 1737, an affront to the British, it also breached French laws stipulating that only 
French subjects or citizens could be accepted into the army.27 The difficulty in recruiting local 
French Indians to join the defence corps explains why no French sepoys were sent to France 
during the World Wars, with only volunteers joining the fight. However, French Indian soldiers 
were stationed in Indochina, probably to avoid the 1814 Treaty ban, and were used in 1918 and 
1919 to suppress demonstrations in Indochina.28  
In 1946, there were 672 French Indian non-commissioned officers and sepoys, and 
twenty European officers and non-commissioned officers.29 Since Article 12 of the Treaty of Paris 
(1814) had forbidden the erection of fortifications in all parts of French India and limited its 
defence ‘to only such troops as might be necessary for police purposes’, the lack of military 
defence, especially during the Karikal riot of 1845, had demonstrated the vulnerability of France’s 
position in India and her dependency on her neighbour to control the indigenous population.30 
                                                 
25 Jean-Charles Jauffret, ‘Un témoin de l’anglophobie de la fin du siècle dernier: le corps des cipahis’, Revue 
d’Histoire Diplomatique, Vol. 102, No. 3-4 (Septembre 1988), pp. 253, 255. 
26 Ibid., pp. 254-5. 
27 Ibid., pp. 253, 255-6. 
28 Ibid., p. 260; Pairaudeau, 'Via l'Indochine’, op.cit., p. 26; see Martin Thomas, Chapter 6, ‘Rubber, coolies and 
communists: Policing disorder in French Vietnam’, Violence and Colonial Order Police: Workers and Protest in the 
European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for a discussion on colonial 
repression on rubber plantations in the inter-war years. 
29 There were 447 in Pondichéry,153 in Karikal, 43 in Chandernagor, 15 in Mahé and 14 in Yanaon. Weber, 
Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., p. 359. 
30 Université de Perpignan,  Digithèque  des matériaux juridiques et politiques, created 1998, Traité de paix de Paris 
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The situation became quite peculiar after independence, when India continued to fulfil the same 
obligations as the former colonial authority. As the Indian Ministry of External Affairs remarked in 
1949, ‘in case of civil commotion [in French India], the French government would have to rely on 
the government of India for military assistance’.31 Hence, in an unusual twist of fate, France, as a 
colonising power, would have to call upon the forces of the independent country that it partly 
occupied to defend her colonialist position. Nehru, however, questioned the conditions of the 
Franco-British treaty, noting the need to unearth and examine it and asserting that in any event 
this document could not dictate the new government of India’s actions.32 
Portuguese India shared similar territorial characteristics to French India. Georges 
Chaffard, a journalist who wrote extensively on the decolonisation of the French empire, states 
that Portuguese India, located on the west coast of the sub-continent, was made up of a 
‘homogenous bloc of 500,000 inhabitants’.33 But this statement is incorrect. Goa was certainly the 
largest and most important territory of Portuguese India, with an area of 2,903 square kilometres, 
or ten times the size of Pondichéry, and a population of 548,000 in 1950. Portuguese India also 
included Daman, which was a little over 238 square kilometres in area with a population of 
69,000, but the territory was made up of three separate pieces of land: Daman proper, Dadrà (a 
very small enclave), and Nagar-Aveli, which, with an area of 180 square kilometres, made up the 
bulk of the Daman territory. Dadrà and Nagar-Aveli were separated from Daman proper by a strip 
of Indian territory nine kilometres wide. Finally, Diu was an island off the Kathiawar peninsula and 
included the village of Gogola on the mainland and the fort of Simbur on an islet 22 kilometres out 
to sea. The total area was just over 32 square kilometres with a population in 1950 of 21,000 
                                                                                                                                               
(1814), < http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1814paris.htm>, viewed 24 March 2011. 
31 Ministry of External Affairs, 22 February 1949, NAI, 15 (11) EUR I/49: Situation in the French Establishments in 
India. 
32 Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 5, p. 555. 
33 Chaffard, op.cit., p. 200. 
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(Map 2).34 Compared to French India, Portuguese India had a long coastline and greater area, 
which allowed her to be less dependent on India for daily necessities.35  
Furthermore, in contrast to France, Portugal shared defence treaties with Britain, her 
long-time ally in the region, giving considerable leverage to the Portuguese in India. The Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty of 1661, confirmed by a secret declaration of 1899, obliged Britain ‘to defend 
and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the crown of Portugal against its enemies, ... 
future and present’.36 As such, Britain faced the singular situation that by facilitating India’s 
independence, it could at the same time drag itself into an armed dispute between India and 
Portugal. However the Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office emphasised that ‘like every 
other State, the United Kingdom had the right to decide whether a casus foederis – case for the 
alliance – existed, and even if it existed the government might have other reasons, military or 
political, that would prevent it from giving Portugal material help’.37 Hence, Britain retained the 
right to not intervene should armed struggle between India and Portugal arise. The Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty nevertheless reminded Nehru of the possible consequences that a forced 
intervention in Goa could trigger.38 
Another particularity of French India was its cultural diversity, and hence lack of 
uniformity or unifying French Indian cultural bonds, a situation similar to that found in British India. 
The population of Chandernagor was Bengali, and the city’s proximity to Calcutta, capital of 
British India until 1911, easily exposed this French enclave to Indian revolutionary activism, such 
as the Swadeshi movement (1905-1908). The aim of the movement was to reverse the British 
colonial administration’s decision to partition Bengal into two parts for administrative reasons, and 
their strategy involved the boycott of all foreign goods in favour of local products (swadesh means 
                                                 
34 Parker, op.cit., p. 390. 
35 Bègue, ‘La valeur de l’ «exemple français » dans le conflit indo-portugais sur Goa’, op.cit., footnote 2, p. 316. 
36 Present position (December 1949) in regard to the Portuguese Possessions in India, NA, FO371/76089: Relations 
between India and France and Portugal. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bègue, ‘La valeur de l’ «exemple français » dans le conflit indo-portugais sur Goa’, op.cit., p. 323. 
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of ‘one’s own country’).39 Tensions between partisans of the Swadeshi movement and British 
Indian authorities resulted in political dissidents fleeing Calcutta and seeking refuge in 
Chandernagor, thus turning the enclave into a centre for the pro-independence movement. British 
authorities considered this French enclave to be ‘the most dangerous’ spot in Bengal.40 
Chandernagor also experienced a dramatic rise in refugees from neighbouring western Bengal 
during the communal unrest that plagued the region prior to partition, a development that further 
diluted French culture in the territory.41  
The two smallest French Indian territories are situated at opposite direction of each other. 
The inhabitants of Mahé, located on the western coast over six hundred kilometres from 
Pondichéry, are Malayalam speakers and had little in common with the administrative centre. 
Finally, Yanaon lies in a Telugu-speaking region of Andhra Pradesh, and had cultural ties with 
Hyderabad, a princely state that initially refused to merge with the Union of India at the time of 
independence.42 Only Karikal, situated one hundred and fifty kilometres south of Pondichéry in 
Tamil Nadu, shared cultural traditions with the administrative centre, even though it had a larger 
Muslim population than that of Pondichéry.  
In addition to being surrounded, like all the French Indian territories, by British-held 
territory, Pondichéry, Mahé, and Yanaon were also composed of a number of small separate 
pieces of land, making the administrative management of the communes difficult. Indeed 
Pondichéry consisted of eight separate communes – Pondichéry, Ariankuppam, Bahoor, 
Mudaliarpet, Nettapakkam, Oulgaret, Tirubuvanai, and Villanoor – spread over twelve parcels of 
land crosscut by British-held land (Map 4). Tiny Mahé was made up of two parcels (Map 5), and 
                                                 
39 Swadeshi means what appertains to one’s own country and stood in opposition to ‘bideshi’ which means in Bangla, 
the language of Bengal, ‘foreign’, Ranajit Guha, A Disciplinary Aspect of Indian Nationalism (Santa Cruz: University 
of California, 1991), p. 1-2. 
40 Neogy, French Decolonisation: op.cit., p. 4. 
41 Le gouverneur de l’Inde française à Mr le Ministre de la France d’Outre-mer, a/s Chandernagor, Pondichéry 23 
Juillet 1946, AD, Inde française, Vol. 24: Chandernagor;  massive exodus will continue after partition Jawaharlal 
Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 5, p. 340. 
42 Étude sur les possessions françaises dans l’Inde 24 juin 1947, AOM, Inde, H23: Études sur les possessions 
françaises. 
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while most studies do not mention Yanaon as being discontiguous, a close study of the map 
shows that a canal actually separated it into two distinct parcels (Map 6).43 Karikal consisted of 
six contiguous communes: Karikal, Grande Aldée, Nedungadu, Cotchery, Neravy, and Tirunallar 
(Map 7). Chandernagor consisted of one unified commune (Map 8). Nagoji Vasudev Rajkumar, 
the Foreign Secretary of the Indian National Congress, noted in his critique on French India in 
1951 that ‘in several cases the front of [a] house is in Indian territory with the backyard under 
French occupation’, a situation which again pointed to the vulnerability of the French position in 
India.44 Some roads cut through the borders up to eight times, and the Ginjy river in Pondichéry 
crossed from French to British territory no fewer than nine times.45   
                                                 
43 Miles, op.cit., p.5; Rajkumar, op.cit., p.11. 
44 Ibid., p. 12. 
45 Établissements français dans l’Inde, service des contributions chef du service des contributions à Mr le 
Gouverneur des Établissements français dans l’Inde, Pondichéry, 30 Juin 1908, AOM, Inde, G38: Échange des 
territoires. 
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Map 4: Pondichéry. The shaded areas represent French Indian parcels. Source: Pépin-Malherbe, Carte 
des côtes de l’Inde, 1862. 
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Map 5: Mahé. The shaded areas represent the French Indian territory. Source: Pépin-Malherbe, Carte des 
côtes de l’Inde, 1862. 
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Map 6: Yanaon. The shaded areas represent the French Indian territory. Source: Pépin-Malherbe, Carte 
des côtes de l’Inde, 1862. 
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Map 7: Karikal. The shaded areas represent the French Indian territory. Source: Pépin-Malherbe, Carte 
des côtes de l’Inde, 1862. 
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Map 8: Chandernagor. The shaded areas represent the French Indian territory. Source: Pépin-Malherbe, 
Carte des côtes de l’Inde, 1862. 
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Hence, general daily activities carried out by both the local population and the colonial 
authorities involved trespassing onto British territory, a singularly peculiar situation. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, the curious territorial characteristics of the French outposts were the result of a 
number of struggles and various skirmishes between French and British ambitions on the 
subcontinent from the mid-seventeenth century until the Treaty of Paris, when France was 
handed back her Indian territories as they existed in 1792. This was a calculated decision by the 
British aimed at preventing the French from resuming their former economic prosperity in India 
and hindering any further economic development.46 However, despite many complaints from the 
French, the British did not return the entirety of the territories.47 In the case of Mahé, of the 
original 2,400 hectares under French control in 1792, only 900 hectares were reinstated.48  
Furthermore, according to French reports, not only did the British authorities retain some 
of the land, but they also further partitioned the original parcels. Such was the case, in 1895, with 
the sea access of the loge of Calicut.49 Even the British acknowledged that there were on both 
sides ‘constant bickering about boundaries and complaints of encroachment; whether the 
boundary of Chandernagor lay in mid-stream or on the other bank of the Hooghly river, whether 
alluvial islands, or the Godavari River near Yanaon were French or British and that such disputes 
were perennial’.50 Nonetheless, the overall policy of the British in regard to French India was 
encroachment and dismemberment of the French enclaves, which conflicted with a general 
French representation of French India as a grand colonial territory. 
                                                 
46 Jacques Weber, ‘Des barbelés sur le Coromandel : La « guerre froide » franco-indienne (1949-1954)’ in Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, No. 190 (juin 1998), p. 30. 
47 Conclusions, AOM, Inde, H23:  Délimitation du territoire de Mahé. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Confidential paper, South East Asia Department, 4 March 1949, NA, FO371/76086:  Relations between India and 
France and India and Portugal. 
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Maps and the Exposition coloniale as fictional modes of representations 
French India was represented in different ways depending on the message to be 
conveyed. The lack of uniformity among the comptoirs led to some noticeable contradictions in 
the way they were depicted, and omissions often indicated a lack of familiarity with the 
particularities of French India. But the overall intent was to perpetuate the myth of French imperial 
grandeur in India, a campaign in which even the term ‘French India’ played a role. Although the 
official name for the five comptoirs and the loges was Les établissements français de l’Inde, 
hinting at the plurality and smallness of the territories, the French government usually referred to 
them as Inde française (French India), a designation that gave them a much more important and 
unified aspect. 
Moreover, despite their cultural, historical, and territorial differences, the French 
government administratively controlled the comptoirs and loges as a single entity, a practice that 
was also applied to other small French overseas territories. The five archipelagos in the group 
that constituted the Établissements français de l’Océanie (EFO), for example, were similarly 
amalgamated to form one administrative entity. The EFO included the Marquisas archipelago in 
eastern Polynesia, Tahiti, Moorea and other smaller Society islands, the Gambier islands, the 
Tuamotu Islands, and finally the Austral archipelagos.51 Other such administrative arrangements 
included the Comoros Islands, which comprised the islands of Njazidja, Mwali, Nzwani, Mayotte, 
and Dzaoudzi. Likewise, the Terres Australes et Antarctiques encompassed various islands in the 
Southern Indian ocean and the Antarctic ocean, and Terre Adélie on the Antarctic continent.52 As 
with the comptoirs, the administrative organisation of these territories elided the cultural and 
religious diversities found in areas that were separated by considerable distances across land 
and ocean.53  
Maps played a crucial role in the representation of French India and conveyed particular 
                                                 
51 Aldrich and Connell, op.cit., pp. 43, 35.  
52 Ibid., p. 3. 
53 Ibid., p. 242. 
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messages, especially to those who were unfamiliar with the history and particularities of the 
comptoirs. J. P. Harley mentions that ‘maps are not straightforward and express values while 
retaining ambiguities; they are indeed slippery witnesses’.54 French Indian names scattered along 
the Indian coastline offered an image of French India in relation to British India and to Asia. This 
had the effect of emphasising France’s physical presence in the region, as well as exaggerating 
the importance of French India on the subcontinent, since the non-contiguous and patchwork-like 
aspect of the comptoirs and their lack of uniformity was not revealed. For instance, a blotter 
produced in 1897 for customers of the department store Au Bon Marché in Paris presented the 
French empire in various small maps; it offered an image of Pondichéry (Map 9) as a contiguous 
territory only cross-cut by rivers and roads. While the unlabelled blank area surrounding Mahé 
(Map 9) could indicate to the uneducated viewer that the land was uninhabited, it was in fact 
densely populated British-held territory. Above all, this form of representation attempted to erase 
past Franco-British rivalries in India from the colonial memory, and shape ideas of the French 
colonial presence.55 
                                                 
54 J. B. Harley, ‘The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography’, in J.B. Harley and David Woodward 
(eds), The History of Cartography, Vol 1 (Chicago University Press: Chicago, 1987), p. 3. 
55 Ibid. p. 4 
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Map 9: A simplified map of Pondichéry and Mahé. Source: Agenda-buvard. Carte des colonies 
françaises dressée spécialement pour les magasins du Bon-Marché. 
 
 
 
The general map of the comptoirs depicted in the blotter is also revealing (Map 10). First 
of all, the southern end of the Indian peninsula is not labelled ‘British India’ – which would denote 
the rival administrative and colonial authority – but instead is marked as ‘Dekkan’, an Indian 
region historically connected to the ephemeral conquest of Dupleix in the mid-eighteenth century. 
The reference to Dupleix’s territorial exploits initiates colonial nostalgia for past French imperial 
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grandeur in India. However, while two French flags above the names of Pondichéry and Yanaon 
amplify French colonial presence, the absence of such national symbols next to Mahé, Karical 
(sic), and Chandernagor is rather misleading as it does not highlight their colonial status. Thus, 
ironically, while the map attempted to proudly depict France’s presence in India and serve as an 
educational or at best a marketing tool to promote colonial products available at the Au Bon 
Marché store, its omission of three of the comptoirs only resulted in reducing France’s position 
and demonstrates the unfamiliarity of what actually constituted French India. 
 
Map 10: Map of comptoirs des Indes showing Pondichéry and Yanaon as French comptoirs. 
Source: Agenda-buvard. Carte des colonies françaises dressée spécialement pour les magasins du Bon-
Marché. 
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Similarly, a pamphlet produced by the Ministère des Colonies in 1932 to promote travel to 
French India emphasised the size of the five French Indian territories on the maps, which are 
mentioned as large if not larger than the British Indian ports of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. 
The pamphlet also refrained from using the term ‘British India’, writing instead ‘Inde’ in the centre 
of the map, with presumably again the intention of erasing a painful reminder of France’s 
subordinate status on the subcontinent.  
Maps were also instrumental in portraying the loyalty of the empire during the Second World 
War, and helped boost morale after the German Occupation of France in June 1940. At the end 
of that year, France Libre produced a series of maps, parts of which have been coloured by hand 
with pastel sticks; names of towns and countries are also handwritten, suggesting that the 
authors did not have access to appropriate printing equipment to deliver a uniform document. The 
maps emphasise the number of colonies that had joined de Gaulle’s Appeal in contrast to those 
that had accepted orders from the new Vichy government headed by Marshal Pétain. The civil 
war that pitted de Gaulle against Pétain after France’s capitulation to Germany was also being 
played out in the empire, and the printed propaganda proudly listed the number of colonial 
inhabitants across the three continents that had ‘spontaneously chosen to continue the war for 
the liberation of the mother country’.56 A map of the world entitled Les territoires de la France libre 
(Map 11) depicted France and her colonial empire, which included as occupied Vichy-controlled 
territories Guyane, Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), Algeria, Madagascar, and Indochina. 
The West Indies, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, La Réunion, the Chinese territory of Quang-Tchéou-
Wan, New Caledonia, and the territories in the South Pacific were not included in this list of 
French overseas territories. 
Territories that rallied to France were represented in red, and included Congo, Gabon, 
Oubagi-Chari, Chad forming the Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF), and the protectorate of 
                                                 
56 France Libre, Les Colonies libres [A.E.F., Cameroun, Nouvelle Calédonie, Nouvelles Hébrides, Établissements 
Français du Pacifique et de l'Inde], (circa 1940). 
 92 
 
Cameroun. In Asia, four red dots represented the French Indian territories of Chandernagor, 
Pondichéry, Karikal, and Mahé. Yanaon was omitted. A second document comprising four maps 
and entitled Possessions francaises libres de l’Inde et d’Australasie shows a map of New 
Caledonia, one of the New Hebrides, another of Les Iles de la Société and Les Marquises (the 
Society and Marquesas Islands), and finally a map of Les établissements français de l’Inde (Map 
12). Once again Yanaon is not mentioned as a French Indian territory.  
These maps offered a vision that de Gaulle’s call had been heard by France’s far-flung 
territories, thus demonstrating the impact of his mission. The comments that supplemented the 
maps stated that  
the colonies that rallied to Free France have an area of over 3 million square kilometres, 
or five and a half times the size of France, with a population of 6,237,000 inhabitants 
across three continents, that is in Africa, AEF and Cameroun, in Asia, the French 
Establishments in India, and in Oceania, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the 
French Establishments in the Pacific.57  
By providing a comparison between the size of the métropole and the colonies, and by 
mentioning colonies on three continents involving over six million inhabitants, the comments 
intended to amplify the importance of the colonies that had rallied to de Gaulle. The depiction of 
those overseas French territories links them to the plight of the motherland, even though these 
French colonies’ decision to rally was often based on a desire to support Great Britain and Allied 
strategy rather than to show unconditional allegiance to de Gaulle.58 Given the Lilliputian size of 
the French Indian territories, it was almost inconceivable not to follow British India. Thus, the 
territories were amongst the first colonies to rally, with Chanderagor on 20 June followed six 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Regnault  and Kurtovitch, op.cit., pp. 74-5. 
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weeks later by the other enclaves.59 However, by omitting Yanaon on the two maps whose 
purpose was to highlight French overseas territories that had rallied to de Gaulle, one can deduce 
that the authors were unfamiliar with the fact that French India consisted of five distinct territories, 
not four. Furthermore, the French name of ‘Pondichéry’ has been written in its anglicised version, 
‘Pondicherry’.  
These oversights may well have gone unnoticed, since the audience for which the maps 
were intended was also probably unaware of the territorial characteristics of French India. And 
the spelling mistake may suggest that an English officer, perhaps from London where de Gaulle 
had escaped to and had sent his message from, might have been responsible for the creation of 
the French India map. In general, however, the maps discussed above provide an example of the 
type of information that was intentionally conveyed. They were not used to communicate 
meticulous facts about the territorial and cultural characteristics of French India, but to propagate 
specific messages that enhanced France’s colonial presence in India and perpetuated the myth 
of a ‘French India’ larger and more important that it really was. In particular, the maps of French 
India produced by France Libre helped reinforce a vision of French grandeur at a time of defeat 
and national struggle.  
                                                 
59 Cantier, op.cit., p.337; Éric Jennings, ‘La politique coloniale de Vichy’, in Jacques Cantier and Éric Jennings, 
L'empire colonial sous Vichy (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004), p.17. 
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Map 11: The French Empire in 1940. Areas in green represent France and its colonial empire under 
occupation and Vichy-controlled; the area and dots in red represent Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF) 
and the French Indian Territories that rallied to Free France. Syria and Lebanon are represented in grey 
with a red border, as they were both under mandate status.  Source: France Libre, Les Colonies libres. 
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Map 12: Map showing that the Établissements Français de l’Inde had rallied to France Libre, circa 
1940. Only Chandernagore, Mahe [sic], Pondicherry [sic], and Karikal are shown. Source: France Libre, 
Les Colonies libres. 
 
 
 
French India was also characterised as speaking French, as shown on a map of La France, 
ses colonies et les pays de langue française. In the original document, the five outposts are 
underlined in red ink, a colour used to depict colonies or countries that speak French. Indochina 
was also included as a Francophone country (Map 13).60 The map was presumably intended to 
propagate the belief that, despite their lack of territorial homogeneity and the vast distances that 
separated the enclaves, the French Indian territories shared a cultural commonality, namely the 
use of the French language. This helped emphasise the success of France’s mission civilisatrice 
                                                 
60 Claudius Madrolle, La France, ses colonies et les pays de langue française, câbles et lignes françaises de 
navigation (Berne: Institut géographique, 1894). 
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and provide a ‘cultural’ separation between French India and India, whether India was perceived 
as British or in more traditional terms. At the same time, the information embodied in the map 
promoted the omnipotence of the French language, bringing the colony closer to the motherland 
despite the distance between the two. Again, the role of the map was not to provide accurate 
facts, since French was never readily spoken in the comptoirs – in fact, less than ten percent of 
the population, residing mainly in the administrative centre of Pondichéry, ever spoke French – 
but to demonstrate the extent of France’s colonial power and cultural influence.61 
 
Map 13: Map showing colonies and countries that speak French. Source: La France, ses colonies et 
les pays de langue française, câbles et lignes françaises de navigation, Claudius Madrolle. La France, ses 
colonies et les pays de langue française, câbles et lignes françaises de navigation (1894). 
 
 
                                                 
61 Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à Mr le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a/s 
communication d’une note de M. Gandon sur les options de nationalité à Pondichéry, 22 Juin 1955, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
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Another means of promoting the importance of French India was through the French 
Indian Pavilion at the Exposition coloniale internationale de Paris in 1931, which provided a 
specialised site that foregrounded a particular image of what French India was. The Exposition 
ran from May to November 1931 in the Bois de Vincennes, in the eastern part of Paris. The dates 
of the exhibition coincided with the centenary of the French conquest of Algeria (1830), as well as 
the finalisation of Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau’s compilation of the Histoire des 
colonies françaises et de l’expansion française dans le monde. Martineau was a former 
administrator of French India, and the publication detailed France’s colonial exploits and the 
diversity of her empire.62 The exhibition welcomed over 8 million visitors, testifying to the success 
of the entreprise that had been orchestrated by Marshall Louis Hubert Gonzalve Luyautey (1854 
– 1943), a French army officer and the first French Resident-Général in Morocco from 1921 to 
1925.63 He was known as the ‘pacifier’ of Morocco, Madagascar, and Indochina, and his name 
resonated with colonial success. At the age of seventy-seven, when most career men enjoy 
retirement, Lyautey was appointed Commissaire Général de l’Exposition to coordinate this 
colonial celebration. The Exposition formed part of a French tradition of specialised fairs and 
carnival-like exhibitions, earlier examples of which took place in Rouen in 1896, Marseille in 1906 
and 1922, Bordeaux in 1907, and Roubaix in 1911. More specifically, the Exposition of 1931 
emerged out of the success of the Exposition Universelle de Paris 1900, which included a 
colonial section.64  
In contrast to previous eclectic and festival-like exhibitions, Lyautey wanted the 1931 
Exposition to educate the French public as well as stimulate investment in the colonies. While the 
                                                 
62 Gabriel Hanotaux,  Histoire des colonies françaises et de l’expansion de la France dans le monde, (Paris: Société 
de l’histoire nationale, 1929). 
63 Didier Grandsart, Paris 1931: Revoir l’exposition coloniale, (Paris: Editions FVW, 2010), pp. 103-4; Robert Aldrich, 
Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France : Monuments, Museums, and Colonial Memories (Basingtoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005), p. 35; Robert Aldrich, ‘Le Guide de l’Exposition coloniale et l’ideologie coloniale dans l’entre-deux- 
guerres, in Gilles Chabaud et al., Les guides imprimés du XVIe au XXe siècle: Villes, paysages and voyages (Paris: 
Belin, 2000), pp. 607-18. 
64 Morton, op.cit., p. 71. 
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Exposition was aimed at enticing the interest of the business community and the general public, it 
was also intended to glorify the French civilising mission and highlight the colonial 
accomplishments of France.65 The challenge of the exhibition was to remain a coherent space 
that could entertain as well as offer the illusion of ‘an ordered domain in which every thing and 
every person had its proper place’; it had to incite curiosity and pride, not overwhelm or cause 
anxiety.66 With the Exposition, Lyautey offered a specific ‘colonial’ vision of the world organised 
along racial lines and modelled on a hierarchical order. Architecture was one of the primary 
means in which this stereotyped order was expressed and exemplified by the pavilions. Depicting 
the evolutionary progress of French colonies in architecture was a demanding task, and resulted 
in hybrid pavilions whose purpose was to appear primitive and exotic while complying to the 
imperatives of designing buildings appropriate for Paris and its public. At the apex of this colonial 
order stood European civilisation, as reflected in the impressive art-deco French pavilions of the 
Cité des Informations, the Section Métropolitaine, and the Musée des colonies, all of which 
represented French power, sophistication, technological advancement, and knowledge. The Cité 
des Informations provided education and information on the colonies, while the Section 
Métropolitaine exhibited goods and materials produced for export to the French colonies. The 
Musée des colonies was a ‘clearing-house for information on the results and techniques on 
French colonisation’.67  
The pavilions of Asian and African colonies were built to reproduce a certain image that 
was already present in French minds, and to enable a cultural objectification of the colonies. The 
vision of French India was reflected in the Exposition coloniale’s booklet entitled ‘L’Inde française’ 
(Fig. 1). The main themes of exoticism, voyages, commercial ventures, and history associated 
with French India were portrayed in a streamlined art-deco image that appeared on the front page 
of the booklet. The very simplified map shows, at the bottom left corner, a deserted winding road 
                                                 
65 Ibid., pp. 73-7 
66 Ibid., p. 79. 
67 Ibid., pp. 19-24, 273-4. 
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lined with coconut trees, an image that seems to symbolise long distances in an exotic 
environment. Located in the top left hand corner of the map, France is linked to India via the 
Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Indian Ocean; here waterways play a crucial part, and 
help emphasise the technological success of the Suez Canal that allowed a quick link to the 
French establishments dotted all along the Indian coastline. Surprisingly, a sailing ship is 
depicted, which contrasts with the fuel-powered ships of the 1930s and seems, in such an 
instance, to recall and accentuate the era of earlier conquests and the pre-1814 French influence 
in India. While the depiction of waterways, roads, and a ship offers an image of transport links 
between France and French India, there was in fact, as mentioned later in the booklet, maritime 
communication only between Marseille and Pondichéry, not the other comptoirs.68 The scarce 
writing in the pamphlet consists of a very large title, ‘L’Inde française’ in the top third of the 
document, the names of the five comptoirs – with Pondichéry in larger characters demonstrating 
its administrative and economic importance – and finally, at the bottom, ‘Exposition Coloniale 
Internationale 1931’. The poster as a whole attributes to French India an important place in this 
impressive exhibition.  
 
                                                 
68 Exposition coloniale,  L'Inde française. Exposition coloniale internationale, Paris 1931 (Paris: Frazier-Soye, 1931), 
p. 10. 
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Fig. 1: Cover of L’Inde française. A booklet printed for the occasion of the Exposition Coloniale 
Internationale, Paris, 1931. Source: Gallica.bnf.fr  
 
The French India pavilion was located at the western end of the Grande Avenue des 
Colonies Françaises, near the Route des Fortifications, and was placed between the pavilions of 
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French Somalia and French Guiana, and across from that of New Caledonia (Fig. 2). There was 
no obvious geographical, historical, or political logic to the location of the various exhibition 
buildings; this was indeed an unusual organisation of French colonies, and pavilions were often 
inconsistent to the type of buildings originally found in the colony.69 Although French India, with its 
five hundred square kilometres, was the second smallest of the French overseas territories after 
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon at twenty-four square kilometres, the French India pavilion was given a 
prominent place in the Exposition, reflecting the long history with France of these tiny territories.70  
                                                 
69 Morton, op.cit., pp. 26-7. 
70 Ageron,  op.cit., p. 43. 
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Fig. 2: Map of the Exposition Internationale Coloniale, Paris 1931. The Grande Avenue des Colonies 
Françaises is located at the bottom left of the map near the ‘garages’. Source: Publicité Apéritif Clacqesin 
avec le plan de l'exposition coloniale. 
 
The French India pavilion was represented by a mixture of Hindu art and architecture 
conceived by the architects Henri Girvès and René Sors; most of the professionals involved in the 
building and the decoration of the pavilion were French, and they probably had little experience of 
the ‘real’ French India.71 The artists worked closely with a committee made up of colonial officers, 
the mayor of Pondichéry, the presidents of the Pondichéry chambers of commerce and 
agriculture, and the directors of schools and public services in Pondichéry.72 Jo Ginestou, head of 
the political department at the Colonial Ministry, was Commissioner of French India at the 
                                                 
71 Exposition coloniale,  L'Inde française, op.cit., pp. 15-32. 
72 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Exposition assisted by a Mr Gaudart, an engineer in French India.73 The organisers admitted that 
the pavilion was not an exact replica of an actual building since it had to follow the stylised 
instructions dictated by Lyautey.74  
The French India pavilion fitted a particular, preconceived idea of glorification and 
exoticism. It was a large, square edifice with an elaborately-decorated turret on its flat roof. 
Surprisingly, no statue of Dupleix, the symbol of the French Indian empire, welcomed the visitor 
to the pavilion. Like the sphinx guarding the entrance of Egyptian temples, statues of two large 
elephants adorned the entrance of the pavilion (Fig. 3), even though this was not a feature seen 
in Hindu architectural styles. The image of the elephant was strongly associated with French 
India, and might also have epitomised the strength and durability of the French presence in the 
East despite British colonial rivalry and supremacy. (A stylised art-deco representation of an 
elephant was used to decorate the first page of one of the Exposition booklets (Fig. 4)). Just past 
the front entrance, visitors stood on a veranda decorated with Hindu statues and exotic plants 
(Fig. 5); a second entrance led to a courtyard, in the middle of which was erected a statue of 
Nataraja, a depiction of the god Shiva as the cosmic dancer (Fig. 6).75   
 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 18. 
74 Exposition coloniale,  L'Inde française, op.cit., p. 15; Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, op.cit., 
p. 13; Morton, op.cit., p. 28. 
75 Exposition Internationale Coloniale 1931, AOM, EC1/145. 
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Fig. 3: The French Indian Pavilion at the Exposition Coloniale, Paris 1931. Source: Quand l’Inde 
Française était à Paris, Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire de l’Inde 
Française. 
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Fig. 4 Cover of the booklet ‘Quand l’Inde française était à Paris’ for the Exposition Coloniale 
Internationale, Paris 1931. Source: Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire 
de l’Inde Française à l’Exposition Coloniale et Internationale de Paris 1931, Quand l’Inde Française était à 
Paris. 
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Fig. 5: External veranda of the French Indian Pavilion at the Exposition Coloniale, Paris 1931. 
Source: Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire de l’Inde Française à 
l’Exposition Coloniale et Internationale de Paris 1931, Quand l’Inde Française était à Paris. 
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Fig. 6: Internal courtyard of the French Indian Pavilion at the Exposition Coloniale, Paris 1931. 
Source: Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire de l’Inde Française à 
l’Exposition Coloniale et Internationale de Paris 1931, Quand l’Inde Française était à Paris. 
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The courtyard was surrounded by three rooms: on the left from the second entrance was 
a room devoted to commerce; opposite the entrance was a room devoted to the arts, and finally 
to the right was the history room. Two small rooms at the extreme left and right corners near the 
main entrance were allocated to a guard and also used as an office.76 Objects and furniture made 
by French Indian artisans, Hindu art works from private and state collections, and memorabilia 
from the French Indian archives helped furnish and decorate the three exhibition rooms. The 
main themes throughout the pavilion were daily life in French India, historical connection with 
France, the exoticism of India, and the fusion of India and France. Hence it presented a Franco-
Indian cultural heritage that helped praise France’s overseas accomplishments.77 These themes 
were expressed through the display of numerous wooden and bronze statues of Hindu deities, 
Shiva, Ganesh, Rama, and Vishnu, reminding the visitors of the omnipotence of Hindu culture in 
French India, while omitting Muslim and Christian cultural aspects. 
Other objects in the Exposition included cookware, jewellery, and utensils made of 
copper, silver, and wood, and wicker baskets. They all showcased local craftsmanship and gave 
an insight into the type of items used in everyday life such as for cooking, carrying food, and 
personal embellishment. French influences were felt in the heavily sculpted wooden home 
furniture: beds, dining tables, side tables, chairs, armchairs, mantelpieces, cabinets, wardrobes, 
picture frames, and mounted clocks. Panels and images carved on this wooden furniture 
represented Hindu scenes, Hindu deities, and exotic animals such as tigers and elephants. The 
association of Indian fauna and Hindu religious figures with European style home furniture 
demonstrated the fusion of French and Indian cultures. However, such furniture could only be 
accessible to Europeans, those of French descent, and a few French Indians such as renonçants 
or wealthy Indians who had adopted aspects of French lifestyle. Money and spacious homes 
were necessary to acquire such large and elaborately carved furnishings. To complete the 
                                                 
76 Plan du pavillon de l’Inde française, AOM, EC1/145.  
77 Lowenthal, ‘Identity, Heritage, and History’, op.cit., pp. 44-5. 
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ensemble, the exhibition room walls were decorated with intricately patterned bed throws, 
carpets, and what seemed to be silk and cotton fabrics, a reminder that the Compagnie’s ships 
had travelled across high seas in pursuit of these sought-after products, while snake skins and 
turtle shells on display accentuated the exoticism of French India.78  
The painted murals ornamenting the three main rooms depicted Indian daily scenes. 
Hindu deities such as ‘Krishna asking the moon to his mother’, ‘Deliverance of Markanda’, 
‘Krishna Leads the Chattel’, and ‘Shiva Watching over Parvati’s Sleep’ could be found in the Arts 
room. In the History room, the walls were adorned with scenes entitled ‘Friendly Meeting between 
the French and Hindu chiefs’ and ‘Naval Battle’ – supposedly between the French and the 
English. Finally, in the Commerce room one could admire ‘The Potter and the Sculptor at Work’.79 
The heavily adorned building and the use of Hindu objects helped expose the sophistication of 
the ancient Hindu culture, which still remained a source of fascination to the Europeans, while the 
murals depicting naval battles reminded visitors of the long Franco-Indian history. Following 
Lyautey’s instructions, the exterior of the French Indian pavilion attempted to remain as ‘real’ as 
possible, while the interior exhibits were meant to display French civilisation’s influence. 
However, there were few similarities between the French India pavilion and the flat-
roofed, traditional houses found in the Indian quarter of Pondichéry, which instead comprised a 
veranda with timber columns supporting a tiled, sloping roof. The entrance was from the street 
through a fine, carved, timber door and then through a main corridor. All the rooms opened onto 
this corridor, which led to a courtyard, where food storage, reception, and kitchen areas could be 
found. Affluent Indians mixed traditional Indian, primarily Dravidian, styles of architecture with 
colonial-style elements such as a French façade and windows with French shutters. The colonial 
style could also be noticed in the upper floors, where European decorative motifs were used on 
                                                 
78 Gouvernement de l’Inde Française et M. Jo. Ginestou, Commissaire de l’Inde Française à l’Exposition Coloniale et 
Internationale de Paris 1931, op.cit., pp. 37- 45, 63-7. 
79 Ibid, pp. 19, 27, 31, 37-67. 
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wall panels. 80 Although the French Indian pavilion of the Exposition had a veranda, its Indian-
style, decorated columns did not support a sloping roof, and the columned turret on top of the flat 
roof was uncharacteristic of French Indian architecture. In addition, the three rooms were only for 
the display of objects, and none of the rooms were dedicated to the kitchen and living quarters.81  
Pursuant Lyautey’s instructions, then, the French India pavilion fulfilled its role, reminding 
the visitor of the long history that connected France and India and exhibiting the exoticism of India 
through the use of objects and symbols, all encapsulated in a mausoleum-like pavilion guarded 
by two oversized statues of elephants. Like the maps discussed above, the Exposition helped to 
manipulate and transform the insignificance of French India into a more important strategic 
colonial asset where French was spoken and French Indians rallied to the motherland at times of 
difficulty. These forms of representation also helped the ‘objectification’ of India to meet specific 
purposes of national aggrandisement.82 They projected an image of the success of the French 
cultural mission and the extent of the French colonial influence, while limiting the effect of l’Inde 
perdue (lost India) a concept highlighting Franco-British rivalries that was manifested more 
conspicuously in literary forms, newspapers, and official documents.   
 
The myth of l’Inde perdue  
As outlined in Chapter 1, Dupleix’s recall from India in 1754 and France’s defeat after the 
Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) marked the end of any dreams of colonial expansion in India, and 
the beginning of the construct of a French India myth. The myth helped transform the failure of 
French colonial expansion in India to that of a triumph associated with French imperial grandeur, 
even though Dupleix’s influence over the Deccan had been ephemeral. The myth provided the 
French with a colonial identity that had spatial, political, and cultural components. In this myth, 
                                                 
80 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p.1215 bis; The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, op.cit., pp. 
91-2, 97-100. 
81 The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, op.cit., p.128. 
82  Cohn, op.cit. 
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India was given a dual role to perform; she became the site where colonial rivalries between 
France and Britain could be expressed, while at the same time she was the space to be 
conquered. The myth of l’Inde perdue elevated France as a liberating alternative to the colonial 
despotism of Britain, often referred to as ‘perfidious Albion’. By 1814, the reduction of France into 
minuscule and defenceless territories along the Indian coastline further cemented anti-British 
views first uttered by French philosophers such as Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, and the Abbé 
Raynal, who had reacted to France’s defeat in India in 1763. Nonetheless, the colonial and 
historical particularities of French India provided a space where representations were fashioned 
within a triangular model that consisted of the colonised (India), the subordinate coloniser 
(France), and the dominant coloniser (Britain).83 
France’s colonial impetus under the Third Republic, combined with education and mass 
printing, facilitated the production of colonial novels. From the turn of the century, French 
travellers and writers contributed to this process by creating images constructed around the myth 
of lost India. Pierre Loti, the pen name of Julien Viaud (1850-1923), a French naval officer and in 
his time a celebrated bestselling novelist, wrote L’Inde (sans les Anglais) (India without the 
English) between 1899 and 1901 while on a mission for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His 
impressions of India provided a nostalgic image of Pondichéry.84 First of all, as indicated by the 
title, Loti intended to discover an India untouched by France’s colonial nemesis, and never once 
mentioned the British in this account of his Indian travels. While his Anglophobia was stressed in 
the book’s dedication to Boer President Kruger and the heroes of the Transvaal, regarded as the 
face of South African resistance to the British, he did not mind using British technology – such as 
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trains – on his quest for a mythical India that had been unaffected by colonialism.85 Another 
example of his flawed search for an ancient India untouched by Western influence is his sojourn 
for ten days in Pondichéry to indulge in French colonial memories.86 
Loti described Pondichéry as a ‘vieille ville éteinte’ (old defunct colony) like Saint-Louis du 
Sénégal, another Old Regime possession.87 He relished Pondichéry’s old-fashioned buildings, 
which went back to a time when ships adventurously sailed to India via the cape of Good Hope, 
and Pondichéry’s old French charm that newer French colonies of the Far East – probably 
referring to Indochina – did not possess. He emphasised how Indians were proud to be French, 
signalling the civic ideal of ‘Frenchness’ that supposedly contrasted the lack of a similar ideal 
amongst British Indians. While Loti reminisced on his childhood dreams of exotic and far-flung 
French India before the Suez Canal considerably shortened the trip, he pointed out that the 
isolation of this ‘vieille petite ville’ (little old town) was due to its ‘hostile neighbours’. Although he 
again refrained from naming the British, he blamed them for the lack of port facilities and 
electricity, both of which resulted in few visitors or tourists disembarking on Pondichéry’s shores. 
Loti melancholically recalled that within Pondichéry’s walls existed ‘tout un passé français’ (an 
entire chapter of ancient French history), and that Dupleix’s statue reminded him of a ‘grandeur 
passée’ (bygone greatness) when France had broader influence in India.88 In this account, Loti 
longingly reflects on the former glory of French India, which the unnamed British had reduced to a 
few isolated and underprivileged territories that no one ever dared venture. It is as if, in the eyes 
of Loti, the British had dimmed the light out of Pondichéry but the place nevertheless remained a 
beacon of Frenchness, of exoticism, and of splendid memories.   
In 1913, Marcel Genlis published Dans l’ incendie tropical, a journal of his travels through 
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South and South-East Asia in which he similarly uses images of melancholia, exoticism, myth, 
and colonial success.89 He begins with the following:  
 
Pondichéry est exquis, c’est du Paul et Virginie le plus pur, c’est resté du temps ou les 
oncles n’étaient toujours pas encore d’Amérique, mais des Grandes Indes, c’est charmant, 
un peu ridicule…. (Pondichéry is exquisite, it is pure Paul and Virginie, it has remained the 
same as when the uncles were not yet from America, but from Great India, it is charming, 
almost ridiculous….) 
 
The author implies that the beauty and calm aspect of Pondichéry contrast starkly with the other 
places he had just visited in India. Genlis then moves on to compare Pondichéry to a 1787 
romantic novel, Paul et Virginie by Jacques-Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, in which the author 
evokes an idealistic life where all races are equal and inhabitants live in perfect harmony with 
nature. With this reference, Genlis links Pondichéry with the Old Regime, thus establishing 
historical continuity between France and India despite the many losses and territorial 
retrocessions France had suffered in India.  
Genlis’ use of the expression ‘l’oncle d’Amérique’, referring to a not-so-distant family 
member who has left for America and made a fortune there, evokes a bygone time when 
adventurers could be rewarded with fabulous wealth in the Indies well before America offered the 
same opportunities. However, although archival sources cannot confirm whether individual 
adventurers actually did amass fortunes in India, the reality most probably did not meet the high 
expectations of those who chose to disembark there in pursuit of such riches. For every 
successful person, many more would have died of disease or violent death, or just barely 
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survived.90 Genlis’ use of such language nevertheless further contributed to the myth-making 
surrounding French India. Compared to Loti, who never once mentioned the British, Genlis 
almost apologises for such a charming town that still exists amongst a much more imposing and 
oppressive British India. He also mentions that, before reaching Pondichéry, he spent the long 
train journey conversing with a young British colonial servant, a reminder of the omnipresence of 
the British Raj. 
Genlis uses all the standard markers of colonial commentary. He mentions the heat and 
the vegetation, the exoticism of India, colonial architecture, missionaries and nuns, the créoles, 
and the French flags. All of these features remind the reader of France’s colonial presence and 
bring all the elements into fusion to suggest the uniqueness of French India, and indeed the 
greatness of France. However the overwhelming tone of the depiction – although the author 
never uses such specific terms – is that of a dream from which the visitor can hardly awaken, a 
dream of the time when France’s Indian empire existed until the British stripped it away. He 
finishes by saying, ‘I feel nowhere else the past being so present, so tangible, more of a siren call 
than here’.91 Epitomising past glories, French India is now portrayed as an alluring and 
dangerous woman who perhaps invites French patriotic heroes to reconquer India.  
The author’s strong nostalgic sentiment for French India exemplifies a recurrent theme 
since the nineteenth century when India was formulated as an earthly paradise, and a belief 
developed that the French would have imposed their power across India if it were not for British 
interference.92 Representations of French India in French literature faced the challenge of writing 
about the loss of French India and about an India that had undeniably become a British India. 
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Painful loss could be obliterated by creating cultural borders that emphasised the differences 
between French and British forms of colonialism, where French values offered a more ideal form 
of governance.93 Marcel Fauchois, for example, emphasised the dualistic opposition of the two 
European powers. His description of his visit to Pondichéry was reproduced in the monthly L’Inde 
illustrée in July 1933. He notes that the French town was not plagued with famine and filth like 
Madras, thus emphasising the virtue of French colonialism compared to that of the British.94 
While Genlis uses French India to reminisce on a glorious past and a French empire ultimately 
crushed by the British, Fauchois brings French India into play in order to highlight Britain’s brutal 
administration and its consequences for the inhabitants.95  
In 1927, the American author Katherine Mayo published a polemical attack on India 
entitled ‘Mother India’; the response by French authors Romain Rolland and André Philip is 
illuminating. Mayo painted a picture of India as one of decadence, poverty, and dread, and 
pointed to the blatant inability of India to become an independent nation. Some suggested the 
book might have been commissioned by the British – after all, it was written as the nationalist 
movement was gaining momentum – and all means possible were used to undermine it. Mayo’s 
book title in French became L’Inde avec les Anglais (India with the British), probably a take on 
Pierre Loti’s L’Inde (sans les Anglais) (India (without the British)). In 1930 Philip (1902-1970), a 
French politician under the Front Populaire who would later become Ministre de l’Économie in 
1951 and a professor of political economy, published his rebuttal, called l’Inde moderne. Rolland 
(1866-1944), a French essayist and Nobel prize laureate for literature (1915) who adhered to the 
principles of pacifism, responded in a preface to the French version of Lajpat Rai’s book, entitled 
l’Inde malheureuse (1930). Both studies were a counter-attack on Mayo’s work, which they 
denounced as evidence of the evil British exploitation of India.96 Philip confined his comments to 
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British India, omitting any mention of France as a colonising power in the same country, or any 
acknowledgement of the important French trade undertaken by the Compagnie des Indes in the 
eighteenth century. Instead, the author explained that the rise of Indian nationalism was a direct 
effect of British colonial presence, and that the determination of its leaders would probably lead 
India to independence.97 At no point does he question a similar scenario in French India or the 
impact that British Indian nationalism might have on French India. Rolland’s preface was a clear 
gesture of support for Rai’s criticism of Mayo’s propaganda, which he described as ‘so totally anti-
Indian and so obviously pro-English’.98 Both authors’ blatant omission of French colonialism in 
India hints at France’s positive governance in India while condemning the British presence in the 
country. 
Similarly, in Désordres à Pondichéry, written by Georges Lamare in 1938, French India is 
depicted as a haven of peace perturbed only by workers’ strikes for which the British are blamed. 
The author uses the growing nationalist movement in British India as evidence of British 
despotism; in contrast, France’s colonial righteousness is demonstrated by French India 
remaining untouched by nationalist troubles.99 Lamare’s focus on the dualistic opposition 
between France and Britain fails to acknowledge that the period of political and social unrest 
experienced by Pondichéry in 1936, which led to police repression, reflected a growing 
discontentment with French as well as British colonialism. Guidebooks also presented an idyllic 
portrayal of French India. In the Guide des colonies françaises: colonies de l’Océan Indien et 
l’Océan Pacifique (1931), Mahé is described as the ‘beautiful sleepy town …. and after admiring 
the beautiful monuments that manifest the richness of the Indian civilisation, one can understand 
the audacity of Dupleix and the greatness of his dreams.’100 Here the beauty of India is the 
justification for Dupleix’s attempt at conquering it, a task that, if successful, would have brought 
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untold prestige to France. 
Official British and French reports too provided numerous examples of l’Inde perdue. The 
British viewed French India as an affront to their colonial power in India, an opinion expressed in 
rather derogatory ways. For them, French India was a perpetual irritant, a constant thorn,101 a 
‘corrupt disease-ridden colony run by cheese-eating alcoholics, who did not care for latrines and 
policing, and who blamed the British for every ill-fate’.102 Reports from the British Consul-General 
in Pondichéry written in 1940 mentioned, with some sarcasm, the horrendous conditions the war 
had inflicted on the French in India:  
 
A more serious situation [than keeping watch for German war ships] however has arisen 
in Pondichéry from the scarcity of the chief necessaries of life, such as camemberts, 
cheese, paté de foie gras, olive oil, and even certain wines, and important liqueurs such 
as Pernod. Happily at the end of January a French vessel arrived which remedied the 
serious conditions prevailing. So far as wine is concerned, the authorities in France have 
come to the rescue, and have allotted 85 hectolitres of Algerian wine to French India; a 
supply equivalent to 15000 pints, which should alleviate alcoholic distress for some 
time.103  
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Two months later, on 30 March 1940, another report stated: 
 
A steamer has recently landed a fine cargo of booze, the enumeration of which proves 
how necessary alcohol is to the French constitution. Fifty-three barrels and 12 cases of 
vin ordinaire, 4 barrels and 90 cases of liqueur, 38 cases of Pernod, 74 cases of Rum, 51 
cases of Champagne, 25 cases of Brandy, 15 cases of Vermouth, 20 cases of Dubonnet, 
37 cases of wines. This is only one consignment of many ordered, and it is practically 
wholly for consumption locally by a small European population. The alcoholic outlook 
therefore is now less gloomy. In 1939 the consumption of Rum and Eau de Vie at 
Pondichéry came to the trifling figure of 44 casks and 1142 cases, which was 60% below 
the 1938 consumption. The figure of red wine was 730 barrels and 367 cases. It is 
difficult to say where it all goes to, but it is certainly not smuggled into British India.104 
 
The British Consul-General characterised French India as ‘the five tumble-down rotting 
French settlements [which] are a silent yet convincing proof of the incapacity of their owners to 
manage their territories’.105 The juxtaposition of British India and French India caused ongoing 
frictions, with the British accusing the French of Anglophobia: ‘The memory of the glories of 
Dupleix and the loss of a potential empire, as well as the contrast between the effective aims of 
British India and the gangsterism and corruption of these decrepit French territories still do not 
provoke neighbourly emotions’. In addition, the British believed that the June 1940 collapse of 
France only accentuated French resentment towards them: ‘The collapse of France has revived 
these anti-British, and anti-British Indian sentiments, as the French were disappointed that the 
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entire British expeditionary force was not sacrificed to save their country, and they now insist that 
their calamities are our fault.’106 
Indeed, the British Indian government regarded with suspicion the declaration of Louis 
Bonvin, Governor of French India, to rally to Free France in June 1940 as they believed the 
French Indian colonial authorities were pro-Vichy. The tension between tiny French India and 
British India following the June 1940 defeat is reflected in a number of newspaper articles and 
publications produced with the aim of eliminating any doubt as to French India’s loyalty and 
commitment. A file titled Inde – France libre, located in the archives of the Ministry of Overseas 
France, contains clippings from numerous British Indian newspapers that report, on many 
occasions, that French Indian colonial authorities refused to follow Vichy’s orders. The file 
demonstrates the importance the French attached to British Indian newspapers reporting on the 
way French India was rallying to the Allies.107  
A pamphlet written in 1942 attempted to diffuse any doubts the British authorities might 
have regarding the French Indian colonial government’s commitment to the Allies. The pamphlet 
reproduced a speech by Bonvin, in which it was emphasised that the Journal Officiel de la 
République et de l’Inde française (the local government official publication) was still being 
published with the letters ‘RF’, standing for Répubique Française, and the motto ‘Liberté, Égalité, 
Fraternité’. Vichy publications on the other hand, the speech reminded readers, appeared under 
the title ‘État Français’ (French State) and with its motto ‘Travail, Famille, Patrie’ (Work, Family, 
Homeland).108 The pamphlet also praised the loyalty of the whole French Indian population and 
its generous contributions to the war effort in the form of cash, food, and clothing. Finally, the 
governor proudly confirmed that seven hundred volunteers had been recruited and trained to fight 
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in the Middle East on behalf of Free France.109 Above all, these publications intended to depict 
the loyalty of the French Indian government and demonstrate that colonial rivalries endured even 
during the war. In June 1947, Col. Fletcher, the British Consul-General in Pondichéry, warned the 
Indian Interim Government that with the impeding independence of India, the French were 
plotting to turn Pondichéry into a base for their new ambitions in India – a warning that Nehru 
totally dismissed.110 Fletcher’s statement expressed the anxiety that his government’s decision to 
withdraw would actually give the French the opportunity to fulfil their long-held dream of holding 
greater influence over India. 
French officials adhered to the concept of l’Inde perdue because the five insignificant, 
impoverished pockets epitomised British perfidy and determination to annihilate any French effort 
in India.111 Despite the loss of power, the French frequently evoked the glorious past and saw ‘the 
five minuscule territories [with their 300,000 inhabitants] as a reminder of when France 
possessed all of India’, which of course was never the case. In 1942 a Mr Brutinel, 
administrateur-adjoint de l’Inde francaise, used this quotation for patriotic purposes and self-
aggrandisement in the face of the hardship and the humiliation of the German occupation of 
France.112 The French liked to boast that their institutions, particularly the introduction of universal 
(male) suffrage, a higher standard of living, and free education, testified to the superiority of the 
French colonial system.113 French India provided a site for comparisons between the two colonial 
powers, and consequently for disdain of the British. However, a belief in democracy and in the 
role of France’s mission cilivisatrice overlooked the fact that voting was denied to women until 
1946, and that previous elections in the territories had resulted in violence and electoral fraud. 
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Moreover, French India was also plagued by outbreaks of cholera and poverty, and was subject 
to rice shortages, and education was far from free and accessible to all French Indian children.114  
Alongside this view of French India existed a counter-current within French India which 
challenged, but never fully overcame the myth. Some French officials, civil servants, journalists, 
and residents of French India provided an important variant on the theme of l’Inde perdue. 
Although both the theme of ‘the beautiful dream of Dupleix’ and the slogan ‘French India is small 
in area, but great by her past’ persisted, many also moved beyond the mythical to view French 
India for what it really was, a neglected colony of the empire with limited budgets, few 
opportunities, and ongoing corruption.115 
Genlis’ lyrical description of Pondichéry, discussed above, was written only a couple of 
years after the territory had witnessed communal riots and political murders caused by brutal 
electoral corruption, a situation which saw the recall of Alfred Martineau, governor of the French 
Establishments in 1911.116 Such bloody events, likened to a civil war, were not uncommon, and 
stood in stark contrast to the righteousness of the French colonial administration depicted in the 
myth of French India.117 The assimilation policy that introduced universal (male) suffrage in 
French India had created havoc in the territories as it challenged the traditional Hindu 
organisation. Administrators even contemplated the possibility of disposing of some of the most 
troublesome French Indian territories in exchange for overseas British-held land.118 Martineau 
himself, whose extensive efforts to revive and preserve French India points to his vivid and long 
interest in French India and love for the country, questioned France’s colonial future there. The 
idea of exchanging territories exposes the readiness of some perceptive officials to dispose of 
insignificant and unruly territories, thus challenging the idea of a quiet and idyllic French India.  
Curiously, Martineau’s experience of French India conflicted with his own belief in the 
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myth of India. He became governor of French India in July 1910 – he occupied the position again 
in 1913-1914 and 1915-1918 – and while in the post, he dreamt of a quieter time before the 
assimilationists of the Third Republic tainted this ‘delightful and harmonious people’. Since the 
introduction of republican institutions had corrupted this ‘intelligent and peaceful people’, he 
suggested that suffrage, which in any case was not conducted freely, should be withdrawn 
altogether. His hope was that this strategy would help ‘return the colony to its previous state of 
calm and happiness’. But local politicians strongly opposed his stance, and he was recalled.119 In 
Martineau’s view, the constant state of civil strife was the product of zealous assimilationists 
unaware of the particularities of French Indian society. But in his attempt to turn back the clock to 
a more peaceful time, Martineau overlooked the fact that the introduction of democratic 
institutions had only accentuated tensions already present in French Indian society. His idyllic 
view of ‘gentle and peaceful’ French Indians, especially his underestimation of the skilfulness of 
local politicians in manoeuvring and influencing the Ministry, did not prepare him for the onslaught 
of opponents and his eventual recall. While Martineau lamented the difficulties in administering 
French India, he fell victim to his own interpretation of the French Indian myth in which the colony 
was inhabited by peaceful French Indians.  
In contrast to Martineau, who contemplated exchanging French India for British-held 
territories while also dreaming of bygone times, in 1942, a Mr Josselin, Inspector of Public 
Education, commented that, with her 300 million inhabitants on a continent nine times the size of 
France, India generated a strong attraction onto France’s ‘five land scraps’.120 The civil servant 
noted that trade, culture, religions, language, and food were all conspicuously Indian. Similarly a 
report from the Ministry of Overseas France, written in June 1947, emphasised the difficulties that 
France would face should she decide to stay after the independence of India. It stated that, ‘to 
proclaim that we intend to remain is to proclaim the impossible, we cannot stay against the will of 
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400 million inhabitants; this melodrama was only relevant during the time of Dupleix’.121 With the 
‘Quit India’ campaign gaining momentum in British India, Josselin’s comment indicates that the 
Indian space that had been so enduring in French and British colonial minds was rapidly 
becoming redundant, while the June report stressed the urgency of the problem that the 
impending independence of India would cause. France was now facing the ultimate territorial loss 
of her French Indian territories, a process that had begun in the 1756 battle against British forces. 
French India would soon be relegated to exactly what officials and travellers had continuously 
evoked: a mythical colonial past.  
Commentaries by French Indian merchants and inhabitants provide a different slant on 
the vision of French India. In L’Inde Illustrée of July 1933, Fauchois offered the image of a pristine 
colony that was disease-free. But the same monthly magazine contradicted his point and 
implored colonial authorities to improve hygienic conditions in the territories, which were regularly 
struck by outbreaks of cholera and smallpox, and to tackle the issues of insalubrious housing and 
poor sewage system that contributed to the spreading of such diseases.122 L’Inde illustrée, a 
thirty-page magazine with a circulation of 300 copies, was launched in February 1933. The 
subtitle was Revue mensuelle de propaganda et de documentation, and although its aim was to 
promote French India in France, overseas, and throughout the French colonies, it also included a 
section on British India. In October 1933, the magazine referred to the loges as ‘remnants of 
memory’, but also depicted French India as a place where economic opportunities still existed.123 
Rather than blaming the British for French India’s economic stagnation, the magazine considered 
the myth of French India to be an unproductive pretext for administrative indifference. It therefore 
sought to replace the image of l’Inde perdue with one that could attract the interest of French 
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business and parliamentary circles.124 In opposition to the general attitude of animosity towards 
British India, it advocated rapprochement with France’s colonial rival and criticised the French 
colonial administration for its apathy. In the same vein, the President of the Chamber of 
Commerce in Pondichéry, a Mr Colombani, commented that the bi-monthly maritime connection 
between France and French India had not resumed after the Second World War, and declared 
that ‘French Indians feel that they have been totally forgotten’.125 It was no longer a case of l’Inde 
perdue as a mythical construct, but rather its reality, a point that did not go unnoticed by anti-
colonial French Indians. 
Given the encirclement of the French territories by the British, French India appeared to 
the most anti-French French Indians as a bulwark against British imperialism, at least until a 
louder nationalist voice emerged from India in the 1920s.126 For those French Indians who 
supported the freedom movement, French India provided the site for colonial criticism. While 
French novelists and travellers viewed French India as a peaceful haven spared from British 
colonialism, pro-nationalist French Indians used the Tamil and French publications of the satirical 
weekly Sri Soudjanarandjani to describe French India as being in a state of lethargy, in which 
‘atavism of servitude has muffled any buds of freedom’. They advanced the views that only 
Gandhian strategy could help French India challenge French colonial oppression and corruption, 
that only colonial history separated French India from British India, and that their common 
nationalist aspirations would eventually bring the two together.127  
After the Second World War, the Trait d’Union became the mouthpiece of the French 
educated elite. At this time a monthly, the paper displayed on its first page an iconography of 
Mother India (Fig. 7), first drawn in 1905 and inspired by Abanindranath Tagore’s (1871-1951) 
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portrayal of Bharat Mata, or Mother India.128 The four-armed Hindu goddess, who is standing on a 
pedestal with a lotus flower, is placed at the centre of the map of India; in her left hand she holds 
a banner on which is written ‘Swaraj’ (self-rule). The function of cartographically displaying the 
female body is to associate the notion of the nation as motherland.129 In addition, the use of this 
iconic representation in a French Indian newspaper helped promote the French Indian nationalist 
cause and connect it to the Indian independence movement led by Gandhi and the INC.130 The 
monthly was published in French by French-educated French Indians who understood that 
French India would eventually be part of India but campaigned for the maintenance of French 
culture. Yet in the April and May 1947 editions, the paper denounced French culture as an 
instrument of imperialism, and compared France’s internal political crisis with the ‘formidable 
political evolution’ of India that was rapidly evolving and growing from strength to strength on the 
way to independence.131 While India is represented as a young, vibrant, and determined nation 
on the way to becoming a great power, France is depicted as a decrepit and aging nation that 
needed to see the value of allying itself with India.132  
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Fig. 7. Trait d’Union, October 1947, published in Pondichéry and displaying the iconography of Mother 
India, inspired by Abanindranath Tagore’s portrayal of Bharat Mata, or Mother India, at the centre of the 
map of India. The goddess is holding a banner in her left hand, on which is written ‘Swaraj’ (self-rule). 
Source: BnF. 
 
 
 
Indian newspapers regarded the five comptoirs and loges as ‘foreign pimples on the back 
of Mother India’, an image that presented the territories as infected and India as requiring to be 
cleansed of this colonial disease.133 In 1948, The Leader commented that, with a combined 
population of nearly one million inhabitants, the foreign territories were leeches clutching onto the 
newly independent Indian nation of 400 million inhabitants. The same article depicted them as 
‘many Gilbratars’, and both remarks projected an image of French colonial strongholds that 
challenged the vigor of the new Indian nation. The negative imagery was aimed at French 
presence rather than French Indians, who were perceived as culturally and historically part of 
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India.134 For Nehru, the means of incorporation were by far the most important issue, as he stated 
in a speech to the Jaipur committee in December 1948:  
 
We have a large number of intricate problems before us, but this particular problem of 
foreign possessions within our territory is probably one of the smallest. It is inevitable that 
it has to be solved in a particular way. There might be a little delay or difficulty in its 
solution, but it is not in the larger context of India a really difficult problem. What is the 
major issue before us? It is quite inevitable that these foreign possessions should cease 
to be foreign and should be incorporated politically within the India union. That is a big 
thing. That is the policy which India must necessarily adopt because we cannot admit any 
foreign foothold on the continent of India. But to give effect to that policy, we have to 
pursue international methods. We have to deal with foreign governments. As a 
Government, and as a great organisation which is intimately connected with that 
Government, we cannot proceed in a non-governmental way. It is for the people of those 
territories to do what they like, but we cannot go about approaching this problem in a 
non-governmental way.135 
 
Diplomacy and negotiations at governmental level would eliminate the foreign presence 
in India, and despite their anachronism, foreign possessions were not, in Nehru’s words, a priority 
since other national matters demanded attention. What Nehru exposed was that when Britain 
withdrew, and India became the new power, representations of French India could no longer be 
fashioned within a triangular model. This was now to be replaced by a dual model that consisted 
of India as an independent nation and France as a former subordinate coloniser. While the 
previous model focused on ‘India’ as the colonial space where two colonial rivals competed, 
                                                 
134 The Leader (Allahabad), 21 December 1948. 
135 Nehru, SWJN, op.cit.,  Vol. 8, p. 425. 
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within the new model the attention had shifted to French India as a space contested by two 
entities. For the Indian government, French India had to be integrated, while France continued to 
claim legitimacy based on historical, political, institutional, and cultural factors that helped 
constitute a grand vision of French India. Above all, with Britain’s imminent withdrawal the 
perception that France’s model of colonialism was a better alternative to the British approach had 
become obsolete. 
 
Conclusion 
French India was a mere remnant of the former French trading outposts dotted along the 
Indian coastline. It had limited economic value, and territorial particularities that reflected the 
outcome of Franco-British rivalry for supremacy in India. The dependency of the enclaves on 
British India for the supply of basic necessities, the marginalisation of the territories, their 
disparate location on the subcontinent, and the lack of defence forces were all elements that 
defined French India as a subordinate colonial power in India. This adverse situation was 
redressed to an extent by the construction of the myth of a French Indian empire, a myth that was 
based on Dupleix’s ephemeral influence over the Deccan in the eighteenth century, and which 
served to provide historical continuity and stability in the face of political changes in the métropole 
and in the territories. 
Although small and defenceless, French India was used as a prism through which 
various representations were projected. Maps, a major exposition, travelogues, literary accounts, 
official reports, and newspapers were used to produce images that exposed tensions between 
two colonial rivals, rising nationalist demands, France’s neglect for her tiny territories, and a 
space to reminisce on past imperial glory. With the imminent British withdrawal, colonial rivalries 
were replaced by national and colonial tensions. 
PART TWO 
 
 
COMPETING CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
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Chapter 3 
French India and India’s Independence 
 
The British declaration of February 1947 that they would withdraw from 
India before June 1948 had nothing to do with French India, and the 
people of French India themselves would decide their fate and future to 
merge with the Indian Union or remain within the French Union…. The 
French Indian community of 300,000 souls will be lost in the fusion with 
the mass of four hundred millions people without benefit for anyone.  
(François Baron, French India Governor).1  
 
In free India there should be no such thing as French or Portuguese 
India, there should be no trace of foreign rule whatsoever. That is 
incompatible with the independence of India, which is one and 
indivisible. (Bombay Sentinel, 18 November 1946).2 
 
 
French India was small, defenceless and economically insignificant. Why, then, did 
France decide to retain her territories in the face of rising Indian nationalism and mounting anti-
colonial criticism in the post-war world? The announcement in February 1947, by the British 
Labour government of Clement Attlee that Britain would withdraw from India brought into focus 
the presence of the two remaining subordinate colonial powers on the subcontinent, France and 
Portugal, and the difficulties the declaration of an independent India would have on their status. 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Geetha, op.cit, p. 114. 
2 Bombay Sentinel,18 November 1946 quoted in Consulat de France à  Bombay, 19 November 1946, AD, Inde, Vol. 
79: Presse et propagande. 
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The issue was exacerbated by the new French constitution, which made French India, like other 
French overseas territories, an indivisible part of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) that could only 
secede via referendum. This chapter will argue that, because France certainly considered French 
India to be important, based on ideas of national grandeur, historical continuity, and a belief in the 
strategic value of the comptoirs in relation to the rest of the empire, this conviction did not prepare 
her civil servants to face the impending issue of India’s independence and the determination of 
her national leaders to finalise India’s nation-building process.3 I will also suggest that France’s 
decision to hand over the loges, considered as a gesture of goodwill, conflicted with her claim to 
maintain sovereignty over French India, and indeed had the unintended effect of supporting 
India’s legitimate demands for the repossession of all of French India. Finally, this chapter will 
examine the question of the Customs Union agreement of 1941, which initially represented an 
arrangement between two colonial rivals (France and Britain). When India exercised her right to 
denounce the convention, she signalled her confidence in using whatever means necessary to 
reach the goal of repossessing French India. By thus revealing and exploiting French India’s 
vulnerability, India weakened France’s case for retaining her colonial territories. As will be shown, 
while this situation greatly affected the local population, French metropolitan opinion seemed to 
remain unaware and indifferent to the fate of French India. 
 
French India will remain French 
A number of reasons can be advanced to explain why France chose to retain her small, 
discontinuous, and economically insignificant French Indian territories at a time when Britain was 
negotiating a withdrawal agreement with the Indian Provisional Government. As outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2, France’s presence in India was historically associated with the memory of one 
of its most famous administrators. Dupleix’s territorial expansion in India, had the long-standing 
                                                 
3 Breuilly, op.cit., pp. 18-20. 
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effect of evoking colonial nostalgia and admiration for French endeavours in India, and serving as 
an important historical point of reference for French officials. Maurice Schumann, who was sent to 
New Delhi in August 1947 as an emissary of French President Vincent Auriol, referred to the 
enclaves as ‘the heritage of Dupleix’.4 At the time Schumann was a journalist, but he would later 
hold various positions as minister between 1968 and 1973, including as Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs between 1951 and 1954. Similarly, Georges Tailleur, the last administrator of 
Chandernagor, emphasised the association of Dupleix and French India by writing an account of 
his posting entitled Chandernagore ou le lit de Dupleix.5 The title referred to the bed in which, it is 
believed, Dupleix slept, and which has since become a colonial relic on exhibition in the former 
French Governor’s residence – now a museum – in Chandernagor. This form of nostalgia 
provided a sense of stability, especially after the recent humiliation of France in June 1940 and 
the ensuing occupation by German forces.6 The loss of her freedom was perceived at the time as 
the most serious crisis for France in modern times. The new government, led by Marshal Pétain 
and operating from Vichy since the capital was under occupation, collaborated with the Germans, 
while General de Gaulle launched a resistance movement from London that epitomised defiance 
and the survival of a democratic France.  
There was also a cultural reason for remaining in India. France’s belief in her cultural 
superiority had played an important role in her nineteenth-century colonial expansion, especially 
with the introduction of education, suffrage, and the debate over the citizenship of colonial 
subjects. These initiatives were all seen as proof of France’s destiny in propagating the universal 
principles promulgated by the Revolution.7 French officials, journalists, and other commentators 
                                                 
4 Maurice Schumann, Ma rencontre avec Gandhi (Paris: Editions 1, 1998), p.16. 
5 Tailleur, op.cit. 
6 Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw, ‘The Dimension of Nostalgia’, in Christopher Shaw and Malcolm Chase 
(eds), The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 1-17; David 
Lowenthal, The Past is A Foreign Country (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 3-34, p. 13; Gildea, 
op.cit., p. 140. 
7 Déclaration du gouvernement au sujet de l’Inde française, lue à la Tribune de l’Assemblée Nationale par Mr Coste-
Floret, Ministre de la FOM, 8 Juin 1948, AD, Inde française, Vol. 24: Chandernagor; Gildea, op.cit., pp. 139-56;  
Gabrielle Parker, ‘Francophonie et universalité: évolution de deux idées jumelles’, in Pascal Blanchard et al. (eds), 
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liked to remind opponents of the French presence in India that France gave universal suffrage to 
French India while Britain did not, a fact that helped to demarcate French colonialism as a better 
option to the British variety and to underline France’s colonial mission. Moreover, ‘superior’ 
French laws made French Indians ‘citoyens français’.8 But while the history of suffrage in French 
India, starting with the right to elect a deputy, was linked to enlightened post-Revolution cultural 
policy, Britain had been forced, following the nationalist uprisings that had erupted in Bengal in 
1905, to introduce a series of constitutional changes granting limited male and female suffrage in 
British India, a fact that was plainly brushed aside by the French.  
The demarcation between French and British colonial policy was more complex than the 
biased French commentaries allowed. Indeed, the 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms in British India 
allowed a restricted suffrage for election to British Indian legislative assemblies.9 The electoral 
base was limited to a small minority of Indian men who qualified for office on the basis of land 
ownership and education. A decade after the Morley-Minto reforms, the Government of India Act 
1919 removed the sex disqualification and awarded women with sufficient property the right to 
vote and, later, the right to stand for election or nomination. Although this right was limited to less 
than one percent of women, or about one million, who met the extremely restrictive property and 
income qualification, British Indian women were introduced to suffrage well before French Indian 
women, who had to wait until 1946.10 The female vote in British India was bound up with the 
women’s suffrage movement in Britain, while during the same period French women’s suffrage 
was less successful because maternalist French policies placed great emphasis on the pivotal 
role of French women as mothers and wives, thus denying them a greater role in the public 
                                                                                                                                               
Culture post-coloniale 1961-2006, Traces et mémoires coloniales en France (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2005), pp. 
228-242. 
8 see Marsh, ‘Representing Indian colonization in the Parisian Press: 1923-54’, op.cit., pp. 80-4. 
9 NRFOM, March 1953. 
10 Gail Pearson, ‘Tradition, law and the female suffrage movement in India’, in Louise Edwards and Mina Roces 
(eds.), Women’s Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 195-219; 
Muthulakshmi Reddy from Madras was the first Indian woman to sit in an Indian legislature in 1921, Candy, op.cit., 
pp.192, 194. In Britain, only  women over the age of thirty were given the right to vote in 1918, they had to wait until 
1928 to be given the same right as men and be able to vote at the age of twenty-one, Sinha, op.cit., pp. 224-5. 
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domain.11 Nehru campaigned tirelessly for the provincial assembly general elections of March 
1937, asserting that thirty millions voters were needed to choose representatives.12 Although this 
number represented only a small percentage of the adult British Indian population, it was 
nonetheless far from being negligible. 
In addition to the historical and cultural justifications for France’s determination to remain 
in India, the territories were also linked to France’s sense of national grandeur, prestige, and 
honour. The feeling was expressed clearly by Gaston Monnerville, who would become President 
of Council (the Senate under the Fourth Republic). He declared to the Constituent Assembly, 
‘‘Without the Empire, France would only be a liberated country; thanks to the Empire, France is a 
victorious nation’.13 The statement stresses the importance of the overseas empire for the 
motherland, and the urgency for France in re-establishing sovereignty.14 Even though little 
material advantage was gained from such tiny territories, their existence contributed national 
grandeur and international prestige to a nation that had been diminished by German occupation 
and the Vichy collaboration.15 French India, as one of the oldest French colonies together with 
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane, Senegal, and La Réunion, provided a 
sense of pride and historical continuity between France and her empire, and this connection was 
used as a historical resource to legitimate France’s renewed role in a post-war era.16  
In the view of French leaders, epitomised by General de Gaulle, reasserting France’s 
overseas empire and her colonial mission were still the best means to regain her national prestige 
and supremacy. Her revived colonial programme, discussed at the Brazzaville conference (30 
January – 8 February 1944), resulted in a Gaullist declaration of France’s determination and 
                                                 
11 Christine, Bard, Les Filles de Marianne. Histoire des féminismes: 1914-1940 (Paris: Fayard, 1995). 
12 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004), first published in 1946, pp. 58-61. 
13 Quoted in Raoul Girardet, L’Idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), p. 196; 
Secret 17 May 1948 from Frank Robert to Sir Cecil Syers CRO Downing Street, London re: visit to French 
Ambassador in India (Mr Lévi), NA, FO371/76086: Relations between India and France and India and Portugal. 
14 Daniel J. Mahoney, De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy (Westport: Praeger, 1996), 
Chapter 4. 
15 Rajkumar, op.cit., p. 20; Gildea, op.cit., pp. 139-56. 
16 Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 462. 
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ability to continue her role as a leading colonial power.17 Even though there were attempts at 
formulating a new colonial policy based on assimilation, this did not significantly differ from pre-
war colonial policy or from Vichy’s colonial stand. Indeed, the Vichy government considered the 
empire an invaluable asset; not only did it continue to confer upon France an important political 
role, especially since Germany had no colonies, but it also helped propagate at home the myth 
that France was still an independent nation.18 Similarly, de Gaulle used the empire to boost 
France’s importance. He continued to express earlier paternalistic attitudes in order to meet 
nationalist ends, so that ‘France [had] a chance to count amongst the great nations’.19 While 
France was readjusting her colonial position, however, the Indian press was busy reporting the 
damaging effect the war had on France. The Hindustan Standard reminded its readership of the 
humiliation caused by the occupation of France by German armed forces, an important point for 
an Asian people seeking freedom from an occupying European power. The Indian Socialist 
Reformer noted that France was having difficulty adapting to the fact that she came out of the war 
a diminished nation.20 Above all, in Discovery of India, an essay written by Nehru in 1944 while in 
Ahmadnagar Fort prison (1942-1945), the future first Prime Minister of India exposed his vision 
and ideals for India, describing the invasion of France as ‘the astonishing collapse which 
produced a profound impression’.21 Nehru’s words revealed how France’s loss of sovereignty had 
a strong impact across the colonised world, especially amongst Indian freedom fighters.   
Furthermore, any suggestion that France should follow the example of Britain and hand 
                                                 
17 Shipway, The Road to War, op.cit., p. 28. 
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over her Indian territories to a newly independent India could set a precedent whose 
repercussions would impact on the rest of the empire. After all, following the Brazzaville 
conference’s recommendations, the empire had just been reformed. The law Lamine Guèye of 7 
May 1946 introduced the concept of a French Union citizenship while a law of 7 October 1946 
had officially changed the former status of the French Indian comptoirs from colony to a French 
overseas territory. Later that month, Article 60 of the newly approved Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic had transformed the old empire into the French Union, comprising metropolitan France, 
the overseas Territories and Departments, and Associated Territories and States.22 The Union 
consisted of an association of ‘110 million citizens’.23 As such, French India had now become an 
integral part of the French Republic. In addition, Article 27 of the constitution stipulated that a 
territorial cession could not be granted unless the affected population had given its consent in a 
referendum, and that treaties involving territorial cession were only valid after a law had endorsed 
their ratification. When growing nationalist demands throughout the empire were already seriously 
challenging France’s reaffirmation of her colonial rights, any dismantlement was definitely to be 
avoided.24 
Indeed, the civil war between the Vichy authorities and de Gaulle had provided a new 
context in which national movements in other colonies intensified demands for independence. 
Anti-colonial demonstrations erupted in Syria and Lebanon after French authorities there had 
rallied to Vichy in June 1940. Further anti-French attacks in May 1945 resulted in the French 
                                                 
22 The overseas departments were Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and La Réunion; the overseas territories were: 
eight territories of the AOF, four territories of AEF, Madagascar and islands, French Indian Establishments, Somalia 
coast, Comores, New-Caledonia, Establishments of Oceania, St-Pierre et Miquelon, the Associated Territories were 
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statuses stood in contrast with the unitary concept of the new French Union, François Borella,  L’évolution politique et 
juridique de l’Union française depuis 1946 (Paris: Pichon & Durand-Auzias, 1958), pp. 150, 154-5. 
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l’accès aux études universitaires’, in Charles-Robert Ageron et Marc Michel, L'ère des décolonisations: actes du 
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aerial bombardment of Aleppo and Damascus (Syria) on 20 May, and the eventual independence 
of these two mandates in 1946.25 On 8 May 1945, after the Algerian flag had been raised during a 
celebration marking the end of the war, the French administration responded violently, killing 
thousands of natives in Sétif and the Constantine region. The number of casualties, though 
difficult to determine, may have been as high as 45,000.26 Thus, on the very day that France was 
celebrating her recent liberation from German forces, she was carrying out a massacre in her 
Algerian colony of those professing the same privilege. Likewise, in Indochina, the nationalist 
movement had gained momentum during the Second World War. Particularly, the Vietminh, a 
broad-based organisation under the leadership of the Communist Ho Chi Minh, increased their 
popular support amongst the peasantry and the urban centres of Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon, and 
Vinh.27 By 1945, France was experiencing serious difficulties in re-imposing her authority once 
her sovereignty had been compromised by the Japanese occupation of Indochina during the war. 
The French attack on the port of Haiphong, in November 1946, marked the beginning of France’s 
military involvement in Indochina, a ‘bloody’ war against a determined resistance movement that 
would last until July 1954, and an act strongly condemned by Nehru.28 
In contrast to the violence with which France attempted to control anti-French sentiment 
in Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Indochina, the Franco-Chinese convention of 18 August 1945 
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peacefully retroceded the tiny Chinese enclave of Kouang-Tchéou-Wan (Quang Tchéou-Wan). 
The enclave had been administered by the French colonial Government of Indochina since 
1898.29 Furthermore, in the treaty of 28 February 1946 France abandoned her rights to the 
French concessions of Shanghai, Tien-Tsin, Hankéou, and Canton, as well as all other 
extraterritorial French rights in China. Even though these concessions were not French sovereign 
territory, and because of the war France had lost them anyway, this ‘abandonment’ was 
nonetheless an incentive for the government of Chang Kai-Chek, leader of nationalist China, to 
withdraw Chinese occupying forces from Tonkin and the north of Indochina.30 Hence, the 
agreement signalled the readiness of the French government to give up colonial territories as 
long as the concession formed part of a more strategic post-war colonial plan to regain control 
over, in this case, Indochina.  
Despite French India’s territorial particularities and its lack of economic benefits, 
remaining in French India also had an important strategic value to Paris.31 In April 1946, Christian 
Fouchet, French Consul-General in Calcutta, argued that with Britain gone, France had the 
opportunity to play a more influential role in India: ‘Indians would need to turn to “someone” other 
than Britain…. the spiritual and cultural influence of France will even find the approbation of 
Britain… it seems that before the end of the year, interesting possibilities of action will be offered 
to us’.32 Here Fouchet reiterates the old idea of ‘revanche (revenge) that the French fomented 
after their defeat at the hands of the British during the Seven Years’ War and that had contributed 
to the construction of the French Indian empire myth.33 The desire for ‘revanche’ for the loss of 
Alsace-Lorraine (1871) and the humiliation of 1940 had already been satisfied by France’s 
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victories over Germany in 1918 and 1944.34 Now, French civil servants saw the possibility, 
although quite improbable, to overcome Britain, her long-time world rival, and fulfil her destiny in 
India by playing the influential role that politicians, writers, and commentators had dreamed of for 
nearly two centuries. Col. Fletcher’s later suggestion that the French intended to reinforce their 
position in Pondichéry was, it seems, not so far-fetched.35 Besides, the territories also possessed 
another form of strategic value; they happened to be invaluable bargaining chips that could be 
swapped for British-held land or other colonial territories.   
 
Exchange of territories 
The Treaty of 1814 limited France’s defence force to the use of troops for the 
maintenance of law and order, and as such, it clearly established Britain as the main colonial 
power on the subcontinent. These restrictive conditions and the marginalisation of the territories 
have been described as a ‘paralysing system’, while N. V. Rajkumar, Foreign Secretary of the 
Indian National Congress, wrote that ‘French India was given the status of an honoured guest’ by 
the British.36 As such, since military means were out of the question, any territorial consolidation 
on the part of the French would need to be carried out via diplomatic channels. The French 
colonial administration attempted on many occasions to consolidate the Indian territories, with 
various suggestions about the exchange of some parcels of French Indian land for British-held 
territory, either in India or elsewhere overseas.37  
For the French, the consolidation of Pondichéry was undoubtedly the priority, as this 
would facilitate policing at a local level while also strengthening the French presence by reducing 
the need to deal with British Indian authorities. Furthermore, this territorial consolidation could be 
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promoted as a diplomatic achievement and thereby further contribute to French prestige. From 
the point of view of the British, the French presence in India had been a constant irritation. 
Although the British had returned the territories in 1814, they had hoped the French would 
eventually leave or sell their territories, as the Dutch, Swedes, and Danes had done earlier. Not 
only did the tiny territories represent an affront to British supremacy on the subcontinent, but the 
smuggling of goods through the free ports of Pondichéry and Karikal had also cost British colonial 
authorities a loss in tax and customs duty revenue.38 In addition, exchanging Chandernagor or 
other enclaves where little French culture remained would eliminate the political asylum that 
Indian nationalists had enjoyed there.39 In comparison, Portuguese India, though described in 
similar terms by the British, was considered to be ‘slightly less a perpetual thorn in the flesh to the 
Government of India’, probably because the Portuguese territory was larger and had less British-
held land cutting through it, and Anglo-Portuguese relations had been less troublesome than the 
Anglo-French ones.40 Although swapping territories would not altogether eliminate the French 
presence in India, it would at least reduce the number of French territories held on Indian soil and 
facilitate customs control and policing.41 
 It had already been proposed in the nineteenth century that particular French Indian 
territories be exchanged. A convention project of 3 June 1857, drawn up by the French 
government, envisaged the integration of small British Indian parcels to consolidate Pondichéry in 
exchange for cession of all other French Indian territories (the loges, Mahé, Chandernagor, and 
Yanaon) with the exception of Karikal.42 However, the outbreak of the Indian Rebellion in 1857 
brought the project to an end. In fact, the rebellion helped trigger French patriotism, revive old 
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colonial rivalries, and increase Anglophobia, all of which led France to refuse any prospective 
transfer over to British authorities. At the same time, France viewed the rebellion as an 
opportunity to reduce British influence in India and regain some of her former colonial glory.43 A 
later exchange project suggested by Governor Bontemps (January 1863–March 1867, October 
1867–June 1871) failed to materialise because of the outbreak of war in France against the 
Prussians (1870-1).44 
In 1914 the British offered ‘a generous territorial compensation in Pondichéry’ if the French 
administration agreed to maintain surveillance of the Swadeshi agitators who had found refuge in 
Chandernagor. If the French did not comply, the British warned, ‘there would be serious reprisals 
and the use of coercive measures.’45 There is no evidence that a territorial exchange ever took 
place as a result of this bullish request. Georgette David notes that French authorities ceased 
providing assistance to the British in their pursuit of agitators in Chandernagor after the unlawful 
arrest in 1908 of Charu Chandra Roy, an activist living in Chandernagor. Chandra Roy, Deputy 
Director at the Collège Dupleix, was accused by the British of having participated in the 
fabrication of explosives that led to the assassination of Miss and Mrs Pringle Kennedy, two 
British citizens residing in India. He was eventually released, and resumed his duties.46 
 In November 1938, a Franco-British conference was convened in which France reiterated 
her request for an exchange. In this proposal, the loges of Calicut, Masulipatam, Surat, and rights 
over the islands of Iskittipath off Yanaon, would be swapped for British-held land. However, the 
area offered by the French was much smaller than the area they were seeking to consolidate 
around Pondichéry. There were also strong concerns that Indian nationalist groups would react 
violently to the swapping of populations and land between two occupying European powers. 
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Indeed, the proposal would have seen the transfer of 2,000 French Indians and up to 25,000 
British Indians.47 The French Indian population had strongly opposed such proposals on two 
earlier occasions, in 1880-1884, when colonial authorities were contemplating the exchange of 
Chandernagor and the Bengali loges for British Indian-held territories, and in 1908-1911 when 
exchange of the loges was considered for British territories in Gambia and Nigeria. On both 
occasions, the population had called on local politicians to lobby the government in Paris.48 For 
British authorities, the one positive aspect of the 1938 proposal was a simplification of the 
customs area, as the border would now encompass a contiguous territory. The red line on Map 
14 below shows the proposed new border, which would have incorporated the French areas 
indicated in pink and the British Indian areas proposed for exchange and marked in white.49 The 
outbreak of the Second World War, however, put an end to this proposal to ‘tidy up’ the maps. 
 
  
                                                 
47 Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Mr le Ministre des Colonies, Direction des affaires politiques, Paris, le 29 
Novembre 1938, AOM, Inde, G38: Problèmes des frontières Pondichéry 1908.                                          
48 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., p. 2959. 
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Map 14: Map of Pondichéry. The bold line surrounding the area was the proposed new boundary. 
Source: AOM, H23: Étude sur les possessions françaises. 
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After the Second World War, the British Foreign Office agreed in principle to reconsider 
the possibility of a deal involving the exchange of French enclaves for some corresponding British 
territorial concessions, but this time in another part of the world. The proposal suggested a 
possible British withdrawal from the New Hebrides which, since 1906, had been run jointly as a 
‘condominium’ under an Anglo-French agreement. However, the arrangement had proven 
cumbersome, so its exchange for the French Indian territories seemed a practical solution.50 If the 
proposal proved unfeasible, the British would consider ‘a more limited deal in which all the French 
loges, islands, and minor settlements, possibly including Karikal, would be exchanged for areas 
adjacent to Pondichéry’ in order to consolidate its area.51  
But again, the exchange proposal was abandoned. It was considered that ‘the present 
moment was not suitable for considering the proposal’ in view of the withdrawal negotiations that 
were taking place between the Indian National Congress and the British authorities.52 It also 
threatened the British strategic position in the Pacific in relation to Australia and New Zealand. 
Moreover, the Foreign Office admitted that the French governor of Pondichéry had lost all hope of 
keeping the possessions if India were to become independent, which made the proposal 
inherently futile.53  
The exchange of territories, however, was an idea whose scope extended beyond 
negotiating with the British, either in India or overseas. French and British colonial administrations 
tolerated the unusual territorial circumstances of French India, but once India gained 
independence French colonial authorities would face a new nation that challenged any foreign 
presence on the subcontinent. Beyond this time, territorial consolidation would be out of the 
question and the local French Indian population would be trespassing on Indian sovereign soil on 
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a daily basis. The surrender of France’s historical claims to the loges and other pettah, in a 
ceremony held in Masulipatam in October 1947, can therefore be regarded as France 
strategically exchanging territories in order to retain her position in India, just as previously she 
had granted concessions in China to regain influence in Indochina. 
 
Handover of the loges: the first misstep  
The handover of the loges was suggested by Nehru to French officials in the last week of 
May 1947, but the Orissa state government had already made the suggestion to the Interim 
government in April 1947. The French loge in the district of Balassore was creating administrative 
problems, and the Orissa state government suggested that it should be incorporated into their 
own province. Nehru agreed that the transfer should be made, as ‘the loges were of no particular 
use to France and had a certain nuisance value to the rest of India as they might be used for 
smuggling or other purposes’.54 The decision was eventually promoted by both parties as a 
gesture of goodwill to celebrate the independence of India.55 The British, however, dismissed the 
graciousness of the gesture, as they accused the French of handing back land over which they 
had no claim of sovereignty.56  
Territorial disputes had caused on-going frictions between the two European powers, and 
even as India was about to reach her independence, European colonial rivalries were still at play. 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Overseas France consented to the cessation of the loges because it 
was very much aware it had done little to economically enhance these parcels. In fact, the French 
government admitted it did not know the exact location of the loges; any claim to sovereignty, as 
the British had rightly pointed out, would therefore be difficult to defend. In some of the loges, the 
colonial administration kept only a minimum presence. In Balassore, a single French Indian 
gendarme represented the colonial administration, while in Calicut and Masulipatam was, in the 
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words of Henri Roux, the French Chargé d’Affaires in New Delhi, ‘a local person’ (a designation 
that seems to refer to a person without official status) who was responsible for raising the French 
flag every day.57 
Economically, the loges had value only in regard to the very modest revenue generated 
from a lease to the British in Balassore and in Masulipatnam, but diplomatically the loges posed a 
problem because they had served as refuges for British Indian tax evaders and criminals.58 As 
demonstrated by Akhila Yechury, the loges represented an alternative space for British colonial 
subjects in which colonial rivalries between France and Britain continued to be played out.59 Thus 
the handover could provide the opportunity for the resolution of tensions between India and 
France, or at least their minimisation, as France’s lack of interest in the loges could potentially 
provide an excellent opportunity for the Indian government to denounce France’s legitimacy over 
all of her Indian enclaves.60 Hence, by disposing of the superfluous loges, France hoped to 
appease India while retaining her entitlements over the larger enclaves.  
Monsieur Tezenas du Montcel, Inspector at the Ministry of Overseas France, believed 
that by ceding the loges France would lose only an ‘illusory sovereignty’, and that the gesture 
would enhance India’s respect for France, especially after the recent incidents in Madagascar. As 
had happened in Syria, Lebanon, and Indochina, France had lost her control over the island 
when, during the war, it had been occupied by the British military from May to November 1942. A 
call for independence by Malagasies was based on the principle of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and culminated in the organisation in 1946 of two nationalist parties: the Parti 
Démocratique Malgache (PDM) and the Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache 
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(MDRM). While the PDM intended to use existing colonial institutions to gain independence, a 
section of the MDRM, which had a broader base across all levels of the Malagasy society, was 
determined to challenge French authority with more forceful means. The insurrection of March-
July 1947, which was blamed on the MDRM, testified to the rising difficulties faced by the French 
colonial administration. As in other parts of her empire where demands for independence were 
defying French attempts to re-establish control, France retaliated by using military means to 
suppress the Malagasy insurrection.61 The violence of the repression was reflected in the death 
toll, which French authorities estimated at approximately 89,000, although this figure was 
probably inflated.62  
Du Montcel’s comment that France would lose only an ‘illusory sovereignty’ reveals the 
extent to which senior French officials relied on the myth of French India, a historic construct 
based on past imperial territorial influence. Despite the fact that French officials were very much 
aware of France’s erroneous sovereignty over the loges, it was thought the myth of French India 
would help France maintain her historical presence in India, and even increase her current 
influence in the context of Britain’s withdrawal. Indeed, du Montcel expected his Indian 
counterpart to concede the same belief in France’s bygone entitlement over French India. That 
expectation, as will be shown, was thwarted. The myth was a Eurocentric construct with some 
potency when Britain was in control, but with little relevance in the face of Indian nationalism. 
While India was masterminding the integration of former British India and the princely states, the 
amalgamation of these French loges was seen as part of the process of nation-building and 
independence.63 Nehru’s position regarding Portuguese and French India was extremely clear. In 
April 1947 he stated that ‘a free India is not going to accept foreign rule in any part of India’, and 
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that there was no doubt the loges would be unified with the rest of India at some point in time.64 
The attitude of du Montcel, expressing a traditional belief in the role of France as a colonising 
force leading the less evolved peoples of India and elsewhere, hindered any coherent vision for 
the future of post-war colonial France.65 Hubert Deschamps summarised this policy by stating 
that colonial administrators who reached the top of the hierarchy had been ‘formed by tradition 
and worked to preserve it, arriving at a kind of fossilisation’ which prevented any forward thinking. 
Deschamps had first-hand experience, having formerly served as a colonial administrator of 
Madagascar for nearly nine years (1926–1935), an unusually long period in the French colonial 
service. He was a socialist who viewed his mission as the extension of European civilisation 
overseas but his career in the colonial administration was ended in 1945 due to his alignment 
with Vichy in 1940 while governor at Djibouti. He was rehabilitated in 1950, became a historian, 
and was appointed in 1962 as professor of history at the Sorbonne University. In 1975 he would 
become the first former administrator to write a full-length memoir of his colonial service, entitled 
Roi de la brousse: Mémoires d’autres mondes.66   
Even though a larger number of the pettah were located in Bengal than in the rest of 
India, a reminder of France’s earlier colonial trade, the handover ceremony took place on 6 
October 1947 in Masulipatnam (Andhra Pradesh), partly because this was the largest of the 
loges. It was attended by second-rank officials, P.A. Menon, Joint-Secretary of the Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs, and Raschid Ali Baig, Consul-General of India in Pondichéry, as well as a 
representative of the government of Madras, Mr Fouchet, First Secretary of the French Embassy 
in India, Mr des Longchamps from the French Embassy in New Delhi, Mr Goumain, the Chief of 
Cabinet of the Administrator’s office in Pondichéry, and Mr Drouhin, the Administrator of Karikal. 
Similar ceremonies took place concurrently at all the other loges, attended by French 
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representatives and local Indian authorities.67 Fouchet represented the French government; it 
would have been embarrassing and compromising to have officials of the Ministry of Overseas 
France dealing with what really appeared to be the first official cession of a French Union 
territory.68 Clearly, issues affecting the French Union were not limited to the Ministry of Overseas 
France, and the division of responsibilities between the respective ministries – Foreign Affairs and 
Overseas France - remained blurry. 
While the handing over of these parcels of land was promoted as a goodwill gesture 
initiated by both governments, Henri Roux, Ministre Plénipotentiaire and Chargé d’Affaires of 
France in New Delhi, complained in his report on the ceremony that Indian authorities did not 
express gratitude for the transaction. Indeed, Roux was offended by Menon’s declaration that ‘the 
handover of the loges marks the end of a long dispute but there is still the issue of the 
Establishments to be resolved’.69 The ploy to cede the loges in the hope of negotiating the 
survival of the comptoirs came tumbling down, testifying to France’s inability to gauge the 
determination of her opponent to remove all foreign colonial presence. The ‘illusory sovereignty’ 
to which du Montcel referred had no relevance to the Government of India; the loges were 
regarded as part of India, and so were the comptoirs. France’s decision to surrender her ‘illusory 
sovereignty’ over the loges in order to appease Indian authorities only resulted in opening the 
door to further territorial claims from the Indian government. 
It is worth mentioning that some of these original loges – namely Dacca, Jougdia, the 
factoreries of Chittagong and Sylhet, and the parcels of Sirampour and Sola (Map 3) – were 
actually located in Bengal, which at the time of Britain’s withdrawal in August 1947 had become 
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part of the independent state of Pakistan.70 Hugues de Dianoux has explained that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs never listed the names of the loges in official correspondence, and since India had 
no jurisprudence in East Pakistan and was not granted the right to accept these loges on behalf 
of the state of Pakistan, the Bengali loges could still be considered the possessions of France.71 
However, while de Dianoux is correct in stating that the French government committed an error 
when the agreement did not catalogue the loges, a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ information and press service, dated 14 August 1947, lists ‘Calicut and Surat on the 
Malabar coast, Mazulipatam [sic] on the Orissa coast, Balassore, Goretti and Cassimbazar in the 
Golf of Bengal’ as the loges that had just been handed over. It does not mention the ‘Pakistani’ 
loges.72  
Furthermore, contrary to Dianoux’s suggestion that the loges could technically still be 
French, the French government did in fact address the issue of the Pakistani loges in 1949, when 
they were exchanged for a building in Karachi to house the French embassy. While the Ministry 
of Overseas France insisted that the exchange should have been finalised under the same 
gracious conditions agreed on with India, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was delighted to receive 
in exchange of the Pakistani loges an asset in Karachi that saved rent expenditure for the 
Ministry.73 Except for this positive outcome of the Pakistani loges, the handover of the Indian 
loges nevertheless failed to fulfil France’s ploy to appease India, and France would have to 
consider alternative strategies in order to preserve her Indian territories. 
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The British are leaving 
Correspondence in the French and British archives shows that the French government 
was very much aware of the impact of the Second World War on Indo-British relations.74 The 
recruitment of Indians to fill the top ranks of the British Indian armed forces in October 1945 had 
already demonstrated British commitment to an eventual transfer of power, and the introduction 
of an interim government headed by Nehru in 1946 only confirmed the evolution towards India’s 
independence.75 In a November 1945 report from France’s Consulate-General in Bombay to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, it was stated that the British intention to withdraw 
from India would have dire consequences for France and her tiny enclaves. In fact, the 
Consulate-General foresaw that, with the British gone, the merging of the French Indian territories 
into an independent India was a fait accompli, especially since Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-
1950), the first Indian Minister of Home Affairs, had declared in 1945 that ‘it was useless to talk 
about the future of the French establishments as independence would automatically resolve their 
existence’.76 Not only does the statement emphasise the level of confidence the leaders of the 
Indian National Congress had in obtaining independence, it also highlights that the incorporation 
of other foreign territories, that is the French and Portuguese enclaves, was not seen as a 
separate issue to the integration of the British Indian provinces and the princely states that would 
form the Union of India.77  
Within twenty months Patel convinced the heads of the princely states to merge in order 
to form the Union of India. Indeed, unification was considered of the utmost importance, because 
Britain’s withdrawal exposed the country to balkanisation and even to the possible rallying of 
some princely states to Pakistan. It fell on Patel who embodied authority and the right-wing of the 
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INC, as the first Minister of Home Affairs, to unify the 562 princely states with the British Indian 
provinces under the banner of a central government based in New Delhi. His fourfold policy 
consisted of persuasion (sam), money (daam), punishment (dand), and division (bhed).78 In his 
mind, foreign territories needed to be dealt with in the same way: firmly and uncompromisingly.79  
The decision by the British Labour government of Clement Attlee in February 1947 to 
withdraw from India undeniably challenged France’s future in South Asia.80 While Britain 
acknowledged, even if reluctantly, that the time had come to leave, France’s post-war agenda 
focused on preserving her empire, despite growing nationalism throughout the colonial world and 
the opposition of the USA and USSR. In an attempt to overcome the changes taking place, vague 
plans for reform based on the British Commonwealth were considered, but Indochina was already 
thwarting this ideal, and the possible disappearance of the French Indian territories would only 
further challenge the new colonial framework.81 In an effort to convince the Indian government to 
allow France to maintain her Indian territories, President Auriol sent Schumann to India shortly 
after independence.82 Schumann remarked in his memoirs that the mission was doomed to 
failure since the Indian government, which had been founded on anti-colonialism, would not 
accept France’s demands to pursue her colonial ambition.83  
Nehru confided in Schumann that ‘it was obvious the comptoirs would came back to 
India’, insinuating that they had already been part of India in the past, but also that ‘there was no 
urgency as we have other problems to deal with’. The French therefore hoped that time was on 
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their side.84 Auriol was very much aware of the impact that any demands for cession from the 
Indian government would have on the rest of the empire. France was reaffirming her colonial 
command in a changed world, and the growing opposition to colonialism was reflected both in 
Nehru’s correspondence to Marius Moutet, Minister of Overseas France, and in Indian headlines. 
Nehru mentioned that India was ‘following with grave concern the development in Indochina’ and 
that ‘the events were having a very unfortunate effect on Indian opinion’. Indian daily papers such 
as the Amrita Bazar Patrika, The Star of India, The Statesman, The Nationalist, and The 
Hindustan Standard regularly condemned the re-occupation of the East Indies (Indonesia) by the 
Dutch, and of Indochina by the French.85  
The increasing hostility towards European colonisers was described in reports from the 
consulates as ‘pan-Asian and xenophobic’, with Indian Muslims rallying to the Algerian national 
cause and the Hindus denouncing the French colonial presence in Indochina.86 These anti-
colonial feelings had exploded as a direct reaction against the actions that had been undertaken 
in France’s two main colonies. The Sétif repression (8 May 1945) was criticised in India not only 
because of the level of military brutality, but also because it defied the Atlantic Charter of 14 
August 1941, which supported self-determination. In a Joint Declaration by the United Nations (1 
January 1942), representatives of twenty-six Allied nations, including the exiled governments of 
the occupied European powers and the Free French, pledged adherence to the Charter. The pro-
India newspaper Amrita Bazar Patrika claimed on numerous occasions that it was high time the 
signatories of the Charter implemented its declared principles. The fact that the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs retained clippings from the paper in their archival files demonstrated France’s 
concern over India’s criticism of France and other signatories to maintain power over colonised 
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nations.87 Numerous missives between Paris and her consulates in Bombay and Calcutta kept 
the Ministry informed about these and other anti-imperialist articles published in the Indian 
press.88 
Moreover, Hindus were rallying to the community of Indians in Indochina and denouncing 
the reoccupation of the colony by French armed forces after the Japanese surrender.89 While it is 
believed there were approximately 7,000 Indians living in Indochina during the peak period of the 
1920s,90 the last census in 1937 indicated there were 6,000 ‘Asiatic foreigners’, mainly British 
Indians from the Coromandel coast. This figure included approximately 2,000 French Indians, 200 
of whom were Muslims, while the remainder were Catholic renonçants, who lived mainly in 
Cochinchina (the southern tip of Indochina).This French Indian community consisted of Tamils 
and their Indo-Vietnamese descendants, the product of inter-marriage between French Indian 
men and Vietnamese women.91 Their economic power was much more important than that of the 
indigenous population, a situation that encountered growing resentment from the local 
Indochinese population. Indeed, dark-skinned Tamils challenged the established Vietnamese 
racial hierarchy, although they did not experience the violence that Indian communities faced in 
other parts of the Indian Ocean where there had been larger influxes of Indian labourers.92  
French Indians living in Indochina, however, were not wholly supportive of the nationalist 
movement in Indochina, nor were they confident that the effect of India’s independence on 
French India would be positive. Indeed, their positions in the French colonial administration and 
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other auxiliary services, as well as their money-lending activities, had provided them with a 
privileged status.93 Commercial activities and employment in the colonial service, especially the 
police and military, positioned French Indians as intermediaries within the configuration of French 
colonialism, and this gave them the particular position of being both coloniser and colonised.94 
Thus, the Vietnamese nationalist movement threatened their socio-political advantages, a 
development that could ultimately trigger violent repercussions from the local population who felt 
a strong animosity towards this ‘sub-imperial’ community that was perceived as just another 
colonial layer between them and the French administration.95 Furthermore, it was understood that 
the independence of India would most likely have an important impact on the future of French 
India, and could equally affect privileges enjoyed by those French Indians who worked in 
Indochina. 
However, despite the local and regional turmoil, a few options were emerging and being 
considered by the French administration: either follow the British and leave India, or like the 
Portuguese, stay at any price.96 The first solution raised its own issues. The French authorities 
believed that the territories would be rapidly integrated into India and feared that very little or no 
French culture would be preserved on the subcontinent. Yet, contrary to official French beliefs, 
French culture in India was limited to a very small community of French-educated Indians, while 
the larger population of French Indians shared language, religion, and culture with their 
neighbours. A report on education in Overseas France, published by the Ministry of Education in 
1946, noted that the native language was always present in French Indian educational 
establishments, even amongst those whose policy was to teach primarily in French.97 It was 
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evident that the amalgamation of the French Indian territories would be facilitated by the 
economic, geographic, and cultural links that had already been established with India.  
Furthermore, as noted above, any decision to leave India would set a precedent for the 
rest of the French empire, with potentially severe repercussions on the French position in 
Indochina, where hostilities between France and the nationalists had begun in late 1946.98 In 
post-war France, the focus was on preserving the empire at all costs rather than facilitating its 
dissolution. Finally, a docile departure from India could be viewed as a servile alignment to British 
colonial policy and the abandonment of a potentially important geo-political position in India, 
especially in view of the growing unrest in Indochina. Pondichéry was still considered as a 
possible stopover for military ships bound to Indochina, and as a region from which military 
volunteers could be recruited.  
The second solution entailed following the example of the Portuguese, who had declared 
that since their Indian possessions were not colonial territories but an unalienable part of the 
mother country, they could therefore not be abandoned.99 However, even if reorganising the 
empire offered the potential to make French India an integral part of the French republic, this 
solution seemed risky. Colonial authorities acknowledged that French foreign possessions in 
India had only a tenuous cultural and moral link with France. Moreover, it did not make sense to 
stay in India against the will of four hundred million people, especially in the context of India’s 
long and successful fight for independence from Britain. Rumours in 1947 that Portugal was 
negotiating a railway agreement and the sale of its port, Marmagao, to the landlocked state of 
Hyderabad, only aggravated the positions of both Portugal and France, as the sale would 
jeopardise New Delhi’s integration plan.100 As a member of the Security Council at the UN, 
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France had to avoid the embarrassing UN intervention that India threatened to request. Such an 
intervention could be viewed by world leaders and the rest of her empire as proof of France’s 
inability and unwillingness to negotiate.  
Thus, neither leaving India nor staying at all costs, especially with the limited military 
forces available to France, presented as satisfactory options. An alternative solution had 
therefore to be considered, and the option that emerged would be closely linked to issues 
surrounding the Customs Union Agreement and a referendum.101  
 
The Customs Union Agreement and the referendum 
The Customs Union Agreement was introduced in 1941 as a wartime measure to 
facilitate trade between British and French India. The outbreak of the Second World War had 
impacted on maritime trade and slowed the transportation of goods between European powers 
and their empires. With shipments from the métropole reduced, French India was now, more than 
at any earlier time, dependent on British India for supplies. The British Consul-General in 
Pondichéry ironically suggested French officials must have suffered from a dearth of their usual 
luxuries due to the lack of maritime communication between France and her Indian territories 
(see Chapter 2), but in reality it was the livelihood of the local population that was more seriously 
affected, because it partly depended on the economic activity of the free ports of Pondichéry and 
Karikal.102 Since the disruption of maritime trade indiscriminately affected both French and British 
India, the colonial powers decided to enter into a Customs Union Agreement to facilitate the 
transfer of goods between the French Indian free ports and British India.  
There were also political reasons for the arrangement. Since June 1940, the governor of 
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Pondichéry, Louis Bonvin, had rallied French India to de Gaulle’s Appeal to Free France, 
affirming French India’s determination to fight alongside Great Britain and its faithful dominions.103 
However, while the Customs Agreement testified to French India’s opposition to the Vichy state 
and German occupation, the British Indian government nevertheless looked suspiciously on 
French citizens in French India, whom they considered to be, as a rule, supporters of Pétain. 
Indeed, Governor Bonvin had first recognised Pétain after the 22 June armistice, but under British 
pressure he quickly rallied French India to de Gaulle.104 However, not all French diplomats in 
India had rallied to de Gaulle. A report published in 1942 stated that two French consuls, a Mr 
Sudreau in Bombay and a Mr Dubois in Calcutta, had made comments in favour of Pétain. It was 
nevertheless further noted that, since they had been put under house arrest in Dehradun (North 
India), no other Vichy diplomats were believed to be in office in India.105   
The Customs Agreement specified that the French would receive six lakhs twenty (a unit 
in the South Asian numbering system equal to one hundred thousand (100,000)), or 620,000 
rupees, for losses in customs revenue, a figure the British believed was in excess of whatever 
revenue the French would have received from reduced maritime trade during the war years.106 
The accord could be terminated by either party by giving notice to the other party on 31 March 
one year in advance of the termination coming into effect. French Indian goods, which no longer 
had an outlet overseas due to the war, could now be sold in British India without payment of 
customs duties. However, the British acted to protect their textile industry by restricting the 
volume of French Indian cotton products that could enter their market.107  
The overall result of the accord was two-fold: it tightened the economic links of the 
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French enclaves to British India, and at the same time reduced smuggling, because French ports 
were now under the customs control of British India.108 For the British, the agreement was most 
welcome, as it solved a smuggling problem that had cost nearly a million pounds sterling per year 
before the war. In 1939, the British had even taken ‘the extreme measure of surrounding some of 
the French enclaves with barbed-wire fences in an effort to stop the leakage’.109 Customs control 
would also be facilitated by the fact that the same currency, the rupee, was used in both the 
French Establishments and British India. In sum, the agreement suited both parties: Britain was 
pleased that French Indian smugglers would no longer benefit from their illegal activities, and the 
French colonial administration and local traders were guaranteed revenue during wartime.  
The Franco-British measure was originally introduced for the duration of the war and was 
an accord between two colonial powers, but with the war over and a transfer of power to a newly 
independent India potentially imminent, the stakes changed significantly. Concerns over the 
future of the agreement were being felt from all sides: the British colonial government of India, the 
Indian Provisional Government, the French colonial authorities, and the local population. The 
French were concerned that the agreement might become an impediment to their future on the 
subcontinent, as India could point out it had economically integrated French India into British 
India. Thus the merging of these territories could be a mere diplomatic formality in line with 
Nehru’s policy of incorporating the princely states and foreign territories to form the Union of 
India.110 The British had rightly noted that the agreement had ‘paved the way for an easier 
transference of political power from French to Indian hands’.111 However, the British were also 
aware that with the war concluded, normal maritime trade would resume, and French India could 
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well return to being what the British had described as ‘a putrid pearl beyond all price’.112 They 
expected the French authorities to now denounce the agreement, since they would profit more 
from legitimate customs duty while smugglers would return to their previous habit of generating 
increased gains by taking goods into British India.113  
The British Foreign Office also foresaw that Indians would take this opportunity to 
increase economic pressure on the territories. Compared to the French, who thought they could 
withstand India’s pressures, the British anticipated that the French position could only be 
sustained with difficulty.114 Leading merchants in French India had been asked for their opinion as 
to the continuance of the agreement; feelings were divided, with some believing that the rapid 
gain from a free-port status would not outweigh the difficult position in respect to supplies.115 
Amongst those in favour of the renunciation were the directors of the Anglo-French Textiles 
Company who, precluded by the terms of the agreement from selling more than their prescribed 
quota as well as from charging higher prices for their cloth, were confident that they could make 
better profits from overseas markets once the restrictions had ended.116 Apart from the obvious 
financial gain for some, renouncing the agreement could also be a smart tactical move on the part 
of the French authorities, as access to tax-free goods would give the local population the 
impression that the necessities of life were inexpensive as long as French India was not 
incorporated into an independent India.117 In addition, a return to smuggling would facilitate the 
increase in prosperity for some. 
The Provisional Government of India, busily concluding the independence of India with 
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Britain, had more pressing problems to deal with, such as partition, the creation of the state of 
Pakistan, and the incorporation of princely states. Not only was it much easier to continue with 
the agreement than abandon it, but the interim government was even prepared to grant 
concessions to the French just as the British had done previously.118 Indeed, ever since the 
introduction of the agreement the French had made numerous complaints on behalf of the 
merchants’ lobby regarding its restrictive terms in regard to the import and export of cloth, but by 
1946 the issue had become critical for the French colonial authorities. The cotton mills in 
Pondichéry were unwilling to supply cloth to the French army out of their own quotas as defined 
by the agreement. The cloth earmarked for the army stationed in Indochina would have been 
exchanged for very much needed Indochinese rice. Indeed, during a famine in the Madras region 
in May 1946, Governor Baron, pleaded with Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, who was sent to 
Indochina to restore French colonial authority, to urgently deliver 4,000 tons of rice to Pondichéry 
because ‘French India could not meet her basic foodstuff needs.’119 However, a famine had also 
hit the northern and central provinces of Indochina in 1945, caused partly by the collapse of the 
market and transport network.  
To add to French difficulties, the Viet Minh had strategically taken control of the granaries 
in order to relieve the famine, a move that gained them widespread support.120 Hence the supply 
of rice from Indochina to support other parts of the Empire, especially French India, was seriously 
compromised. A report submitted on the eve of the independence of India mentioned that the 
total import of rice to the French enclaves in 1946 amounted to 9,610 tons, more than half of 
which (5,700 tons) came from Indochina. The French authorities calculated at that time that any 
disruption to the supply of rice from British India would have dire financial consequences. In fact, 
France would most likely not be able to meet the extra costs, and her consequent inability to feed 
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the population would jeopardise her claim over the enclaves.121 The issue of providing essential 
food to the local population would become a crucial point in the debate concerning the potential 
merging of territories.  
Despite the shortages of cloth in post-war India, the interim Indian government agreed to 
grant increased cloth quotas to the French, and even added ‘quotas of wines, perfumes, silks and 
medical drugs, with a view to preventing the possibility of the agreement being denounced’.122 
The rationale behind this decision was two-fold: first, as long as the agreement was maintained, 
smuggling was limited and customs revenue controlled. The smuggling had not been entirely 
eliminated by the agreement, as is revealed by regular notices in the French Indian official journal 
that listed, in English, the goods that had been seized by Indian customs officers and their value 
in rupees.123 The second reason for India’s desire to retain the Customs Agreement was that its 
maintenance allowed the interim government to focus on the pressing internal issues of merging 
princely states, dealing with the Muslim League, and managing the takeover from Britain. 
Furthermore, once home issues had been settled, the maintenance of the agreement could be 
used to demonstrate that French India was already economically incorporated with India, hence 
facilitating a political merger. 
With regard to whether the agreement should be terminated or not, the local population in 
the French enclaves was divided into four groups: those who did not buy imported goods and 
therefore did not mind the current situation; a pro-Indian group who supported the Indian National 
Congress policy of merging foreign territories and therefore favored the status quo; merchants, 
business owners, and goods smugglers, who profited most from a return to pre-war conditions; 
and finally, the pro-French lobby that comprised administrative workers and French-educated 
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natives who agitated to have the agreement terminated.124  
However, the future of the agreement became closely linked to France’s inability to offer 
a satisfactory course of action with regard to French India. Already the promulgation of the Fourth 
Republic had introduced changes to the structure of the government of French India as in the rest 
of the empire A decree of 25 October 1946 created an assemblée representative to replace the 
conseil général. It was constituted of 44 elected members from across all of the five territories.  
The assemblée’s members were responsible for making decision on social, economic, legal, and 
taxation matters, a much more important role than previously granted to the members of the 
conseil général.125 In addition, as a response to the independence of India in August 1947, 
France, by a decree of 7 November 1947, took the measure of granting ville libre (free town) 
status to its territories with full administrative powers independent of each other. An assemblée 
municipale of 25 elected members was responsible for controlling the administration of the town. 
However this assemblée was placed under the control of the conseil du government in 
Pondichéry which was headed by the Commissaire de la République (title given to the former 
governor), the representative of the French government.126 Despite the changes, the free towns 
were still under the control of the French authorities.   
While in the past the five territories were administered as one unit, the decision to 
separate them had three goals. First, it intended to appease the Indian government, 
demonstrating France’s commitment towards a gradual autonomy to the territories, although no 
detailed programme or time-line was provided. This was nonetheless an unsatisfactory alternative 
to a complete French withdrawal and fell short of India’s objective of eliminating all foreign 
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presence on Indian soil.127 The second reason for the new administrative arrangement was to 
minimise the impact that a possible secession of Chandernagor, where anti-French unrest was 
most prominent, would have on the other four southern territories. Above all, the administrative 
change was a device to protect Karikal and Pondichéry, the more populous and what seemed to 
be the most pro-French of the five territories.128 Chandernagor had always resented being 
administered by people from the South, and its proximity to Calcutta exposed it to strong 
nationalist influences from the former British Indian capital. In addition, the partition of the eastern 
part of Bengal, which became part of Pakistan in August 1947, caused an influx of refugees into 
Chandernagor, further diluting the little influence France had in the area, and putting 
Chandernagor into the heart of communally induced fighting. The third reason was linked to the 
Comoros Islands where a referendum per island was being considered.129  
Already in 1946, the colonial authorities had described the Bengali comptoir as the 
Achilles’ heel (‘point névralgique’) of French India; Tailleur, the last administrator of 
Chandernagor, asserted in his bitter chronicle of the last year of Chandernagor as a French 
territory, that ‘Chandernagor no longer existed’.130 Unrest had been constant since the end of the 
war, official buildings had been occupied, and students had demonstrated with the aim of having 
the names of French colonial heroes removed from the school they attended.131 Shortly after the 
municipal elections of June 1946, the Mayor of Chandernagor hoisted the Indian National 
Congress flag.132 The gesture demonstrated not only that the nationalist sentiments being 
expressed in British India easily crossed over into French India, but also that the lack of interest 
shown by the French colonial administration had left a political and economic vacuum that 
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allowed the elected representative of a French colony to embrace the symbol of a nationalist 
movement without fear of reprisal.  
Anti-colonial feelings continued with French Indian students organising a Vietnam Day on 
21 January 1947 to show support to the independent struggle taking place in Indochina.133 A 
similar demonstration on 25 February 1947 caused serious altercations between the French 
police and students; other means used by Chandernagorians to demonstrate their allegiance to 
India included fasting and threats of hartal (general strike).134 After further unrest, the assemblée 
locale consisting of elected members responsible for local administration, decided to declare 15 
August 1947 (the day India gained independence) a national public holiday in Chandernagor. The 
same assemblée in March 1948 voted on a motion proposing the immediate merging of 
Chandernagor with India, which prompted Paul Coste-Floret, Minister of Overseas France, to 
announce on 8 June 1948 that a referendum would be organised in consultation with the 
Municipal Councils of each of the territories.135 The decision was confirmed in correspondence, 
dated 29 March 1948, between New Delhi and Paris.136 As expected, in June 1949 7,500 
Chandernagorian voters, comprising women and men above the age of twenty-one years, 
approved the secession of the French Bengali comptoir from the French Union, while 114 voters 
opposed the change.137 The overwhelming response led to the 1951 Treaty of Cession that finally 
sealed the demise of the French Bengali comptoir.  
France proved unable, however, to organise a date to hold similar referenda in the other 
four territories, fearing perhaps the outcomes and the impact this would have on the French 
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Union. India responded by finally terminating the customs agreement in 1948 – effective as of 1 
April 1949. By terminating an accord that had initially been brought into being by two colonial 
powers in India, this resolution strongly signaled the determination of India to use various means 
to increase diplomatic pressure until the French were compelled to leave. It also severed the 
economic bond that had linked French India to British India since 1941. This tactical move 
occurred within five months of the first stage of territorial restitution (the handover of the loges in 
October 1947), and announced that another serious step was being taken by Indian authorities 
towards merging the rest of French India. In a spirit of goodwill, India had offered to allow French 
authorities to continue the agreement if they wished, but France had failed to reply within the 
twelve months designated for their response. This failure to respond was due partly to France’s 
concern that continuing with the current agreement would signal their dependence on India, and 
hence demonstrate that they were unable to feed their own population at a time of severe rice 
shortages.  
While France was unwilling to bow to India’s demands for a referendum, the British 
Foreign Office remarked that the French had made no plans for dealing with the kind of 
emergency they would face ‘if Indians really decided to turn on the screw’.138 The British Consul-
General in Pondichéry had warned the French Minister for Colonies, Marius Moutet, during his 
visit to Pondichéry in January 1947, that ‘if the agreement were to cease French India would be 
surrounded by a customs barrier which would make smuggling almost impossible and that the 
amount paid by India to the French authorities for loss in customs revenue would be enough to 
defray the expense of maintaining a thoroughly effective customs cordon’.139 The statement was 
based on first-hand experience, since the British had erected barbed-wire fences in 1939 to 
prevent smuggling and the losses of revenue. India’s position was reflected by her Consul-
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General in Pondichéry, Rachid Ali Baig, who was convinced that strong measures were 
necessary to get the French out. Baig did not believe the French would ever accept ‘a democratic 
solution to a problem of this kind, because if they did the whole basis of the constitution of 
Overseas France would collapse, and with it the frail structure of France’s Empire in Indo-China 
[sic].’140 The British and Indian predictions indeed proved accurate. 
The termination of the agreement triggered a sense of panic in the weeks leading up to 1 
April 1949, as a local resident highlighted to the President of the Indian National Congress:  
 
Hundreds of cartloads of rice, spices and firewood were flown into the French territories 
from the Indian Union by merchants and monied people, while dye stuffs, yarns and 
cotton goods were taken to the Indian Union by railway and lorries because after the first 
of April these goods may not be wholly consumed by the local population or purchased 
by the Indian Union merchants on account of customs barriers.141  
 
Apart from this temporary hoarding effect, the long-term impact of the agreement’s termination 
was quite significant. It severely hindered the transit of goods and people, and thus contributed to 
the worsening of Franco-Indian negotiations during the following years. Indeed, Indian customs 
authorities considered every single parcel of French Indian land as a distinct foreign territory, a 
particularly arduous practice for the residents of Pondichéry who lived in eight separate 
communes spread over twelve parcels of land crosscut by British–held territory. 142 The practice 
forced local French authorities to lobby the Minister of Overseas France to request that the Indian 
government extend the customs cordon and allow all of the enclaves to be considered as one 
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single foreign unit, but this was rejected.143 Negotiations between the British and the French that 
had failed earlier to effect the consolidation of the French Indian enclaves was once again 
revived, but this time the French were dealing with a different type of opponent. As with previous 
French reactions to British attempts to tighten customs controls, the new Indian customs cordon 
was viewed as an economic blockade. 
 
The economic blockade 
The Indian government had simply reverted to the pre-war 1941 agreement and, like any 
other sovereign state, was enforcing and tightening customs and border regulations, but the 
effects of the new Indian customs regulation amounted to what the French called an ‘economic 
blockade’.144 In reality, this so-called economic blockade was yet another phase in the series of 
economic restrictions imposed upon French India starting with the British Treaty of 1814, which 
had enforced the demilitarisation of French forces and the carving up of French Indian territories 
into non-contiguous parcels with the intention of preventing the regrowth of France’s former 
economic prosperity in India. In 1816, for example, while Portuguese trade was subject to a 
single duty of 8 percent, a double duty of 16 per cent was levied on all French merchandise 
introduced into the Madras Presidency, as well as on all Anglo-Indian products entering 
Pondichéry. At the time, it was noted that the measure ‘was tantamount to a prohibition’.145  
Moreover, Franco-British relations prior to the Second World War had continued to be 
plagued by customs issues, with France appealing to the British for concessions. The monthly 
L’Inde illutrée blamed the British for the impoverishment of French India caused by the loss of 
commercial trade in favour of British Indian ports, and pleaded for the French government to 
enter into discussions with Britain to have the economic blockade lifted or at least lightened.146 
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The tightening of the British-Indian customs control policy in the late 1930s together with the 
effect of the war had eventually convinced the government of Pondichéry to accept the 1941 
Customs Agreement. It was seen as merely a step further than the lifting of customs regulations, 
since French India had already transferred her customs rights to British India, with the effect of 
economically binding French India to British India. As such, the customs union agreement 
became a welcome respite in the long history of Franco-British customs relations.  
This history, however, seems to have eluded the French press and other commentators, 
who now denounced the new regulations as an unprecedented ‘economic blockade’. Reactions to 
the move went from one of sympathetic support for the Indian nationalist cause to one of total 
dismay and condemnation. Above all, it highlighted the vulnerable position of French India vis-à-
vis an Indian government that was determined to unify foreign territories and to gain international 
recognition. This period was marked by the introduction of coercive means referred to as the 
‘guerre froide franco-indienne’ (Franco-Indian Cold War), a reflection of the American-Soviet 
tensions that were concurrently being felt at an international level.  
The first to be surprised by the intensity of the new regulation were French officials in 
Pondichéry, who sent a telegram to Paris listing the new custom prohibitions in eight points.147 
For the first time, Indian troops were deployed at the border of Pondichéry, a reminder that 
France was now dealing with a new kind of sovereign state determined to use all of its arsenal to 
convince a rival that it had overstayed its welcome. French civil servants in India provided an 
image of French India under siege, and were quick to emphasise that ‘India disposed of far 
greater means of pressure than France did; above all India could put an end to the air and 
maritime traffic to Indochina’.148 It is unclear how the civil servants imagined India could stop 
French ships bound to Indochina. Not only do the comments illustrate how Franco-Indian 
relations were now closely intertwined with the Indochinese conflict, but French civil servants also 
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recalled that Indian military forces, six months earlier, had invaded Hyderabad, a renegade 
princely state that had been unwilling to bow to New Delhi’s pressures to join the Indian Union.149 
Even if the invasion went against Gandhian ideals, Nehru had declared that the end justified the 
means, and French officials warned of ‘the new habit that Indians have developed to use violence 
to resolve issues’.150 Daniel Lévi, the French Ambassador in New Delhi (1948-1951), described 
Patel’s methods and intransigence as ‘nazi-like’.151 Raoul Bertrand, the Chargé d’Affaires, 
informed Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that after Hyderabad, Portuguese 
India and French India were next on the new nation’s list of territories that would be merged by 
force.152  
The colonial press also made generous use of a terminology and images that were 
familiar to a French readership and that aimed at provoking dread and outrage. Climats, a pro-
colonial weekly magazine, in an article entitled ‘De Gandhi à Hitler’, likened India’s coercive 
means to an ‘Anschluss’, echoing the forced annexation of Austria by Hitler’s forces in 1938. It 
dismissed Indian nationalist claims and promoted instead the possibility of French India co-
existing alongside a large and independent India, in the same way that tiny colonial states like 
Monaco, Liechtenstein, and Andorra existed in Europe.153 In addition, the newspaper drew on 
familiar European stereotypes, such as India’s inscrutability; depicting India as a ‘mysterious 
political adolescent’, the paper suggested that her political inexperience had now led the new 
nation to make confused and irrational decisions. A post-war journalist who specialised in the 
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Third World, Tibor Mende, had earlier expressed similar views to Mayo’s description of India.154 
Representing the colonised country in this way perpetuated a familiar colonial discourse in which 
the superiority of the colonising power is promoted as the only means to preserve order and 
functionality,155 while the ‘feeble colonised other’ is construed as weak, evil, and perverted.156 
Marchés coloniaux du Monde, a popular colonial weekly that had been created by René 
Moreux in 1945 to focus on economic issues, described the economic blockade as immoral. 
Starvation would force the population of French India into supporting the merger, the paper 
suggested, an action considered contrary to basic human rights and a denial of the French Indian 
population’s right to vote on their own future.157 The commentary also portrayed India as an 
insatiable giant who could go as far as claiming possession of any territory within the French 
Union where an Indian community existed, such as in the West Indies, Madagascar, Guyane, La 
Réunion, and Indochina. Not only trade by Indian merchants within the Indian Ocean arena had 
resulted in the sprouting of Indian communities, but the abolition of slavery had also lured 
indentured Indian labour to work on the French sugar islands, resulting in the introduction of new 
and larger communities as far as the Atlantic ocean. Between 1854 and 1885, 24,147 Indians 
were shipped to Guadeloupe, 43,326 to Martinique, 8,416 to Guyane, and 63,573 to La Réunion, 
although it is believed that the numbers were higher due to the clandestine migration that went 
unregistered by the administration.158  
Despite a high mortality rate due to difficult shipping and labour conditions, and a minor 
effort at repatriation, Indian communities remained in the sugar islands. Since French censuses 
do not include ethnic criteria, the number of people of Indian descent living in the French West 
Indies in 1946 can only be estimated, but a figure of 20,000 has been suggested.159 In 
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Madagascar, where Indian communities existed before the French established control in the 
1880s, their number increased with colonial expansion to reach over 8,000 prior to the Second 
World War.160 According to the article in Marchés Coloniaux, France had now become prey to an 
uncontrollable Indian imperialist. The authors, André Schock and Georges Le Brun-Kéris, both 
advisors to the French Union, denigrated India by presenting a picture of an economically weak 
state that, headed by ‘a megalomaniac’, was desperately attempting to become a great power. 
Thus France had a moral duty to defend her population from a miserable future under the 
incompetent management of India.161 Portugal used similar imagery and themes to oppose any 
attempts by Nehru to negotiate the future of Portuguese India.162 
Climats provided a similarly paternalistic representation of Franco-Indian relations, using 
the phrase ‘grande famille’ (big family) to convey the idea that India still needed the advice and 
help of a politically mature state like France.163 The article also drew on familiar colonial myth to 
enhance the importance of French India, depicting it as a grand commercial trading centre, a 
crucial link with other French overseas territories, and a necessary stopover between the 
territories of the Pacific, Indochina, and Africa. The depiction was certainly an overstatement, 
since no ship had called at Pondichéry since the Second World War. Likewise, it was even 
suggested that an aerodrome might facilitate the transit of military planes bound for Indochina, 
but this remained a product of colonial fiction.164 Overall, the economic blockade caused the 
colonial press to propagate the old vision of a feeble and unstable India, unable to manage her 
own affairs, and to juxtapose this notion with the idea of a privileged and faithful French Indian 
population that enjoyed free access to education, better hygiene, civil rights, and larger rice 
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rations. 
The blockade also highlighted French India’s vulnerability and especially her dependency 
on Indian goods and services; commentators pointed to the urgent need to improve economic 
conditions and infrastructure in French India. Thus, the level of neglect that had negatively 
affected the territories was now conceded.165 This belated effort was first translated into the 
erection of a power station, since Pondichéry received most of its power supply from a station 
located in Mettur, which lay in Indian territory. Credit for the venture was made available from the 
Fonds d’investissement de développement social et économique (FIDES), a fund to assist with 
the improvement of infrastructure in Overseas France. FIDES was a form of Marshall Plan aid for 
the colonies that demonstrated the Fourth Republic’s commitment to supporting the enhancement 
of overseas territories through grand-scale projects, an idea that originated from Albert Sarraut, a 
Minister of Colonies in the 1920s.166 In 1949, the colonial authorities decided to proceed with the 
dismantling of an old power station from the north of France, with the project to be completed 
within seven months. However, it took over eighteen months for the power station to be re-
erected in Dupuypeth, south of Pondichéry, and cost twice as much as originally scheduled. 
Moreover, the station actually provided less power than had formerly been received from 
Mettur.167  
Similarly, the port of Pondichéry finally received attention from colonial authorities in 
order to counteract the effect of the economic blockade, and to show the population of French 
India, as well as of India, that France was dedicated to improving local conditions. The pier, which 
had been constructed in 1865 and then extended in 1881 and 1908, had been left unused due to 
the extensive corrosion that rendered the whole structure unsafe. While projects before the 
Second World War had focused on the erection of a new port further south than its location at 
that time, the decrease in maritime traffic made this solution too expensive. Hence, repairs to the 
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pier were undertaken in early 1951, but they were not sufficient to allow large ships to moor, and 
in any case its use was impossible during the monsoon.168 Despite the realisation that eliminating 
dependency on India was paramount, and that infrastructure improvements would contribute to 
Pondichéry’s survival, these efforts were too modest and too late to reverse a trend that moved 
inevitably towards merging the remaining foreign territories with India.  
While the economic blockade was seen as a vexatious measure to asphyxiate French India, 
Indian officials realised they were imposing too much hardship on the French Indian population, 
and were forced to withdraw some of the blockade’s prohibitions. Indeed, to facilitate the 
checking and detection of smuggling and other evasions of import and export control regulations, 
which had cost a great deal of revenue to the former government of British India, the Indian 
authorities introduced a permit system ‘under the provisions of Indian passport rules 1921 with 
effect from the first of April 1949’. The permit system was designed to control the movement of 
persons entering into India or the French Establishments of Pondichéry and Karikal, and in order 
to avoid inconvenience and expense, a special type of identify document was prescribed for 
which a fee of only one rupee was charged.169 But the permit system was eventually withdrawn, 
as it proved problematic to poor people living on the border.170  
The new customs regulations also led to a number of skirmishes on the borders.171 Files at 
the National Archives of India contain numerous reports by officials of the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs as well as politicians’ notes that highlight the difficulties caused by the non-
contiguous nature of borders and the trespassing of French Indian police.172 In sum, the 
introduction of a permit system designed to protect India’s national integrity was, as noted by the 
French authorities, also a means to turn an increasingly discontented population against France, 
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in the hope that this pressure would ultimately convince the coloniser to leave.  
The most detrimental impact of the end of the customs union agreement was the reversal 
of the status of Pondichéry and Karikal as free ports, and ultimately the creation of an artificial 
prosperity, in the two largest French Indian territories. This occurred at the same time that 
referendum negotiations between India and France were taking place. The windfall benefited the 
pro-French lobby which opposed merging with India. However, Pondichéry and Karikal were not 
wholly free ports. A tax of three to five percent was added onto the value of all goods entering or 
leaving the two ports, as well as a value-added tax of one percent. Both these taxes were an 
important source of revenue for the local administration.173 According to Rajkumar, the cost of the 
same product in the Union of India was between fifty to sixty percent higher as a result of the 
difference in customs regulations between the two countries.174 Hence the disparity encouraged 
smugglers to bring in goods illegally despite the customs cordon erected by the Indian authorities. 
The main commodities included bicycles, silk, perfumes, fountain pens, and watches. It was the 
large amounts of smuggled gold and diamonds, however, that created a financial crisis in 
Pondichéry.175 With large stock of rupees leaving Pondichéry to purchase gold and diamonds in 
Hong Kong and the Gulf countries, the quantity of rupees in circulation in the French territories in 
1950 was reduced, forcing French authorities to provide a credit of £50,000 to buy rupees from 
the Bank of India.176 This monetary crisis only highlighted the dependency of the comptoirs on 
India’s banking system.177  
The tax advantage afforded these two ports attracted goods carriers in search of large 
profits. Although the quantity of goods handled in Pondichéry in 1950 was half that of 1936, by 
comparison the volume of imported goods was noticeably greater. In 1936, 72,000 tons of goods 
were exported and 19,000 tons imported; in 1950 the figures were respectively 8,478 and 
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40,400.178 Two explanations could be advanced for this development. First, since the end of the 
customs agreement, Indian goods transiting via Pondichéry were subject to the two taxes 
mentioned above (a French customs tax of three to five percent of the value of the goods, plus a 
value-added tax of one percent), which made the use of the French Indian port more expensive 
than an Indian port. The second disincentive was that Pondichéry offered very basic port facilities 
that had not been upgraded adequately since the end of the nineteenth century. However, the 
inferior port standard did not deter the import of goods meant for smuggling into India.   
By 1952, the contraband had such an adverse effect on both India and French India that 
they both contemplated a return to the pre-April 1949 situation. However, given the 
circumstances, it was impossible for India to concede a solution that preserved French sovereign 
presence in India, while for France the distress caused by India’s increasing withdrawal of its 
services and goods had resulted in significant pro-merger support which would have been difficult 
to reverse. In a note regarding the situation in French India dated May 1952, Comte Stanislas 
d’Ostrorog (1897-1960), the French Ambassador in India (1951-1960), admitted that ‘the time 
when the European countries imposed their law onto the world was over’.179  
Born in Constantinople in 1897, Ostrorog represented the epitome of a man of French 
culture brought up in a country perceived to be the link between the West and the East. His name 
was Polish, but both his parents were French and worked in Constantinople. After service in the 
First World War and a brief return to the family home, he studied in Paris to prepare a career in 
the French diplomatic corps. His first posting was in China, followed by Turkey, Syria, and the 
Soviet Union. After the Second World War he was posted to Lebanon, and then to Ireland, his 
only European posting. He was ambassador to India and Nepal, a position in which he was 
responsible for diplomatic relations with both countries, from 1951 until his death in 1960.180 
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While Ostrorog’s statement alerted his superiors to the demise of French India and the French 
empire as a whole, French public opinion seemed to show little interest in the future of France in 
India.  
 
French public opinion 
Indeed, apart from the litany of the comptoirs’ names repeated by generations of 
schoolchildren, who would anyway have found it difficult to identify their location on the map of 
the French empire, French public opinion showed little interest in either France’s colonial 
presence in French India or its nemesis, the Indian independence movement.181 The very few 
press articles and studies of Indian nationalism in the inter-war and post-war periods limited their 
accounts to reports on Gandhi. In 1924, Romain Rolland was the first to publish a biographical 
account of Gandhi and his non-violence movement, but Mahatma Gandhi conferred upon Gandhi 
a ‘messianic and prophetic characteristic with legendary dimensions’.182  While Rolland never 
went to India himself, he helped popularise the image of Gandhi as an Indian Christ. This 
mythical portrayal prevented the specific characteristics of Gandhi’s struggle from becoming 
familiar to the French public, who were in any case preoccupied by the rise of fascism in 
Europe.183 In addition, the press tended to discuss Gandhi using a French framework so that the 
man and his mission could be understood by French readers. He was sometimes seen as a 
follower of the French Revolution’s principles and a saint, while at other times his non-violence 
struggle was perceived to be in opposition to French revolutionary ideas. The attempt to 
understand an indigenous nationalist movement through a framework based on European values 
represented a misappropriation of the specific terms of India’s nationalist struggle.184  
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After the war, French daily newspapers such as Le Figaro, Le Monde, and L’Humanité 
did not report extensively on Britain’s withdrawal from India, in part because they paid greater 
attention to the rise of the Cold War, to the hot spots of decolonisation in Indonesia, Palestine, 
Indochina, and North Africa, and to European affairs. When articles on events in India were 
published, they were often no more than reproductions of the British press, hence they rarely 
offered any in-depth analysis of the effect of British decolonisation on French India. Only a few 
journalists had read Nehru’s An Autobiography (1936) and his Discovery of India (1946) by the 
time India became independent. Most French reporters had little insight into India’s first Prime 
Minister and the potency of the Indian nationalist movement.185 Ostrorog remarked in 1958 that 
the inspirational work of Gandhi and Nehru remained unknown to almost everyone in France 
except for a few specialists.186 Indeed, the fact that Nehru’s Discovery of India was not translated 
into French until 2002 testifies to the continuing lack of appeal India’s first Prime Minister and his 
views on India have had in France.187  
In addition, few French people actually had firsthand experience of the relatively 
unimportant French Indian territories, and nor were they attracted to a life in French India where 
hardly any work opportunities existed. Incentives to join colonial troops in the colony included a 
taste for adventure, an accelerated career advancement, and a salary twice as large as that paid 
in the métropole, but since the Franco-British Treaty of 1814 had limited the number of troops that 
could be stationed in French India, the opportunity for new troops to be posted there no longer 
actually existed.188 Unlike Algeria and Indochina, which had welcomed a settler population, 
French India had no large tracts of agricultural land with which to attract a migrant population. It 
also lacked a mining industry, and the textile industry used cheap local labour. Teaching and 
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legal professions were the only occupations in which approximately one hundred French people 
had found employment, while fifty others were known to engage in some small commercial 
activities.189  
Furthermore, the most prestigious destinations for graduates of the École Nationale de la 
France d’outre-mer – formerly the École coloniale (1889-1934) – were Indochina and Africa.190 
The best students chose to serve in Indochina because it offered higher salaries and faster 
promotion, as well as better transportation, schools, and hospital facilities, all important factors for 
those who were married or planned on having families. Most others chose to go to French 
territories in Africa, which included the AOF, AEF, and Madagascar. The focus of graduates on 
these two colonial regions was reflected in their school curriculum, which concentrated on Africa, 
North Africa, and Indochina. Nevertheless, topics were very general and lacked specialised 
subjects that would have better prepared graduates for a professional life dealing with overseas 
societies and with particular geographical regions.191 More importantly, the curriculum failed to 
provide serious courses on economic development, sociology, and contemporary political 
developments, studies that would have better equipped administrators to deal with the issue of 
decolonisation.192 
Despite the myth of the French Indian empire, French India occupied only a minor space 
in the École’s programme, which hardly inspired would-be graduates to consider a posting in 
French India.193 Even though it was mainly the search for exoticism, adventure, and a desire to 
                                                 
189 Marchés Coloniaux, 21 August 1954. 
190 Not all colonial administrators were former graduates of the École Nationale, Cohen, Rulers of Empire, op.cit., pp. 
97, 98. 
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submit a thesis at the end of their studies, most of them focused on France’s African colonies. Until the creation of 
Ministère des Colonies, overseas territories were administered by an under secretariat at the Ministère de la Marine. 
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to establish a corps of administrators and a ministry responsible for administering overseas territories which had 
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help spread French civilisation that motivated those who enrolled in the École, French India 
remained unappealing. It was, indeed, a sad reminder of France’s losses to her rival, Britain. 
Unlike other French overseas territories, French India offered few commercial opportunities and 
no possibility of economic expansion. Next to Britain’s Indian empire, described by the 
Association de Fonctionnaires of the Ministry of Colonies in 1911 as ‘the greatest colonial 
achievement in the world’,194 France was left to struggle as a mere subordinate coloniser in India. 
No graduate could pretend to become ‘roi de la brousse’, to use Deschamps’ later term, in French 
India.  
In addition, French India was notorious for its political instability and frequent changes of 
governor. Local politicians, who were themselves frequently difficult to deal with, seemed to have 
little trouble convincing the Ministry of Colonies to recall recalcitrant governors, such as Théodore 
Drouhet in 1884 and Alfred Martineau in 1911. In 1954, the deputy Edouard Goubert tried 
unsuccessfully to have Governor Ménard recalled.195 The local French Indian magazine, L’Inde 
illustrée, described French India as ‘the sad colony that looked like a small boat that, without a 
skipper, was being tossed about by the waves’.196 While the high turnover of governors affected 
other parts of the empire as well as French India, the influence that local politicians played was 
certainly linked to the introduction of republican institutions and the party politics that French 
Indians enjoyed before other parts of the empire.197 By setting up local assemblies and by 
granting the right to send a deputy to the French parliament, the power of the local administration 
was weakened, ultimately creating a less desirable administrative post.198 While French India 
could not offer local administrators the possibility of acquiring the self-appointed title of ‘roi de la 
brousse’, the introduction of suffrage had provided opportunities for powerful upper-caste natives 
                                                                                                                                               
been expanding since 1830s. 
194 Quoted in Cohen, Rulers of Empire,  op.cit., p. 60; Cohen,  ‘Book review’,  op.cit., p. 301. 
195 Weber, ‘Chanemougan’, op.cit., p. 296; Weber, ‘Gouverneur et historien de l’Inde francaise’, op.cit., p.125; 
Annasse, op.cit., pp. 174-6. 
196 L’Inde Illustrée, September 1933. 
197 Cohen, Rulers of Empire, op.cit., p. 123. 
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like Chanenougam to become, in the words of the historian Weber, ‘King of French India’.199 
Former governor Lemaire was so incensed by his recall in 1906, initiated by Chanenougam, that 
he resigned from his post in New Caledonia in order to run against and subsequently defeat his 
archrival in legislative elections in French India.200 Overall, for the average French person seeking 
career opportunities, French India was a singularly unattractive prospect. 
This lack of interest was not limited to those looking for employment. Tailleur, the last 
administrator of Chandernagor remarked in his bitter chronicle of the last year of Chandernagor 
as a French territory, that Carrefour, a weekly colonial paper, was the only newspaper that 
dedicated an article on the ‘loss’ of Chandernagor.201 Similarly, the weekly colonial magazine, 
Climats deplored that one out of three Frenchman completely ignored the existence of the French 
overseas territories. It reported that, according to a poll carried out in 1949 by the Institut National 
des Statistiques, only 32% of adults living in France knew anything about the French overseas 
territories, and only a fraction of them could actually name some of them. To the surprise of the 
author of the report, Corsica was mentioned as an overseas territory, while Syria, Lebanon, 
Thailand, China, Palestine, Brazil, and Canada were also believed by some to be part of the 
French Union.202 General knowledge about France’s overseas territories had hardly improved 
since March 1934, when the monthly magazine L’Inde illustrée despaired that some Frenchmen 
thought Yanaon was in Africa and Mahé in Japan.203 Similarly, in October 1949 Le Figaro 
asserted that education was urgently needed to improve knowledge about the French Union 
among French youth. Teachers were pleading for better school-books on the topic and the 
proclaiming need for the press, cinema, and radio to play a more assertive role in informing the 
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public about French Union matters.204 The school curriculum of the Third Republic exposed 
French adults of the post-war era to topics concerning the French colonial enterprise, the 
inequality of races, the mission civilisatrice, economic interests, emigration, the colonial army, 
and how to get ahead of other colonial powers. Although education proved to be a potent means 
of propagating a nationalist vision of the colonial past, French India’s small size relegated it to the 
margins of the curriculum in favour of more important parts of the empire,205 such as Algeria, 
Tunisia, Africa, Madagascar, and Indochina.206 
As a result of this situation, in 1951, the Minister for Overseas France, François 
Mitterrand, initiated the establishment of the Comité d’information de la France d’outre-mer. Its 
aim was to promote Greater France to the French public and business circles, predominantly by 
publishing relevant articles in the press.207 It was replaced in January 1954 by the Service 
d’information et de documentation de la France d’outre-mer. The broader aims and scope of the 
new body included the production of short films to promote commercial opportunities, the 
coordination of trade fairs and exhibitions, and the increased allocation of credit to both expand 
the catalogue of photographs relating to greater France and improve their conservation.208 
It is questionable whether these ministerial agencies actually accomplished their goals. 
Studies of opinion polls in France between 1946 and 1971 have shown that the French paid little 
attention to colonial matters. Concern regarding overseas France was triggered, however, by the 
Algerian crisis of 1956. Following guerrilla attacks by the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, 
France increased her military commitment in Algeria; in less than two years, the number of troops 
mobilised in the region increased from 54,000 to 350,000.209 But despite the Algerian crisis, 
                                                 
204 Le Figaro, 22-23 October 1949. 
205 Breuilly, op.cit., p. 16. 
206 Service éducatif du Musée national de l'éducation, op.cit.; Tailleur, op.cit., p. 15. 
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issues of living standards and social justice dominated public opinion far more than those relating 
to overseas territories.210 This general attitude towards greater France accords with earlier 
studies of French public opinion in relation to the colonies between 1919 and 1939, which 
demonstrated that anti-colonialist groups managed to limit the effect of colonialist propaganda in 
the métropole.211 Hence, issues that emanated from the empire, and more particularly from 
French India and India, found little resonance amongst the French population, and contributed 
almost nothing to any form of mobilisation for or against French India.  
It is worth pointing out that French scholars also showed very little interest in India and 
her independence movement. Coquery-Vidrovitch has estimated that between 1888 and 1960, 
French academic research on India – excluding French India – produced only sixty-one titles, 
including books, research articles, and magazine articles, of which only nine focused on Indian 
nationalism. Four of these nine studies were written between 1899 and 1911, three between 1919 
and 1931, and two between 1935 and 1944. The next body of work relating to India’s 
independence was not published until after 1960, a period of intensive decolonisation of the 
French empire, and thirteen years after Britain’s withdrawal from India. It is clear that India’s 
claims for independence did not attract intense study from French researchers.212 Coquery-
Vidrovitch’s study accords with Mende’s comment that, when in the late 1940s he was about to 
embark on a work-related trip to India, French books on contemporary India were rare, a dearth 
that eventually led him to publish L’Inde devant l’orage (1950) and Conversations with Mr. Nehru 
(1956). On the whole, then, and for all the reasons outlined above – French India’s relative 
insignificance within France’s vast empire, the lack of scholarly debates and journalistic reports, 
the limited impact of the government’s propaganda agencies, and the fact that domestic affairs, 
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the Algerian conflict, and Europe attracted more attention – the general French population 
seemed quite unaware of what was happening on the subcontinent. 
 
Conclusion 
The fact that France had a history of negotiating the potential exchange of colonial 
territories with her rival, Britain, facilitated the decision to hand over her three-hundred-year-old 
territorial rights over the loges to India. The transfer aimed to appease the newly independent 
nation, but India was determined to pursue a policy of territorial integration, and therefore viewed 
the handover as the first step in a process that would eventually lead to the surrender of all the 
other French Indian territories. The French belief in an ‘illusory sovereignty’, as well as the 
expectation that more unrest linked to partition would prompt France’s intervention and thereby 
extend her influence over India, encountered the Indian nationalist vision of state formation as 
well as the skills of her leaders. France’s decision to remain in India was based on past glories 
and the belief that national grandeur was associated with the reaffirmation of a pre-war empire, 
an approach that subsequently annulled the potential secession of even the smallest of the 
overseas territories. The British withdrawal from India, however, and the beginning of the 
Indochinese conflict eventually determined the future of French India. Although the end of the 
1941 Customs Union Agreement proved to be favourable to the French, as it gave the impression 
of prosperity in the comptoirs, it also exposed the territories’ vulnerability. Indian authorities now 
had the means to apply enough economic and diplomatic pressure to force France to consider 
the inevitable. French public opinion, however, viewed this development with indifference. 
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Chapter 4 
In the Name of Bharat: Indian nationalism and French India 
 
 ‘Leaders of French India preferred to be the first ones in Pondichéry 
rather than the last ones in Madras or Delhi’. (Note concernant les 
établissements français dans l’Inde, Ministère de la France d’outre-
mer).1 
 
A million Indians [French and Portuguese] are still subjects of foreign 
states and have no political freedom. The most astonishing aspect of the 
situation is that while Britain has relinquished her possessions 
comprising over two million square miles and containing a population of 
400 million her two western allies should cling like leeches to a few 
hundred square miles of territory on the soil of free India. (The Leader, 
Allahabad, 21 December 1948). 
 
During the last 150 years or so, the [French territories] have existed in 
India because of the goodwill of the dominant authority in India …  which 
was the British power. These possessions can only exist through the 
goodwill of the dominant authority in India. There is no other way for 
them to exist. (Jawaharlal Nehru at a press conference in New Delhi, 12 
November 1948).2 
                                                          
1 Étude sur les possessions françaises dans l’Inde 24 Juin 1947, AOM, Inde, H23: Études sur les possessions 
françaises. 
2 Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 8, p. 309. 
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That the creation of Pakistan as well as that of India was established in August 1947 
marked the failure of the Indian National Congress (INC) to form a greater post-colonial India. 
The rupture between Hindu and Muslim nationalisms was consecrated with the establishment of 
two distinct states, resulting in generation-long disputes over the state of Kashmir, and India’s 
support in 1971 for the dismemberment of the eastern part of Pakistan to form the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh. Despite these traumatic developments on the subcontinent and the rise 
of hostilities between the new nations, the August 1947 event demonstrated the INC’s 
achievement in unifying 562 princely states along with former British India into a new entity called 
India. The Constitution of the Republic of India (1950) referred to the new nation as Bharat, a 
concept based on a secularised form of nationalism. The decision was political, and aimed at 
reducing the effects of politicised religious identities that had already resulted in the split between 
the two main communities. Moreover, the unification of princely states had also brought into 
sharp focus the issue of foreign possessions on the subcontinent.  
This chapter will explore the nature of Indian nationalism and the process by which the 
small, scattered, and geographically peripheral French Indian territories became an essential 
component of the imagined new Indian community. For India, the merging of the French Indian 
comptoirs was perceived to be a natural process based on ethnic and cultural factors that 
overrode French claims to the comptoirs as historically and constitutionally part of the French 
Republic. It is necessary first to examine the concept of Bharat, a notion that embraced a new 
form of loyalty based on territoriality and thereby closely linked India’s claim over French India to 
the process of building the nation-state. However, this territorial claim also triggered a range of 
merger and anti-merger movements within French India that supported and challenged French 
and Indian nationalism. 
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The concept of Bharat  
The post-colonial Indian nation-state that emerged out of British India and the 
autonomous princely states had a population of approximately 400 million inhabitants whose 
cultures, languages, and religions were very diverse. Such diversity challenged the definition of a 
nation-state based on shared myths, memories, and language, and common political rights. The 
standard differentiation between an ‘ethnic’ notion of nationhood, based on language and ethnic 
descent, and a ‘civic’ model, typified by the union of smaller and less heterogenous populations, 
only partially suits the specificities that led to the formation of India and Pakistan.3 Furthermore, 
Benedict Anderson’s notion that a nation is an ‘imagined community’, a social construct that helps 
bring a group of people together around the idea of a nation,  has been challenged as has 
Anthony Smith’s theory of the transformation of ethnic states into territorial state.4 Indeed, much 
of British India’s vast population had been left unaffected by the various modern institutions, such 
as education and printing that contributed to the European process of nation-making and the 
creation of a national community, a point highlighted by Nehru in a speech celebrating excellence 
in printing and publications in 1958.5  
Instead, the idea of an imagined ‘Indian’ community was adopted and promoted by a 
group of Western-educated middle-class and mainly Hindu men who were members of the INC 
and who saw themselves as the ‘natural leaders’.6 They became the driving force behind the idea 
of the Indian nation, of which the most important element was the territorial unification of princely 
states and former British India, and the formation of the state as the authoritative Indian identity. 
Patel, who represented the right-wing of Congress, epitomised this determination to create an 
                                                          
3 Zimmer, op.cit., pp. 174-5; Anthony D. Smith, op.cit., pp. 80-1. 
4 Anthony D. Smith, op.cit., p. 138; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, (London: Verso Press, 1991 [1983]). 
5 Bandyopadhyay, op.cit., pp. xviii-xix; Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Books to Reach the People’, in Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
Speeches: September 1954 – April 1963, Vol. 4 (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications 
Division, 1964), pp. 172-4; Anderson, op. cit. 
6 Corbridge and Harris, op.cit., p. 23. 
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independent and unified nation.7 Nehru and Patel were the creators of a party machine, the 
Indian National Congress, and the architects of the new state, while Gandhi provided its 
inspiration and dynamic leadership. But how did the concept of an Indian nation-state evolve and 
how did it impact on French India? 
In 1949, the newly approved Constitution that was to be promulgated on 26 January 
1950 defined India as Bharat, a ‘sovereign democratic republic’.8 The use of the word Bharat in 
India’s foundational document embodied a concept referring to Hindu culture and religion while 
designating a liberal nation-state that wanted to be socialist and secular by nature.9 However, 
William Gould mentioned that the European concept of secularism took a more fluid form in India 
and did not exclude religious connotations.10 Indeed, Bhārata-Varsha, in the Brahmanical 
tradition, refers to a set of values, ideas, concepts, practices, and myths that denote the Indian 
subcontinent, and the term Bharat was extended to refer to the Hindu culture that bound South 
Asia together.11 The inhabitants of India were known as the Bharati rather than ‘Hindus’, a term 
that was coined by Muslim travelers and Arab geographers and derived from ‘Sapta Sindhu (the 
seven Indus rivers) via the Iranian equivalent, Hapta Hindu’.12 Bharati did not refer to themselves 
as ‘Hindu’, but instead used their own socio-religious system based on castes to distinguish 
themselves from non-Brahmanical societies. The term ‘Indians’, which derived from the Persian 
language came into existence following the Mughal invasions in the early sixteenth century as a 
means to designate a Muslim born in the northern parts of India.13  
                                                          
7 Krishna, op.cit., p. 517; Corbridge and Harris, op. cit., pp. 43-4.  
8 The Constitution was formally promulgated on 26 January 1950, Government of India, The Constitution of India, 
updated 3 May 2013, <http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india>, viewed 26 January 2014.  
9
 Corbridge and Harris mention that the words ‘socialist’ and ‘secular’ were only introduced into the preamble of the 
Constitution during the period of ‘Emergency Rule’ of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, op. cit., p. 21. 
10 Gould, op.cit., pp. 5-9. 
11 Ray, op.cit., p. 54; Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Dismal Fate of New Nations, Vol.2 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 111-2. 
12 Ray, op.cit., p. 538. 
13 Ibid., pp. 55, 538-9; Masselos, Indian Nationalism, op.cit., p.3 mentions that Islam from the eighth century was 
limited to the Indus Rivers area, the establishment of Muslim kingdoms around New Delhi expanded the religion to a 
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Bharat as a political and cultural concept was used by an  anti-colonial movement in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Its purpose was to restore the glory of the Hindu past, and 
to purge Indian society from foreign presence and influences. The movement promoted the 
superiority of Hinduism over other religions, thus providing a religious and cultural component to 
an emerging Indian nationalism.14 This early form of nationalism was created within a spiritual 
and religious framework that could infiltrate all levels of popular consciousness, while also 
reclaiming a glorious Hindu past that stood in contrast to the more recent history marked by 
Mughal (Muslim) and British intrusions. It also provided some of the elements involved in the 
modern nation-building process, especially the use of Hindu symbols to reinforce the legitimacy of 
this particular cultural form of nationalism.15 For example, the iconography of Bharat Mata or 
Mother India, which was first drawn by the Bengali artist Abanindranath Tagore (1871-1951) in 
1905, depicted a four-armed Hindu goddess clad in an orange sari holding a book, sheaves of 
rice, a mala (a rosary), and a white cloth. These items were probably intended to represent 
knowledge of the classics or education, agriculture, religious devotion, and industry, respectively 
(Fig. 8) while the goddess would later be used to adorn maps of India becoming the territorial 
deity.16  
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
area. Masselos also adds that jati is more accurate that the varna system in describing one’s place in Hindu society, 
p. 7. 
14 Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism, op.cit., p. 97; Anthony D. Smith, op.cit., pp. 197-8. 
15 Bandyopadhyay, op.cit., p. xxiii; the concept of an old Hindu civilisation that transformed into the Indian nation has 
been challenged by Bayly, op.cit., pp. 98-132; Anthony D. Smith, op.cit., pp. 200-2. 
16 Ramaswamy, op.cit., p. 103. 
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Fig. 8: Bharat Mata, by Abanindranath Tagore. Source: Erwin Neumayer and Christine Schelberger, 
Bharat Mata: India’s Freedom Movement in Popular Art, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. vi. 
 
 
 
Hindu slogans were also used. For example, the word swaraj, from the Sanskrit swarajya 
meaning ‘own kingdom or dominion’, came to mean ‘self-rule’ by the time of the Swadeshi 
movement in 1906.17 In January 1930 Gandhi made a declaration of purna swaraj (total self-rule), 
and later referred to independence as Ramrajya, or the rule of Rama, an incarnation of the Hindu 
                                                          
17 Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism, op.cit., p. 3. 
 
 
191 
 
protector God Vishnu.18 Above all, Hindu religious symbolism offered a universal system that 
brought the wider religious communities of India together with the aim to gain political 
legitimacy.19 While Nehru rejected this kind of attachment to tradition and preferred to constantly 
look towards the future, he did, in fact, make reference to the past on occasion. Linking India’s 
eventual independence to the historical and cultural might of India’s civilisation, in December 
1946 he declared: ‘We are at the end of an era and possibly very soon we shall embark upon a 
new age; and my mind goes back to the great past of India, to the 5,000 years of India’s history, 
from the very dawn of that history which might be considered almost the dawn of human 
history’.20 Gandhi continued to support Brahmanical tradition stating that Hinduism had enough 
space to accommodate Christianity and Islam, while others like Rabindranath Tagore and Nehru 
viewed India in more modern terms and promoted a new vision that would transform the authority 
of Hindu traditions into a neutral form of nationhood that signaled progress.21  
While the concept of a nation constructed within a heterodox cultural framework that had 
sufficient potency to infiltrate all levels of Indian popular consciousness, this form of cultural 
nationalism could not successfully encompass all sections of such a heterogeneous society.22 
The challenge of unification was exacerbated by the political alienation of Muslim Indians in 1940, 
who unable to access power in the legislative assemblies, began agitating for their own nation-
state based around their identity as Muslims. The increasing antagonism between the two 
communities eventually led to the partition of India and the creation of two states. British decision-
                                                          
18 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, History, Nationalism and Nation Building: The Asian Dilemma (Armidale: University of 
New England, 1974), p. 11; Gandhi initially thought of a confederated state of Hindus and Muslims but changed his 
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19 Gould, op.cit., pp. 5-14. 
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21 Nehru, Discovery of India, op.cit.; Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism (London: MacMillan & Co, 1917), pp. 97-130; 
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making played a part in the partition, but in any case it was seen that Muslims had a legitimate 
political claim to nationhood, based on religious, cultural, and political factors distinct to those of a 
predominantly Hindu Indian state and led mainly by Hindu Congress members who were 
perceived as the new ‘Raj’. While some members of Congress accepted the concept of a Muslim 
Pakistan, within the party a faction emphasising the particularity of the new Indian state that 
welcomed various religious groups, worked to undermine the claim. Nonetheless, the fulfillment of 
partition together with the later assassination of Gandhi triggered a change of policy, which now 
focused on the promotion of ‘a new Indian identity based on territorial loyalty and the authority of 
the state over and above the particularisms of religion, ethnicity, language and caste’.23 In 
addition, the death of Gandhi brought closure on the nationalist struggle which had had been 
associated with the leader, and acted as a unification moment during the postcolonial process.24  
The result of this new imagining of the nation was twofold. Firstly, an increased emphasis 
on the territorial boundaries of the country meant that further balkanisation of India had to be 
avoided. The merging of recalcitrant princely states and the foreign possessions thus became an 
even more essential component of the nation-building process, which now went beyond cultural 
references to Hinduism and demonstrated the sovereignty of the state as a unifying force. 
Secondly, more neutral national symbols, borrowed from a past with which neither the Hindu nor 
the Muslim communities could strongly identify, were adopted in order to bring together numerous 
cultural, linguistic, and religious communities under the banner of a single, unified nation. For 
example, the Buddhist wheel of law emblazoned on the national flag was inspired by the Sarnath 
Lion Capital of Ashoka (third century BCE), the Mauryan Emperor who had brought large parts of 
the subcontinent under his leadership. The Indian flag consists of three coloured, horizontal 
stripes – saffron, white, and green – and the dark blue wheel of law sits in the centre of the white 
stripe. Congress intended that the flag’s colours would remain neutral and have no communal 
                                                          
23 Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 12; Roy, Beyond Belief, pp. 17-21. 
24 Yasmin Khan, ‘Performing Peace: Gandhi’s assassination as a critical moment in the consolidation of the 
Nehruvian state’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2011), pp. 57, 78-9. 
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significance; saffron represented courage and sacrifice, white represented peace and truth, and 
green stood for faith and chivalry. But the colours were nonetheless associated with religious 
communities: saffron with Hindus, green with Muslims, and white with all the other communities, 
including Parsis, Jews, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, and Jains.25   
While the song Bande Mataram (Hail Mother), based on a poem from the Bengali novel 
Anandamath (1882) written by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, had earlier been a national 
symbol of the struggle for independence, it was replaced by Jana Gana Mana written by another 
Bengali poet, Rabindranath Tagore, in 1896.26 In 1937, the All India Committee Congress (AICC) 
remarked on the potency of Bande Mataram:  
During the past thirty years, innumerable instances of sacrifice and suffering all over the 
country have been associated with Bande Mataram and men and women have not 
hesitated to face death even with that cry on their lips. The song and the words thus 
became symbols of national resistance to British imperialism in Bengal especially and 
generally in other parts of India. The words “BM” became a slogan of power which 
inspired our people and a greeting which ever remind us of our struggle for national 
freedom.27   
But after independence, non-Hindu religious communities objected to the use of the old fighting 
song because it referred to the notion of ‘Mother’ as divine motherland and the mother-goddess 
Durga.28 The republican anthem, Jana Gana Mana, was chosen because it mentions peoples 
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and regions of India in a neutral way and makes no use of religious symbols.29 As Tagore had 
noted in his 1917 study of Indian nationalism, the number of different ‘races’ found in India made 
it difficult to rally so diverse a people around the idea of social communality. Hence, geography 
became primordial, since India could easily be defined as a nation by means of her ‘fixed’ 
geographical particularities, including the Himalayas mountains, the coastline, and her great 
rivers.30  
In Discovery of India, written while in prison in 1944, Nehru similarly recalls that in his 
1936-7 electoral campaign for the provincial assemblies, he asked the many people he 
encountered how they perceived India. They expressed their concept of India in geographical 
terms that also encompassed her inhabitants: ‘the good earth of India, mountains and rivers of 
India and forest and the broad fields which gave us food were all dear to us’. Nehru added that 
‘what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them and me, who were spread out 
all over the vast land. Bharat Mata, Mother India, was essentially these millions of people. You 
are part of this Bharat Mata’.31 Later, Nehru conveyed his own view of India in similar terms, 
recalling his experiences 
of broad fields dotted with innumerable small villages, of towns and cities I have visited; 
of the magic of the rainy season into a glistering expanse of beauty and greenery of great 
rivers and flowing water; of the Khyber Pass in all its bleak surrounding; of the south tip 
of India, of people individually and in the mass and above all of the Himalayas 
snowcapped or some mountain valley in Kashmir in the spring covered with new flowers 
and with a brook bubbling and gurgling through it.32 
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The benefit of such an image was that it set the origins of the nation in a very distant past, and 
guaranteed the inclusion of the whole population, hence circumventing social-political and 
religious divisions found in Indian society at the time.33 In addition, such natural features could be 
perceived in national consciousness as part of the cultural heritage that needed to be defended 
and preserved.34 The partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, however, defied this 
version of India based on geography. Hence, the rise of independent India was more than ever 
before reliant on the notion of a secular state that rallied its citizens around neutral, non-religious 
symbols. Above all, in the aftermath of partition, loyalty to the territory became an essential 
component of national identity, and was synonymous with national unification.  
 
The Indian nation-state and national territory 
 In a speech to the Constituent Assembly in December 1946, Nehru defined the 
forthcoming nation as consisting of ‘British India, the Indian [princely] States, other parts of India 
as are outside of British India and the States, as well as other territories as are willing to be 
constituted into the Independent Sovereign India.’35 While this definition does not seem to have 
anticipated that the north-western and eastern parts of India would become Pakistan in August 
1947, it allowed for the future inclusion of other territories into the new Indian nation (Map. 15). 
Indeed, by 1948 the new Indian state was organised as follows: ‘Part A’ states' comprised the 
former ‘British’ provinces and those states that had been merged into the adjacent former ‘British’ 
provinces; ‘Part B’ included the former princely states or groupings of states; ‘Part C’ states 
represented all the centrally-administered areas, while the tribal populations of the northeast 
frontier of India were given special status as the ‘autonomous district’ of Assam.36 Nehru’s 1946 
statement implied that the foreign possessions would be welcomed should their populations 
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desire to join India, but that the decision ultimately rested with local populations rather than any 
governmental authority. His statement underlined India’s intention to resolve any territorial issues 
by peaceful means.  
In 1950 India adopted a constitution that specifically allowed the incorporation of other 
states, such as Kashmir-Jammu and the French and Portuguese Indian possessions, whose 
future status was not yet determined at the time of the constitution’s promulgation.37 However, no 
alternative to joining the Union could be contemplated. In a speech in Bangalore in 1948, Nehru 
warned that ‘separatism or disruptionism’, which he likened ‘to an evil monster raising its head in 
India’, would not be tolerated as he believed that separatism would give foreign powers an 
opportunity to undermine the unity of the nation. In Nehru’s words, ‘disruptionism’ of the territorial 
unity of India was as big a threat as politicised religious identities. While the former suggested 
separation based on regional, cultural, and political differences, the latter was a politicised and 
religious conflict. In Nehru’s view, both would lead to the balkanisation of India.38  
  
                                                          
37 Government of India, The Constitution of India, Part 1, Article 3, <http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-
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Map 15: Map of unified India formed by the amalgamation of princely states, former British India, 
part B states and part C states. Source: Holden Furber ‘The Unification of India’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, December 1951, p. 353. 
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It is worth pointing out that Patel, who as India’s first Home Minister masterminded the 
integration of princely states, was in favour of amalgamating the foreign possessions as part of 
the broader integration scheme. Patel considered French India a domestic issue that should be 
dealt with the same way as the Indian princely states, that is, firmly and resolutely. Hence, his 
view did not rule out the use of armed forces. In comparison, Nehru was more sensitive to 
France’s position and the international implications of the future of French India. He did not want 
‘to fall out with France’, and therefore favoured a diplomatic path to obtain the same objective, 
even though this ran the risk of taking longer and becoming entangled with other international 
issues such as Indochina.39 Furthermore, Nehru’s approach was to deal with French India in a 
way that induced the more intransigent Portugal to enter into negotiations.40 The two leaders’ 
divergent views with regard to the foreign territories reflected their political differences.41 The 
integration of the princely states remained mainly a ‘Home’ issue, although with the added 
problem that some states physically located at the heart of the nation might choose to align with 
Pakistan. Foreign possessions, being for the most part territorially scattered and confined to the 
periphery, presented a lesser danger than the larger princely states.  
 By the Second World War, the foreign possessions had already been described by the 
Indian press as ‘foreign pimples’ disfiguring India, and denounced as anachronistic and 
‘incompatible with the [upcoming] independence of India which is one and indivisible’.42 It is 
revealing that Indian nationalists used the term ‘one and indivisible’, a French republican principle 
dating back to the Revolution which was similarly used by the French to argue against the 
secession of the Indian territories from the French state. The main issue was that both countries 
considered French India to be an integral part of their polity. The Indian government emphasised 
                                                          
39 Furber, op.cit., p. 352; Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 527, Vol. 4, p. 644, Vol. 5 p. 338;  More, Freedom 
Movement in French India, op.cit., p. 121. 
40 Bègue, ‘La valeur de l’«exemple français »’, op.cit., p. 317. 
41 Zachariah, op.cit., pp. 180-7, 185. 
42 Bharat Jyoti , no date, AD, Inde, Vol. 79: Presse et propagande; Sentinel, 18 November 1946, in Consulat de 
France à  Bombay, 19 novembre 1946, AD, Inde, Vol. 79: Presse et propagande. 
 
 
199 
 
the cultural links between India and the comptoirs, and regarded France’s refusal to cede the 
enclaves as politically provocative in the context of the government’s very recent unification of the 
princely states and British India to form the Union of India.43  
If India had been unable to negotiate the incorporation of the French possessions, her 
international status, as well as the future incorporation of Hyderabad and, in particular, of 
Kashmir-Jammu, would have been jeopardised.44 At the time of India’s independence, the Nizam 
(Muslim ruler) of Hyderabad had challenged India’s unity by refusing to join the new state. Since 
Hyderabad comprised a territory of 215,000 square kilometres –almost the size of the United 
Kingdom – inhabited by 17 million people and located in the centre of the subcontinent, the 
Nizam’s claim to independence resulted in the ‘belly [of India] being cut off from the main body’. 
An added danger was that Pakistan, an ally of the Nizam, could potentially exercise influence 
over an area positioned in the heart of the Indian nation.45 India eventually settled the issue with a 
five-day, armed campaign in September 1948, which resulted in the Nizam’s capitulation. This 
action had, in Nehru’s words, ‘a good communal effect’; it established the supremacy of the new 
central government in New Delhi and sent a warning to anyone wanting to challenge its power 
and determination.46 Nevertheless, it was not convincing enough to resolve the issue of Jammu 
and Kashmir, the princely state located in the far north-west corner of the territory, on the border 
of the new state of Pakistan.47 At the time of partition, its Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh, who ruled 
over an overwhelmingly Muslim majority, had not decided whether his state would join Muslim-
majority Pakistan or Hindu-majority India. His fateful indecision resulted in decades of boundary 
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disputes, rival territorial claims, mounting tensions, and even wars between Pakistan and India. 
Indeed, the boundary issues remain unsettled today.48  
The Indo-Pakistani dispute influenced Nehru’s negotiations over the future of French 
India. Indeed, India agreed to resolve the issue of accession of Kashmir-Jammu and French India 
via popular vote. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, a plebiscite was suggested, while in French 
India the French Constitution (Article 27) required that a referendum be held to decide whether or 
not cession would proceed. When India realised that a plebiscite in Kashmir-Jammu could 
actually lead to its independence, the idea of a popular vote to decide the future of any territories, 
including Kashmir-Jammu and French India, was abandoned.49 The situation in Kashmir-Jammu, 
however, was not unique. On the west coast, Junagadh (5,370 square kilometres with a 
population of 670,000) witnessed scenes of disruption in the summer of 1947 when its Muslim 
ruler refused to accede to India. The population rebelled and forced him to seek refuge in 
Pakistan. A referendum held in February 1948 supported merger with India.50   
Apart from territorial entitlements, the building of the Indian nation-state was associated 
with a foreign policy that included four platforms: a position of non-alignment, which India hoped 
would serve as a role model for others; a role as mediator (which Indian leaders would fulfill at the 
end of the Korean and Indochina wars); leadership of Afro-Asian co-operation; and finally, a 
position against any form of colonisation.51 In 1946 Nehru drew on the full extent of his diplomatic 
ability to negotiate India’s independence and assert India’s leadership in Asia and organised the 
first Asian Relations Conference which was held in the capital city in March-April 1947; 
representatives of twenty-eight countries from the Middle-East and across all of Asia attended. 
Observers from Australian, Soviet, and American research institutes were also welcomed, as 
                                                          
48 Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 1-6,  
49 Ibid., pp. 54-9. 
50 Furber, op.cit., p. 359. 
51 Harish Kapur, India’s Foreign Policy: 1947-92: Shadows and Substance (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 
212-3; Manu Bhagavan, India and the Quest for One World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 
 
201 
 
were representatives of the United Nations. The conference’s purpose was to assert Asian unity 
rather than discuss specific individual political issues linked to independence. The conference 
was part of Congress’s broader foreign policy ‘based on the elimination of political and economic 
imperialism everywhere, the co-operation of free nations… [to] develop relations with all 
neighbouring countries’.52 The first instance of such gathering of delegates from colonised 
countries had taken place in Brussels in 1927 under the aegis of the European League Against 
Imperialism and for National Independence, which had evolved from the Second Congress of the 
Communist International in July 1920. This first Afro-Asian conference welcomed 175 delegates 
from thirty-seven countries and territories.53 Already in Brussels, the seed of a common cause 
and the need for solidarity was expressed.   
Topics for discussion at the 1947 conference included defence and security, racial 
problems, intra-Asian emigration and the status and treatment of immigrants, the transition from a 
colonial to a national economy, agricultural and industrial development, public health, nutrition 
and labour welfare, and cultural co-operation.54 The All India Congress Committee (AICC) report, 
dated 22 August 1946, had made clear the extent of the wider region that India would be called 
on to exercise influence in Asia, the East African coast, New Zealand, and Australia. In the view 
of the AICC, India had become a beacon for colonised countries seeking independence. The 
vision of India as a confident and true leader was summed up in a phrase underlined in the 
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original report: ‘Let our fear yield place to confidence without pride, and let our suspicion give in 
before trustfulness without credibility’.55  
This gathering of Asian and Middle-Eastern countries was unique because, for the first 
time, it was held in a country that was about to gain its independence from a European power. It 
emphasised the achievement of India’s freedom movement and provided inspiration for the 
delegates of nationalist movements who were invited to attend. Hence it is not surprising that the 
conference triggered a series of anxious communications from the French colonial administration 
in India to the British Foreign Office. French authorities feared that ‘unwelcome subjects might be 
discussed’, hinting at their level of concern that a conference of colonised countries, including 
Vietnam and newly independent Syria and Lebanon, were discussing the means to achieve the 
independence of French colonies.56 Moreover, the French were offended that, while 
representatives of their colonies and former mandates were welcome to attend, they themselves 
were not invited.57 As India’s leadership grew, so did her criticism of European colonialism, as 
revealed in Nehru’s speeches. More importantly, in his inaugural address to the Asian Relations 
Conference, Nehru denounced European colonialism for having severed the old ties that had 
linked Asian countries, and invited ‘peoples of Asia, to meet together, to hold together and to 
advance together’. His inference was that unity and collaboration amongst former colonised 
countries and those seeking independence would be the force that would ultimately defeat 
imperialism.58 The declaration reiterated Nehru’s earlier statements, and his call for Asia to look 
back and be inspired by her own past, a time when she enjoyed superiority while Europe 
remained in the darkness: ‘For a thousand years or more, while Europe was backward and often 
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engulfed in its dark ages, Asia represented the advancing spirit of man. Epoch after epoch, a 
brilliant culture flourished there and great centres of civilization and power grew up’.59 
The Asian Relations conference was followed in January 1949 by the Inter-Asia 
conference, once again held in New Delhi, at which the independence of Indonesia was 
discussed, and India helped organize the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, 
Indonesia. Twenty-nine countries from Asia, the Middle-East, and Africa participated in the 
Bandung conference, at which colonialism was condemned.60 The Bandung conference 
highlighted the stalemate of the Cold War between aligned and non-aligned countries.61 This 
series of conferences marked the rise of a new post-war world order that included new states 
emerging out of former European colonial empires. The conferences helped establish the idea of 
a regional identity and promoted economic and political co-operation amongst former colonised 
countries. Above all, it strengthened the role of India in international relations.62 
Although Nehru had insisted that the first Asian Relations Conference would not address 
issues of national independence, the official position of Congress towards foreign territories in 
independent India was asserted the following year in the Jaipur Congress resolution (19 
December 1948), which stated: 
 
With the establishment of independence in India the continued existence of any foreign 
possession in India becomes anomalous and opposed to the conception of India’s unity 
and freedom. Therefore it has become necessary for these possessions to be politically 
incorporated in India and no other solution can be stable or lasting or in conformity with 
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the will of the people. The [Indian National] Congress trusts that this change will be 
brought about soon by peaceful methods and the friendly cooperation of the 
governments concerned. The Congress realises that during this long period 
administrative, cultural, educational and judicial systems have grown up in these foreign 
possessions which are different from those prevailing in the rest of India. Any changeover 
therefore must take these factors into consideration and allow for a gradual adjustment 
which will not interfere with the life of the people or those who desire a measure of 
autonomy to be granted, wherever possible so as to enable the people of those 
possessions to maintain their culture and institutions within the larger framework of free 
India.63 
This statement raised several issues. First of all, while it implied that foreign possessions 
would be incorporated according to the ‘will of people’, the ‘people’ were not clearly defined. Were 
they those living in the foreign territories, or those living in India, or perhaps an aggregate of 
both? In addition, the statement did not specify the means by which the will of the people would 
be assessed. Would this be via a referendum or plebiscite, or would elected representatives be 
called on to make the decision? Finally, the peaceful means and friendly cooperation being 
referred to stood in stark contrast to the sending of troops into Kashmir in October 1947 and the 
violent manner by which Hyderabad had been incorporated in September of 1948. Despite India’s 
determination to merge the foreign territories, Congress was nonetheless ready to acknowledge 
their cultural heritage and to grant them the right to maintain their culture and institutions within 
the larger framework of an independent India. In the case of France, Nehru had earlier expressed 
his wish that the French enclaves be a ‘French window in India for the interpretation of French 
culture to the Indians and vice versa’.64 However during the same Jaipur conference, the Prime 
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Minister admitted that India was facing ‘a large number of intricate problems… but this particular 
problem of foreign possession was probably one of the smallest’. Hence it did not, for the time 
being, require immediate attention.65  
For France, retaining the comptoirs was linked to the belief that the extent of her empire 
enhanced France’s international prestige. Moreover, agreeing to a cession of the French Indian 
territories could set a precedent to the rest of the empire, as well as put at risk military access to 
Indochina.66 Both France and India rejected separatism or cession as an option, but while they 
chose diplomatic channels to decide the future of French India, they underestimated the voices 
that came from the French Indian territories. 
 
Emerging anti-colonial movements in French India 
Christopher Bayly argues that nationalism in India was built on the basis of a pre-existing 
sense of territoriality, and that it evolved despite European influence.67 It is necessary to add, 
however, that anti-colonial movements in French India emerged more specifically as a response 
to the process of French colonisation. J.P. More has argued that, by introducing new land 
revenue policies and a legal system that transformed common property to individual land 
ownership, the French colonial enterprise displaced old property relations.68 In the same vein, 
studies by Weber and A. Suresh have demonstrated that it was the introduction of French political 
institutions in 1840, involving the nomination of notables on the basis of land ownership that 
triggered the first opposition movement organised by rich local landowners sitting as nominated 
members in the local assemblies. These members objected to the under-representation of local 
French Indians in these assemblies on the basis that French Indians contributed in larger 
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numbers than French residents to the payment of local taxes. As such, it was argued, they should 
be given a larger number of seats.69 Although it is tempting to describe these landowners, as 
Weber and Suresh have done, as embryonic nationalist factions, it is preferable to refer to them 
as early forms of anti-French or anti-colonial groups. Indeed, it was not until the twentieth century 
that a comprehensive nationalist movement, based on an ‘all-India’ program of mass mobilisation 
encompassing British India, the autonomous princely states, and the foreign possessions, came 
into being.70  
The uprising of 1857, also referred as the Sepoy Rebellion, provides evidence to 
substantiate this argument. While the Rebellion is commonly viewed in Indian historiography as 
the first war of Indian Independence, it did not generate a sense of solidarity with French India or 
a spontaneous condemnation of European colonialism. The Rebellion was triggered by the 
refusal of Indian sepoys to obey their officers when ordered to bite open the paper of the Enfield 
Paper Cartridge, because the paper had been covered in tallow made of beef and pork fat. 
Obeying the order would have constituted a religious infringement for Hindus and Muslims alike. 
The Rebellion was quashed, but it led the following year to the formal takeover of the East India 
Company (EIC) by the British government, which had the further consequence, nineteen years 
later, that Queen Victoria was given the title ‘Empress of India’ (1877). Interestingly, this first war 
of Indian independence had an adverse effect on French Indians, who responded by writing to 
the French governor to reaffirm the population’s support for the French colonial administration. 
Indeed, the letter raised the issue of religious interference in British India, and thanked French 
officials for respecting local usages and customs, in contrast to the actions of the EIC’s 
administration, which had bluntly interfered with local customs.71 Hence, the Rebellion provoked 
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the leaders of the local French Indian population to officially endorse French colonialism as a 
better option to British colonialism.  
This stand changed little until the twentieth century because no ‘nationalist’ organisation 
had been able to gain sufficient influence over all regions and territories, including British India, 
the princely states, and the foreign possessions. In fact, the expansion of education and political 
institutions in French India under the Third Republic only helped reaffirm that French Indians 
enjoyed colonial benefits, even if these benefits were limited. Women, for example, did not vote 
until 1946, and free education did not mean that all children were educated. Nonetheless, it was 
believed that similar benefits were out of reach for British Indians. In addition, given the 
encirclement of French India by British India, any form of nationalism or separatism emanating 
out of French India would have been futile, for not only would it have faced the challenge of 
overthrowing French colonial authorities, but ultimately British authorities as well. Hence, the 
particularity of French India and its status as a subordinate colonial power limited the scope of 
any potential nationalist movement in French India until new conditions emerged after the First 
World War.72   
The extremist politics of the Swadeshi movement (1905-1911) in Bengal had a greater 
influence on the French Indian territories, especially Chandernagor, than the INC partly because 
the Swadeshi militants choose violent means of action and were inspired by Western 
revolutionary principles in opposition to the Gandhian ideology of satyagraha.73  Agitation against 
the colonial administration was strongest in Calcutta because the British had ruled longer in 
Bengal than in other parts of India. Between the INC’s creation in 1885 and 1920, when Gandhi 
rallied a wider range of support to create the beginning of mass political participation, the INC 
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promoted a moderate form of nationalism led by a British-educated Indian elite whose efforts 
were limited to improving the conditions of Indians within the British colonial framework. The INC 
did not contemplate the overthrow of the British colonial rule, nor at this stage was it mobilising 
non-elite groups.74 The British decision to partition Bengal in 1905, however, prompted the 
Swadeshi movement which called for the production of home-made goods and the boycott of 
British goods. It was a landmark in the history of Indian nationalism as it involved all sections of 
the Indian people who rallied around a national cause.75 
Because of its proximity to Calcultta, the political activists of the Swadeshi movement 
used Chandernagor as a safe political shelter, and the French territory became the heart of the 
movement. Other British Indian political dissidents in the Madras Presidency also found refuge in 
Pondichéry. The Franco-British Treaty of Paris (1814) and its subsequent amendments provided 
conditions for the extradition of persons who had found refuge either in British India or in French 
India, but neither colonial power respected the agreement. Instead, they used their own discretion 
in matters of extradition, and the more important and wealthier the refugee, the less likely it was 
he would be arrested and handed over to the rival colonial authorities.76 Displeased with the 
French for allowing dangerous political rebels to find shelter in the French Indian territories, the 
British attempted to convince the French to spy on the ‘manufacturers of bombs’ in exchange for 
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swapping territories around Pondichéry. If the French refused, the British warned, they would use 
reprisals and coercive measures such as the re-establishment of the customs barrier.77  
The French did not give in to British threats, however, and there is no indication that 
reprisals were initiated.78 Besides being a safe haven, the French Bengali territory offered other 
advantages to political refugees: the French post was used to receive seditious political literature 
banned in British India; the purchase of firearms was free because it was believed the police 
force was too small to protect the population; and newspapers intended for illegal distribution in 
British India were printed in Chandernagor and later Pondichéry.79 In fact, followers of the 
Swadeshi movement who had found asylum in Chandernagor left a legacy of using print 
communication to promote anti-colonial sentiments, a practice later followed by French Indians to 
voice opposition to their colonial masters.80 
One of the most famous leaders of the extremist branch of the Swadeshi movement who 
found refuge in Chandernagor was Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950). Born in Calcutta, Aurobindo 
(who was referred to by his first name), was the product of the British system. His father had 
earned a medical degree at the University of Aberdeen and subsequently worked as a physician 
and heath officer for the British Raj. Determined to maximise his children’s chances of passing 
the Indian Civil Service examination, he sent his three sons – the youngest, Aurobindo, was just 
six years old – to Britain to receive an education. Although a bright and promising student, 
Aurobindo grew to despise British imperialism and decided against pursuing a career in the 
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Indian Civil Service.81 He returned to India in 1893 greatly inspired by European thinkers and the 
principles of the French Revolution, which he said ‘in just five short years had done more to 
change entirely the political and social exterior of that country that seven centuries of 
parliamentarism in England.’82  
The anti-partition movement in Bengal gave Aurobindo the opportunity to engage in 
political activism. In contrast to Congress members, who saw Swadeshi as legitimate only within 
the limited context of Bengal, Aurobindo perceived the movement’s wider application.83 In 1906 
he founded the newspaper Bande Mataram, the voice of opposition to Britain that was published 
in English from August 1906 to October 1908. The title was the symbol both of devotion to the 
motherland and of defiance of the British authorities.84 Following the assassination of a police 
official in the Calcutta High Court by revolutionaries indirectly connected with Aurobindo, a 
warrant for his arrest was issued, causing him to flee to Chandernagor and then Pondichéry, 
where he resided in exile until his death in 1950.85  
Like others from the 1870s onwards who had found national political consciousness 
through the Hindu revival movement, Aurobindo started his own journey of spiritual renewal 
through the study of Hindu texts and the practice of yoga, neither of which he saw as 
contradictory to his fight against British imperialism. On the contrary, he believed his interest in 
the Hindu classics converged with and supported his commitment to Indian nationalism. At the 
beginning of his stay in Pondichéry, he remained a role-model of Indian nationalism and kept in 
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contact with fellow revolutionaries. From 1920 until his death, however, despite many attempts by 
Congress members to lure him back into politics, and to the great disappointment of Nehru,86 he 
ceased to engage in political activities, devoting himself instead to the creation of a spiritual 
centre, the Aurobindo Ashram, with the assistance of a French devotee, Mirra Richard (née 
Alfassa), called the Mother.87  
By circulating their nationalist sentiments around French India, the political dissidents 
who found refuge in Chandernagor contributed to the rise of a political consciousness in the city 
already shaped by resentment at being administered by people from the South. 
Chandernagorians never accepted orders from Pondichéry, the colonial centre located almost 
two thousand kilometers south of the Bengali territory. The cultural abyss between them could be 
measured by the three days it took to reach Chandernagor from Pondichéry, and the lack of 
interest from a colonial administration that gave the Bengali enclave the status of a ‘colony of the 
colony’.88 Chandernagor’s resentment was increased by the fact that before the Seven Years’ 
War it had been an important commercial colonial centre, and because it felt a sense of 
importance from being associated with nearby Calcutta, the commercial and political capital of 
British India until growing Bengali nationalism compelled the British colonial administration to 
relocate the capital to New Delhi in 1911. In addition, an inadequate knowledge of French 
amongst educated Chandernagorians barred them from positions in colonial administration, thus 
causing further resentment. The fact that numerous French visitors and administrators 
commented on how few people spoke French in Chandernagor strongly suggests that both the 
administration and the local population were rebelling against French colonial authorities. It 
seemed that they were willingly allowing themselves to be influenced and even absorbed by their 
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British neighbours.89 The extent of the revolutionaries’ influence on Chandernagorians is tellingly 
demonstrated by an unsuccessful attempt, at the end of 1908, to assassinate its mayor, Mr 
Tardival, by throwing a bomb at the window of his house.90 Indeed, it was in Chandernagor that 
the Swadeshi movement made the most impact, with elected members using French institutions 
to request greater financial autonomy and to demand that local taxes be used for the 
development and welfare of the enclave’s population rather than continue to be transferred to 
Pondichéry.91  
Economic difficulties and the rise of organised revolutionary movements because of the 
impact of the First World War provided the right conditions in the French comptoirs for more 
insistent demands for better governance. Ensuing labour unrest, encompassing an array of 
strategies such as demonstrations, workers’ walkouts, shop shutdowns, and fasting – all 
commonly referred to as hartal or strike action – developed into the most powerful driving force 
challenging French colonial authorities. These methods were widely used by growing leftist 
groups and Indian nationalists; with his 1919 Rowlatt Satyagraha, Gandhi had succeeded in 
launching a mass movement that made him a dominant figure in Indian politics.92 An increase in 
the price of basic commodities in 1919 had worsened the working and living conditions of 
approximately 10,000 labourers employed in the French Indian textile mills and a further 10,000 
in the traditional handlooms.93  
Shortages of cotton during the First World War had resulted in the import of poor quality 
cotton from India and consequently also an increase in the number of damaged cotton products. 
Fines introduced by the management of French Indian mills further contributed to the hardship of 
workers, who already faced poor working conditions, long hours, and minimal pay. A series of 
strikes organised in the 1920s pressed for an increase in wages, a reduction of working hours, 
                                                          
89 Ibid., pp. 89-91. 
90 Geetha, op.cit., p. 63. 
91 David, G. ‘Chandernagor’, op.cit., pp. 89-103. 
92 R. Kumar, op.cit., p. 4; Sri Soudjanarandjani, 26 May 1932. 
93 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., p. 338; Suresh, op.cit., p. 250. 
 
 
213 
 
weekly holidays, and improved sanitary conditions.94 Under pressure from colonial authorities, the 
mills’ management agreed to improve wages and suspend fines, and a labour fund was 
organised to assist the welfare of workers. But misappropriation of the labour fund and political 
rivalries within the mills resulted in more strikes, lockouts, and police repression.  
This already incendiary labour situation in French India was worsened by the worldwide 
economic crisis of the 1930s. French Indian textile mills were affected by the establishment of 
customs barriers, increased competition, and a decline in the overseas market for textile 
products, all of which led to a decrease in demand for cotton cloth from Pondichéry. The mills’ 
management reduced production costs by retrenching some of their workforce and cutting wages, 
which not surprisingly led to labour action such as walkouts, strikes, and demands for better 
working conditions and the right to form a workers’ union. Labour unrest in Pondichéry coincided 
with similar developments in British India, where a new surge of nationalist sentiment generated a 
wave of strikes affecting the major industrial sectors of Bengal, Bombay, Kanpur, Ahmedabad, 
and Jamshedpur. When the strikes reached their peak in 1938, Congress reacted. Presenting 
itself as the party of all classes, Congress restrained the labour movement and brought it under 
its own leadership.95  
During this decade, Indian nationalist politics and various forms of leftism spread to 
French India giving rise to new methods of organising. In 1931 the French Indian communist 
Varadarajulu Subbiah founded the Jeunesses de l’Inde française modelled on the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Party’s (WPP) Naw Jawan Bharat Sabba (New Youth Indian Association). The WPP 
was created in 1927 by the Indian Communist party to represent Indian peasants and workers 
with the aim to put pressure on the INC. The youth organisation was dedicated to education and 
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political activities amongst the most disadvantaged people in the French territories. It was run by 
French Indian working class youth who campaigned for the departure of the British and the 
French. In parallel, Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience Movement, launched in 1930 with the Salt 
Satyagraha – a defiant march to the sea in protest at the British monopoly - helped create the 
Harijan Sewak Sangha (also spelt as Harijana Seva Sangh) of Tamil Nadu, a group that linked 
French India to the nationalist cause in British India.96  
The Harijan Sewak Sangha was constituted after Gandhi had maintained a historic fast, 
during the last days of September 1932, in protest against the British Indian government’s 
intention to organise a separate electoral system based on castes. In essence, the Harijan Sewak 
Sangha was dedicated to improving the conditions of the underprivileged and campaigning for the 
abolition of caste, but above all its ideology promoted non-violence, harmony amongst classes, 
and arbitration between the British and dissidents.97 It organised social services that included 
education of Harijan boys and elders – Harijan meaning ‘Child of God’, a term used by Gandhi for 
Dalits or Untouchables – improving sanitation and water supplies. 98 On 17 February 1934, on the 
invitation of the Harijan Sewak Sangha, Gandhi visited Pondichéry and then Karikal and invited 
his audience to fight against politicised religious identities and caste segregation. Two years later, 
he delivered a similar message during a visit to Mahé.99 It is worth mentioning that at the time 
French authorities had banned the public gathering of more than twenty people, but to the great 
surprise of the Harijan Sewak Sangha’s organisers, the French Governor, Georges Bourret, 
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granted permission for the meeting of Gandhi, expressing in his letter his glowing tributes and 
respectful homage.100  
In his speech translated in Tamil by his friend and fellow-freedom fighter Chakravarti 
Rajagopalachari, often referred as ‘Rajaji’, Gandhi ensured to link the French ideals of equality 
and liberty with the end of politicised religious identities and caste discrimination. Besides 
providing education to illiterate workers, the Harijan Sewak Sangha of Pondichéry also set up 
illegal unions in 1934 to organise the mills’ mainly outcast workforce.101 The introduction of 
Gandhian social reforms into French India, via the Harijan Sewak Sangha, assisted with the 
political awareness of unorganised labour and set the scene for the evolution of the Harijan 
Sewak Sangha into a more powerful group ready to undertake the next level of labour unrest.  
The events in Pondichéry found their echo in a specific wave of strikes in France 
triggered by the May 1936 victory of a new coalition government dominated by Socialists, the 
Front Populaire. The strikes led to the Accord Matignon (June 1936), a set of agreements which 
included the legal right to strike, the right of workers to organise in unions, wage increases, 
holiday pay, a reduction of the working week to forty hours, and collective bargaining.102 On 25 
and 26 July 1936, French Indian workers went on strike demanding the same rights that their 
fellow-workers in France had recently obtained. Negotiations between workers’ delegates, the 
Governor and the Mayor Joseph David who represented the mills owners’ interests came to no 
fruition. The French authorities decided to end the strike by using repressive methods that 
involved cordoning the three mills under occupation with armed police to prevent the access of 
the striking workers to the leaders outside, only permitting relatives to make food deliveries. On 
the morning of the 30 July the police armed with machine guns marched onto the mills triggering 
a shooting referred to as la fusillade de Pondichéry (Pondichéry Shooting Day). Police repression 
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resulted in twelve dead and twenty injured.103 The colonial administration was opposed to trade 
unionism because it considered it a seditious British import.104 Labour agitation continued until 
new labour regulations were introduced by the decree of 6 April 1937, making French Indian 
workers the first in Asia to enjoy labour laws granting workers a forty-hour working week and the 
right to strike and organise in unions.105  
This period of labour unrest and its subsequent organisation of legal unions provided the 
ideal conditions for political activists to promote anti-colonial feelings by means of print media 
such as the newspaper Soudandiram - La Liberté (also spelt Swandanthiram and Sundandiram), 
which published articles both in French and in Tamil. It was founded by Subbiah in June 1934 
and was published monthly from Pondichéry. It was linked to the setting up of Trade Union 
Committees in July 1934 and rapidly acquired a reputation as a propagator of anti-colonialism. 
Contributions included stories by leading writers in Tamil Nadu and unpublished stories by the 
poet Subramaniya Bharathi (1882 – 1921). The newspaper had a circulation of 8,000 copies 
which reached Tamil people beyond Indian borders, in Ceylon, South Africa, Malaya and Burma. 
The success of the paper was reflected in the British authorities banning its entry into British India 
and British overseas territories leading to the termination of the paper until January 1935 when it 
resumed as a weekly whose circulation remained limited to Pondichéry.106 Soudandiram did not 
limit its criticism to the French Indian authorities, but also denounced the British Customs 
regulations and their effect on the French Indian population. It vociferously attacked colonial 
authorities for supporting business owners and for making a mockery of the electoral process.107  
Indeed, the labour agitation that occurred between the two world wars demonstrates that 
antagonism between French Indian workers and French colonial authorities had now reached a 
new level. Nineteenth-century opposition to French colonial authorities had been limited to a 
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small group of landowners, and later to those who, having benefited from a French education, 
used institutional means – such as putting pressure on illiterate voters and manipulating party 
politics – to maintain their economic and social advantages. The labour unrest of the 1920s and 
1930s, however, marked the spread of political consciousness across less advantaged socio-
economic groups, who made significant use of non-institutional means to press for change. The 
labour movement and its leaders had clearly benefited from the legacy of the Swadeshi 
movement revolutionaries, as well as from the mounting influence of the international left, and of 
a nationalist movement in British India that helped politicise a poor, illiterate, and socially 
excluded group of French Indians. However, it is important to point out that, while the successful 
introduction of labour laws in French India certainly provided a means to measure the success of 
labour unrest, the effects remained limited to the workforce of the textile mills of Pondichéry and 
Chandernagor. Actions such as these had not yet reached the large agricultural working 
population found in rural areas of French India, who were less organised and still bound to their 
landlords.108 
Besides social conflicts, unrest was also felt in the French Indian political scene with the 
formation of a new party in 1937. The reign of Chanenougam, ‘The King of French India’ who had 
ruled for over a quarter of a century, had come to an end in 1907. After being accused of electoral 
fraud, Chanenougam found refuge in British India, where he died the following year. For the next 
thirty years, French Indian politics was dominated by continuing antagonism between Hindu 
traditionalists and supporters of the French ‘idea’. Hindu traditionalists under the leadership of 
Sadassivanaiker, also known as Sadassiva, held power until 1914, when they were replaced by 
their opponents, headed by Henri Gaebele, an Alsatian and Pondichéry textile mill owner. In 1927 
Gaebele’s former collaborators founded the Franco-Hindu party, and maintained control of the 
colony until 1937 when a new party, the Mahajana Sabha, contested its hegemony and 
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demanded the removal of the two-list system in favour of a unique college of electors.109 
Branches of the party were founded in Karikal and Mahé, and its activities were monitored by 
representatives of the INC, including Varahagiri Venkata Giri, a close associate of Nehru who 
would become the President of India in 1969.110 The party’s formation and demand for fair and 
non-violent elections was inspired by the victory of the Congress Party in the Madras provincial 
elections in February 1937. The municipal elections of 2 May 1937 in French India provoked an 
usual amount of violence, but this time the fighting took on a new dimension: the population 
clashed over the issue of a ‘French India’ versus an ‘Indian India’, demonstrating that the visits of 
Indian nationalist leaders, the influence of political refugees, and the organisation of labour unrest 
under the aegis of the Indian nationalist movement had firmly infiltrated French India.111  
Political concepts had now changed. French Indian issues were no longer perceived in 
an exclusively French colonial context, the ‘European’ borders that separated French India and 
British India were becoming more blurred, political awareness had sharpened, and a sense of 
common socio-political purpose had emerged across the region and socio-economic groups. 
Nonetheless, it is important at this juncture to emphasise that even though a sense of political 
unity was being felt during this period amongst the people living in and around the French Indian 
territories, the idea of an ‘all-India’ nation was not yet fully expressed in any political program 
advanced by the INC. It would take until the outbreak of the Second World War and the 1942 
‘Quit India’ campaign for the nationalist movement to gain mass participation, and until the round 
of talks with Britain regarding its withdrawal as the war ended to concretise the idea of a new 
nation that would include the foreign possessions in India.112 Furthermore, the INC’s viewpoint 
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regarding the future of foreign territories always took second place to the issue of partition and 
the task of merging former British India and the princely states into one political entity. However, 
once these issues were settled, the task of determining the future of French India became 
imminent, and India would now need to negotiate with France and French Indians over the 
merging of French India with the Indian nation. 
 
The merger and anti-merger issue in French India 
Political and social unrest in French India was allayed by the impact of Second World 
War, and while the overseas market became inaccessible, the establishment of the Customs 
Union Agreement in 1941 between the British and French governments provided an outlet for 
French Indian textile products in India. Concerns over the continuing world conflict took 
precedence over local issues. As had happened during the First World War, French Indian 
volunteers joined colonial forces to fight on behalf of their colonial masters; the colonial 
administration reported that they numbered seven hundred. Despite difficult economic conditions, 
French Indians organised and generously contributed to a fund to support the war effort. Money 
was allocated for food and clothes parcels, and assistance given to refugees and prisoners. 
French Indians also became involved in the printing of war propaganda and liaising with similar 
relief groups across the major British Indian cities.113 Despite this display of support, anti-colonial 
feelings were increasingly stirring, and the war provided a new context for an Indian nationalist 
upsurge that spread to the French Indian territories.   
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As the war neared its end, the British were conscious that they could not remain in India. 
A series of round table conferences finally led to India’s independence and the creation of 
Pakistan on 15 August 1947. While Britain was negotiating her withdrawal, France was gathering 
representatives of her empire to discuss the future of her colonies. For the first time an 
indigenous person, Deiva Zivaratinam (also spelt Zivarattinam), a lawyer who trained at the École 
de droit in Pondichéry was  elected by the conseil général in 1943, to be the French Indian 
delegate to the Assemblée constituante provisoire in Algiers (3 November 1943 – 25 July 1944). 
He then went to Paris where the Assemblée relocated (7 November 1944 – 3 August 1945) after 
the liberation of the capital, and participated in the debates surrounding the new Constitution as a 
member of the Commission de la France d'outre-mer.114  
During the debate on colonial matters that took place in the Consultative Assembly in 
Algiers in January 1944, Zivaratinam criticised the French government for treating French India 
like ‘a poor member of the French family ’ (parent pauvre). In a speech on 14 January 1944, 
reproduced in the Journal Officiel de l’Inde Française,115 Zivaratinam pointed out that the current 
system, which had remained virtually unchanged since the early days of the Third Republic, 
allowed the conseil général to have only an advisory role. He condemned the dual-list system of 
elections in which the first list was reserved for French citizens residing in French India, their 
descendants whether white or of mixed race, and the indigenous people who had opted for 
‘renunciation’, while the second list consisted of indigenous French Indians who represented 98% 
of the electorate. The French Indian delegate argued for the implementation of universal suffrage, 
greater decision-making power for the conseil général and conseils municipaux in regard to tax 
and revenue matters affecting each commune, and free, compulsory primary education for all 
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children. In other words, he argued for the introduction of a system of fair and equal 
representation similar to the one in place in the métropole. But he also asked that education 
should be conducted ‘in the native language’,116 a practice opposed by French assimilationist 
principles, which called for the promotion of French culture and French language.117 Some of his 
demands were satisfied when a decree of 23 August 1945 removed the two-list system and 
introduced a ‘universal’ suffrage that, for the first time, included women.118 But in conveying the 
need for social and political reform to bring French India into line with the métropole while 
upholding her cultural characteristics, Zivaratinam’s speech precisely expressed the conundrum 
that continued to face India and France from the time of India’s independence until France’s 
withdrawal in 1954. On the one hand, France had a history of introducing political institutions, law, 
justice, and education, while on the other hand India had an ethnic, social, cultural, and economic 
affiliation with French India. While both countries claimed territorial and moral sovereignty over 
French India, French Indians joined the dispute and became divided along the merger/anti-
merger lines. 
It is not my intention to chronicle the step-by-step evolution of diplomatic negotiations 
between France and India in this period, as this has been extensively covered by Ajit Neojy. 
Moreover, S. Geetha has focused on the merger and anti-merger groups, while More has 
analysed the situation in Mahé and Yanaon.119 Drawing on these studies, my interest here is to 
highlight the fact that, within the context of the merger/anti-merger and national/colonial debate, 
there existed a number of conflicting groups operating at two distinct levels, and that each of 
these groups used various means to achieve its aims. Most interestingly, while pro-merger 
groups supported the INC and perceived that merger would be a form of ‘liberation’, a means to 
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overthrow another European colonial power, the anti-merger factions were divided. Those who 
were pro-French campaigned to maintain the status quo, but a new separatist voice also 
emerged to undermine the arguments of both nation-states. Indeed, for this faction, neither 
merging with independent India nor remaining part of the French Union was an option. While 
Indian nationalist leaders promoted a vision of national community based on historical, linguistic, 
religious, cultural, and political factors that extended to include French India, this new French 
Indian lobby group perceived that within the integration conflict created by the independence of 
India there existed an opportunity to create an independent polity, an option that, clearly, was not 
countenanced by either India or France. 
A different set of players acting at two distinct levels can be identified within the Franco-
Indian merger debate. At the international level, two nation-states claimed sovereignty over the 
peripheral territories of French India within a post-war context influenced by nationalism and 
decolonisation. Of most importance for the region – and of most relevance for this study – were 
the dispute between Pakistan and India over the future of Kashmir-Jammu, and the growing 
conflict in Indochina, both of which affected the Franco-Indian negotiations. At this level, heads of 
government and state officials laboured to defend a particular set of national policies that had 
been engineered in the capital cities, and which centred on territorial sovereignty and national 
pride. Although standing in opposition to one another, the two nations shared the same 
determination to avoid balkanisation, which would have jeopardised, on the one hand, the Indian 
nation-building mission and, on the other, the recently transformed French colonial framework 
called the French Union. In addition, while Nehru followed a foreign policy of non-alignment and 
saw France as part of the American bloc using Marshall Plan aid to continue her colonialist 
influence in Indochina, he was aware that in order for India to maintain her independence and 
gain recognition as an international influencer, she would need to access nuclear knowledge, 
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hence the importance of maintaining good relations with France, that was already renowned for 
her atomic research.120  
Despite Nehru’s condemnation of French action in Indochina, and promoting a foreign 
policy supportive of neighbours who fought for the attainment of internal peace and freedom, 
issue of home affairs always took precedence over the independence movement of a colonised 
country. When the Vietnamese requested that India stopped French military aircrafts flying across 
India on their way to Indochina, India only limited their number, aware that a total prohibition 
could have repercussions on Franco-Indian relations and the future of the French Indian 
territories. Shortly after the bombardment of Haiphong by the French in November 1946, Nehru 
responded to a letter to Marius Moutet, Minister of Overseas France, to congratulate him on the 
opening of diplomatic contacts between France and India.121   
The choice of each state’s representative was also strategic. Daniel Lévi, first French 
Ambassador (1947 - 1951) to independent India, was nominated on the basis that he was the son 
of the renowned Indologist, Sylvain Lévi (1863-1935). Nehru mentioned that the appointment had 
been intended ‘specially to please India’.122 He was succeeded in 1951 by Comte d’Ostrorog, a 
man whose birth and upbringing in Constantinople was seen as bestowing upon him a 
comprehensive understanding of the East. India dispatched Rachid Ali Baig as Consul-General to 
Pondichéry in 1947. He had previously held the post of Consul-General in Goa for one year, 
during which time he had demonstrated great activism.123 His nomination was viewed as a kind of 
‘Trojan horse’ that would trigger some kind of action from within Pondichéry; indeed, he showed a 
great capacity for mobilising anti-French factions, organised protests and demonstrations. He 
initiated the economic blockade and the introduction of travel permits to impair the movement of 
populations and goods between the French Indian enclaves. He was commended for his abilities 
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by Nehru, but also reprimanded on the grounds that his excessive zealousness could ‘cross the 
diplomatic frontier and create new problems for India’. In 1949, after many complaints from the 
French government, he was sent to Batavia (Jakarta).124 The other important Indian Consul-
General was Raj Krishna Tandon (1951- 1953), who similarly managed to organise a network of 
anti-French operations that operated from the borders of the Madras Presidency.  
At the local level, which in the case of French India was spread over the five distinct 
territories, four main groups emerged that were likewise headed by dedicated men: those who 
favoured merging with India, those who were opposed to merger and wanted to maintain the 
current association within the French Union, and those who claimed autonomy within the French 
and Indian Union. This last group comprised two factions, the supporters of the Dravidian 
movement and the Communists. It is important to indicate that the positions of these factions 
were not fixed but rather oscillated depending on the political and economic circumstances that 
developed over the following seven years.125  
Those who fought for merger with India, and who advanced their political program as one 
of liberation from colonialism, were represented by the Parti du Congrès de l’Inde Française, 
which was formed in 1946 and included the Mahé Socialist Party and other wings of the Indian 
National Congress. Their claims belonged to the broader movement taking place in India. 
Although support for the merging of the territories with India was welcomed, New Delhi did not 
encourage spontaneous liberation movements and the use of popular agitation or satyagraha, as 
Nehru was determined to follow a diplomatic path and keep the situation under control within the 
broader policy of state integration. A demand for immediate amalgamation with India could just as 
easily have triggerred the opposite effect, that is, a demand for greater autonomy, or merger with 
France, or even separatism, which would have thwarted any effort to integrate the French Indian 
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territories, with negative repercussions for the Kashmiri situation.126 Thus, local disruptions in 
favour of India had to be contained, as they could cause the diplomatic negotiations to deviate 
and subsequently reflect poorly on Nehru’s ability to deal effectively with an issue that affected 
both home and foreign affairs. This point is highlighted by Nehru’s correspondence with Rajendra 
Prasad, Congress President and later India’s First President in 1950, and to India’s Consul-
General Baig and other high-ranking Indian officials, in which he requested that his subordinates 
use all of their skills to smother any direct action movements emerging from the territories, and to 
convince their leaders of the benefits of a course of action based on diplomacy.127 
The second group consisted of those in favour of remaining within the French Union, 
although as I will demonstrate shortly, the ideological position of those belonging to this group 
changed over the period of the Franco-Indian negotiations from maintenance of the status quo, to 
autonomy within the French Union, to integration with the Indian Union. This group encompassed 
the Front national démocratique (FND, hereafter referred as the Front), founded in 1944, and the 
Parti socialiste de l’Inde française (PSIF), founded in 1948. The Front provided the first post-war 
generation of French Indian politicians. It grouped together the Communists, Socialists, and small 
left-wing parties such as the former Franco-Hindu party.128 Municipal elections in June 1946 
confirmed the popularity of the Front, and a Front member, Lambert Saravane, was elected to the 
Assemblée Nationale in November 1946.129 The municipal elections were important not only 
because they were the first since the war, but also because for the first time eligible women 
participated and a single electoral list was organised, signalling the end of two prominent Third 
Republic policies.130  
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Just as French India experienced the impact of the Indian nationalist movement and 
other left-wing groups, the Front was influenced by the evolution of French politics in the post-war 
era, and similarities between the tripartisme in France and the alliance of the Front emerged. 
When French Communist deputies in Paris refused to support the military budget for Indochina in 
May 1947, and a few days later the Communist ministers were dismissed – marking the end of 
the alliance between Communists (Parti communiste français, PCF), Socialists (Section française 
de l’Internationale Ouvrière, SFIO) and Christian Democrats (Mouvement républicain populaire, 
MRP) – the French Indian Front also split into two factions in July 1947.131 The most conservative 
members formed the PSIF, which was led by Saravane and his long-time friend Edouard 
Goubert, who had become ‘the number one of Pondichéry’ by heading the Conseil du 
gouvernement.132 The Communists, headed by Subbiah, founded the Parti communiste de l’Inde 
française (PCIF). As in France, the ideological split reflected the issue of French imperialism.  
Despite its name, the PSIF was not Socialist; in fact it was strongly associated with the 
colonial administration, which preferred the PSIF over the Communists. The members of the 
PSIF strongly campaigned and plotted in favour of remaining within the French Union. Its leader, 
Edouard Goubert, was born in 1894 in Pondichéry of a father who belonged to an old French 
family and a mother who was an outcast from a village of French India. At a young age, he 
witnessed the violence that regularly affected the administrative centre around election time. The 
fact that he served the mother country for three years during the First World War gave him 
prestige and respect amongst the French Indian population and the colonial administration, which 
perceived him as a trustworthy veteran. After his demobilisation, he completed studies in law and 
entered the colonial service as a tribunal clerk. He started his political career in 1945 with a 
pamphlet in which he accused local politicians of supporting the colonial system for their sole 
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personal benefit. He joined the Front, headed by Saravane, and remained until the two men 
founded the PSIF in 1948.133  
Saravane was, in a sense, the epitome of a French Indian politician, a man in whom 
French and Indian influences had come together. He regarded himself as Indian by birth and 
French by culture and education. At first he supported the maintenance of French India within the 
French Union and worked in collaboration with the colonial administration. However, he was 
influenced by the deputies representing Algeria and Madagascar, and witnessed the French 
government refusing their claim to the status of Associated State, a provision of the 1946 
constitution. In view of the independence of India and the growing conflict in Indochina, he 
believed that French India was an anachronism. He favoured the transfer of the comptoirs as the 
least troublesome option, and one that could provide the basis for a true alliance between India 
and France. Most of his proposals, however, were dismissed by the Ministry of Overseas France 
and at home.134 He eventually left the PSIF to form the Parti Republicain in 1950. He campaigned 
in favour of merger with India, and even proposed the solution of transferring the administration of 
French India in the same manner that the customs administration had been handed over in 
1941.135  
Goubert initially had the full approval of the French administration, which saw him as a 
determined ally, even though his methods of persuasion were likened to gangsterism, or as it was 
locally called ‘goondaism’ – ‘goonda’ meaning hired thugs. With the assistance of the local 
administration, which turned a blind eye to the violence and political irregularities undertaken by 
Goubert and his gang, he eliminated all political opposition, including Subbiah and his old friend 
Saravane, and played the French administration against the Indian authorities and vice versa. 
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Goubert first wanted French India to remain within the French Union, and then advocated 
autonomy and used it like a bargaining chip. He dominated the political life of Pondichéry, and 
was later accused of corruption and of amassing a personal fortune. An arrest warrant was 
delivered against him in March 1954 for misappropriation of administrative funds, causing him to 
flee the French territories for independent India, from where he organised an anti-French front. 
Goubert represented a small elite group of French-educated French Indians who controlled the 
political situation for their own benefit. They manipulated New Delhi and Paris, and their stand 
vacillated between the maintenance of the status quo, greater autonomy within the French Union 
in order to postpone what seemed inevitable, and finally in March 1954, a volte-face that fully 
supported merger with the Indian Republic. Ironically, despite Goubert’s ambiguous role in the 
years leading to the end of French India, he returned to politics after the de jure transfer of French 
India, and was appointed the first Chief Minister of Pondicherry (1963-1964) – as if for services 
rendered to the Indian nation.136    
The third group to be found at this local level, and more particularly in Pondichéry and 
Karikal, was the anti-merger group consisting of the Dravidian movement, India Unionil Sera 
Maruppor Kazaham. This group claimed autonomy within the French Union in order to prevent 
merger with the Indian Union, hoping instead to merge the enclaves with a Tamil nation should 
one come into existence. The Dravidian movement as a whole demanded a separate Tamil Nadu 
or Dravida Nadu – ‘nadu or natu’ meaning ‘nation’ in Tamil – and therefore did not recognise the 
legitimacy of the Indian state. Like other nationalist movements across India, the Dravidian 
movement of South India emerged out of earlier opposition to British rule, but because of regional 
socio-political factors it developed a specific Dravidian consciousness separate from the national 
claims of North India. It continued in the period after India’s independence to forcefully oppose 
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the Indian government and its claims to national legitimacy.137 Dravidian consciousness was 
based on the commonality of Tamil culture, including its language, (Tamil, as opposed to Hindi 
which was spoken in the north of India), socio-religious groups which were non-Brahmin, and 
historical traditions that promoted Tamil values over those of the North.138 The movement was 
established against the perceived political threat of sedition from Brahmin quarters, and promoted 
egalitarian ideas based on secular and anti-caste sentiments.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the precepts of Tamil nationalism were advanced by Erode 
Venkata Ramasami Naicker (1879 – 1973), also referred to as E. V. Ramasamy, who had first 
joined the Congress non-cooperation movement against the British, but soon fought within 
Congress for the end of caste segregation, for social reforms, and above all for equality for all, or, 
as it was often referred to, ‘self-respect’. He fought to eliminate Brahmins from positions of power, 
to destroy the caste system, to end British rule, and eventually to bring this liberation movement 
across all of India under the rule of workers and peasants. In 1937, when Congress adopted the 
objective of introducing Hindi as the national language, Ramasamy rebelled, as Tamil workers 
would have been disadvantaged in relation to those who spoke Hindi. His view of the nation was 
quite distinct from the Congress elite’s idea of a traditional Hindu past. His demand for a Tamil 
nation was constructed around the notion that the Tamil past was more just in that it did not 
discriminate against castes. He promoted the overthrow not only of the British, but also of the 
Hindu elite who, he declared, had facilitated British imperialism so that it could continue its own 
hegemony over the uneducated groups that formed Indian society.139 Party divisions within the 
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Dravidian movement in India, however, along with the elitism of the leadership and its inability to 
contest major elections, transformed the earlier nationalist claim for a Dravidasthan into Tamil 
Nadu regionalism. By 1954, the waning of the Dravidian movement posed little threat to the 
merging of French India with India.140 
The fourth group that was involved at the local level was headed by the French Indian 
Communist Party, which had been created in 1942 and was now the largest party in French India. 
It demanded independence from French rule, but wanted to decide later whether to join the Indian 
Union or not. Its leader, Varadarajulu Subbiah (1911-1993), a staunch opponent of French 
imperialism in India and in Indochina, had earlier demonstrated his skills as a political organiser 
when he founded the Jeunesses de l’Inde francaise in 1931 and the Association des étudiants at 
the College Calvé. These students went on strike in September 1936 when their list of grievances 
drawing attention to the lack of facilities and poor curriculum were not addressed.141 Subbiah also 
held the position of secretary of the Harijan Sewak Sangha and of the political party Mahajana 
Sabha. His involvement in the workers’ strikes of 1935-37 led to his expulsion from French India, 
but in an unusual turn of events, when Communists were later banned in India he found refuge in 
French India.142 Subbiah served many terms in French Indian and British Indian prisons, and the 
British had no qualms in extraditing him to French India in 1939.143 He now rallied the anti-merger 
movement under the Communist banner.144 However, persecution of the Communists in India, 
who remained a threat to the nationalist ideology advanced by INC, as well as their inability to 
challenge Goubert, who had the full support of the local administration, weakened the Communist 
voice and its challenge to merger with the Indian Union. Subbiah eventually rallied to the Indian 
national cause and actively participated in the ‘liberation’ of the French Indian enclaves. 
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Subbiah’s support to the nationalist cause was in par with the communist ideology that prioritised 
any opportunity to strengthen the anti-imperialist movement.145 All of these pro- and anti-merger 
groups demonstrate the complexities facing the Indian and French authorities as to the future of 
the southern French territories. The matter would not be confined to diplomatic negotiations as 
hoped by Nehru, as the local population was resolute to fight for their own cause, even if this 
meant mounting tensions against each other.  
For seven years (1947-1954), the various forces at both the international and local levels 
wrestled over the issues of integration, status quo, and autonomy; within this period, three phases 
can be identified. The first period, from 1947 to 1949, encompassed the withdrawal of Britain from 
the subcontinent, the rise to independence of India and Pakistan, and the end of the Customs 
Union Agreement. As stated earlier, national programs underpinned Franco-Indian negotiations 
concerning the future of French India, with India focusing on the integration of the princely states 
and France prioritising the consolidation of the French empire. Given these parameters, both 
nations agreed on a referendum in June 1948 to resolve the future of French India. The 
referendum was organised in Chandernagor, where the strongest agitation for merging with India 
had been felt, and in June 1949, 7,500 voters, comprising women and men above the age of 
twenty-one years, approved the secession from the French Union, while 114 voters opposed.146 
This overwhelming response led to the 1951 Treaty of Cession that finally sealed the demise of 
the French Bengali comptoir.  
This period also witnessed pro-India riots in Mahé that broke out on 21 October 1948, 
three days before local elections were scheduled, over the belief that French authorities had 
withheld electorate cards from known pro-merger voters.147 When a French military ship on the 
way to Indochina was sent to assess the seriousness of the situation, the Indian Ministry of 
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External Affairs accused France of breaching the Treaty of 1814.148 The local Administrator was 
held hostage by local inhabitants for a few days, but when the French ship sailed into sight the 
pro-India supporters fled in fear of reprisals.149 The 1948 riots, referred as the October Revolt was 
the first uprising in French India after India’s independence, and showed that the anti-French 
sentiments in Mahé were as strong as they were in Chandernagor.150  
The second period, from 1949 to 1951, was marked by the declaration of Karikal and 
Pondichéry as free ports, resulting in an increase in the smuggling of illegal tax-free goods into 
India and the creation of an artificial sense of prosperity, especially in Pondichéry. The end of the 
agreement also signaled India’s introduction of new methods to convince the French colonial 
administration and the local population that French India was vulnerable. India emphasised that 
the enclaves would have great difficulty surviving without the help of their neighbours, thus 
stressing the inevitability of their future. Hence, this phase was likened to a Franco-Indian cold 
war.151 The period was also dominated by the postponement, due to mounting violence, of the 
referendum due to be held on 11 December 1949 in the four southern establishments (since 
Chandernagor had already expressed its decision to merge).152 A group of neutral observers, 
dispatched by France to assess whether fair and free conditions existed for a referendum to be 
conducted in these establishments, reported that the situation in French India was unsettling and 
violent. As hinted at in the report, electoral manipulations were involved in Goubert‘s ascension to 
power when his party won an overwhelming victory to the Assemblée représentative in 1951. The 
electoral results caused Nehru to declare that a referendum could not be fairly carried out under 
the prevailing conditions.153  
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The third period (1952 – 1954) witnessed the failure of the referendum negotiations and 
India’s increased use of coercive means to settle the French Indian problem. While France 
wanted the idea of democracy to prevail and to abide by her Constitution, which mandated 
consultation with the population, the history of fraudulent elections in French India accompanied 
by violence and electoral terrorism proved that under such conditions it would have been difficult 
to reach an acceptable outcome. Whether the result was to favour India or France, the electoral 
process was rigged. The introduction of democratic institutions had brought a certain prestige to 
France, but withdrawing without some form of consultation would have affected France’s legacy 
in French India, with negative consequences for the French Union. On the basis that the southern 
comptoirs would be allowed to leave the French Union without consultation, nationalist leaders in 
other French overseas territories could demand the same ‘unconstitutional’ arrangement. 
Furthermore, the hardship and coercive measures experienced by the local population assisted 
pro-Indian armed forces to liberate the two smallest French Indian territories, Yanaon on 13 of 
June and Mahé on 16 July 1954, with a population of 6,000 and 18,000 respectively.154 Following 
the introduction, in April 1954 by New Delhi, of rigorous border regulations limiting the movement 
of goods and of the local population, the mayor of Yanaon and four municipal councilors 
demanded on 3 May 1954 the immediate merger of Yanaon with India. Fearing reprisals, they 
fled to bordering Indian territories, from which a local man Dadala Ravanayya, who had resigned 
his post as sub-inspector of police in Pondichéry, organised and subsequently led with the help of 
‘gun-wielding Indian police in civil dress’, a liberation attack. Dadala would assume charge as the 
first Indian administrator of liberated Yanam (Yanaon). 155 Likewise, hardship due to the economic 
blockade in Mahé led to a number of pro-merger supporters, who had found refuge in India, to 
                                                          
154 More, Freedom Movement in French India, op. cit., pp. 185-6.  
155 Libération, 28 April 1954; More also  states that the liberation of Yanam did not attract much attention in France, 
The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam, op.cit., Chapter 6, pp. 173-209, pp. 202, 204, 209. 
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organise under the banner of the Mahajana Sabha, and to take over Mahé on 16 July 1954 with 
less resistance than during the earlier uprising of October 1948.156  
Apart from the determination of Nehru and the local population’s desire to merge with 
India and see the end of the economic blockade, the military defeat of the French forces in Dien 
Bien Phu in May 1954 sealed the end of French imperialism in Asia. Negotiations over the future 
of the French Indian territories now centered around finding a solution which did not involve 
holding a referendum; such a solution, however, would bypass the population’s constitutional 
right to decide. An acceptable way out of this conundrum was suggested by the fact that Article 
27 of the French Constitution did not clearly stipulate it was the whole voting population that was 
required to vote in a referendum, only that a vote should take place. The omission allowed for the 
option that elected representatives could vote on behalf of the population. Hence, at the Kijeour 
(Kizhoor) Congress in October 1954 elected representatives of the assemblée représentative and 
conseils municipaux – in lieu of the eligible population – voted in favour of merging with the Indian 
Union.157  
Over these three periods, various means were used, by all groups and at both levels, to 
reach their specific aims. At the macro level, the opening of embassies in Paris and New Delhi in 
1947 and an Indian Consulate-General in Pondichéry allowed communication between 
representatives of the French and Indian governments to occur, a first step towards the 
recognition that diplomatic channels were considered a legitimate way to interact.158 Official 
meetings between the states’ representatives, correspondence, the release of communiqués via 
embassies and consulates, and the use of the press were all means which assisted both 
governments to defend their respective positions with regard to the future of French India. 
                                                          
156 Libération, 28 April 1954; More, The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam, op.cit., pp. 185-6.   
157 Arrêté convocation pour le Journal Officiel, 9 octobre 1954, AD, Inde, Vol .75: Congrès Kijeour. 
158 Geetha, op.cit., pp. 115,135; the Conseil des Ministres agreed in October 1946 to the creation of a French 
Embassy in New Delhi,  and an Indian diplomatic mission was first established in Paris in February 1947, although 
India had difficulties nominating a head of mission, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Fransulat, Calcutta et 
Ambassade de France à Londres, 12 février 1947, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Mr Henri Roux, Chargé 
d’affaires de France, New Delhi, 26 mars 1947, Affaires Etrangères, télégramme à arrivée, New Delhi, 24 avril 1947,  
AD, Inde, Vol. 62: Relations avec la France; Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 3, p. 411. 
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Debates in the Lok Sabha (Indian Lower House) and the Assemblée Nationale provided the 
arena for elected members to question the evolving future of French India.159  
It is worth mentioning that spying was also a means to achieve this end. Indeed, the 
presence of renonçants during a meeting at the Ministry of Overseas France in September 1948 
demonstrates that they were highly regarded by the French government and entrusted to be 
instigators of pro-French propaganda. The report of this meeting, in the collection of the National 
Archives of India, testifies that the government of India relied on those who seemed – because of 
their adherence to a French way of life – to be loyal, to gather information from the heart of the 
French Ministry.160 At this macro level, institutionalised political processes such as elections and 
referenda provided the means with which to seek the eligible voting population’s approval to 
maintain sovereignty and legitimacy over the territories. Despite the lack of an Indian constitution, 
which was not adopted until January 1950, India had nonetheless, on two occasions within her 
first year of existence, expressed the desire to resolve territorial disputes via referendum or 
plebiscite.161 As mentioned earlier, the population of Junagadh had voted almost unanimously in 
February 1948 in favour of union with India, while in the White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir 
1948, India declared a desire to use a fair and impartial plebiscite to resolve the territorial dispute 
between India and Pakistan.162 However, despite France’s insistence on the need to carry out a 
referendum to decide on the cession of the territories, her earlier agreement to return the loges to 
India without consultation constituted a definite breach of her own Constitution. 
Although a referendum was held in Chandernagor, various factors – including a history of 
electoral terrorism, the liberation of Mahé and Yanaon, and the artificial prosperity of a segment 
                                                          
159 Chatrath, op.cit. 
160 Confidentiel ‘plusieurs réunions ont été tenues au ministère de la France d’outre-mer à Paris ainsi qu’à 
Pondichéry au sujet de l’avenir des Etablissements français  en Inde, NAI, 15(11)EUR1/49: Situation in French 
Establishments in India. 
161 Geetha, op.cit., pp. 136-9. 
162 The White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir was compiled following India’s military intervention on behalf of the 
maharaja in October 1947; the document laid out two fundamental themes, establishing India’s innocence in any 
premeditative actions and the guilt of Pakistan of active complicity in the attempt of tribesmen to seize power. In it 
India specified that the territorial issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be resolved via a plebiscite or referendum, 
Wirsing, op.cit., pp. 39-41. 
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of the population in Pondichéry and Karikal triggered by their free ports status – prevented a fair 
and impartial voting process from taking place. Indeed, the incendiary situation in Pondichéry and 
Karikal, where the majority of the population endured great hardship with the economic blockade 
while a smaller segment benefited from increased illegal smuggling, pushed the two territories to 
demand their merging with India. France feared that a negative result in Chandernagor’s 
referendum could greatly influence the southern territories, while India was equally concerned 
that a referendum could turn against the Indian Union.163 Moreover, with the separatist movement 
gaining momentum and the increasing allegiance to the state of Pakistan of the predominantly 
Muslim community in Kashmir, India worried that any referendum in Kashmir would probably 
return a result in favour of Pakistan. Hence, as time went by, the desire for India to hold referenda 
strongly waned.  
Despite many official discussions, combined with criticisms and threats on both sides, the 
only referendum that was held in French India confirmed an already evident outcome: 
Chandernagorians wanted to join India. After this, the issue of the referendum was too closely 
associated with the events unfolding in Kashmir, and for France a referendum result in favour of 
India would have meant the cession of all of French India. Such an eventuality would in turn have 
undermined the structure of the French Union itself, a highly undesirable situation at a time when 
France’s intervention in Indochina was increasing. The situation called for the consolidation rather 
than the disintegration of the colonial framework.  
France also resorted to legal means, such as decrees banning public meetings, 
processions, and the freedom of the press, the issuing of arrest warrants, and the replacement of 
French civil servants by Indians in order to ‘indianise’ the French civil service in French India. 
Decrees were issued to introduce reforms such as the declaration of ‘free town’ status, although 
this resulted in only the administrative separation of the French Indian territories and did not 
                                                          
163 F2789, minutes of meeting 26 February 1949, FO371/76086: Relations between India and France and India and 
Portugal. 
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prompt any definite program of handover. Other means included using the law and police to 
repress opposition and to bring the Mahé rioters to trial.164 The electoral process, which the 
French were so proud to have introduced, continued to be exploited and abused in order to serve 
the interests of a small group, including French-educated French Indians, merchants, and 
politicians who operated with the backing of the colonial administration, until the situation spun 
out of control and arrest warrants were issued against them.  
 Conversely, India used an array of coercive means to convince both the French 
administration and the population that French India had little future without India. Their measures 
included erecting barbed wire around the French Indian enclaves, tightening of customs and 
immigration control, terminating postal services, and hindering the delivery of vital necessities 
such as food, petrol, and electricity. The imposition of permits for travel between French India and 
India caused uproar amongst French Indian Muslims, since having a photograph taken entailed 
the violation of purdah, a set of religious practices that included the need for women to cover their 
face with a veil. Thus not only did the colonial/national dispute affect the population living in the 
French territories economically, it also permeated their personal space. It was no longer the 
coloniser that was violating religious customs but the former colonised, a turnaround that resulted 
in what formerly manifested as Anglophobia turning into ‘Indophobia’.165  Above all, New Delhi’s 
policy was to remain fully in charge of the negotiations and the procedures that would lead to the 
merging of the French Indian enclaves.  
Most interestingly at the micro level, the local population displayed a variety of means to 
express opposition and to confront the local administration as well as local rivals. Strategies 
included the formation of associations and political parties, the organisation of strikes, walkouts, 
campaigns of harassment, students protests, public meetings, demonstrations and shop 
lockdowns, the use of familiar symbols such as national flags, and the shouting of powerful 
                                                          
164 More, Freedom Movement, op.cit., pp. 121, 153. The October 1948 Mahé rioters were jailed for up to five years, 
Ibid, p. 182; More, The Telugus of Yanam and Masulipatnam, op.cit., pp. 170, 180. 
165 Geetha, op.cit., p. 188. 
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slogans such as ‘Liberté, Fraternité, Égalité’ and ‘French, Quit India’. Following Gandhi’s 
example, fasting became a familiar satyagraha tool to demonstrate disapproval while, in 
comparison, the takeover of administrative buildings constituted a more forceful way to challenge 
authorities hence expressing an allegiance to the nationalist movement. The use of physical 
violence and even arson sometime amounted to terrorism. The fear felt by residents about their 
uncertain future was exploited by spreading rumours that less food would be available, prices 
would rise, and current benefits be stripped. The forced annexation of Hyderabad, the armed 
campaign in Kashmir, and the horror of partition helped propagate panic amongst French Indians 
and in particular amongst the Muslim community. The press was also a useful tool to disseminate 
information for or against the merger issue and to justify territorial claims over French Indian 
territories.166 Above all, the events that led to the Kijeour Congress were far from peaceful. They 
manifested the tensions that existed between various factions of the population, and the use of 
coercive means exposed the extent to which India was willing to go in order to fulfil her national 
policy of territorial unification.  
 
Conclusion 
Compared to earlier forms of anti-French feelings, which had been limited to a small 
group of French-educated elite figures who exploited republican institutions to voice their 
discontent and maintain the hierarchy of French Indian society, the post-First World War 
economic difficulties triggered a wave of social unrest that challenged colonial authorities more 
significantly. The labour movement spread to a wider segment of the lower socio-economic 
population, and ran parallel to a rise in Indian nationalism that itself drew on a wider participation. 
With the influence of political refugees from British India and the spreading of a new national 
consciousness, French India became increasingly exposed to the anti-colonial ideology of the 
                                                          
166 Suresh, op.cit., p. 263; Geetha, op.cit., pp. 174, 177; More, Freedom Movement, op.cit., pp. 135, 184. 
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Swadeshi movement, the rise in national revolutionary movement, and the INC. The use of the 
press and organisations inspired by Gandhi and the Indian left, helped link the fight against 
European colonialism across Indian borders.  
Indian nationalism had a religious strand that undermined the building of a modern all-
inclusive secular nation-state. The partition in 1947 and the ensuing massacres between its two 
main communities enticed the leaders of the new Indian nation to use neutral national symbols to 
help bring together a multi-cultural society previously segmented by provinces, languages, class, 
and religions. The building of this new state depended strongly on the unconditional 
amalgamation of former princely states, the provinces that formed British India, and foreign 
possessions. Hence, any form of separatism was condemned as a challenge to the success of 
the national enterprise. As such, those in French India who had hoped for special status on the 
basis of cultural particularities or sheer political opposition to the Indian state had little option but 
to accept New Delhi’s resolve for unification. This was especially the case after diplomatic 
negotiations over the referendum failed and coercive means were introduced to convince France 
and the local population of the inevitability of the situation.  
Because of the distances between them, their Lilliputian size, and their lack of cultural 
homogeneity, the comptoirs could only with some difficulty support a movement for separatism, 
despite the intention of the Communists and those who believed in a Dravidian nation to use the 
merger debate to claim autonomy from both France and India. In contrast, Chandernagor’s 
residents, because of their proximity to Calcutta, the former British colonial capital, and because 
they had been exposed to the early nationalist movement, were the first to break away from the 
French Union. Chandernagor was the only colonial possession in French India to do so via a 
ballot, since the issue of a referendum became strongly associated with the problem of Kashmir 
and the future of France’s new colonial framework, which was undermined by the increasing 
fighting in Indochina. Above all, the merger debate created confrontation as well as collaboration 
 
 
240 
 
amongst participants, and while both nation-states manoeuvred within a space delimited by 
national policies and diplomacy, French Indians operated within a space where the 
colonial/national debate spilled, at times violently, onto the streets and invaded their personal 
sphere. 
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Chapter 5 
The Birth of a New State: French India Representations Refashioned 
 
On 18 October 1954, after eight years of negotiations, 178 out of 180 elected 
representatives of French India were called to vote on the future of French India. The question 
presented to them was whether the comptoirs should merge with India or remain within the 
French Union. Of the 178 voting representatives, 170 voted in favour of French India merging 
with the Republic of India, which led, three days later, to the governments of India and France 
signing an agreement for the de facto transfer to India of the remaining four territories.1 This 
handover occurred on 1 November, and while the event was mostly celebrated in the Indian 
nationalist press as liberation from the French colonial yoke, legally speaking the physical French 
withdrawal was not the end of the saga. In fact, France remained a sovereign state of the 
territories for a further eight years, until the French Parliament finally ratified the Treaty of Cession 
(1956) in July 1962. For the independent government of India, the representation of French India 
until the handover functioned to expose the dichotomy between a perverse European power 
determined to maintain its colonial yoke and the duty of the Indian motherland to reunite its 
people. For France, French India had remained the site of past imperial glories and myth-making 
embodied in the success of Dupleix in the mid-eighteenth century.2 Furthermore, as one of the 
oldest colonies of France, French India provided an important symbol of continuity and stability, 
and thus an asset to the French Union, the colonial framework established by the Constitution of 
the Fourth Republic.  
                                                          
1 Seven representatives voted against the resolution, and there was one abstention, Service d’Information de l’État 
de Pondichéry, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, évènements marquants et progrès économiques et social depuis le 
transfert de facto (Madras: Associated Printers, 1956), p. 51, copy available in AD, Vol. 339: Ex-établissements 
français situation générale. 
2 Marsh, India in the French Imagination, op.cit., p.13; Weber, ‘L’Inde française de Dupleix à Mendès France’, op.cit., 
p. 209. 
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Through a review of articles written in the French and Indian press during the period of 
the French withdrawal from the comptoirs, and relevant reports from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, I will explore how the handover triggered a change in the French colonial narrative. I 
argue that, on the one hand, the vision of a research institute in Pondichéry initiated, especially 
for the supporters of France’s colonial presence, a shift in the representation of French India from 
an imagined large Indian territory to an imagined organisation that would connect with other 
countries beyond the borders of French India. I will also discuss the fact that, for other actors and 
commentators, the end of French India was the site of a tragicomedy that stood in contrast to the 
seriousness of empire building. For India, on the other hand, France’s withdrawal was celebrated 
as a nationalist victory that helped bring into focus the issue of the Portuguese enclaves. 
From blame to opportunity 
As discussed in Chapter 3, public opinion on India’s independence and its impact on the 
future of French India was indifferent. Press articles on the end of French India were sporadic, but 
the events leading to Kijeour congress generated the most comments.3 In August 1954, Le 
Monde, a left-wing French daily, dedicated a large article to the last months of French India, 
which now consisted of Mahé, Yanaon, Pondichéry, and Karikal; Chandernagor had joined the 
Union of India in 1951.4 The article was entitled ‘La pitoyable fin des comptoirs français de l’Inde’ 
(The pitiful end of the French territories in India). The author, Georges Gallean, describes French 
India as an impoverished territory where little has been accomplished in matters of education, 
health, or employment.5 While the French revolutionary model and its associated liberation 
narrative was used in the interwar years – from the 1920s until the mid-1940s – to explain the 
Indian liberation movement and British withdrawal, Gallean’s article introduced a new narrative 
based on indignity and shame at French colonial apathy. Indeed, Gallean condemns France’s 
                                                          
3 Tailleur, op.cit., p. 15. 
4 Chanderdernagor voted in a referendum to join the Indian Union in 1949.  
5 Le Monde, 18 August 1954. 
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failure in fulfilling her mission civilisatrice and explains that this failure has provided the 
justification for India to claim sovereignty over the remaining French enclaves. This failure is 
exemplified by the insufficient creation of jobs, which had been limited to those involving the 
‘selling of alcohol which attracted hordes of thirsty customers from dry India and the smuggling of 
gold and diamonds’.6 Selling alcohol appeared to have been a major occupation in French India. 
Guy Demaison, a journalist who wrote in the monthly colonial magazine La Revue des Troupes 
Coloniales, wrote of his trip to the Bengali French enclave that arriving in Chandernagor was like 
entering a distillery, and that ‘next to the words ‘‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’’ was a sign ‘Rhum 
[sic], Gin, Whisky, Brandy!’ 7   
Gallean also describes the French Indian population as extremely poor, ignorant, and 
unable to speak French, a fact, he says, which indicates the failure of the French colonial 
enterprise whose principle was embodied in the idea of bringing French civilisation and education 
to the less evolved natives. The author also draws attention to the lack of infrastructure that 
undermined the economic development of the colonial administrative centre. The Pondichéry 
jetty, indeed, had been left unrepaired since it was destroyed by storms at the end of 1952.8 Not 
only does the author describe as ‘pitiful’ the way the French diplomats handled the negotiations 
over the future of French India, but, using Dupleix as a reference, he hints at three centuries of 
neglect by the French colonial enterprise that defies the idea of ‘grande œuvre’ (grand 
enterprise). While Gallean states that, since France has failed in her colonial mission, she is not 
worthy of remaining in India, he does not acknowledge India’s quest for independence from a 
foreign power, nor the success of her territorial integration policy. As such, Gallean’s 
representation of French India does not allow for a dualistic expression of nationalist India versus 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 La Revue des Troupes Coloniales, April 1947, p. 75.  
8 Pitoëff, op.cit., p. 123.  
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French colonial power, but continues to view the evolution of French India within a Euro-centric 
framework. 
On 20 October 1954, two days after the Kijeour meeting, Le Monde published an article 
entitled ‘De l’empire de Dupleix à l’Inde: Pour la création d’un centre français de recherche à 
Pondichéry’ (From the Empire of Dupleix to India: For the Creation of a French Research Centre 
in Pondichéry), authored by Tibor Mende, a journalist who specialised in the Third World and who 
wrote a pessimistic account of India in L’Inde devant l’orage, which appeared in 1950.9 The article 
did not make the front page of the newspaper, but was instead printed on page three in the 
foreign news section. Unsurprisingly, the news was overshadowed by other important colonial 
reports – the Suez crisis and Indochina – which minimised the fact that the French Indian 
enclaves had become the first French overseas territory to secede from the French Union. This 
point was unacknowledged at the time, but its consequence was reflected in the title of a book 
written by Georges Tailleur, the last governor of Chandernagor, Le premier maillon de la chaîne: 
Chandernagore ou le lit de Dupleix (The first link of the chain: Chandernagor or the bed of 
Dupleix). Indeed, the mandates of Lebanon and Syria had obtained their independence in 1946, 
and the Chinese concession of Kouang-Tchéou-Wan (Quang Tchéou-Wan) was retroceded 
before the French Union was constituted; Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam had the status of 
Associates States under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, though the status lasted only a 
few years. The loss of Indochina and French India marked the end of France’s hegemony in Asia, 
with the increased risk that these changes could initiate a wave of secession across other 
territories of the French Union. French India was no longer considered a place where French 
colonial or Indian nationalist tensions clashed. Developments there had become a threat to the 
existence of the French Union itself.  
                                                          
9 Le Monde, ’De l’empire de Dupleix à l’Inde’, 20 October 1954; Mende, op.cit. 
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The article’s title, ‘From the Empire of Dupleix to India’, provides an unchallenged 
chronological link between the conquest of the Deccan in the mid-eighteenth century by Dupleix 
and France’s approaching withdrawal on 1 November.10 While the title embodies a two-hundred-
year French presence, it overlooks the subordinate colonial status of France in India during that 
period, and also obliterates the history of India’s nationalist movement. As suggested by the 
subtitle of the article: ‘For the Creation of a French Research Centre in Pondichéry’, Mende 
focuses on the setting-up of a research centre which, he argues, would allow France to maintain 
a foothold and some influence in the former French Indian territories. He also suggests that, with 
the approval of the Indian government, the establishment of a research institute in Pondichéry 
would provide a unique opportunity for France to assist formerly colonised countries, as well as 
directly assisting the countries of the French Union, by creating a direct link between them. The 
article offers a shift in the former representation of India; French India is now reduced to the 
vision of a research institute from which France could maintain her influence in India and beyond.  
Furthermore, the article hints that the institute could become a bulwark against the 
spread of Communism in under-developed countries, thus reiterating France’s traditional role as 
the defender of democratic principles. While France had been circumscribed to the enclaves by 
the Treaties, and had now lost the French Indian territories altogether, her culture, her strength in 
research, and her republican tradition based on universal rights would nonetheless persist and 
extend beyond the former French Indian borders. Universalist principles, which had been 
promoted as a more benevolent French colonial style compared to that of the more ruthless 
British approach, would prevail. This new representation of a post-French India as embodied in 
the research institute places France in a new position of influence, a central role in a post-colonial 
world that would promote France’s grandeur and prestige at a time when her colonial abilities had 
been thwarted by the Vietnamese and Indian nationalists, as well as by the increasing unrest in 
                                                          
10 Le Monde, ’De l’empire de Dupleix à l’Inde’, 20 October 1954. 
 
 
246 
 
Algeria. While Mende depicts the end of French India as a failure of the French colonial 
enterprise, the establishment of the research centre reflects a new hope designed to enlighten 
formerly colonised countries and maintain France’s position as a first-world power.  
In Combat, a left-wing newspaper that first appeared underground during the Second 
World War, Philippe Decraene, chief editor of the African news at Le Monde, wrote two articles, 
the first on 8-9 May entitled ‘La France doit-elle rester en Inde?’ (Should France stay in India?), 
and the second on 16 October 1954 entitled ‘Après six mois de négociations le différend franco-
indien est en voie de règlement’ (after six months of negotiations, the Franco-Indian conflict is 
about to be resolved). In these articles, Decraene acknowledges that the French Establishments 
‘never fulfilled their function as commercial outposts’, and in fact questions whether it is beneficial 
for France to remain in India since the comptoirs depend on India for their mere survival and cost 
ten billion Francs annually to the French government in wages, allowances, and pensions.11 In 
fact, Decraene overly inflated the amount the comptoirs cost France, Ostrorog indicated in a letter 
to the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Antoine Pinay, dated 10 May 1955, that prior to the 
withdrawal ‘the annual expenses pertaining to the comptoirs were over five billion Francs’.12  
Decraene seems to hint that, given the dire situation, there would be a distinct advantage 
in repatriating or dispatching the current civil servants to other postings. He also argues that final 
negotiations over the fate of the French Indian territories offered an opportunity to avoid a repeat 
of the ‘coup de Chandernagor’, which saw the integration of the former Bengali territory with the 
State of West Bengal, and he recommends maintaining France’s prestige through the existing 
educational facilities and the creation of a Franco-Indian cultural centre. As one of the few French 
journalists who acknowledged the leadership of India in the region, despite his pro-French stand, 
                                                          
11 Combat, 8-9 May 1954; Combat, 16 October 1954. Philippe Decraene was also the Director of the Centre des 
hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes in 1989, and Professor of the Modern and Contemporary History of 
African Civilisation at the Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales in1989,  Académie des Sciences 
d’Outre-Mer, documentation on members,  created 2010, 
<http://www.academieoutremer.fr/academiciens/fiche.php?aId=187>, viewed 8 November 2012. 
12 Stanislas Ostorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à son Excellence Mr le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a/s 
institut français à Pondichéry, 10 May 1955, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
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Decraene pointed to the importance for France of establishing strong diplomatic ties with India if it 
wished to maintain some form of continuing presence in India and influence in the region.  
The creation of a research institute was perceived by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
the best chance of retaining that influence. In a note dated 17 July 1954, the Conferences 
Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts that a solution to the Franco-Indian conflict 
must benefit both countries, must be founded on mutual equality, and must in no way jeopardise 
France’s future relations with India. Similarly to Decraene, the Secretariat suggests that the 
creation of a cultural and technical centre in Pondichéry would go beyond the mere maintenance 
of French culture, as it would be able to provide direct technical assistance to a country fighting 
‘starvation and poverty’.13 A letter from the French ambassador, Ostrorog, to Jacques de Bourbon 
Busset, director of cultural relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explains that the embassy 
did not view the withdrawal as an ‘abandonment’, but, ‘since Pondichéry was a rotten market 
town, stained with corruption’, he welcomed the opportunity to found an institute which he saw as 
a means to exhibit French skills and efficiency. Furthermore, the institute would allow France to 
follow the example set by other organisations whose aims were to provide assistance for the 
development of India.14 As such, the research institute allowed a transformation of the old 
civilising mission to one that was humanitarian, dedicated to tackling poverty and helplessness. 
This vision of starvation and doom reflected Mende’s own pessimistic description of 
contemporary India.15 Likewise, Marchés coloniaux du Monde, which focused on economic 
issues, had depicted starving Indians receiving smaller rice rations than French Indians.16 
While some officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs viewed post-French India relations 
in terms of equality with India, a note by Ostrorog on the function and essence of the would-be 
                                                          
13 Secrétariat des conférences a/s de l’avenir de Pondichéry, 17 July 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut 
français de Pondichéry. 
14 Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à Mr de Bourbon Busset, directeur des relations 
culturelles, 1 December 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
15 Mende, op.cit. 
16 Marchés coloniaux, 24 December 1949; Sandrine Lemaire, et al, ‘Économie colonial: entre mythe propagandiste et 
réalité économique (1940-1955)’, in Pascal Blanchard et al (eds), Culture coloniale en France: De la Révolution 
française à nos jours, (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2008, 4th edition), p. 393. 
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Institute of Pondichéry showed that the colonial rivalry that had existed between Britain and 
France was still at play. The note recommends that the centre should evoke ‘la montagne Sainte 
Geneviève’, an area of Paris where the first universities were founded, and which had attracted 
students from all regions of medieval Europe. From there, it suggests, ‘the Greco-Latin heritage 
would be spread across India and challenge the Anglo-Saxon culture’.17 The use of the analogy 
implies that French culture, which itself found its origins in Greco-Latin civilisation, would be 
better suited to continue the transmission of civilising values than Anglo-Saxon culture. Similarly, 
Ostrorog reiterates this point by saying that the ‘last vestiges of a past empire trigger the need to 
expand our presence across all of India’.18 In the author’s view, the research centre would 
provide a space from which to continue old European rivalries, a beacon of Mediterranean culture 
on a subcontinent corrupted by Anglo-Saxon influence, as well as a platform from which to launch 
the next stage of French influence. This view challenges Britain’s own reference and 
appropriation of the Greco-Roman past to explain her colonial presence in India.19 
Finally, the Trait d’Union of November 1954, in an article entitled ‘Pondichéry la 
Nouvelle’, views the end of French India as a new beginning that would allow Pondichéry to 
finally fulfil its destiny. The author declares that Pondichéry could have been a ‘permanent trade 
fair’; it could have showcased model schools and hospitals, beautiful roads, and agricultural 
works; in all, Pondichéry could have been the jewel of French colonial power, the epitome of 
French ingenuity and generosity. Instead, the author laments, it became a model of political 
corruption. But, he announces, ‘nothing is lost’, because the cultural centre will now fulfil 
Pondichéry’s destiny.20 In a sense, the centre was believed to have the power to redress 
                                                          
17 Note du professeur Robert Debré, no date but sequential to 17 July 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut 
français de Pondichéry. 
18 Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à son Excellence Mr le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 
a/s institut français à Pondichéry, 15 November 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
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France’s missed opportunities in India, and to generate hope for the future, a view that was not 
shared by those who associated the end of French India with decay and extensive loss.21  
 
From French India to colonial decrepitude 
The colonial press offered a number of variants on the theme of colonial loss. The 
Nouvelle revue française d’outre-mer (NRFOM), a colonial monthly published by a quasi-official 
association named the Comité du rayonnement français, whose main purpose was to promote 
the diffusion of French culture in the colonies, paid little attention to French India in the post-
Indian independence era. It did, however, published four articles on French India between March 
1953 and January 1955 that indicate an increasing interest in the future of the southern territories. 
While the articles written prior to and around the time of the French withdrawal were entitled 
‘L’Inde française’,22 ‘L’Inde française va-t-elle disparaitre?’,23 and ‘L’Inde qui fut française…’,24 the 
article published in January 1955, entitled ‘À propos des Établissements français de l’Inde’,25 
referred to French India by its former official name.26 The switch to the former name – ‘the French 
Establishments in India’ – contrasts with the previous reference to ‘French India’, which was 
associated with a larger territory. The new reference signals much smaller territories within a 
larger Indian entity, thus consciously diminishes the importance of French India. Not only is the 
colonial loss of French India reduced from the grand empire of Dupleix to mere ‘territories’, but at 
the same time it minimises an Indian nationalist victory that, after Britain, vanquished another 
European power.  
Two of the articles were written by the former colonial administrator Deschamps. In the 
first article, dated March 1953, Deschamps condemns the economic blockade organised by the 
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Government of India against French India, and asserts that French Indians wish to remain within 
the French Union. He continues to emphasise the positive aspect of the French administration by 
pointing out that French Indians receive a higher ration of rice and better education, and that the 
salary of French Indian civil servants is four times higher than the wages their Indian counterparts 
receive. French India is thus portrayed as a site where nationalist and colonial tensions interact, 
and where the privileges acquired by French Indians are under threat from Indian nationalist 
demands. The article also reiterates the competing colonial discourses of the era prior to India’s 
independence, noting that ‘French Indians were allowed to vote well before British Indians’. As 
such, France is judged a superior colonial power to Britain, and French republicanism is 
expressed as a liberating force and a better option to the uncertainties presented by an 
independent India. However, the author argues within an Indian colonial context that is no longer 
relevant. India had by now become the largest democracy in the world, with the promulgation of 
her constitution in 1950 giving the right to vote to all males and females above the age of twenty-
one years. Moreover, the article neglects to mention that the right to vote had been granted by 
the British to a limited number of British Indian men and women. In this article, then, French India 
is a place where Indian nationalism and its use of coercive means is contrasted with French 
republicanism portrayed as the defender of universal rights and a fairer alternative.  
In May 1954, in an article entitled ‘L’Inde française va-t-elle disparaitre?’,27 Deschamps 
anxiously warns that, should French India be lost, the four outposts could rapidly dissolve within 
the Indian Union – as had many of the other European trading posts that once dotted the Indian 
coastline – and become ‘sad necropolises’.28 While the use of ‘French India’ in the title fosters a 
sense of continuity in the history of colonial France, the warning that it could disappear 
challenges this stabilising notion; it is as if the borders of the French nation have come under 
attack. French India is compared here to former Dutch, Swedish, and Danish commercial 
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outposts, but key historical details – namely that these outposts had been sold to Britain – are 
overlooked. The author warns that French India, like the other European outposts, would be 
reduced to colonial vestiges. The idea that these possessions would decay under Indian 
influence, thus tarnishing France’s glory, triggers a sense of anguish in the author that recalls the 
amputation of other territories such as Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, and the occupation of France 
during the Second World War.29 The mention of decay also implies that the Indian government is 
incompetent and unable to protect European culture, which naturally the French Indian territories 
epitomise. The loss of French India is presented as an attack on the civilising mission of France. 
The author belittles India’s territorial claims over French India, and argues that ‘with her two 
million square kilometres and her 380 million inhabitants, India has far more pressing problems to 
resolve than worry about minuscule [French] pockets’. By focusing on the French Indian 
territories, in other words, India is neglecting her own population and national affairs. 
Nonetheless, the author suggests that if the territories were to merge, France must continue to 
exercise her cultural influence through the establishment of a research centre, presented here as 
a last resort to retain some kind of national dignity.  
The December 1954 article entitled ‘Inde qui fut française…’, written by François Baron, 
the last governor of French India, lists the key dates and events which led to the foundation of 
French India.30 The historical overview ends abruptly in 1816 when, with the Treaty of Paris, the 
English retroceded ‘Pondichéry under the condition that it will not be fortified’. Then a new 
section, entitled ‘The French Establishments in India’, gives a summary of the negotiations that 
led to the October agreement and ultimately the French withdrawal. By leaving out the history of 
French India between 1816 and 1954, not only does the author emphasise the earlier, ‘glorious’ 
colonial period ‘when Dupleix gave to Pondichéry and France a splendid moment that is still 
remembered across all of India’, he also obliterates the Indian nationalist movement and its 
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relationship with the British colonial administration. The omission also has the effect of minimising 
France’s subordinate colonial status on the subcontinent and the fact that French India greatly 
depended on the goodwill of its neighbours, whether British or Indian, for its survival. In his 
description of the events that led to the October agreement, including the economic blockade and 
the occupation of Yanaon and Mahé by Indian nationalist forces, the author depicts France as a 
‘non-violent’ participant that faced India’s coercive means. Again, the author reiterates the 
dichotomy of the Occident/Orient (synonymous with civilisation/barbarism). France, in other 
words, criticises the Indian nationalist movement for using coercive means while adhering to 
Gandhian strategy of satyagraha (non-violence). In these articles, French India is no longer 
represented as a site of imperial glory, but rather as the victim of Indian nationalism whose future, 
under Indian administration, is doomed to violence, decay, and oblivion. Such images are 
consistent with a ‘colonial discourse that construes the colonised as a population of degenerate 
types on the basis of racial origin’, a discourse that had in the past given European powers a 
legitimacy for conquest.31 
In an article entitled ‘Après l’abandon de Yanaon et de Mahé, il faut sauver Pondichéry’, 
published in Combat on 19 July 1954, Decraene similarly expresses a sense of anguish at the 
shrinking of the French colonial world. He notes that, with the loss of Yanaon and Mahé, French 
India has now been reduced to 40% of its former size.32 Describing French Indian events as a 
‘naufrage’ (wreck), a term that implies moral loss, the author calls on the French government to 
do its ‘moral duty’ and salvage whatever is left of French India.33 In French, the word naufrage is 
strongly associated with Théodore Gericault’s famous painting, ‘Le Radeau de la Méduse’, which 
depicts a tragic colonial episode off the coast of Senegal when the French ship Méduse wrecked 
as it brought military personnel to Senegal in 1816. Hence, Decraene is likening French India to a 
fragment of the French Union adrift in the ocean, a fissure in that post-war colonial edifice, the 
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French Union.34 In his attack on Indian nationalism, Decraene uses traditional forms of 
representation, similar to those used in the NRFOM’s articles that emphasised the division 
between the Orient and the Occident: ‘The Indian government continues its policy of territorial 
nibbling with well-known oriental patience’. The author fails to mention, however, that the policy of 
‘territorial nibbling’ may well have been learnt from European colonisers during the early period of 
India’s colonisation. In addition, when France agreed to hand over the loges in the hope of 
appeasing the Indian government, ignoring the fact that the gesture was contrary to the 
constitution, they effectively consented to the first stage of ‘territorial nibbling’. Finally, Decraene 
admits that, after India’s independence – which he portrays as ‘the vivisection of the British 
Empire in 1947’, in reference to the pain inflicted by Indian nationalists and their lack of morality in 
doing so – France had underestimated the new state of India. He accuses French foreign policy 
of negligence and short-sightedness, and to some extent criticises France for her lack of 
negotiating power. As a Frenchman, he reproaches his own government for its inability to 
withstand the duplicity of Indian leaders, once again reiterating a favourite discourse that 
discriminated on the basis of racial origins.35 In any case, he continues, India would soon sink 
into anarchy and require the intervention of the great powers. 
For Climats, a colonial weekly magazine, the loss of French India also provoked a sense 
of anxiety, but in contrast to the way NFROM’s articles presented a vision of decrepitude and 
oblivion, Climats’ reaction was epitomised in the title, ‘Les Établissements français de l’Inde rayés 
de la carte du monde’.36 The title warns that Indian nationalism will ruthlessly erase all European 
heritage, and that the ‘abandonment’ of French India was a grave blow to the French Union which 
presages further crisis for the French Republic. As Decraene had done, the article points out that 
the end of French India entails the loss of the third largest population in the French Union after 
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Africa and Madagascar, (Algeria had a largest population, but was considered to be a départment 
rather than a ‘territory’ of the French Union). As such, the articles in Combat and Climats echo the 
old colonial argument that a strong nation equalled a large population, an argument that had been 
the impetus for France’s nineteenth-century colonial expansion but that was now obsolete in the 
post-Second World War Two era.37 At the same time, the articles expose the ways maps and 
censuses were used as tools, as discussed in Chapter 2, with which to construct the colonial 
imaginary, reinforce the image of a great nation, measure and control the colonial space, and 
justify the colonial entreprise.38 The ‘abandonment’ of French India was a reflection of France’s 
lack of determination and confidence in defending her territories. Indeed, one Climats article, 
entitled ‘Maintenir! La situation de nos Comptoirs de l’Inde va s’aggravant’, went so far as to 
praise Portuguese authorities in Lisbon for their condemnation of a Goanese resident who 
promoted the merging of the Portuguese colony with India. The article supported the use of such 
a determined response should any French Indian renegades foment efforts against the interests 
of the ‘patrie’.39 According to the paper, France had not fought hard enough for her territories, and 
as a result had undermined the grand effort of Dupleix and other bâtisseurs d’empire (builders of 
empire); the end of French India stood in stark contrast to the mythical memories associated with 
Dupleix’s heroic battles and his dream of a French Indian empire. 
The unceremonious end of Dupleix’ empire  
Some of the French articles depicted the end of French India as farcical and as full of 
extravagant developments and unexpected volte-faces. The French Indian deputy, Goubert, 
attracted the most comical and sarcastic titles. An article in Paris Presse, for example, dated 1 
April 1954 and entitled ‘Le député français de Pondichéry fuit ses électeurs’, describes with some 
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humour how the previously pro-French deputy defected to India, vanishing in thin air to avoid an 
arrest warrant on corruption charges.40 Indeed, ‘the bailiffs have been unable to locate him’ 
because he had managed ‘to make his way through the thick barbed wires that surround 
Pondichéry’. Not only does the author ridicule Goubert’s sudden change of allegiance, he sneers 
at the inability of India’s barbed wire to keep all the undesirables out of India.  
In an article in the Paris Presse of 22 April 1954, entitled ‘… Pondichéry la douce a vécu 
un roman noir’ (… Sweet Pondichéry in the midst of a thriller), Goubert’s former regime is 
described as one led by ‘pirates only interested in accumulating wealth… estimated at tens of 
thousands of lacks’, (a lack is a unit of currency equalled to 100,000 rupees). Until a month ago, 
the article continues, the streets of Pondichéry resembled those of London on a coronation day 
due to the numerous pictures of Goubert on display in shop windows.41 Goubert is here likened to 
an authoritarian king focused only on his own interests. Climats describes the last days of the 
French administration as an orchestrated play (scenario monté): in the first act, the evacuation of 
civil servants and their families is already being planned ahead of the result of the Kijeour 
Congress at which, in the second act, Goubert and other fugitives will be allowed to vote as 
elected representatives. The order of scenes makes a mockery of the vote to decide whether or 
not French India will merge with India.42  
The choice of Kijeour was of the utmost importance; situated at the extreme eastern 
border of the Pondichéry enclave and easily accessible by road, the location allowed French 
Indian representatives such as Goubert – for whom an arrest warrant was still in force – to enter 
the pandal (the structure that accommodated the Congress) from an entrance right on the Indian 
border.43 Moreover, a Climats article dated 4 November 1954 reported that the Kijeour Congress 
was a muted battlefield and provided a military description of the event:   
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The ‘pandal’… was built in neutral territory…. it only took one week to erect … 
demonstrating the efficiency and skills of French engineering…. it is twenty metres long, 
sixteen metres wide and four metres high… cost 10,000 rupees…. the president opened 
the session at 10 am by reading the clauses of the proposed agreement in French and 
Tamil… until now the agreement was under military guard…. the vote commenced at 
11.10 am with the members of the representative assembly voting first, then the 
municipal councillors, in total 178 representatives… [at] 12 noon the changing of the 
Indian guard takes place, it is larger than ours [twelve sepoys] their khaki uniforms so 
similar to ours that we had to paint a small French flag on the English helmets of our 
cipahis in 1941… the result is given at 1.20 pm…. 170 are in favour… Mr Pierre Landy, 
the Secretary of the French Embassy in India, and Mr Kewal Singh, the Indian Consul-
General in Pondichéry, are allowed to enter the ‘pandal’…. all is over by 1.45 pm… in a 
perfect order….44 
 
At the end of the article, the author remarks, after being given a ‘mala’ – a garland of flowers 
presented on important occasions in India – that ‘in France these are reserved for funerals’. Thus 
the end of French India is portrayed as a quiet orchestrated defeat and a funeral procession.  
Overall, the articles present the deplorable end of French India as a tragicomedy that 
stands in stark contrast to the seriousness of empire building and the memory of colonial heroes 
such as Dupleix. In a rather light tone that contrasts earlier articles written in 1949, Marchés 
coloniaux wrote in August 1954 that the imminent loss of French India would have little impact on 
economic activities between France and her establishments, in part because such activity was 
already quite minimal.45 Finally, Agence France Presse reported in its communiqué on the 
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forthcoming transfer of the establishments that France’s withdrawal should serve as an example 
for resolving the problem of Goa. Despite the unceremonious end to French presence in India, 
there were still those who saw French colonialism as a role model on which to base negotiations 
over the future of Portuguese India with the uncompromising government of Portugal.46 
The transfer also provided an opportunity for a nationalist response from France’s high-
ranking politicians. On 30 October, French Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès-France, who had 
recently negotiated the end of France’s colonial presence in Indochina, gave one of his weekly 
speeches – this one was entitled ‘C’est de notre France d’Outre-mer que je veux vous parler ce 
soir’47 – in which he reiterated France’s great achievements overseas. Without making any 
mention of French India’s forthcoming transfer, Mendès-France emphasised the size of overseas 
France, her population, her untapped resources and unlimited potential, and the economic and 
political advancements that had been achieved. The effect of the speech was to foreground the 
unique bond between France and her overseas territories while minimising the impact on France 
that the loss of a small territory like French India would have. At the end of the speech, his 
invitation to focus on African and Madagascan youth shifted attention away from France’s recent 
colonial losses in Asia.  
Similarly, in a speech given a day before the transfer, Gaston Monnerville, President of 
the Council (Senate), underlined that the French Union offered a revolutionary novelty to any 
French overseas territory and a constitutional framework to suit the needs of individual members 
of the French Union, while neglecting to mention that France was about to lose another overseas 
territory.48 This statement, from the first black Frenchman to hold a senior position in the French 
government, was intended to remind a national audience of France’s ongoing benevolent support 
of less politically advanced territories. 
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While some French newspapers and more particularly colonial magazines wrote about 
and debated the events that led to the transfer, they did not elaborate on the handover ceremony. 
Paris Match was one of the few to published a lengthy article, entitled ‘I saw the flag that Dupleix 
hoisted being brought down for the last time’.49 Focusing on the evening before the transfer when 
the French flag was taken down for the last time, the author reminisced about the imperial 
splendour of French India. The tone is overly emotional and at times melodramatic as it reports 
how ‘the ceremony was distressing and the flag bearer passed out’, supposedly overwhelmed by 
the experience. The French press underplayed the fact that the Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, did not attend the ceremony, as he was on an official visit to Saigon and then 
Phnom Penh, the new capitals of the former South-East Asian French colonies. Agence France 
Presse commented from Vietnam that Nehru, who was the first head of state to meet Ho Chi 
Minh after France’s defeat in Indochina and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (North Vietnam), seemed to have rejoiced at the completion of the Franco-Indian 
negotiations.50  
A more accurate analysis, however, would emphasise that on the day of the de facto 
transfer, rather than attending the withdrawal of what in 1945 he had already considered a ‘third-
rank power’, Nehru was strengthening India’s ties with South-East Asian heads of state and 
investing in her role as a world leader.51 Indeed, a report on the political situation in India from the 
French Consulate in Bombay, dated 29 November 1945, noted that Nehru considered only the 
USA and USSR to be ‘first rank’ powers, a status he believed India and China would also enjoy in 
the near future. France and Britain had, from his viewpoint, lost most of their relevance.52 
Contrary to France’s own myth-making in regard to her so-called Indian ‘empire’, there was no 
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historic speech equivalent to that which marked the end of British presence in 14/15 August 1947 
(‘At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and 
freedom….’).53 In fact, The Statesman (founded in Calcutta in 1875) reported that the de facto 
ceremony lasted only ten minutes: 
 
Exactly at 6.45 am Mr Kewal Singh [the former Indian Consul-General to Pondicherry, 
who had just become the Indian Chief Commissioner] drove from the Consulate to 
Government House and his arrival was the signal for cheering by thousands of citizens 
who had gathered in the garden in front of Government House. He was received at the 
gate by Mr Pierre Landy [a French Foreign Office official]. They shook hands ... signed 
the agreement, and the artillery fired a salvo of guns to signal the transfer to the citizens 
of Pondicherry. 
 
The whole process, which was over by 7 am, can be viewed as an accurate reflection of 
the importance of France’s Indian empire: small and insignificant.54 Similarly, the Amrita Bazar 
Patrika (ABP), one of India’s oldest newspapers, founded in Calcutta and renowned for its 
nationalist tone, reported that a week before the official ceremony brisk preparations were already 
under way to wind up the French administration. One ship berthed in Pondichéry port was being 
loaded with all the personal belongings of officials, the paper said, as well as arms and 
ammunitions, two police cars, two trucks, and the gendarmes who had been stationed there for 
the past few months. Another ship was expected during the last week of October to take on board 
officials and their families; only a few officers required to hand over the administration would stay 
behind and then travel by air.55 These arrangements were confirmed in a report by the 
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Représentant Français in Pondichéry – the title given to the French Consul in Pondichéry during 
the transition period – to Ostrorog. The report states that the French administration packed in 
such a hurried manner that ‘in the eyes of the population, it appeared suspicious as if it was 
hunted by an enemy that was imposing the law of the victor’.56 Thus, in stark contrast to what 
appeared in the French imagination as a large French Indian empire, the whole of French India 
sailed away on two ships. Finally, acknowledging that French India was not limited to the 
administrative centre of Pondichéry and that the event was celebrated across all of the former 
French Indian territories and welcomed by them, the ABP mentioned that handover ceremonies 
also took place in the other territories celebration the ‘return’ of the territories. 
 
French India as an imagined Indian space 
As soon as the agreement for the de facto transfer was signed on 21 October 1954, it 
was promoted in most of the Indian press as a nationalist victory and an opportunity to turn the 
focus onto Portuguese India. Indeed, press articles declared that Portugal ought to follow the 
French example,57 a statement that was reflected in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report of 
1954-55 - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the administration of the territories 
until 1962.58 Portuguese India was now the last foreign enclave to remain on the subcontinent, 
and it was hoped that the ‘French action will have a sobering effect on Portugal’.59 French India 
now provided the setting for a showdown between an uncompromising Portugal and a nationalist 
India. 
The Searchlight, which started publishing from Patna in 1919, printed an article dated 31 
October 1954 entitled ‘Power transfer by France to India’, in which the author twice stated that the 
                                                          
56 Robert Morel-Francoz, Représentant Français à Comte Ostrorog, Ambassade de France à New Delhi, 13 mars 
1957, AD, Inde, Vol. 339: Ex-établissements français situation générale.  
57 Searchlight, 2 November 1954. 
58 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual reports, 1954-55, <http://www.mealib.nic.in/?2386?000>,     
viewed 26 January 2014. 
59 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 22 October 1954. 
 
 
261 
 
ceremony would mark the final chapter of French presence in India. The article also hinted that 
tax evaders had enjoyed the territorial oddities of French India, noting that Pondichéry would now 
cease to be the haven ‘it had been to civil debtors on either side of the border’.60 The programme 
of the ceremony was given in more detail than it had been in the French press, and the tone of 
the language, although more restrained than in the ABP, is clearly aimed at turning the event into 
a nationalist victory. The article made repeated mention of national symbols, such as the raising 
of the Indian flag and the illumination of government buildings, to reinforce the process of nation-
building initiated by the merging of French India: 
 
Other highlights of the programme include raising the Indian tricolor at the flag mast of 
the customs house near the sea shore and a public rally at which messages from 
President Rajendra Prasad and PM Nehru will be read both in English and Tamil. There 
will be illuminations of all government buildings and private houses, and a torch parade 
and fireworks will mark the end of the celebrations. The transfer eve as well as the day of 
independence will be observed as a day of great rejoicing by the 320,000 citizens of the 
four settlements of Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahé and Yenam. 
 
The article made use of identifiers that signalled, albeit at times subtly, that the process of nation-
building was in process. The hoisting of the Indian tricolour contrasted with the French tricolour, 
and the messages were to be read, not in French, but in the official language of the Union 
(English), and the local official language of the state of Tamil Nadu (Tamil). There is no mention 
that similar celebrations were organised in Yenam (Yanaon) and Mahé, and it seems that no 
speeches were to be given in the Indian languages of these two enclaves (Telugu and 
Malayalam, respectively). The oversight may indicate that these territories were not viewed as 
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separate entities, or that the journalist was unaware that celebrations were taking place in the 
other territories. That both public buildings and private houses would be illuminated could be 
perceived as a deliberate strategy to link public space, represented by government buildings now 
under the charge of the Indian government, with the local population. 
The Searchlight article of 2 November 1954, entitled ‘French rule over four enclaves 
comes to end’, reiterates the basic principles of the Indian government’s policy and outlines its 
success in overcoming another colonial power: ‘firstly the elimination of foreign rule and the full 
integration of the French territories with the Union of India, secondly preservation of the cultural 
and other rights of the people and thirdly bringing about integration not by force but in a peaceful 
way by the method of friendly negotiations’.61 The celebration emphasises the success of India’s 
integration policy and the determination of its leaders to carry it through. As such, French India 
provides India with an example of the successful resolution of nationalist and colonial tensions, 
and also serves as a warning to Portugal.62 
The Statesman’s article entitled ‘French enclaves transferred to India’, pointed out that, 
although the ceremony marked the end of alien rule, France technically still held full sovereignty 
over the territories until the de jure agreement was ratified by the French Parliament. The 
newspaper also reported the assurance of Indian Chief Commissioner, Kewal Singh, that he and 
his colleagues ‘shall bend all our energies for the social welfare and economic prosperity and 
general happiness of the people of these territories. Our aim will be to give you [the population] a 
thoroughly honest and efficient administration based on justice, fair play and absolute 
impartiality’.63 The Chief Commissioner seems intent on contrasting the commitment of the Indian 
government with a notoriously corrupt French system that had done so little to economically 
improve the territories. The newspaper also reported the Chief Commissioner saying, in French, 
that:  
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As French was the official language of the new state, he was speaking in French and 
hoped that French would continue to be the popular language in these territories. Apart 
from the French language, he said the rich heritage of French culture would be preserved 
and promoted, and with this special cultural background the new state could contribute to 
the rich and varied cultural panorama of India.64 
 
The statement was intended to reassure former opponents of the merger, who feared that it 
would result in the disappearance of French Indian cultural characteristics. Here the Indian Chief 
Commissioner affirmed that French culture would not only be preserved but also welcomed in an 
already culturally diverse India. The Searchlight indicated that the five-year plan introduced 
across India to facilitate and monitor her economic development would be extended to the former 
French enclaves, demonstrating the commitment of the Indian government to rapidly improve the 
economy of the former French territories.65 Hence, French India provided an opportunity to outdo 
the former coloniser, and by welcoming the diversity of French India it proved to the world India’s 
commitment to the preservation of the territories’ cultural particularities. Such policy was in line 
with New Delhi’s view of a naturally diverse nation that also helped consolidate state authority in 
post-colonial India.66 
The ABP of 2 November 1954 published a lengthy article entitled ‘A big problem solved 
in spirit of goodwill: de facto transfer of French pockets to India’.67 The article included a cartoon 
entitled ‘Hearty Welcome’ (Fig. 9) reproduced, as mentioned in the bottom right corner of the 
caption, by arrangement of Shankar’s Weekly. Its author was the celebrated Indian cartoonist 
Kesava Shankara Pillai (1902-1989) who founded the weekly in 1948.  Pillai became famous for 
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producing cartoons as a form and source of political knowledge during colonial and post-colonial 
times. His cartoons provided accurate representations of political events that were most 
importantly accessible to a wide readership.68  The caption reads: ‘Pandit Nehru says the people 
of the French Settlements are welcome to the wider family of India’. It depicts French India as an 
Indian woman carrying an umbrella in her right hand and a suitcase in her left hand; she makes 
an entrance into what looks like an office. The characters depicted in the cartoon are Prime 
Minister Nehru, Foreign Affairs Minister Krishna Menon (standing behind him), and three other 
men who are all looking at the woman. Curiously, no hands are stretched out, and nor are hand 
palms brought together at the centre of the chest in the manner that would physically indicate 
they were welcoming the woman. The male character standing on the far right of the cartoon and 
wearing an army uniform is holding a bunch of flowers that seem to be for her, but he is standing 
the furthest from the woman and the entrance. In the middle of the room is a large armchair that 
seems to have been provided for the female visitor.  
The cartoon genders French India, representing her as a tired, perhaps even lost, female 
figure who has travelled a long way to join this group of men. Perhaps she is an Indian version of 
Marianne, the national emblem of France. On the other hand, India is represented by the five 
men, a number that epitomises strength and demonstrates the inequality between French India 
and India. Perhaps these men will rescue the woman (hence the offer for her to rest in the 
armchair). The lack of welcoming gestures is particularly interesting: the two men closest to the 
woman have their hands behind their backs, while the army officer holding the bunch of flowers 
seems to represent India’s military forces, a reminder that although India used pacific means in 
the merging of French India, the use of military force had not been entirely dismissed. The 
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cartoon also helps celebrate Indian men’s manhood in defeating colonialism which had 
traditionally represented them as effete.69   
Fig. 9: Hearty Welcome! Source: Amrita Bazar Patrika, 2 November 1954.   
 
 
The article itself uses national images of the motherland, likening the transfer ceremony 
to a day of freedom and reproducing part of Nehru’s speech sent from Cambodia: 
I am far from India on this day, but my thoughts are in Pondicherry where an event of 
great significance is taking place. A part of India long separated from the motherland is 
coming back to us of its own free will and this change is taking place as a result of 
friendly agreement with France. The French settlements in India were small in area but 
they raised difficult problems. It is never easy to solve problems which involve the interest 
and prestige of different countries. It is thus a matter of peculiar satisfaction that both 
India and France have succeeded in solving this question with grace and goodwill. In 
doing so they have set an example of tolerance, good sense and wisdom which if applied 
to other problems in the world might lead to successful results. 
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I congratulate the people of what used to be French enclaves in India and welcome them 
as nationals of the republic of India. I offer felicitations also to the government of France 
under the wise leadership of his [sic] Prime Minister [Mendès-France] and the people of 
France on this occasion. I am happy that Pondicherry will continue to be a centre of 
French language and culture and will be a cultural link between the Republic of India and 
the Republic of France. The settlement of this problem is a justification and a vindication 
of the policy we have pursued in such matters. That policy is of peace and patient 
perseverance. Some people have thought that it was slow in achieving results. But the 
way of peace, though it might appear long, is always the shortest and most satisfactory. 
Jai Hind.70 
Nehru’s speech is the epitome of diplomacy, as it presents in a flattering manner the 
outcome of eight years of negotiations that were not always cordial. The speech conceals some 
crucial points. To begin with, the population did not decide of its own free will to join India; the 
decision was made after India introduced a number of coercive measures. These means included 
the erection of barbed wire around the enclave, the discontinuation of the provision of electricity, 
the suspension of fuel, food, and mail deliveries, and finally, the introduction of travel documents 
to enter Indian territory. This last measure limited the movement of local populations, especially 
that of Pondichéry, whose enclave was criss-crossed like patchwork by Indian territory. 
Furthermore, Pondichéry’s population did not participate in any referendum or election process to 
decide the fate of the French territories. Instead, the decision was made indirectly at Kijeour by 
the population’s elected representatives, some of whom had previously fled their constituency on 
charges of corruption and found refuge in India. While in Nehru’s statement the outcome testifies 
to the goodwill and the grace of both governments to resolve the issue, in fact negotiations had 
dragged on for years and led to the Indian government’s introduction of aggressive measures. 
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While the policy outlined by the Jaipur National Congress did not include resorting to armed 
forces, the withdrawal of necessities could be viewed as equivalent to the use of explicit means of 
violence.  
Nehru’s statement that French India ‘had long been separated from the motherland’ 
conceals another obvious fact: French India was originally the result of land purchases and gifts 
by local rulers, as well as treaties with another European power, and had never been a part of the 
Indian nation as it was conceived in the twentieth century. Nehru’s choice of words had a two-fold 
effect: they clearly situated the enclaves as an integral part of the wider political and cultural entity 
that was the Indian nation, and they hinted that, under European power, the enclaves had been 
carved out and removed from that imagined Indian nation. These assumptions contributed to 
building the myth that the Indian nation had its origins in a history that pre-dated invasion by 
European powers, a myth that was intended to reinforce New Delhi’s policy and its supposedly 
‘undeniable right’ to integrate British India, the princely states, and foreign enclaves into one 
political entity. The statement also embodies the success of the Indian National Congress’s policy 
in regard to foreign enclaves on Indian soil. The allegedly peaceful means by which the transfer 
was finalised reinforced the strategic value of satyagraha and emphasised the undeniable 
progress of the nationalist movement.71     
In his speech, Nehru rightly stated that the French settlements in India brought prestige 
to both France and India, and that the outcome of the long negotiations testified not only to his 
personal statesmanship, but also to the invaluable experience Indian officials had in dealing with 
difficult problems. He thus bestowed upon India and her statesmen the authority to resolve other 
disputes, and placed India at the forefront of nations to be reckoned with. While Nehru welcomed 
French Indians as nationals of the Republic of India, he failed to mention the possibility that some 
of those same French Indians might opt for French citizenship, and left unspoken whether the 
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same welcome would be extended to them. In 1955, a report prepared by the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs estimated that as many as 25,000 French Indians might exercise their right to 
obtain French citizenship.72 In sum, the handover ceremony helped erase the hardship of the 
blockade, pacify Franco-Indian relations, and validate India’s policy of territorial integration, which 
now served to bring the dispute between Portugal and India sharply into focus. It also marked the 
beginning of a new administrative arrangement and the creation of the latest state to join the 
Republic of India. 
 
The birth of a new state  
The French Indian press was less nationalistic than the Indian press and more realistic 
than the French dailies and colonial magazines. In contrast with the French press, the Trait 
d’Union of May 1954, in an article entitled ‘Le Merger’, enquired whether the French Indian 
territories’ role was to perpetually serve as ‘sad memories of the lost conquests of Dupleix... 
vestiges of her great Indian empire’.73 It also pointed out that the merging of French India with the 
Republic of India would be an economic improvement for the four enclaves and provide an end to 
their ‘putrefactive stagnation’. It called for an ‘intelligent resolution of the minuscule problem of 
French India’ that would not only facilitate Franco-Indian relations, but also offer France an 
opportunity to establish herself in the former enclaves by creating a cultural centre, an idea that 
had been supported by Nehru as early as August 1947.74 The article demonstrates a willingness 
to move away from the realm of colonial myth and memories towards the possibility of local 
economic improvement under the aegis of India. On a local level, French India seemed 
unimportant, while on a national level, the enclaves fulfilled a far more important function for both 
India and France. Nehru had acknowledged that French India was linked with other international 
                                                          
72 Ambassade de France aux Indes à Affaires Etrangères, Paris, a/s sur les options de nationalité à Pondichéry, 22 
Juin 1955, Inde Française, Vol. 79: Nationalité; Paul  Michalon ‘L’aventure ambiguë’, op.cit., p. 170 
73 Trait d’Union, May 1954. 
74 Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 4, p. 641. 
 
 
269 
 
issues such as Indochina, the issue of Indians in South Africa – France had helped India with this 
issue at the United Nations – and the rise of the Cold War between USSR and the USA, in 
respect to which India remained unaligned.75 
The article positions French India within a new and peculiar post-colonial situation in 
which France still had full sovereignty over territories that India ruled in a de facto manner. It 
questions what impact the merger would have on the population, how long the period of transition 
would last, and how the introduction of Indian legislation would affect the administration and its 
civil servants and pensioners. Would the French education system be preserved, and would 
workers’ rights acquired after the labour agitation of 1936 be maintained? These were all 
important concerns that would eventually be defined in the Treaty of Cession (1956). The 
outcome of the national and colonial dispute would have major consequences for the local level, 
hence French India was depicted as a place where benefits gained in the past were being 
challenged by the change of administration.  
The Trait d’Union issue of November 1954 acknowledged that French India had been 
caught up in a tide of momentous events (‘vague de grands courants’), and that the new post-war 
international context and nationalist demands had not spared the small French enclaves. Rather 
than blaming France or India, the monthly perceived the evolution of French India as the birth of a 
new state within India that was the product of a ‘pacific agreement between two governments’. 
However, French deputies and a variety of colonial issues delayed the ratification; the Indian 
government had to wait until the instruments of exchange took place on 16 August 1962. Shortly 
afterwards, a Bill was submitted to the Indian parliament that allowed the four former southern 
French Indian territories to be referred to as the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The article’s 
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introduction emphasised that the new state could not repudiate its past, nor its origin; it was 
unique.76 The body of the article proposed a common effort to ensure economic advancement 
and prosperity, and looked at how French India could become a centre of French culture in order 
to guarantee a continuing link between France and India. The Trait d’Union had a small 
readership since, being published in French, it was only accessible to a few mainly educated 
French Indians. Thus, the authors, although realistic about the effect that the merger would have, 
wanted to preserve the privileges enjoyed by this small minority and to promote the maintenance 
of French culture. In sum, French India would now offer a better future for a larger number of its 
citizens while remaining the point of contact between India and France. 
In October 1956, two years after the de facto transfer, a booklet entitled ‘Nouvel état de 
Pondichéry: évènements marquants et progrès économique et social depuis le transfert de facto’ 
continued to celebrate the transfer as a nationalist triumph, and wrote the following on the first 
page: 
 
325,000 citizens could finally join the big Indian family from whom they have been 
separated, and add the precious gift of the French culture to the rich mosaic of languages 
and cultures that form the Indian Union. Faithful to their great political traditions, after a 
campaign of non-violence, the population of these territories and the government of the 
Indian Union have obtained from France this grandiose and historic gesture. On the night 
of 31 October 1954, at the stroke of the midnight hour, the sirens of the cotton mills of 
Pondichéry announced the day of independence.77 
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Once again the message emphasises the return to the nation of citizens described as members 
of the big Indian family and the need to maximise their welcome. The culture they developed 
under foreign rule is portrayed as an asset to the already rich variety of Indian cultures. The 
message also minimises the violence that was perpetuated during the eight years of negotiations 
between French and Indian authorities, and between merger and anti-merger movements. The 
use of the phrase ‘at the stroke of the midnight hour’ relates the announcement of the merger of 
French India to Nehru’s speech at the Constituent Assembly on 14/15 August 1947, and links the 
two events together as nationalist victories over European colonial powers.78 After R.K. Nehru, 
Special Emissary of the Government of India, read messages from Rajendra Prasad, President of 
the Indian Republic, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, he declared, ‘this solution was the 
result of the policies of the government of India regarding the issue of foreign possessions in 
India, of which the fundamental principles are 'to eliminate foreign hegemony and integrate with 
India, to maintain culture and other rights, to obtain integration through diplomatic negotiations 
and not by force’.79 In reasserting India’s policy regarding foreign territories in India and India’s 
determination to deal with them via diplomatic channels rather than the use of force, this 
declaration was an obvious warning to the Portuguese, who were still reluctant to consider a 
withdrawal. 
 
Conclusion 
Through the review of various articles that reported the handover of French India, I have 
demonstrated that representations of French India in the French and Indian imaginary were 
reformulated. These changes were not linear, but rather were fashioned to meet particular 
discourses and stages in the evolution of French India. For most of the Indian press, French India 
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was still associated with colonial and nationalist tensions, but such tensions were now limited to 
Portuguese India, since the celebration of the handover signalled the liberation of French India 
from colonial control. The event also served to affirm India’s national integration policy and 
promote the statesmanship of India’s politicians. For the French press, the event initiated a 
reconsideration of the Third Republic’s mission civilisatrice, and the creation of the research 
centre helped transform the French Indian failure into a new post-colonial opportunity that would 
continue to fit France’s role as a world leader. Conversely, for the French colonial press, the 
handover reduced the imagined French Indian empire to the state of decaying vestiges soon to 
be engulfed by an expansive nationalist India. 
PART THREE 
 
 
THE FINAL EVOLUTION 
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Chapter 6 
Preserving French culture in post-French India 
 
Our territories, freely given two hundred years ago by local sovereigns to the 
[French] Indian Company, are like small properties within the vast domain of 
a friend. Their reason for existence, their happy destiny, is to constitute a 
natural link of union between two great peoples, two cultures. The Franco-
Indian community of 300,000 souls would be lost by dissolving itself in the 
mass of 400 million brother people without benefit to anyone.’ Governor 
Baron.1  
 
The Agreement of 21 October 1954 signed by the French to cede the four southern comptoirs to 
India provided a set of articles that outlined issues of citizenship, administration, justice, records, and 
education. Articles XXIV to XXX dealt specifically with French culture, which would be maintained 
through the continuation of French language teaching at existing educational establishments, the 
recognition of French Indian qualifications by the Indian government, and the creation of a research 
institute.2 The maintenance of French culture was viewed by the French and Indian governments, 
journalists, and those in French India who had opposed the merger as a means to secure the cultural 
link between France and one of her oldest colonies. No longer viewed as a total abandonment, the 
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London, NA, FO371/60041: French Establishments in India. 
2 ‘Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of France providing for de facto transfer of 
administration of the territory of French Establishments in India, 21 October 1954’, Indian Bilateral Treaties and 
Agreements, op.cit., p. 265. 
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handover allowed France to transfer the territories with some dignity while also preserving the French 
influence, and the research institute became a new panacea, a respectable way to transform an 
unceremonious withdrawal into a more glorifying post-colonial achievement. From the viewpoint of 
the Indian authorities, the perpetuation of French culture was considered a small concession against 
India’s refusal to hold a referendum, and would soothe the fears of a French Indian population that 
was surrounded by four hundred million non-French Indians.  
In view of the changes that the Agreement embodied, this chapter will first investigate the origins 
and the role that the Institute was designed to fulfil as France’s formal presence in Asia waned, and 
how India perceived the transformation of a colonial administration into a research institute. Since the 
Agreement allowed for the preservation of French culture in French India, the chapter will also assess 
the extent of French cultural influence and the level of French education in the territories in order to 
establish whether French culture was a myth or a reality, and to determine whether it could sustain 
the changes generated by the withdrawal. 
 
A cultural institute: a post-colonial vision  
As early as June 1945, the French Foreign Affairs Ministry was assessing the potential 
effects of India’s political independence on France’s presence in the territories, and considering the 
possibility of setting up a university to enhance cultural relations between the two countries.3 This 
was not a new idea; the French state had a history of propagating French language and culture 
through the establishment of overseas French lycées, écoles (primary and secondary schools), and 
instituts français, all of which were overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1873 and the 
Second World War, each region of the empire as well as areas where France had geo-political 
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influence saw the emergence of an institute from which scientific research was carried out. Institutes 
of this kind included the Institut français d’archéologie orientale in Cairo (1880), the École française 
d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO), (Saigon, 1900), the Institut des hautes études marocaines in Rabat (1920), 
the Institut français d’études arabes in Damascus (1922), and the Institut français d’Afrique noire in 
Dakar, Senegal (1936). Similar institutes were also created in the French capital, such as the Centre 
des hautes études des affaires musulmanes (1936) and the Office de la recherche scientifique 
coloniale (1943). The latter would become, after the war, the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et 
Technique d’Outre-Mer (ORSTOM), a state agency responsible for scientific research in the 
colonies.4 These institutes formed part of a colonial network designed to foster scientific knowledge 
and the development of colonial specialists, but above all they were instruments of state policy with 
the specific purpose of projecting national power and persuading other countries to value French 
culture and talent.5 The period prior to the Second World War also saw a marked surge in the 
creation of new lycées and écoles françaises in foreign countries which were not part of the empire, 
with the number of French schools nearly doubling – from 23 to 40 – between 1933 and 1939, while 
the number of instituts increased by 25% – from 29 to 35 – in the same period.6  
Discussions and reports in relation to setting up a university in French India were first 
instigated by Olivier Lacombe, the French Cultural Attaché in Calcutta, who suggested in 1946 that 
the university would operate through the creation of a network of ‘Maisons de France’ – also labeled 
‘centres de rayonnement spirituel’ (centres for the diffusion of French culture) – based in large Indian 
cities, as well as in Pondichéry. The idea was inspired by the EFEO, which had been established by 
the Government of Indochina in association with the Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres 
with the aim of spreading French cultural influence throughout Asia. The EFEO was meant to be the 
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precursor of a university in Saigon but, having failed to fulfill its mission as an educational 
establishment; it focused instead on scientific and cultural research in Asia.7 The use of the word 
‘spirituel’ instead of ‘culturel’ on several occasions in a report dated October 1946 is revealing; it was 
believed that ‘these “Maisons” would have a magnetic force on Hindu youth, and that they would 
invigorate the [French Indian] territories, whose spiritual as well as economic activity were very 
weak’.8 Although there were no details on how such centres would be run and how they would exert 
such cultural influence, in granting French culture an almost religious role the Ministry’s vision was 
following the traditional French mission of civilising and enlightening lesser cultures by means of the 
‘cultural superiority’ of France. Albert Salon, a French diplomat who later reflected on the role of 
French culture in the world, calls it ‘French messianism’, a set of religious, philosophical, and political 
beliefs that grants French culture the power to bring civilisation to barren lands and imposes on its 
agents the duty to propagate it.9 Above all, the purpose of the research centre was meant to preserve 
a sense of identity in former French India.10 The Ministry nevertheless withdrew the idea, because it 
believed Indian nationalists would perceive these ‘Maisons’ as new comptoirs and a renewal of 
French imperialism.11  
The proposal was revisited shortly afterwards, but this time rather than setting up a 
university, it focused on the creation of a cultural centre in Pondichéry. Lacombe considered three 
aspects of this new colonial vision. The location had to be in a former French territory, in order to 
demonstrate the willingness and commitment of the French government toward its French Indian 
population. Furthermore, the institute could have no affiliation with the EFEO, or would at least have 
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to be set up along different parameters, especially after a Vietnamese nationalist group (Viet Minh) 
had occupied a branch of the EFEO in Hanoi and expelled its French personnel.12 The underlying 
reason for the attack was that the EFEO was receiving its budget from the Government of Indochina, 
and was therefore associated with the French colonial administration.  
Lacombe was aware of the effect this incident was having on the reputation of France in 
Indochina, overseas, and at home. As a result, Lacombe’s recommendation was that the would-be 
institute be totally independent from the colonial administration, and even that it be granted diplomatic 
status in order to safeguard future French interests in the region. His suggestion would give the 
institute a more official status and demarcate it from other educational organisations such as the 
privately-owned Alliance Française, which had been set up in 1883 in Paris with the aim of 
propagating French language and culture across the French colonies and across the world. A branch 
of the Alliance Française had opened in Pondichéry in 1889, and between 1911 and 1914, other 
branches were established across British India in Calcutta, Secunderabad, Bombay, Simla, and 
Baroda.13 However, Lacombe’s report was unclear on which French Ministry would be responsible for 
the financing and running of such an institute. Should it be the Ministry of Overseas France, or 
External Affairs, or Education? Furthermore, he did not provide details of the curriculum to be taught 
and the budget that might be required, an issue of some importance given the economic situation in 
post-war France.  
Despite these shortcomings, by June 1947 Lacombe’s proposal seemed the only possible 
solution to the question of maintaining influence in the face of India’s independence, and it offered 
some real advantages: by promoting France and guaranteeing her rayonnement, the proposal 
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accorded well with France’s policy of post-war recovery, consolidation of the empire, and the 
regaining of her former status as world leader. At the same time the centre would allow France to 
remain present in Pondichéry, a strategically important factor in the context of cession threats from 
the enclave of Chandernagor. However, other challenges were becoming apparent. Financial 
assistance from Paris was delayed and might not come at all. More importantly, events in Indochina 
were seriously discrediting French plans to build an amicable and peaceful relationship with the 
Indian government and local population. Strikes, boycotts, pamphlets, and the Indian government all 
denounced the French action in Indochina.14 The institute was put on hold until the Agreement of 
October 1954, but what Lacombe’s proposal revealed is that after three hundred years of presence in 
French India, and despite ministerial reports, newspapers articles, and a small colonial lobby that 
incessantly trumpeted France’s cultural and institutional achievements overseas, France had, in fact, 
invested little in the way of cultural or scientific research in French India. 
 
A strategic move in a new geo-political context  
France could only maintain her influence on Indian soil as long as it was acceptable to the 
Indian government. The point was addressed in Article XXV of the 1954 Agreement, wherein it was 
stated that ‘the Indian Government agree[s] to the continuation of the existing French institution of a 
scientific or cultural character and by agreement between the two Governments, to the granting of 
facilities for the opening of establishments of the same character’.15 While Nehru had totally rejected 
the presence of foreign powers on the subcontinent, from the onset of the negotiations he welcomed 
                                                          
14 Étude sur les possessions françaises dans l’Inde, 24 juin 1947, AOM, Inde, H23: Études sur les possessions 
françaises. 
Gouvernement de l’Inde française, Mahé, 21 janvier 1947, AOM, F6: Télégrammes chiffrés à l’arrivée 1946-1947.                                                                          
15 ‘Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of France providing for de facto transfer of 
administration of the territory of French Establishments in India, 21 October 1954’, Indian Bilateral Treaties and 
Agreements, op.cit.  
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the idea of some form of French educational establishment, whether a university or an institute. In his 
view, an educational establishment would allow France to withdraw with some dignity and at the 
same time respect the historical and cultural particularities of French India.16 In addition, the creation 
of a research institute was in line with the Nehruvian policy that fostered scientific and technological 
modernisation as part of the nation-building formation.17  
A cultural centre also offered the means to appease anti-merger groups. Indeed, Kewal 
Singh, the Indian High Commissioner in Pondichéry (new title given to the former Indian Consul-
General after the de facto agreement), urged the Représentant Français in Pondichéry (known before 
the handover as Commissaire de la République) in November 1954 to open the centre as quickly as 
possible in order to thwart any attempt from pro-merger groups at eliminating French influence in the 
comptoirs.18 Such eagerness from the Indian representative was not a show of support for France’s 
new post-colonial enterprise, but rather an indication of India’s determination to comply with the 
details of the Agreement and retain friendly relations with France that could lead to financial aid and 
trade agreements. Moreover the suggestion took into consideration the small number of French-
educated French Indians, comprising pensioners, war veterans, and former civil servants, who would 
strongly oppose any non-compliance with the Agreement and would regard it as a form of 
abandonment from both governments were such an Institute not be opened. From a national and an 
international viewpoint, it was paramount for India to avoid any form of unrest; the memories of 
communal brutality at the time of partition were still vivid, and French India had also experienced its 
share of local violence in the period leading up to the Kijeour Congress. For as long as the Treaty of 
                                                          
16 Nehru, SWJN, op.cit., Vol. 4, pp. 641, 645, Vol. 12, p. 5. 
17
 Roy, Beyond Belief, op.cit., Chapter 3, pp.105-32. 
18 Mr Robert Duvanchelle Représentant français à Son Excellence le Comte Ostrorog ambassadeur de France aux Indes, 
a/s institut de Pondichéry, 25 novembre, 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
 281 
 
Cession remained unsigned, it was in the interest of both countries to see the speedy opening of the 
Institute and to smother any signs of disturbance from dissenting groups. 
For France, the research institute went beyond the mere maintenance of France’s presence 
in former French India; it became part of a broader post-colonial agenda aimed at maintaining 
political influence in the region and aligning France with other great powers. The French Ministry of 
External Affairs noted, in December 1954, that with the end of the conflict in Indochina, and in view of 
the Franco-Indian Agreement, France’s candidature as a member of the Colombo Plan would be 
regarded more favourably; the US and Britain had already approved her candidature on principle.19 
The Colombo Plan had been conceived in 1950 by the Foreign Ministers of Commonwealth 
countries, and aimed to provide economic assistance to countries across South-East and South Asia, 
based on Five-Year plans.20 At its inception, India – the largest aid recipient – had rejected the 
possibility of France becoming a member because of her increasing military involvement in 
Indochina.21 Franco-Indian negotiations over the future of French India would undoubtedly have 
played a part in India’s initial refusal, since India was opposed to any form of colonialism whether at 
home or abroad.  
But in December 1954 Nehru communicated to Ostrorog, the French Ambassador in New 
Delhi, that both India and Ceylon would now support France’s candidature.22 As the regional leader, 
India’s endorsement would greatly influence the decision of other Asian countries regarding France’s 
nomination, and France would gain real advantage from being a member alongside Britain and 
                                                          
19 Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Note pour la Direction des Relations Culturelles, 2 décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
20 The founding members were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom with 
the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak; the following countries also joined: Burma (1952), 
Cambodia (1951), Indonesia (1953), Japan (1954), Laos (1951), Nepal (1952), Philippines (1954), Thailand (1954), USA 
(1951), South Vietnam (1951), Colombo Plan Bureau, op.cit., pp. 6-7; Zachariah, op.cit., p. 165. 
21 Netherlands were also sidelined because of their control of Indonesia. 
22 Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Note pour la Direction des Relations Culturelles, 2 décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
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especially the USA, the largest contributor of aid to the organisation. In fact, the French Ministry of 
External Affairs envisaged that scientific research emanating from the Institute would not only assist 
countries within the French Union, but also members of the Colombo Plan, especially the former 
Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.23 Under the cover of the Plan, the centre could 
become the means by which economic and political links with the former French overseas and 
associated territories would be maintained, while at the same time lifting France’s status from colonial 
failure to international advisor and decision-maker. France’s participation in the future economic 
development of former colonised countries legitimised some form of continued colonial rule. 
However, despite Nehru’s willingness to support France’s participation in the Columbo Plan, she 
never became a member partly because the organisation remained centred around Great-Britain and 
her Commonwealth countries. 
The creation of the institute in Pondichéry was also closely linked to the evacuation of the 
EFEO in Hanoi between 1954 and 1957. Jean Filliozat, a distinguished Indologist and professor since 
1952 at the Collège de France, negotiated the closure of the administrative centre of the EFEO in 
Hanoi on behalf of the Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres. Unsurprisingly, Filliozat was 
then appointed the first director of the Institut français de Pondichéry.24 The Indian collections were 
transferred from Hanoi to Pondichéry so that the Indian studies previously carried out by the EFEO 
would now take place in India, where the new Institut would continue the tradition of scholarly 
                                                          
23 Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Note pour la Direction des Relations Culturelles, 2 décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry; France was a member of the Econcomic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) established in 1945, which preceded and supplemented the Columbo Plan, althogh funds were not 
substantial the ECAFE acted as a meeting forum for members that enabled comparison of economic development, Marc 
Frey, ‘Control, Legitimacy and the Securing of Interests: European Development Policy in South-ast Asia from the Late 
Colonial Period to the Early 1960s’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2003), pp. 395-412. 
24 The EFEO had already opened a centre in Jakarta in 1952, while others would open in Pune in India in 1964, in Kyoto 
in 1968, in Chiang Mai in 1977 and Kuala Lampur in 1987; the EFEO reopened in Hanoi in 1995, Singaravélou, L’École 
française d’Extrême-Orient op.cit., p.300. Filliozat’s first contact with India was in 1947; at the age of 41, he became an 
honorary member of the EFEO in 1948, Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat, ‘Jean Filliozat 1906-1982’, Bulletin de l’Ecole française 
d’Extrême-Orient, Vol. 73, (Janvier 1984), pp. 4-10. 
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research in Asia.25 The old dream of setting up a thriving research institute to compete with the British 
Indologists of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, was resurrected.26 The previous attempt in the 
form of ‘La Société de Chandernagor’ had failed because the French had chosen to establish their 
prestigious research institute in the most isolated and least ‘French’ of the French Indian territories. 
Victor Goloubew, a permanent member of the EFEO later commented that, located so close to the 
British Indian capital, which at the time of the project was Calcutta, this beacon of French scholarship 
in India had little chance of succeeding.27 While the administration of the EFEO was transferred from 
the Government of Indochina (Ministry of Overseas France) to the Ministry of Education, the Institute 
in Pondichéry was overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus the inauguration of the new 
Institute signalled the survival of a colonial project embodied in the EFEO and a transfer of 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Overseas France to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
The inauguration of the Institut Français de Pondichéry 
Five months after the Agreement was signed, l’Institut Français de Pondichéry was 
inaugurated on 21 March 1955 by Ostrorog, the French ambassador to India. Over one thousand 
people attended the opening ceremony, including such high-ranking officials from the Indian 
government as Shri C. Rajagopalachari, the former Premier of Madras and last Governor-General of 
India; M.A.K. Chanda, the Indian Vice-Minister of External Affairs; Shrimathi E.B. Hoshi, Indian 
Secretary to the Ministry of Education; Kewal Singh, the Indian High Commissioner in Pondichéry. 
Among the French officials were Armand Gandon, the French Représentant in Pondichéry, Mr 
                                                          
25 Jean Filliozat, ‘La recherche scientifique française en Asie’,  France-Asie, No. 162/163 (1959), pp. 1240-48. 
26 Singaravélou, L’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, op.cit., pp. 294-7. 
27 Victor Goloubew mentioned in Singaravélou ‘Les Indianistes français et le « Greater India »’, op.cit., p. 311; Louis 
Malleret, ‘Le vingtième anniversaire de la mort de Victor Goloubew (1878-1945)‘, Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-
Orient, Vol. 53, No.2 (1967), pp. 331-373. 
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Bayen, the Vice-Director at the French Ministry of Education; and Mr Journot, attaché culturel at the 
French Embassy in New Delhi.28  
The Institute was promoted as a cultural link between India and France. A message from 
Prime Minister Nehru was delivered at the inauguration:  
 
We have always looked upon Pondichéry as a cultural link between the Republic of India and 
the Republic of France and a centre where French language and culture would be 
encouraged. The establishment of this institute by the French government is an important 
step in this direction and is therefore very welcome.29  
 
In this brief message, Nehru acknowledged that, for Indians, Pondichéry was a privileged site where 
cultural exchanges between India and France had historically taken place. By noting that ‘the Institute 
is an important step in this direction’, he asserted that with the blessing of India, France was given 
the opportunity to spread her culture in more peaceable ways than had been used in her colonial 
past. By juxtaposing the ‘Republic of India’ with the ‘Republic of France’, Nehru accentuated the 
equality of two nations, and as such erased the dichotomy between conquered and conqueror. Now 
that France was confined in former French India to a few buildings such as the Institute, schools, 
churches, the Alliance française and a Consulate, her self-proclaimed ‘superior culture’ would be put 
to the test. The Institute would either successfully fulfill France’s mission by means of research and 
education or, on the contrary, in the words of Deschamps, a former colonial administrator, it would 
become ‘the sad necropolis of a former glorious colonial power’.30  
                                                          
28 Trait d’Union, March 1955. 
29 Searchlight, 22 March 1955. 
30 NRFOM, May 1954. 
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Ostrorog and Filliozat, the new director of the Institute, gave speeches at the opening that 
offer different perspectives on what the Institute represented for France’s civil servants. Filliozat 
emphasised how scientific cooperation and cultural rapprochement between France and India was 
crucial for the Institute’s research, from which both countries would benefit. The creation of the centre 
was not the beginning, he added, but rather the reinforcement of long-standing cultural exchanges. 
By providing a history of French interests in Indian civilisation, Filliozat described France’s cultural 
role as a peaceful contribution to the development of scientific knowledge. In his view, the centre was 
the product of this long cultural and scholarly tradition rather than of territorial conquests. By 
emphasizing the view that past Franco-Indian exchanges had occurred in a world where scientific 
activities were carried out on an equal footing, Filliozat effectively dismissed the notion that France’s 
former colonial impetus was based on her own cultural superiority.31  
Ostrorog’s speech, on the other hand, was that of a man who had first-hand experience of 
the events leading to France’s withdrawal. He mentioned, almost apologetically, the different ways a 
country can be conquered: with violence leading to war, through political influence, which he 
described as less violent, or finally by conquest of the mind, which he believed to be the most lasting 
form of conquest. To prove his point, he noted that Alexander the Great’s empire (gained through 
violent means) lasted only ten years, while the Greco-Latin civilisation, which in his view never used 
violence, lasted over twenty centuries. Ostrorog thus bestowed great importance on the Greco-Latin 
civilisation from which French culture emanates, and highlighted France’s significant track-record in 
erecting institutes dedicated to education and research, such as the École française de Rome (1875), 
École française d’Athènes (1846), École du Moyen-Orient in Cairo (1880), École d’Extreme-Orient in 
Japan (1898), and EFEO in Indochina. However, Ostrorog also unashamedly asserted that these 
Écoles were not benevolent cultural institutes, but rather a means to peacefully conquer other 
                                                          
31 Trait d’Union, March 1955; Jean Filliozat, op.cit., pp. 1240-48. 
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civilisations. He also restated the opinion proffered by the Ministry of External Affairs that Indian 
specialists would learn modern concepts and methods from French experts, with the result that the 
Institute would become a centre for Indian specialists working for the economic advancement of 
under-developed countries like India.32 In Ostrorog’s words, the Institute would become a beacon of 
French civilisation and a liberating force that would undoubtedly enlighten less educated peoples; 
France’s colonial presence, then, was to be converted into a benevolent research program that would 
usher in a new era of peaceful yet crucial influence. 
French Indians had their own viewpoint on what the Institute symbolised. The Trait d’Union of 
January 1956 dedicated a special two-page report to the Institute entitled Le brilliant avenir culturel 
de Pondichéry. Overstating the geographical and cultural advantages of Pondichéry, the report 
zealously described the French Indian administrative centre as a ‘plaque tournante’ (a crucial centre) 
located near the intellectual and cultural centres of Madras, Bangalore, Tiroupati, Chidambaram, 
Tanjore, and Madura, the birthplace of Tamil civilization.33 It suggested that Pondichéry could play a 
double role as a centre for the diffusion of French culture in India as well as the diffusion of Indian 
culture in France. However, the author pointed to the necessity of creating a ‘grand current of 
opinion’, a statement that indicates there had been little interest in the Institute among the general 
French Indian population since its inauguration nine months earlier. The article was written by 
Ambady Narayanin, a teacher at the Lycée Français de Pondichéry, (formerly known as the Collège 
Royal and opened in 1826) who seems to have expressed the dreams and concerns of the small 
percentage of French-educated French Indians who wanted to preserve the distinctive characteristics 
of French India, and perhaps also their cultural advantages, in the face of mounting Indian influence. 
Narayanin described this small population as a ‘sensitively cultivated class’ that understood the 
                                                          
32 Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Note pour la Direction des Relations Culturelles, 2 décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
33 Trait d’Union, January 1955. 
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Orient and the Occident, a comment that conferred on this small ‘privileged’ group a particular status 
that differentiated them from the larger Indian and French Indian populations. They upheld the 
ideology of French cultural identity in the former colony and identified with Nehru’s image of the 
‘French window’ in India. 
 
 A bridge rather than a window 
In his October 1954 article entitled ‘De l’empire de Dupleix à l’Inde: Pour la création d’un 
centre français de recherche à Pondichéry’, Tibor Mende raised the ultimate question: could France 
maintain an influence on Indian soil that would be acceptable to the Indian government?34 The 
proposal was to maintain French culture in the former comptoirs through the continuing existence of 
educational institutions dedicated to teaching the French language. However, the proposal would 
face significant limitations. Although the Agreement stipulated that French would be the official 
language in the former territories, most of the population spoke local languages, and the official 
language of India as a whole was English. Moreover, an institute that promoted French culture and 
language while offering limited economic opportunities would have little attraction to Indians. Indeed, 
while employment opportunities in colonial administration had formerly been readily available to a 
small number of French Indians who had received a French education, the withdrawal of France from 
Indochina meant that these opportunities no longer existed. One of the major reasons for acquiring a 
French education had suddenly disappeared. In addition, French culture was considered elitist, and 
parents concerned about their children’s future favoured an education in English, which would be 
essential for any work opportunities elsewhere in India. In fact, the Trait d’Union likened English to a 
‘commercial and administrative esperanto’, thus stripping the English language of any cultural 
                                                          
34 Le Monde, 20 October 1954. 
 288 
 
specificity and emphasising its economic advantages in contrast to the French language.35 In 
addition, the universalism and neutrality of the English language had already become an established 
aspect of Indian life, and English was regarded as one part of the Indian identity that linked socio-
linguistic groups together.36 The article suggested that the languages of communication at the 
Institute should be French, English, and Hindi. Interestingly, Tamil was not mentioned as a medium of 
communication, even though it was the language spoken by the largest number of French Indians - 
since Pondichéry and Karikal, situated in Tamil Nadu, were the most populous territories of French 
India – an unexpected oversight from a journalist who spent some years living in and reporting on 
India.37 In effect, Mende’s words were suggesting that, in his view, the purpose of the centre was to 
strengthen the bonds between New Delhi and Paris, rather than between Pondichéry and those 
capital cities.    
There were numerous difficulties in the establishment of the Institute, which consisted of 
three sections: French civilisation, Indology, and scientific studies. The second section, headed by 
Filliozat, a renowned scholar of Indian studies, was the easiest to establish. It was to be dedicated to 
the study of the civilisation, ethnology, linguistics, history, philosophy, and archaeology of India. The 
first and third sections, however, in the words of Ostrorog, needed to ‘be innovative… so as to meet 
the conditions and needs of a country where our cultural action has never had much influence in the 
past.’38 In a sense, the French ambassador admitted to France’s failure in the domain of education 
and cultural diffusion during the three hundred years of her presence on the subcontinent. The cost of 
the Institute also created some concerns. Even though payments of pensions and salaries amounted 
                                                          
35 Trait d’Union, Octobre 1954; Benrabah, op.cit., p. 254.  
36 Benrabah, op.cit., pp. 255-7. 
37 Mende, op.cit. 
38 Stanislas Ostrorog, ambassadeur de France aux Indes à son excellence Mr Antoine Pinay, Ministre des Affaires 
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to only one billion francs per year, a saving of four billion francs to the French government on the 
original five billion francs allocated to the territories, the Ministry indicated that funds were scarce and 
the recruitment of dedicated and qualified staff difficult. Ostrorog also disagreed with the French 
language and civilisation section being given a secondary status, emphasising the importance of 
perpetuating the memory of Dupleix.39  
While debates continued over which directions the Institute should take, with the scientific 
section only becoming operational in 1956 and the French section being transferred to the Alliance 
Française of Pondichéry in 1958, the real gain from the ‘territorial sacrifice’ that the Institute 
represented was the opening of a period of rapprochement that included scientific and Indian studies, 
commercial exchanges, economic assistance, and technical cooperation.40 The Institute, which came 
under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would evolve to focus on Indology, social 
sciences, and environmental studies, and would acquire a reputation for its work on ecology, climate 
change in India, and the study of Indian civilisation and culture, specifically the history and religions of 
South India. The facilities included laboratories, libraries, and an extensive database, which provided 
a source of information for scholars carrying out research.41  In addition to the establishment of the 
Institute, within a few years of the Agreement, India had become the country in Asia to which French 
exports had increased most significantly, and they would continue to increase with the development 
of other industrial projects. The value of French exports to India had already doubled between 1951 
and 1955, from eight billion to fifteen billion francs, with the sale of military equipment, planes, trains, 
                                                          
39 Stanislas Ostrorog, ambassadeur de France aux Indes à son excellence Mr Antoine Pinay, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, a/s institut de Pondichéry, 10 mai 1955, AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry. 
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tanks, and munitions.42 This increase in commercial activities led to the signing in 1959 of the first 
Franco-Indian commercial agreement before the de jure transfer of 1962.43 By the 1960s, the major 
areas of French export were machine tools, aeronautical and electric materials, and chemical and 
engineering products.  
While France never became a member of the Colombo Plan, in 1961 she joined the Aid India 
Club, which offered economic assistance to India in the form of credits to purchase heavy equipment 
and receive French technology and expertise for the equipping of mines, the processing of minerals, 
and the setting up of steel production factories and petrol refineries.44 The technical cooperation 
programme between the two countries that started in 1956 provided scholarships for Indian students 
to receive training in France in the fields of productivity, petroleum, electricity, railways, and mining. 
Between 1956 and 1966, 593 Indian trainees went to France, while during the same period 62 
French experts went on missions to India to assist with railway projects (1957-1966) and to set up an 
Indian Institute of Petroleum (1961).45 The Institut Français de Pondichéry was envisioned by the 
French and Indian authorities as an essential part of the Treaty, the panacea for a colonial loss, 
devised to satisfy the cultural sentiments of a small minority and the colonial memory of the whole 
French nation, but in fact it turned out to be a real investment in Franco-Indian scientific and 
                                                          
42 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Note pour le Ministre, 21 janvier 1959, a/s ratification du Traité de cession des 
Établissements français de l Inde, AD, Inde, Vol. 331: Traité de cession. 
43 France Diplomatie, Base des Traités et Accords et de la France,  Accord entre le gouvernement français et le 
gouvernement Indien relatif aux établissements français de l'Inde, ensemble huit échanges de lettres 21/10/1954, 
<http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-
php/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___traites/home.html&VUE=mae_internet_
__traites&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN=1>, viewed 26 January 2014.   
44 Ministère de la France d’outre-mer, Bureau de Presse, Bulletin d’information de France Outre-Mer, No. 137, November 
1949, p. 57; Note pour le Ministre délégué à la présidence du Conseil, a/s des relations indiennes, (no date), AD, Inde, 
Vol. 193: Relations culturelles avec la France 1956-1967; Assemblée de l’Union Française, Compte rendu analytique 1 
Mars 1957, AD, Inde, Vol. 328: Ex-établissements français traité de cession; Note pour le Ministre, a/s ratification du traité 
de cession franco-indien, Paris, 17 Juillet 1957, AD, Inde, Vol. 328: Ex-établissements français traité de cession; 
‘Information Report presented on behalf of the Commission of External Affairs and the ‘Plan’ following a visit to India by a 
delegation of the Commission from 18 Janaury to 8 February 1967’, in Chatrath, op.cit., pp. 109-112. 
45 ‘Information Report presented on behalf of the Commission of External Affairs’ in Chatrath, op.cit., pp. 109-112. 
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economic relations.46 French technological assistance in India played a far more important role than 
the benefits traditionally assigned to French culture. In fact, Nehru’s emphasis on the need to acquire 
science and technology worked to consolidate national sovereignty and democracy.47  
 
French cultural influence and French Indian characteristics  
French Indian culture remained at the centre of negotiations and claims – the Indian 
government, for example, had insisted that French Indian cultural legacy should remain, as they were 
never considered a threat and on the contrary would reinforce India’s multiculturalism – but no one 
clearly explained what actually constituted French Indian culture. There seems to have been a 
consensus that the most determinant factor was the primacy of the French language. After all, 
primary and secondary schools as well as the medical school and law school in Pondichéry taught in 
French, courts there operated in French, and official reports and some newspapers were published in 
French. But after three hundred years of presence in India, French cultural influence was not limited 
to this linguistic factor. In a letter dated 10 October 1950 to Purushottamdas Tandon (1882-1962), a 
friend and fellow freedom fighter, Nehru helped broaden the meaning of what French Indian culture 
might be when he stated that  
 
culture is a way of life or a way of looking at things. It is a mental approach derived from long 
tradition and racial experience as well as environment, geography, climate etc. This includes 
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both the mental climate of a people as well as their physical habits, such as food, clothing, 
social customs etc. Language, of course, is an important part of all this, but it is only a part.48  
 
Following Nehru, we can propose that French Indian culture was the result of a combination of 
imported French elements blended with local Indian ones, including permanent features such as town 
planning, buildings, monuments, and softer aspects such as clothing, food, drinks, and religion 
especially Christian converts who were discussed in Chapter 1. A look at the evolution of French 
Indian towns will help draw out their ‘French’ uniqueness and expose their cultural characteristics. 
French Indian towns emerged according to the macro-politics of colonialism, which determined their 
location and evolution and reflected the internal order of colonial society. Almost all colonial buildings 
and fortifications erected by the Compagnie were destroyed by the British. When the French 
reoccupied their territories in 1816 there was no trace of their previous presence, and for the next one 
hundred and forty years they rebuilt without fear of foreign occupation and destruction; only cyclones 
caused severe damage. From 1820, the French endeavoured to resurrect Pondichéry, their 
administrative centre, by laying down outer boulevards on the site of the old circular fortifications, 
which had by then made way for large thoroughfares. A new town built on the previous foundations 
followed a gridiron pattern, a feature also visible in Karikal and Chandernagor, but to a lesser extent 
in Mahé and Yanaon. This form of geometric city planning, in which rectangular blocks of houses 
were separated by straight streets intersecting at right angles, derived from the Dutch occupation of 
Pondichéry between 1693 and 1699. French Indian towns were also modelled after the French 
bastide town, which includes a large open space for the market, usually at the centre, a church close 
to the market, main roads leading to the market place, and a quai or promenade along a river or the 
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coastline.49 With its 1,800 metres of walkway along the Bay of Bengal, the Cours Chabrol in 
Pondichéry is the most noticeable of these promenades, while a shorter quay is a dominant element 
in all of the other territories.50  
The Indian and French sections in Pondichéry were segregated. The ‘white’ town or French 
quarter with its administrative buildings was built on the waterfront, and to the hinterland was the 
‘black’ town; the two neighbourhoods were clearly separated by a canal built in1788. The architecture 
of the two towns was noticeably different; the dwellings of the local population were flat-roofed and 
displayed a verandah, while colonial architecture favoured high walls that enclosed gardens and 
houses, with ornamental gates as the dominant feature.51 Administrative buildings followed a similar 
pattern and style to private houses but were larger and more profusely decorated. Pondichéry had 
the most noticeable number of such colonial buildings, with the oldest the Hôtel Lagrenée de 
Mézières, a private upper-class mansion built in 1772. One of the few colonial buildings to survive 
war and foreign occupations, the house has a distinct façade with a monumental entrance, and walls 
that have exquisite, flowery, lime plaster scrolls featuring motifs representing the arts.  
This eighteenth-century high-class mansion, or hôtel particulier, had a symmetrical layout of 
interconnected large rooms built around a garden or courtyard. However, Indian elements were 
borrowed to suit local weather conditions and to demonstrate the co-existence of European and 
Indian styles. The adoption of a flat terraced roof, uncommon in France, was probably a reaction to 
the strong winds and cyclones regularly affecting the area. The stone that was used for construction 
in France was unavailable in the south of India, so lime plastering was used instead, a major 
departure from traditional French construction methods. The Tamil town was itself a hybrid of a 
                                                          
49 Deloche, <http://www.ifpindia.org/ecrire/upload/digital_database/Site/Pondi/data/fr_part_1.html>, viewed 4 February 
2014; The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, op.cit., pp. 93-117. 
50The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, op.cit., pp. 44-9, 117 
51 Ibid., pp. 93-117. 
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European concept and native building traditions, resulting in a unique Franco-Tamil identity. The 
most evident feature of this mix of Tamil and French styles is the façades of two-storied buildings: the 
ground floor is usually of the Tamil type with a verandah and carved doors, while the first floor 
features French influences such as arched windows, plaster decoration, luted pilasters, columns, and 
architectural motifs. In 1956, the French administration was relocated from the Hôtel du 
Gouvernement which became the Raj Nivas – the official residence of the Indian High Commissioner 
and from 1962 the Lieutenant Governor of Pondicherry - to a former administrative building, the 
Secrétariats Généraux, which became the French Consulate.52  
With Pondichéry having one of the largest Christian populations in French India, churches 
are also important landmarks, including the Cathédrale de Notre Dame de l’Immaculée Conception 
(1791) built in the baroque style, the Église de Notre-Dame des Anges (1855), and the neo-Gothic 
Église du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus (1908).53 This study is only concerned with churches as part of the 
French legacy in the Pondicherian landscape and not whether they are still affiliated with France. 
Approximately 1,300 buildings located along the boulevards are now considered heritage buildings, 
but with the lack of funding to preserve them this Franco-Tamil cultural heritage is now at risk of 
disappearing.54 
Parks, gardens, squares, statues, and cemeteries which emerged during the colonial period 
– the list of which is too long to name – add to the particularities of French Indian culture. The most 
prominent park, located in the old white town of Pondichéry, is a rectangular area situated on a site 
with a long history. Originally the old fort of François Martin, the site later became the Fort Louis, was 
then converted into a Place d’Armes in 1761, and later again became the Place du Gouvernement. 
This large park was surrounded by mansions, including the former Hôtel du Gouvernment, which is 
                                                          
52 Deloche, <http://www.ifpindia.org/ecrire/upload/digital_database/Site/Pondi/data/fr_part_1.html>, viewed 4 February. 
53 The Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, op.cit., pp. 44-9. 
54 Deloche, <http://www.ifpindia.org/ecrire/upload/digital_database/Site/Pondi/data/fr_part_1.html>, viewed 4 February. 
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still an official building today. In the middle of the park one can still find a large 1863 building – a 
mandapam – that used to provide drinking water. After the Second World War, the jardin colonial was 
renamed the jardin botanique, which still welcomes visitors today.55  
To someone familiar with France, however, Pondichéry seemed not to offer enough French 
cultural influence. A Mr Josselin, the Inspector of Public Education, complained in 1942 that while a 
visitor to Pondichéry might expect to come across the standard features of a French town – a 
‘kiosque à journaux’ (newspaper stand), a ‘café’ with pedestal tables, the traditional ‘librairie-
papeterie’ (stationers), a newspaper seller holding the local daily, a ‘pâtisserie’, the ‘coiffeur’ 
(hairdresser) – none were to be found. Perhaps the most important of these missing cultural 
institutions was the café, which has an evocative power in French culture. A familiar site in any 
French town, and commonly located at the heart of the public space, next to the church and the town 
hall, the café has been given a particular function in French history; as the place for the elaboration 
and diffusion of ideas, the café has been immortalised in literature and newspapers.56 After three 
hundred years of French presence in India, it is not surprising that Josselin deplored the lack in 
French India of shops that were found everywhere in France.57 
In addition to the permanent urban features that formed part of the particularity of French 
Indian culture, other elements such as drink, food, and clothing can be identified. French India always 
allowed the production of arrack and toddy, traditional distilled alcohols made from the sap of coconut 
palm trees, because of the revenue these drinks generated for the local government through either 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
 
56 Benoît Lecoq, ‘The Café’, in Pierre Nora (ed.), Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Mémoire, Vol. 3 Legacies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009, [first published in French in 1984]), pp. 342-74. 
57 P. Josselin ‘La difficulté de la culture française dans nos établissements de l’Inde: de quelques difficultés qu’elle y 
rencontre’ in Brutinel, op.cit., (unpaginated). 
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taxes or the sale of licenses to vendors.58 British India and later independent India had a history of 
prohibition, which did not extend to French India, even though, as in British India, authorities were 
aware of the damage that alcoholism was causing amongst the population.59 France had been 
receiving a yearly indemnity since 1853 for not manufacturing and selling alcohol in Masulipatnam, a 
preventive measure imposed by Britain to safeguard the health of British troops stationed nearby.60  
Although Hindu texts and Islamic law frowned upon alcoholic drinks, alcohol consumption was 
common practice in Indian culture but from the 1900s the nationalist movement promoted 
temperance as means to weaken the colonial state and its taxation policy.61   
Gandhi brought the issue of alcohol to the forefront of his disobedience movement and 
strongly condemned the consumption of alcohol because he believed it contributed to the 
impoverishment of the masses. He had laid down a clear set of guidelines for satyagrahi, that is, 
those who wished to follow satyagraha, or ‘truth force’, a philosophy that went beyond the concept of 
non-violence to encompass the principle of living a life of self-purification and the pursuit of truth. One 
of these principles commanded the follower ‘to be a teetotaler and be free from the use of other 
intoxicants in order that his reason may be always unclouded and his mind constant’.62 The 
temperance issue was important as it reflected the moral standing of those who pursued national 
goals through the means of satyagraha. As stated by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, often referred as 
                                                          
58 Most of the tax revenue in French India in the nineteenth century came from the sale of arrack, toddy, tobacco, betel 
nut, and salt. Tax collection was organised through the old regime tax farming system of outsourcing but from the mid-
nineteenth century came under state control. Arrack and toddy were the preferred alcohol drinks of Indians. Toddy was 
made from the sap of coconut tree and arrack was the product of the distillation of toddy. In 1882, because of the need to 
balance the local budget, the administration and the conseil général encouraged the consumption of alcohol. From 1882, 
the production and sale of alcohol was granted to individuals who purchased licences. It proved very successful with a 
rapid increase in local tax revenue representing by WWI, 80% of the revenue from indirect taxes and 45% of the total 
revenue, Weber, Les établissements, op.cit.,   pp. 323-33, 2201-3; Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après 
Dupleix, op.cit., p. 340. 
59 Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., pp. 329, 341-2; Fischer-Tiné, op.cit. 
60 Weber, Les établissements, op.cit., pp. 445-8; Fischer-Tiné, op.cit. 
61 Harald Fischer-Tiné and Jana Tschurenev, ‘Indian anomalies? – Drink and drugs in the land of Gandhi’, in Harald 
Fischer-Tiné and Jana Tschurenev (eds), A History of Alcohol and Drugs in Modern South Asia: Intoxicating Affairs 
(London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1-6. 
62 Gandhi, Vol. 69, pp. 69-70. 
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‘Rajaji’ (1878-1972), Chief Minister of Madras and a close follower of Gandhi’s ideology, ‘look at the 
glory that would be ours, if prohibition succeeds. We can be an example to the whole world. Do you 
not want India to succeed where America has failed?’63 In other words, the success of prohibition 
would be a moral victory over the vice associated with Western powers. It is worth noting that to a 
great extent the anti-alcohol campaign imposed the brahmanical values among other social 
classes.64 
The first success of Gandhi’s abstinence campaign was the introduction of prohibition laws in 
the presidency of Madras in 1937. Although suspended in 1943 because of the war, the measures 
were later reintroduced and extended to the rest of India, with the exception of Kashmir, Bengal, and 
Mysore.65 Prohibition became a ‘directive principle of State Policy’ enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution (1950). Article 47 of the Constitution stated:  
 
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its 
people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, 
the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal 
purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.66 
 
Prohibition resulted in thirsty South Indian customers crossing the French Indian border in search of 
their favorite alcoholic drinks. The government of Madras vehemently criticised the French 
administration, which it believed was undermining the Indian government’s attempt at eliminating the 
                                                          
63 Quoted in Irschick, Tamil Revivalism, op.cit., p. 209; Robert Eric Colvard, ‘Drunkards beware!’: Prohibition and 
nationalist politics in the 1930s’, in Harald Fischer-Tiné and Jana Tschurenev (eds), A History of Alcohol and Drugs in 
Modern South Asia: Intoxicating Affairs (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 188-90; similarly celibacy was viewed as a form a 
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 Fischer-Tiné and Tschurenev, op.cit., pp. 1-6. 
65 Ostrorog, op.cit., pp. 139-41 
66 Government of India, The Constitution of India, <http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india>, viewed 26 
January 2014. 
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evils caused by alcohol, in defiance of the moral campaign instigated by Gandhi. In a spirit of 
cooperation with the Madras presidency abstinence laws, elected members of the assemblées 
representatives in Karikal, Mahé, and Yanaon voted in January 1948 to close liquor shops. But the 
loss of income, an increase in unemployment amongst workers involved in the manufacturing and 
distribution of alcohol, and a decrease in the local government budget caused the same members to 
reverse their initial decision, much to the disappointment of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.67 
The French administration did agree to limit the number of bars and introduce a stricter policing of 
public intoxication, but given the lack of a police force one wonders how the French could possibly 
have enforced this agreement.68  The abstinence debate did not affect Chandernagor because the 
law did not extend to the State of Bengal where Chandernagor was located. 
While the spirit of satyagraha spread to some of the French Indian territories, Pondichéry 
remained immune. It seems the administrative centre was unwilling to associate itself with an 
abstinence movement that was strongly associated with Indian nationalism, nor was it eager to 
relinquish an important part of French culture that was at the same time an important source of 
income. Indeed, Pondichéry had a history of wine and alcohol consumption. Already during the 
period of the Compagnie, two of the most important products to be imported into the administrative 
centre were food and alcohol. Between 8,000 and 10,000 litres of Bordeaux wine, 20,000 litres of 
eau-de-vie, and 20,000 litres of Madeira wine arrived in the French Indian capital every year between 
1725 and 1770 for which data is available, with a similar quantity landing in Chandernagor.69 The 
delivery of delicate French wines and liquor continued even during times of hardship caused by the 
                                                          
67 Cabinet du commissaire de la République Française, Pondichéry, 23 Novembre 1949 à Ambassade de France à New 
Delhi, AD, Inde française, Vol. 63: Chemin de fer, alcool; Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 8 November 1949, AD, 
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69 Haudrère, ‘Le commerce’,  op.cit., p. 25. 
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war, to the dismay of the British authorities.70 It is worth recalling that Pondichéry had the largest 
number of renonçants in French India, who may well have been less inclined to support the 
elimination of alcohol after making a decision to associate themselves with French culture.  
Moreover, the ten percent of Pondichery’s population who were Catholic were regularly 
exposed to the wine used during mass. After all, a vocal critic of prohibition in the Madras presidency 
was a Syrian Christian, the politician George Joseph, who proposed that everyone should have the 
right to make their own liquor.71 Even the Indian authorities effectively admitted the importance of 
wine consumption in Pondichéry when, during discussions over the Customs Union agreement, they 
consented to an increase in the wine quota allowed into French India.72 Even after the de jure 
transfer, and while prohibition laws were still enforced in the Madras region, such was the cultural 
importance that alcohol played in Pondichéry that distilleries continued to operate, thereby creating 
problems with smuggling and attracting a flow of customers from neighbouring areas.73   
While French Tamil food had not been the subject of heated disputes like alcohol, and had 
not been the bearer of political connotations like clothing, as we shall see later, it nevertheless 
evolved to include a French influence. Unlike the mainly vegetarian cuisine found in South India, 
Pondicherian cooking is characterised by a number of non-vegetarian dishes – a reflection of the 
large Christian community that is present in this part of India. Religious bans on the killing of cows 
and the consumption of pork by Hindus and Muslims have eliminated these products from their own 
cooking. But a very small population of Indo-Vietnamese, who migrated from Indochina after 1947, 
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and Créoles, whose ancestors can be traced back to the beginning of European presence in India, do 
incorporate beef and pork in their meals. Like Muslims and non-vegetarian Hindus, they also eat 
goat, fish, poultry, and mutton.  
Another particularity is that Pondicherian dishes tend to shy away from the use of coconut, a 
primary ingredient in South Indian cooking, while French recipes that call for the use of butter and 
olive oil have been adapted to include ghee (clarified butter) instead. Moreover vinegar, a product 
readily available in French kitchens, is preferred in Pondicherian dishes over lemon and tamarind. 
Finally, while some Créole dishes have French names – for example, ‘ragoût’, ‘salade célébrité’, and 
‘le curry boulette’ – they are in fact typically Créole dishes and have very little in common with 
similarly-named French dishes.74 However, the replacement of French ingredients by readily 
available local products and the habit of calling Créole dishes by French names both point to a 
French culinary influence, even if the consumption of such dishes would have been limited to a small 
population of French Indians. 
As in British India, the wearing of Western-style clothes was related to religion, wealth, 
urbanisation, gender, and levels of education, and thus formed part of a dual process of identification 
and differentiation. The adoption of Western-style dress allowed the individual to be identified with the 
modernity that European clothes inferred; at the same time it set the person apart from the majority of 
fellow Indians.75 In French India, Western-style clothing helped educated French Indians, especially 
renonçants, to demarcate their ‘special’ status from the general Indian population. Articles published 
in L’Inde Illustrée emphasised the importance for renonçants of adopting French-style attire in order 
to show that they had fully embraced French culture and could therefore command respect and 
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consideration.76 However, after Gandhi abandoned his barrister’s suit for the modest khadi or 
khaddar, a cloth made of homespun yarn, French Indians, like their counterparts in British India, 
followed his example and adopted Indian-style clothes as a means of displaying their opposition to 
Western culture and especially European colonialism.  
Gandhi’s sartorial choice became the symbol of subversion in British India, and the 
introduction of the charka, the spinning wheel used for spinning cotton, and the wearing of the khadi 
took on socio-political dimensions. Favouring homespun Indian clothes and promoting locally 
produced goods over British manufactured ones signaled a decision to identify oneself in the public, 
‘imperial’ space as part of an Indian community that demanded self-determination.77 In addition, the 
simplicity of khadi helped eliminate divisions between castes and religions, and acted as an equaliser 
amongst those who chose to wear it. Nehru noted the effect created by khadi: ‘The old standards had 
fallen; European dress, symbol of position and authority, no longer counted. It was difficult to 
distinguish between peasants and townsmen… they were often dressed more or less alike, mostly in 
handspun cloth with the well-known Gandhi cap on their heads.’78 Gandhi’s decision to wear minimal 
clothing went even further, in that it symbolised ‘the wound of an imperially subjugated people that 
had once clothed the world’, a reminder that India had once been the ‘industrial’ hub of the textile 
industry and the reason European trading companies had originally come to India. Hence Gandhi’s 
clothing reinforced a sense of pride in Indian values and her ability to assert economic 
independence.79 Likewise, his emphasis on the use of the traditional charka rather than industrial 
                                                          
76 L’Inde Illustrée, Septembre 1933, Septembre 1934; Vidy, op. cit., p. 13. 
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machinery had the effect of condemning the damage British manufactured goods had inflicted on the 
traditional cotton industries of India.80 
Charka and khadi were introduced into French India by the Harijan Sewak Sangha, the 
organisation founded by Varadarajulu Subbiah, who was also its Secretary. The organisation was 
inspired by Gandhian ideology and dedicated to improving the conditions of the outcastes.81 Already 
during the 1936 labour agitation in Pondichéry, French official reports remarked that wearing khadi 
and the topi (or Gandhi’s hat), another badge of nationhood that marked the essence of ‘Indian-ness’, 
had become more widespread.82 In his memoirs, Subbiah mentioned that when he gained political 
consciousness, he dressed in Indian clothes.83 The former French Indian deputy to the Assemblée 
Nationale, Edouard Goubert, experienced a similar conversion. The official picture of Goubert on the 
Assemblée’s website shows him wearing a suit that signals his French identity and adherence to 
Western-style fashion (Fig.10).84 After his March 1954 political volte-face and defection to India, from 
where he led an anti-French attack, Goubert made sure he always wore Indian attire and even 
changed his name from Edouard Goubert to E.G. Pillai, a palpable sign of his new political allegiance 
to India and the merger movement.85 The statue in his honour located at the northern end of the 
Romain Rolland Street in Pondichéry (Fig.11) pictures him wearing a sherwani (long coat with a small 
upright collar), a pair of cotton trousers, and a Gandhi topi, all symbols that designate Indian values 
and identity.86 
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12; 
Chandavarkar, op.cit., p. 386. 
83 Subbiah, op.cit. 
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Figure 10: Edouard Goubert. The French Indian deputy from 1951-1954 wears a French suit in this official 
picture. Source: Assemblée Nationale, histoire et patrimoine.  
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Figure 11: Statue of Edouard Goubert in Pondicherry portraying him in full Indian attire. 
Source: Pondicherry: Past and Present. 
 
 
 
Almost all of the French Indian personalities attending the de facto transfer ceremony wore 
similar Indian garments. In a photograph of the event (Fig.12), Kewal Singh is shown introducing R.K. 
Nehru, the Indian Foreign Affairs secretary who was the Prime Minister’s first cousin, to the leaders of 
the new State, Goubert, Subbiah, a Mr Peroumal, Pourouchothama Reddiar, Mr Dutamby, and V.S. 
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Matthews. All but one are wearing local outfits, with Mr Peroumal even sporting a topi. Only Mr 
Dutamby wears a white, Western-style suit and a bow tie, and holds a Western-style hat in his 
hand.87 Numerous pictures taken of crowds and officials at the event (and published in a booklet 
celebrating the new State of Pondichéry) suggest the practice of wearing Western clothes had 
already lost ground among the new leaders and those members of the population who had in the 
past subscribed to it. While the picture of a polling station taken early in 1947 shows all male voters 
wearing their Sunday ‘Western’ best to participate in the election process (Fig. 13), the pictures of the 
de facto transfer shows the majority of participants wearing Indian garments, and the event has an 
overwhelmingly nationalist tone.88 Hence, in the matter of a few years, the wearing of Indian clothes 
during important public and national events had become widespread and was associated with Indian 
political assertiveness; bodies clad in Indian garments marked the new national boundaries by 
serving as metaphors for the nation. 
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Figure 12: Mr Kewal Singh introducing Mr R.K. Nehru, the special emissary of the Indian government, 
to the new leaders of the new State of Pondicherry. Source: AD, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, évènements 
marquants et progrès économiques et social depuis le transfert de facto. 
 
It is worth noting that while men’s dress complied with these shifting social and political 
norms, French Indian women had little need to adopt Western clothing, even when their husbands 
did so. Men were more widely involved in public activities, but women continued to operate within a 
more traditional framework, and the customary sari helped meet the notion of female modesty. When 
women did don items of Western clothing, they were usually lacy blouses and petticoats to 
complement their saris. Pictures of groups of people and of street scenes taken in French India 
during the 1930s and 1940s confirm that women were rarely adorned with Western-style dress and 
thus continued to be the bearers of tradition. In a picture of school teachers taken in 1936, five out of 
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six female teachers in the foreground wear a sari; the one remaining woman is dressed in a below-
the-knees skirt and buttoned, white blouse.89 In two pictures showing voters carrying out their duty at 
local assembly elections on 12 January 1947, all male voters and attendees (Fig. 13), without 
exception, are wearing Western-style suits, while the female voter is wearing a traditional sari (Fig. 
14).90  
 
 
Figure 13: A line of French Indian men voting at the assemblées provinciales elections, 12 January 
1947. Source: ANOM. 
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Figure 14: A French Indian woman voting at the assemblées provinciales elections, 12 
January 1947. Source: ANOM.  
 
 
While urban planning, clothes, food, and drink were not considered cultural elements of 
French India worthy of mention in the Franco-Indian agreement, the maintenance of French language 
was carefully inserted, as it seemed to epitomise French culture. Moreover, Indian officials and 
journalists portrayed French culture as unique, and as important as any other in India. During his visit 
to Pondichéry in November 1955, Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Indian Republic, said in his 
speech in English, that ‘the Indian culture was comparable to a magnificent necklace made up of 
various precious stones, and that French culture would only enhance the splendour of this jewel’.91 
His statement was in line with a national policy to retain local and regional cultures, especially 
languages, as the central government had faced fierce opposition from regions where it attempted to 
impose Hindi as the national language. It also emphasised the notion of ‘diversity in unity’ which was 
fundamental to the Indian nation-building process. 
                                                          
91 Trait d’Union, November 1955. 
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Nonetheless, promoting the maintenance of French culture was a particularly strategic move. 
On the one hand, it satisfied the French-educated population, particularly the French-educated class 
that had supported incorporation within the French Union and, as a result, had lost credibility when 
the handover took place. It also pleased the French government, which had ‘to accept a humiliating 
defeat after brandishing constitutional means’ and, instead of a full referendum, had been forced to 
agree to elected representatives voting on the future of French India.92 On the other hand, the 
decision to maintain French as the official language of French India left most of the French Indian 
population unaffected because they continued to speak their own local languages regardless. 
Articles XXIV to XXX of the 1954 Agreement made provisions for French education to remain 
available in French India, and for existing educational establishments such as the medical and law 
schools to be maintained. The provisions were designed to recognise and foster the cultural 
characteristics of French India while appeasing the former anti-merger lobby. For visitors, especially 
French civil servants and officials, the use of the French language in French India was still the most 
discernible sign of French culture.93 However, after three hundred years of French presence in the 
comptoirs, the use of French as the most common language of communication did not seem to be as 
predominant as was often believed to be the case. As early as the 1910s, Alfred Martineau, the 
governor of French India, suggested on many occasions that Chandernagor might be exchanged for 
some similar British-held land, either in India or overseas, as there were no French speakers and little 
sign of French culture left there.94 In 1935, Victor Goloubew labeled Chandernagor a ‘colonie 
fantôme’ (phantom colony) and blamed its lack of Frenchness on the failure of the scholarly project of 
                                                          
92 Ibid. 
93 ‘Information Report presented on behalf of the Commission of External Affairs and the ‘Plan’ following a visit to India by 
a delegation of the Commission from 18 January to 8 February 1967’, in Chatrath, op.cit., pp. 78-9. 
94 Weber, ‘Gouverneur et historien de l’Inde française’, op.cit., p.134. 
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La Société de Chandernagor.95 Georges Tailleur, the last French governor of Chandernagor, had 
noted that there was only one French speaker in the territory when he arrived at his new posting in 
1949.96 In an April 1947 article for the colonial magazine La Revue des Troupes Coloniales, the 
journalist Guy Demaison similarly wrote that Chandernagor was a dead comptoir, and that he was 
surprised on his arrival to see the English words ‘French’ next to ‘bakery’ and ‘wine’, instead of 
boulangerie française and vin français.97 By then, except for the French Administrator, one police 
officer, one priest, and a few French nuns, there was only one local person who could speak French. 
Hence it is not surprising that the English section of the local school was busier than the French 
section; it seems there was little point in learning French in Chandernagor.98   
The colonial administration’s lack of interest and investment contributed to a process of 
cultural abandonment. From Pondichéry, Governor Baron admitted in July 1946 to the French 
Minister of Overseas France, Marius Moutet, that ‘our administration is responsible for the situation in 
Chandernagor, we have in the last twenty years abandoned it to its own isolation. There are no 
teachers, no magistrates. The Governor only showed up once a year for a very short visit …. 
furthermore half of the population is not French but is constituted of refugees.’99 A year late, René 
Kolb-Bernard, the French Consul-général in Calcutta, made similar comments after his visit to 
Chandernagor: ‘The French influence no longer exists, there is no trade with France, no French 
industry, no French family except those of the French administrator and the Chief of Police, no 
                                                          
95 Victor Goloubew mentioned in Singaravélou ‘Les Indianistes français et le « Greater India »’, op.cit., p.311; Malleret, 
op.cit.,  pp. 331-73. 
96 Tailleur, op.cit., p. 20. 
97 La Revue des Troupes Coloniales, April 1947, p. 76. 
98 Ibid., p. 75. 
99 Le Gouverneur de l’Inde française à Mr le Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, a/s Chandernagor, 23 juillet 1946, AD, 
Inde française, Vol. 24: Chandernagor. 
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decent French newspapers, and any recent effort to propagate our language has been unsuccessful 
due to thirty years of neglect’.100 
In Pondichéry, the situation was only slightly better. More newspapers were printed in the 
administrative centre than in any of the other comptoirs, thanks to a larger population of expatriates 
estimated at one hundred and fifty, as well as French-educated French Indians.101 In addition, since 
most secondary and all tertiary educational establishments – that is the lycée, the law school, and the 
medical school – were situated in Pondichéry, there were more French speakers to be found. The 
official newspaper (Journal official de l’Inde française), newspapers focusing on issues affecting civil 
servants (L’Educateur, Le Petit fonctionnaire), or an historical review (Revue historique de l’Inde 
française) were all printed regularly in Pondichéry.  
In addition, the independence of India and the negotiations over the future of French India 
triggered an increase in the number of newspapers published in French. Some appeared for only a 
few issues, while others continued until years after the handover. Most commented on current affairs 
and issues affecting the population, and debated the pros and cons of merger. The increase in 
newspapers testifies that the printing press was viewed as an important propaganda tool for the dual 
task of informing the population and challenging the authorities. It also indicates that there existed an 
audience of people who could read French and afford the cost of a paper, although it was not 
unusual for sheets to be passed on, hired, or read aloud to a small group.102 Papers published in 
French from Pondichéry included Le Trait d’Union (a pro-French monthly), La Voix nouvelle: Organe 
politique et culturel (a bi-monthly newspaper focusing on cultural and political issues), La Voix du 
Peuple (the bi-monthly organ of the Parti Démocrate Progressiste), Libération (a pro-merger bi-
                                                          
100 René Kolb-Bernard à Mr Henri Roux, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, New Delhi, a/s visite à Chandernagor, 3 septembre 
1947, AD, française, Vol. 24: Chandernagor. 
101 Marchés Coloniaux, 21 August 1954 mentioned that there were approximately one hundred had found employment in 
teaching and legal professions, while fifty others were known to have some small commercial activities. 
102 Chapman, Gender, Citizenship and Newspapers, op.cit, p. 100. 
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monthly), Jeunesse et Joie (a bi-monthly aimed at Christian youth), Le Petit Fonctionnaire: Organe 
de la Fédération des fonctionnaires et retraités de l'Inde Française (a monthly focusing on civil 
servants issues) and République Française (a pro-French weekly which published Tamil and French 
articles), all of which started publishing after the Second World War.  
While these magazines and newspapers are catalogued at the Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, the collection and information relating to them is incomplete. Apart from Le Trait d’Union and 
La Voix Nouvelle, all other Francophone papers disappeared between the time of the handover and 
the late 1950s.103 Readership was never large, and as mentioned by the Trait d’Union in its tenth-
year special edition in November 1954, ‘French was a language less spoken and even less read than 
English or Tamil’.104 
Although newspapers published in French indicate the existence of a Francophone and 
Francophile community, they do not specifically prove that French culture was readily available. 
Indeed, a number of articles despaired of the lack of cultural events in French India. The République 
Française was the most critical and cynical about the unavailability of French culture in French India, 
as it stated in 1949:  
 
There is currently no French cultural event, not even a French film is shown. Whenever an 
Indian official is in Paris, pathetic comments are made regarding the tight cultural links that 
have evolved over centuries between France and India. In fact we must note that France 
does absolutely nothing to tighten these links. Our town would be proud to become the ‘open 
window’ so dearly mentioned by Nehru, we are ready to build this ‘window’, to make it the 
most beautiful, the largest and the most welcoming, but needless to say it should not open 
                                                          
103 ‘National Assembly Information Report, Second Ordinary Session of 1963-4 sitting of 22 April 1964, in Chatrath, India 
in the op.cit., p. 79. 
104 Trait d’Union, November 1954. 
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on a vacuum … Pondichéry is actually receiving less support in the cultural domain than the 
most backward parts of Central Africa.105 
 
Fifteen months later, the same newspaper commented that the cultural situation had not improved; 
no films and only one French play were scheduled for the whole of 1951.106 As part of its commitment 
to maintaining whatever French culture was available, the newspaper regularly listed the radio 
programme broadcast by Radio France-Asie to the French comptoirs in India. The programme 
offered a wide range of music from classical to more popular forms of French musical entertainment, 
but broadcast for only forty minutes – from 7.05 to 7.45am – daily.107  
The Alliance Française of Pondichéry, founded in 1889, provided French language courses 
to members, school students, and medical school students who needed to improve their French 
language skills. Other cultural activities delivered from the Alliance included the projection of films, 
but the antiquated equipment and the poor selection of movies made the experience rather dull and 
unattractive. The success of the Alliance Française was limited because of lack of funds and frequent 
closures. The Association des Français en Inde also indicated their concern to French officials that 
the shortage of books and French journals across the French Indian educational establishments 
constituted an impediment to the instruction of French language.108 
Ministry reports were rather pessimistic about the state of French cultural influence in other 
parts of French India. In September 1956, Armand Gandon, Représentant Français in Pondichéry, 
wrote to his superiors about his official trip to Yanaon: 
 
                                                          
105 La République Française, 9 November 1949. 
106 La République Française, 3 March 1951. 
107 La République Française, 21 April 1951, 26 May 1951, 9 June 1951, 
108 ‘National Assembly Information Report, Second Ordinary Session of 1963-4 sitting of 22 April 1964, in Chatrath, 
op.cit., p. 89; Annoussamy, L'intermède, op.cit., p. 185. 
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Yanaon has a population of about 8,000 inhabitants with only 4,000 living in the main town. 
There are no descendants of Europeans, no mixed-race person and no more than twenty 
renonçants, most of whom are employed in the French army. …Most inhabitants are farmers 
…. [and] most of the population is Hindu, with two hundred Muslims and the Christian 
community is composed of sixty roman Catholics; all are fishermen and extremely poor. The 
only regrets about the change of administration come from the loss of some economic 
advantages previously gained from the resale of goods from Pondichéry. …. During the 
events of June 1954, all French cultural influence was eliminated, French street names were 
changed to local names, from then on all education was delivered in Telegu and despite the 
agreement of 21 October, the situation has never been reversed. French is only taught as a 
second language by a teacher who has been recruited in India and hence does not know any 
French. French was in the past only taught at primary level and any students wanting to 
progress to secondary level had to go to Pondichéry …There are only a few French books 
available at the local library.  
 
The author concludes that, overall, the French cultural situation is poor. The territory that was already 
neglected under the French colonial administration – ten years could go by before a French governor 
visited Yanaon – had little chance of exhibiting any kind of French culture or of producing French 
speakers.109   
Two years later, Robert Morel-Francoz, Gandon’s successor, wrote that nothing 
distinguished Yanaon from the other villages in Andra Pradesh apart from the church, the botanical 
                                                          
109 Armand Gandon,  Représentant Français à Pondichéry à Mr Christian Belle ministre plénipotentiaire, chargé d’affaires, 
28 septembre 1956, a/s visite à Yanaon, AD, Vol. 339: Ex-établissements français situation générale; Le Gouverneur de 
l’Inde française à Mr le Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, a/s Chandernagor, 23 juillet 1946, AD, Inde Francaise, Vol. 24: 
Chandernagor. 
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garden, and the administrator’s residence. A student who had received his French primary school-
leaving certificate was unable to read the few lines in French meant to welcome the French official. 
Morel-Francoz despaired that French studies were in a state of ‘complete decadence… and [have] 
only become a fiction of politeness’. He finished by saying that he thought neither he nor his 
successor would ever come back to Yanaon, as it would probably end up being absorbed by the 
state of Andra Pradesh. He then described the former tiny French Indian territories as ‘fictive 
possessions, like a family jewel that one can no longer wear, and that, even if emotionally difficult, it 
is better to dispose of.’110 
Morel-Francoz also visited Mahé in 1958, and in his report to the French ambassador in 
Delhi he commented that the village had already been engulfed by the surrounding areas, and that 
‘the interest to France is more sentimental than intellectual. The past has become blurred… a pretty 
page has been turned.’111 In sum, these official reports attest that French culture was already non-
existent in Yanaon and Mahé before the 1954 agreement, and despite the willingness of the Indian 
government to recruit staff to teach French, there was no hope that any form of French linguistic 
influence would survive the change of administration. 
 
The impact of a new kind of civilising mission  
A 1945 report from the Ministry of Education mentioned that there were seventy-one state 
primary schools, nineteen religious primary schools, two private and two public secondary schools, 
twenty-one schools offering English tuition, and four vocational schools in French India. In 
Pondichéry, secondary education in French was available at a girls’ boarding school (pensionat), the 
                                                          
110 Robert Morel-Francoz, Représentant Français à Pondichéry à Comte Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes, 
15 décembre 1958, a/s visite à Yanaon, AD, Vol. 340: Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
111 Robert Morel-Francoz, représentant français à Pondichéry à comte Ostrorog Ambassadeur de France aux Indes,  a/s 
voyage à Mahé, 13 janvier  1958 AD, Vol. 340: Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
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Collège Calvé, which had two sections: one taught to the level of the Brevet élémentaire (certificate 
of the first level of secondary studies), and the other offered classes in English to matriculation 
level.112 There were also similar colleges in Karikal (Le Collège moderne) and in Mahé (Le Collège 
de La Bourdonnais). Le Collège français in Pondichéry (known before 1947 as the Collège colonial), 
founded by Jesuits in 1760, was the only establishment that taught both genders to the level of 
French matriculation (baccalauréat).113 Two schools – the medical school, established in 1863 to train 
doctors, midwives, and nurses, and the law school, both of which were overseen by the colonial 
administration rather than by the Ministry of Education – provided the only tertiary education 
available. Both of these schools delivered diplomas which were only valid within French India, since 
students were specifically trained to meet local needs. Students wishing to pursue further studies in 
France had to sit special entrance exams. L’École des Arts et Métiers, a professional college that 
formed part of the Public Works Service, provided very basic skills to just a few boys.114  
According to data provided by the Ministry of Education in 1945 and listed in Table 5, there 
were more pupils schooled in first level primary bilingual schools than in primary local language 
schools, but more pupils received a Certificat d’Études Primaires (CEP, certificate of primary studies) 
in an Indian language than in French language. There were three times more pupils attending a 
French language second level primary school than a local language second level primary school (347 
versus 114).  Although the report did not differentiate between the number of graduates in the Indian 
                                                          
112 Annasse, op.cit., p. 136-7; In 1945 English tuition was provided across French India to 2,123 pupils at Collège Calvé in 
Pondichéry, Collège la Bourdonnais in Mahé,  and in Chandernagor three establishments taught English: Collège 
Dupleix, École Mandir and Section d’Etudes supérieur Franco-anglaises mentioned in Ministère de l’éducation nationale, 
Carnet de documentation sur l’enseignement dans la France d’outre-mer, Carnet No. 15, op.cit., p. 31. 
113 The Collège français became the Lycée français in 1975, Annasse, op.cit., p. 116, 136-7; Chanmougassoudiram, 
op.cit., p.157; Ministère de l’éducation nationale, Carnet de documentation sur l’enseignement dans la France d’outre-
mer,  Carnet No. 15, op.cit., pp. 23-33;  Annoussamy, L’intermède, op. cit., pp. 108-9; Service d’Information de l’Etat de 
Pondichéry, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, évènements marquants et progrès économiques et social depuis le transfert de 
facto (Madras: Associated Printers, 1956), AD, Vol. 339: Ex-établissements français situation générale, p.19. 
114 Ministère de l’éducation nationale, Carnet de documentation sur l’enseignement dans la France d’outre-mer,  Carnet 
No. 15, op.cit., p.33. 
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Brevet Élémentaire (certificate of the first level of secondary studies) and the French Brevet, only 
thirteen students graduated out of the 156 who sat the examination, just above 10%. Finally, only a 
handful of students in secondary education ever obtained a qualification: six received the certificate 
of secondary studies, while only eight received the diploma at the end of secondary studies 
(baccalauréat). Overall, although a large number of pupils received their primary education in French, 
only a few pupils ever went onto French secondary education. L’Éducateur, the organ of teachers in 
French India, confirmed this point, noting that the CEP was not sufficient to obtain a job in the 
administration, and questioning the value of an education designed for the benefit of a privileged 
minority.115 While 70% of French Indian children in 1954 received primary education, the French 
ambassador berated its quality. In a letter to de Bourbon Busset, director of cultural relations at the 
Ministry of External Affairs, the ambassador suggested that ‘the exceptional mediocrity of the level of 
education [was] due to the free education which the administration wanted to guarantee but [which 
had] resulted in recruiting underqualified teachers’.116  
Not all schooling was free in French India, but whenever the republican principle of free 
education was enforced, the French government’s unwillingness to spend the necessary funds 
seriously compromised the quality of that education, to the point where only a few French Indians 
were fluent in French. Ostrorog estimated that about 25,000 French Indians, approximately 8% of the 
French Indian population, could differentiate themselves from the mass of peasants by some 
knowledge of the French language and by their ‘Christian practices’ (which the ambassador did not 
further identify).117 In 1954, the French administration believed that only 3% of French Indians could 
                                                          
115 L’Éducateur, Juin 1949. 
116 Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à Mr de Bourbon Busset, directeur des relations culturelles, 1 
décembre 1954,  AD, Inde française, Vol. 81: Institut français de Pondichéry; Annoussamy, L’Intermède, op.cit.,  p. 101. 
117 Stanlisas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à Mr le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a/s communication 
d’une note de M. Gandon sur les options de nationalité à Pondichéry, 22 Juin 1955,  AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: 
Nationalité. 
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hold a conversation in French.118 With such poor results, maintaining French culture through the 
medium of French education would prove to be a challenge, especially in the face of India’s 
commitment to improving living standards through better education in the vernacular. 
                                                          
118 Michalon, ‘Des Indes françaises aux Indiens français’, op.cit., p. 253. 
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Table 5: Number of students and number of teachers in private and public schools, type and number 
of qualifications awarded in French India for the year 1944-1945. Source: Ministère de l’éducation 
nationale, Carnet de documentation sur l’enseignement dans la France d’outre-mer,  Carnet no 15, les 
Établissements français de l’Inde,  Paris 1946, pp. 23-33. 
 
 Number of 
students 
Number of teachers 
Qualifications Number of candidates 
girls boys French 
speakers 
Local 
language 
speakers 
registered graduates 
Indian primary schools (1st 
cycle): French and local 
language tuition 
2,550 3,779 Nil 144 
CEP(1): certificat 
d’études primaires 
(Indian language) 
Between 50 to 67% 
graduated 
or 3,164 to 4,240 
French primary schools 
(1st cycle) bilingual 3,453 6,931 123 40 
CEP : certificat 
d’études primaires 
(French language) 
567 305 
Indian primary schools 
(2nd cycle): local language 
tuition 
59 55 2* 6 
Brevet (2) 
élémentaire (Indian 
language) 156 13 
French  primary schools 
(2nd cycle): bilingual 
347 Not provided 
Brevet élémentaire 
(French language) 
Secondary education 
Pondichéry & Karikal 
(French language) 
375 Not provided 
Certificat d’études 
secondaires (3) 
55 6 
Baccalauréat (4) 39 8 
Tertiary education: École 
de droit (Law School) 
22 11 Diploma Not provided 
Tertiary education: École 
de medecine et safes-
femmes (School of 
medicine and mid-wifery) 
12 12 Diploma Not provided 
Vocational training: École 
des Arts et Métiers & 
Ecole d’enseignement 
artisanal  
83 15 Various Not provided Not provided 
(1) CEP: certificat d’études primaires: certificate of primary studies  
(2) Brevet élémentaire: certificate of first cycle of secondary studies  
(3) Certificat d’études secondaires: certificate of second level of secondary studies  
(4) Baccalauréat: diploma of third cycle of secondary studies 
* minimal French tuition was provided 
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In 1955, as soon as the handover had taken place, the Indian government announced that 
not only would Pondichéry be included in the next plan (1956-1961), but that extra budget would be 
allocated to help the French Indian territories keep on par with the rest of the country.119 The five-year 
plans were designed to assist industrial and agricultural development to achieve self-sufficiency, and 
were important instruments in the nation-building formation.120 Seven hundred thousand rupees (or 
over 51 million francs) was granted for the financial year ending March 1955, and one million rupees 
(or 73 million francs) was allocated for the 1955-56 financial year.121 In comparison, for the period 30 
June 1946 to 30 June 1951, the Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et 
Social (FIDES) allocated 155 million francs to French India for infrastructure improvement, or an 
equivalent of just 31 million per year. This figure equals 61% of the amount that the Indian 
government provided in 1955, and 43% of the 1955-56 amount.122 While it is often argued that the 
amount invested by the French government in French India demonstrates that France was not 
abandoning the territories, data provided by the Bulletin d’information de la France d’Outre-Mer and 
published by the press bureau of the Ministry of Overseas France show that French India received 
only a third of the investment given to Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, which was half the size of French 
India and had only 4,500 inhabitants, and almost all of European descent, compared to the 320,000 
living in the southern French Indian territories.123  
                                                          
119 Service d’Information de l’État de Pondichéry, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, évènements marquants et progrès 
économiques et social depuis le transfert de facto, (Madras: Associated Printers, 1956), p. 23, AD, Vol. 339: Ex-
établissements français situation générale; Zachariah, op.cit., p. 225. 
120 Zachariah, op.cit., pp. 187-93, 225; Roy, Beyond Belief, op.cit., p.110. 
121 Trait d’Union, February 1952. 
122 Ministère de la France d’outre-mer, Bureau de Presse, Bulletin d’information de France Outre-Mer, 10 November 
1951. 
123 Although Weber mentions that funds of 68 million francs was allocated to French India in 1952 for the construction of 
new schools, health centres in rural areas, the reconstruction of the pier and for the completion of the power station, the 
author does not provide references or a comparison with amounts given to other overseas territories. See Weber, 
Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., footnote 2 p. 407; Ageron, La décolonisation française, 
op.cit., pp. 43; French India was yet again a neglected colony with little change since between the two world wars. 
Already between 1919 and 1934 French India had to manage with a limited financial assistance of seven million francs to 
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While France’s economic assistance to French India had been very modest, the Indian 
government’s monetary aid showed a greater commitment to economic development, including the 
improvement of vocational, adult, and children’s education through the provision of additional schools 
that catered for a variety of educational needs. These schools were set up to increase the level of 
literacy, numeracy, and technical skills across a much larger cross-section of the population than the 
colonial administration had ever catered for, hence fulfilling Nehru’s aspiration that all Indians be 
given greater opportunities for educational and economic growth.124 This impetus towards greater 
equality was embodied in Articles 14 to 18 of the Indian Constitution, and aimed at transforming 
Indians into citizens of the new nation.125 Although the maintenance of French education was 
guaranteed by a few institutions, the establishment of more schools and other educational 
organisations that taught in local languages only diluted the little French culture that still existed in 
former French India. The focus of the Indian government’s efforts was not, of course, on perpetrating 
some French colonial myth, although in practice there were no objections to it, but rather on providing 
greater skills and improving living standards across the region, a strategy that also helped persuade 
the population of the benefits of the merger with India.  
A report on the new state of Pondichéry, published in 1956, provided a detailed account of 
the first year under the governance of India. The number of primary schools had risen to 218, or just 
over twice the number existing in 1945, and fifty-seven of these new primary schools were located in 
isolated villages. There were sixty new teaching positions, and new school equipment. There were 
twenty-three secondary schools, a marked increase on the 1945 situation, and established schools, 
including the Collège in Mahé and schools at Pallour and Calmandabam, were to be expanded. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
improve infrastructure, while between 1923 and 1934 La Réunion received almost 25 million and Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 
60 million, Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., p. 328.  
124 Nehru, Discovery of India, op.cit., p. 581. 
125 Government of India, The Constitution of India, <http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india>, viewed 26 
January 2014; Roy, Beyond Belief, op.cit., 110. 
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Above all, the curriculum had been reviewed to reflect local needs. French Indian students had long 
complained that the French curriculum did not teach any Indian-specific subjects.126 In 1936, students 
at the Collège Calvé had gone on strike over a list of grievances that included ‘school’s fees, lack of 
sports and science facilities, and the ridiculous conditions of the curriculum of the school 
characterised by the absence of subjects in Indian history and geography which maintained students 
in darkness regarding Indian culture’).127 The École des Arts et Métiers was to be transformed into a 
large vocational training school that would enrol one hundred students; childcare centres had been 
set up, the law school and school of medicine had increased their intake of students, and a teacher’s 
school, nineteen adult schools, and courses in English had also been set up. Finally, technical 
education in the use of modern equipment had been given to peasants.128   
The report also indicated that 572 candidates, mainly boys, had received the Certificat 
d’Études Primaires (certificate of primary studies) in an Indian language – the document does not 
stipulate which Indian language this was – while only 395 candidates received the same qualification 
in French. However, forty-one candidates had received the Brevet élémentaire (certificate of the first 
cycle of secondary studies) in French, a greater number than the seven who had received the same 
qualification in the Indian language (see Table 6), an indication, perhaps, that the government’s 
efforts had not yet reached the pupils who were at the first level of secondary studies. 
 
                                                          
126 Annasse, op.cit., 1975, p.138. 
127 Subbiah, op.cit., p. 108. 
128 Service d’Information de l’État de Pondichéry, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, évènements marquants et progrès 
économiques et social depuis le transfert de facto (Madras: Associated Printers, 1956), p. 47, AD, Vol. 339: Ex-
établissements français situation générale; Ramasamy, op.cit., pp. 266-8. 
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Table 6: Number of candidates for – and number of graduates from – primary and secondary school 
certificates in the French Establishments in the school year 1956-57. Source: Administration de l’État de 
Pondichéry, rapport annuel 1956-57,  AD, vol. 340, ex-établissements français situation générale, 
documentation p.26-7. 
 
Exams Number of candidates Number of graduates 
 Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total 
CEP* (Indian 
language) 
630 260 890 355 27 572 
CEP (French 
language) 
497 100 597 319 76 395 
Brevet** (Indian 
language) 
19 10 29 6 1 7 
Brevet 
élémentaire 
(French 
language) 
187 27 214 28 13 41 
*CEP: certificat d’études primaires (certificate of primary studies taken by pupils between the ages of 11 and 
13 years) 
**Brevet élémentaire: (certificate of first cycle of secondary studies taken by pupils between the ages of 15 and 
16 years) 
 
The same report stated that the local library in Pondichéry received 2,958 new books, of 
which fewer than 8% were English books (236), 21% were French (620), and the remainder Tamil 
(2,102). There had been a concerted effort to acquire more Tamil books for an increasing number of 
inhabitants who had access to education in Tamil, a strategy that was resulting in a form of 
‘Indianisation’ of the education system. This effort was in line with a national policy to increase 
printing as well as access to printed materials.129 In any case, the figures show that the French 
language was further diluted, a reality that French observers had difficulty reconciling themselves 
with. Indeed, a French National Assembly report, following a mission to French India in 1964, began 
                                                          
129 Nehru, ‘Books to Reach the People’, in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: September 1954 – April 1963, Vol. 4, op.cit., 
pp. 172-4. 
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with a reference to Dupleix and proceeded to comfort French deputies by stating that ‘the streets 
continue with their French names and the statue of Dupleix stands facing the sea as before. In the 
shops French is spoken and the peace and tranquillity of this place has not changed much since the 
eighteenth century’.130 It is clear that the report was intended to reassure officials that French India 
had changed little since the withdrawal, despite later mentioning that a lack of resources was making 
it difficult to maintain French education. David Annoussamy, a French Indian who lived and worked 
as a magistrate during the period under study, stated that few French books remained in the local 
libraries because of a lack of care, the destructive attention of local insects, and uncaring librarians 
who burnt them to make room for new acquisitions in Tamil.131   
A series of articles on Indian politics, religion, and education written in May 1964 by André 
Fontaine, a French historian and journalist at Le Monde, are useful in measuring the success of 
efforts to preserve French culture in the former French Indian territories.132 The author is taken aback 
by the contrast between the daily pronouncements emanating from France about French grandeur 
and influence in the world, and the small role France was playing in India, a country that was as large 
and populous as all of Europe. His reaction testifies to the potency of the ‘aura culturelle’, whose 
purpose is to promote the importance of French cultural power where it actually has little influence.133 
He also admits that France is faring poorly compared to Britain, the USA, the USSR, and even China. 
However, he states with some admiration that French is still the official language in the former colony, 
and that the French penal code is still in use. While granting French language a central role in the 
new state of Pondichéry, he later admits that only one primary school teaches French and that over 
eighty percent of the population has never spoken French.  
                                                          
130 ‘Information Report presented on behalf of the Commission of External Affairs and the ‘Plan’ following a visit to India 
by a delegation of the Commission from 18 Janaury to 8 February 1967’, in Chatrath, op. cit., p. 78. 
131 Annoussamy, L’intermède, op. cit., p. 186. 
132 Le Monde 12 May 1964, 14 May 1964 ‘L’Inde en suspens’; ‘L’heritage de Dupleix’, 17-18 May 1964.  
133 Bègue, ‘La valeur de l’ «exemple français »’, op. cit., p. 316. 
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On the one hand, the juxtaposition of the importance of French language at the government 
level with its irrelevance at the people’s level shows that the author confers on the French language a 
more influential role than it actually warrants. It also testifies to some remnants of colonial presence. 
On the other hand, Annoussamy, stresses that immediately after the de jure transfer in 1962, ’English 
acquired the pride of place, since it was the language of the Heads of Departments sent by New 
Delhi’, a situation that greatly displeased French-speaking government workers.134 It is true that at 
the time of the de jure agreement, French was the official language, but the onslaught of the English 
language from Greater India challenged the need for French speakers and therefore also the need to 
preserve the French language. The competition between the French and English languages in 
French India was nearing its end.135 Fontaine suggested that one way to reverse the lack of French 
speakers would be to set up a Franco-Indian university, which again testifies to the very limited 
success of the Alliance Française and the IFP as organisations dedicated to maintaining French 
culture and language. The debate over the use of English and French language after decolonisation 
is a reminder of the competition between two colonial powers, with French linguistic ideology, which 
posits that language is an ‘affair of state’, pointing to the ‘dangers’ that the French language faces in 
a world increasingly dominated by English.136 
Despite French being the official language of the state of Pondichéry, India never belonged 
to the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT), an institution set up in 1969 to group 
together Francophone countries, a community that paid allegiance to a language.137 The fact that 
India was a member of the Commonwealth, and a country where English was the most spoken 
European language, suggested that, just as France had occupied a subordinate position on the 
                                                          
134 Annoussamy, ‘The Merger of French India’, op.cit., pp. 73, 71. 
135 Benrabah, op.cit., p. 254.  
136 Ibid.; Gabrielle Parker, op,cit., pp. 695-700. 
137 William W. Bostock, Francophonie: Organisation, Co-ordination, Evaluation (Melbourne: River Seine Publications, 
1986), pp. 20-8; Magedera, op.cit., p. 65; Hayward, op.cit., pp. 330-1; Gabrielle Parker, op,cit., p. 700 
 326 
 
subcontinent in the past, French language usage in the future would remain minimal. Fontaine 
provides a description of the remnants of French culture: a few Citroën cars are parked on streets 
whose French names are written in white on blue enamel plaques like those found in France, and, as 
in a previous era, alcoholic drinks that are freely sold contribute to an incessant traffic of customers 
from neighbouring dry states. His inventory of French Indian assets lists a Lycée attended by the 
children of French civil servants, a research institute, the Ashram, and catholic churches.138 But apart 
from a few French symbols, bad drinking habits, colonial buildings, local policemen wearing a French 
képi, and a couple of educational institutes, there is almost nothing to remind the visitor that this was 
once the administrative centre of a vast power. As Morel-Francoz asserted in 1958, ‘the [colonial] 
past had become blurred… a pretty page had been turned.’139  
 
Conclusion 
The creation of the Institut Français de Pondichéry as a cultural and scientific centre was a 
strategic move that fulfilled numerous functions at a local, regional, and international level. It also 
became the site for the resolution of nationalist and colonial tensions. From the Indian government’s 
viewpoint, it appeased anti-merger groups who had denounced the end of French India as 
unconstitutional, as well as a minority of French Indians who feared that their cultural characteristics 
would be engulfed. It also challenged France to succeed in her mission to civilise using peaceful 
means. For France, the Institute represented her commitment not to abandon her former colony, and 
allowed her to maintain a physical presence in Asia, especially since the foundation of the IFP was 
closely linked with France’s withdrawal in Indochina and the subsequent transfer of the EFEO to 
Pondichéry. While the Institute helped safeguard France’s scientific work in Asia and enhance her 
                                                          
138 Le Monde 12 May 1964,  14 May 1964 ‘L’Inde en suspens’; ‘L’heritage de Dupleix’, 17-18 May 1964.  
139 Robert Morel-Francoz, représentant français à Pondichéry à comte Ostrorog Ambassadeur de France aux Indes,  a/s 
voyage à Mahé, 13 janvier 1958 AD, Vol. 340: Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
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international prestige, it also realised the old colonial dream of establishing a research programme in 
India to rival that of the British Asiatic Society. Colonial rivalries were still at play in post-colonial 
French India. The French government’s responsibility for maintaining French culture and language in 
French India ceased when that section of the IFP was transferred to the local Alliance française, a 
transfer that indicated any concerted effort at retaining French cultural influence would be small and 
inefficient. While elements of French culture endured in the French Indian landscape, softer aspects 
such as the French language could not survive an onslaught from India that consisted in a wide-
ranging educational program in local languages, and waves of migrants attracted by generous 
government investment determined to outdo the former colonial administration.  
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Chapter 7 
The Final Evolution 
 
It was in any case not very reasonable to want the population of French 
India to be French whereas everything held them and attracted them 
towards the Indian world: commerce, social relations, language, moral and 
religious institutions, political ideals,… To explain that French India should 
be detached from India would pose a problem for sociologists as unsolvable 
as squaring the circle. P. Josselin, (Inspecteur de l’Instruction Publique des 
Établissements français dans l’Inde, 1942)1 
 
The 21 October 1954 Agreement signed by the French and Indian governments contained 
thirty-five articles providing for the de facto transfer of the administration of the French 
Establishments in India, applicable as of 1 November 1954.2 Kewal Singh became the Chief 
Commissioner (the equivalent of a governor) of a ‘part C’ state, a centrally administered area as 
described in the Indian Constitution.3 The Agreement, which reflected the Indian National Congress’s 
broader policy embodied in the Jaipur Resolution (18 December 1948), was a carbon copy of a 
                                                          
1 Josselin, op.cit, unpaginated. 
2 France Diplomatie, Base des Traités et Accords et de la France, Accord par échange de lettres relatif à la cession des 
anciennes loges françaises de l'Inde au governement de l'Inde, Août 1947, <http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-
ph/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___traites/home.html&VUE=mae_internet__
_traites&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN=1>, viewed 26 January 2014. 
3 Furber, op.cit., pp. 352-371. 
 329 
 
proposal submitted to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in 1949. This proposal stated that the 
‘present administration, linguistic, educational and judicial systems may be allowed to continue for a 
limited period and subject to this adjustment the territories now known as French Indian settlements 
should be taken over and politically incorporated in India’.4 This limited period lasted, in fact, for eight 
years, resulting in the unusual situation that French legal sovereignty was nominally maintained while 
at the same time the Indian government introduced numerous national laws and controlled the 
administration of French India.  
Above all, the de facto transfer triggered a debate over the issue of citizenship and the 
categorisation of French Indians who might be entitled to French citizenship. Through an exploration 
of the nationality options that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs contemplated, this chapter will 
reveal that despite a constitutional declaration, French citizenship was always intended to be limited 
to a small minority of French Indians, while, in contrast, Indian citizenship was extensively granted. 
This chapter will also demonstrate that the inclusion of French Indians into the Indian citizenry was in 
accord with India’s integration policy as well as her commitment to outdo the administration of her 
colonial predecessor. An analysis of Nehru’s visits to Pondichéry within a year of the de facto transfer 
will indicate that Indian officials were quite aware of the difficulties that the transfer had posed, but 
also show how the calculated deployment of economic investment facilitated the amalgamation of 
French India and helped erase the French colonial past. 
 
The nationality debate: French exclusion versus Indian inclusion 
When Britain announced that she intended to withdraw from India, the French government 
contemplated a number of options designed to avoid a total loss of sovereignty over French India. 
                                                          
4 Submitted to the Honorable Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Deputy PM of India, 3 March 1949, ANI, 15(11) EUR1/49: 
Situation in French Establishments in India. 
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Amongst the issues to emerge from these debates, that of nationality especially preoccupied the 
authorities and those French Indians whose interests and privileges were most at stake. Early on, the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the possibility of dual-nationality under the rule of a 
Franco-Indian condominium; the most famous example of such an arrangement was the French-
Anglo condominium of the New Hebrides.5 Although this solution suggested that India and France 
would share administrative responsibilities and that the population would pay allegiance to both 
nations, it nonetheless posed a number of problems. Since a condominium was considered viable 
only as a temporary measure until the sovereignty of the territory was finally decided, it would only 
postpone that dispute to a later date. Moreover, this form of co-management would only be effective 
if both powers were committed to co-operating and had neither particular privileges nor distinct 
interests, none of which was the case here. French India was physically part of the Indian 
subcontinent, had legally come into existence following a Treaty between two colonial powers 
(France and Britain), and its future depended on an agreement between France and independent 
India. In any case, while India was unlikely to approve a condominium, especially after her 
resounding success in integrating the princely states, France strongly suspected that, given the 
choice of allegiance, the majority of French Indians would probably opt for Indian nationality. The idea 
of a condominium seemed wholly impractical.6  
Other possible solutions arose, such as turning French India into individual, autonomous 
territories with their respective populations given the right to choose between becoming nationals of 
an autonomous (French Indian) territory or of India. The proposal found inspiration from the 
principality of Liechtenstein, which in 1919 conferred on Switzerland the principality’s diplomatic 
                                                          
5 Note pour Monsieur Chauvel, 26 Août 1947, a/s statut de l’Inde française, AD, Inde française, Vol. 37: Projet de statut 
autonome; it is worthwhile to note that New Hebrideans had the citizenship of neither Britain nor France. 
6 Note pour le cabinet du Ministre a/s régime de double nationalité pour les habitants des établissements français dans 
l’Inde, 22 Février 1949, AD, Inde Française, Vol. 37: Projet de statut autonome. 
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representation. Ministry officials thought that France could perhaps likewise represent these small, 
autonomous territories. But France had no authority to offer Indian nationality, and the option did not 
stipulate whether those opting to remain within the French Union would become French nationals or 
only nationals of the French Indian territory in which they resided.7  
The issue of double nationality tended to generate the most discussions amongst the press, 
Ministry officials, and above all, a small minority who thought that their rights and privileges were the 
most at risk from the handover. Even the Aurobindo Ashram’s residents became involved in the 
debate, as they considered dual citizenship an evolution towards global integration rather than merely 
the outcome of an agreement over transferred territories.8 Robert Duvauchelle, the Représentant 
Français in Pondichéry in 1954, favoured the option of dual citizenship, especially if the Franco-
Indian agreement was not going to provide guarantees to protect those who wished to continue their 
allegiance to France while residing in India. Indeed, the French Representative explained that some 
Chandernagorians living in Calcutta who had opted for French citizenship were being treated like 
outsiders by Indians and faced the possibility that the Indian government would not renew their 
residency papers, a situation that could ultimately lead to deportation.9 The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs acknowledged that those who had embraced French ways were now ‘foreigners in the 
same area they were born in’.10  
                                                          
7 Note de Mr Daniel Lévi, a/s Établissements français aux Indes, Paris 9 Novembre 1947, AD, Inde française, Vol. 37: 
Projet de statut autonome. 
8 Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry to the Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi, 22 December 1954, AD, 
Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
9 Représentation Française, Note sur les options de nationalité française, Pondichéry, 21 Décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
10 Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Monsieur l’Ambassadeur de France en Inde à New Delhi, a/s 
nationalité des ressortissants des établissements français cédés à l’Union Indienne, 30 Novembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
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The idea of dual citizenship was not a novelty, since it had recently been embodied in a 
French law of 9 April 1954, which allowed a French citizen to acquire foreign citizenship. As long as 
Nehru supported the principle of dual nationality, the French legislation could be extended to her 
Indian territories.11 On the other hand, Ostrorog, the French Ambassador, objected to dual nationality 
on political grounds, since it gave an individual the right to work for both the French and Indian 
administrations, and would thus ‘give a small number of undesirables the possibility to continue their 
intrigues which had plagued both countries in recent years’. Financially, Ostrorog feared that a large 
number of extremely poor French Indians could choose this option for the sole purpose of gaining 
financial help from the French government, a situation in his view that would be rather undesirable.12  
The option of dual citizenship was eventually discarded. Instead, Ostrorog and Duvauchelle 
wrote at great length to the Ministry about who should be allowed to become a French national. The 
debate provides great insight into the rationale for French nationality and the intricate politics involved 
in granting it. Article 80 of the Fourth Republic’s Constitution granted French nationality to residents 
of overseas territories. The right was initially extended to a large number of French Union residents, 
but as the details of the Treaty of Cession were being discussed, Ostrorog and Duvauchelle 
expressed the view that the option of becoming a French national should be limited to just a few. This 
option would involve not only retracting the citizenship of some current French nationals, in 
contravention to Article 80, but also making it unavailable to many others. Indeed, the two officials 
were greatly concerned by the number and the quality of those French Indians who would apply. 
They believed some civil servants and pensioners who had little allegiance to France would take 
                                                          
11 Note sur la question de double nationalité dans les anciens comptoirs français de l’Inde, 8 Février 1955,  AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
12 Comte Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France, a/s note du député de l’Assemblée Nationale au sujet de la double 
nationalité, 8 Février 1955, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité; Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux 
Indes à Mr le ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 22 Juin 1955, a/s communication d’une note de Mr Gandon sur les options 
de nationalité à Pondichéry, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
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French nationality only to keep their pension privileges. Indeed, pension regulations had not 
considered the possibility of territorial cession and subsequent changes in nationality. This could 
most certainly be circumvented, since the beneficiary would have acquired his rights while holding 
French nationality, and thus the change should not affect pension rights, as such there was no need 
for beneficiaries to apply for French nationality.13 The French authorities in Pondichéry thoroughly 
studied the possible ways to ‘legally and practically’ limit the number of optants (those who would be 
entitled to opt for French citizenship). One of the strategies proposed was to promote Indian 
nationality as more advantageous than French nationality, as it would instantly remove cumbersome 
Indian administrative procedures. There were concerns that the Indian government would make 
residency difficult for those who were not Indian nationals. Another strategy to reduce the number of 
optants was to introduce compulsory military service for French Indian citizens, from which they had 
previously been exempted. 
Armand Gandon, the Représentant Français in Pondichéry in 1955, advised the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on a five-category listing of the most desirable French Indian candidates. The first 
category included descendants of French from the métropole; in the second were mixed-blood 
French nationals; in the third, those who had already acquired French nationality and their 
descendants; in the fourth, renonçants and their descendants; and in the last were Indians who had 
never renounced. According to Gandon, French Indians belonging to the last category (and for whom 
there were very often no civil records) were deemed the least Frenchified, and he strongly 
recommended the agreement deny them the right to opt for French citizenship.14 Somewhat 
                                                          
13 Télégramme au départ, a/s nationalité Indes,  20 Septembre 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité; 
Représentation Française, Note sur les options de nationalité française, Pondichéry, 21 Décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
14 Ibid. 
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problematically, most of the 1,300 volunteers serving in the French army came from this category.15 
Thus, the Ministry’s representative in Pondichéry defined a potential French citizenship applicant on 
the level of francisation, which would have been acquired through blood (or jus sanguinis), or through 
embracing French culture, this being notably the case for renonçants and mixed-blooded French 
Indians. Ostrorog estimated that only 25,000 French Indians were Frenchified. Even if some could 
afford to live in France or in the French Union, in French India they would always be a minority and – 
since the Indian government would favour its own nationals – would no longer have access to 
positions in the public service.16 This nationality debate mirrors the old contradiction between the 
republican ideal of citizenship and the reality of France’s dealings with the ‘other’ which led, 
particularly in the colonies, to a disassociation between ‘nationals’, perceived as subjects, and 
‘citizens’, defined as culturally and socially belonging to the body politic as full members.17  
The Treaty of Cession gave any French Indian the right to opt for French nationality. If under 
the age of 18, the child’s father, or if he was deceased, the mother, would determine the nationality of 
the child. However, the clause included the possibility for the child of a French national to renounce 
French nationality in order to take up Indian nationality upon reaching the age of 18.18 Articles IV and 
V stipulated: 
 
                                                          
15 Armand Gandon, Note sur les options de nationalité à Pondichéry, 4 Juin 1955, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
16 Stanislas Ostrorog, Ambassadeur de France aux Indes à Mr le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 22 Juin 1955, a/s 
communication d’une note de Mr Gandon sur les options de nationalité à Pondichéry, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: 
Nationalité. 
17 Emmanuelle Saada, ‘The Republic and the Indigènes’ in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe 
Prochasson (eds), The French Republic: History, Values, Debates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 223-31; 
see Shepard on the issue of racialised citizenship in Algeria, op.cit. 
18 Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer à Mr le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a/s Établissements 
français dans l’Inde (questions relatives à la nationalité), Paris, le 3 Septembre 1954, AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: 
Nationalité. 
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French Nationals born in the territory of the Establishments and domiciled therein at the date 
of the entry into force of the Treaty of Cession shall become nationals and citizens of the 
Indian Union with the exceptions … of those who by means of a written declaration drawn up 
within six months of the entry into force of the Treaty choose to retain their [French] 
nationality. Persons availing themselves of this right shall be deemed never to have acquired 
Indian nationality.19 
 
This meant that all French Indians lost the French nationality they had been granted by the Fourth 
Republic’s Constitution and became Indian nationals overnight. Hence jus soli became the most 
determinant element of Indian nationality. On the other hand, any French Indian wishing to remain a 
French national needed to make a declaration within six months of the signature of the Treaty. 
Renonçants and those who were of European descent criticised this procedure, since they had 
always viewed their French nationality as the same as that of a person of French descent or a person 
who had been born in France. They therefore argued, although to no avail, that the Treaty of Cession 
should not alter a status previously acquired either by birth or naturalisation.20 It is worth mentioning 
that although India was eventually opposed to dual nationality, dual nationals did exist, as anyone 
born in India is an Indian national and anyone born to a French national was French, but there was 
no administrative mechanism to deal with such instances, and those enjoying dual citizenship did not 
notify the Indian authorities that they also held French citizenship.21 
                                                          
19 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Treaty between the Republic of France and India Establishing 
Cession by the French Republic to the Indian Union of the French Establishments in India’, op.cit, pp. 508-9. 
20 Représentation Française, Note sur les options de nationalité française, Pondichéry, 21 Décembre 1954, AD, Inde 
française, Vol. 79: Nationalité; Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer à Mr le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères, a/s Établissements français dans l’Inde (questions relatives al a nationalité), Paris le 3 Septembre 1954, AD, 
Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité. 
21 Annoussamy, ‘The Merger’, op.cit., p. 72. 
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The Treaty also provided for those who were born in French India but who resided outside of 
it at the time of the de jure transfer. Articles VII and VIII specified that French nationals born in the 
territories but living in a country other than the Indian Union or the French Indian territories would 
retain their French nationality, or alternatively they could choose to acquire Indian nationality upon 
providing a written declaration to the Indian authorities. Thus, entitlement to Indian nationality did not 
extend to those born in the comptoirs but residing outside at the time of the de jure agreement which 
took place in 1962; these people needed to apply for Indian nationality.22 As such, this clause 
challenges the jus soli condition mentioned earlier. In fact, the de jure transfer acted as an ‘Indian 
birth’ to all residing in French India, making them Indian nationals at the stroke of midnight and 
stripping them of their French nationality. By contrast, when Madagascar became independent in 
1960, Indians who were residing there could apply for Indian citizenship if their father and grand-
father were born in India during the colonial period, if they had not acquired another nationality, and if 
they had kept a link with India. Under such conditions, 7,000 Indians residing in Madagascar obtained 
Indian citizenship.23 
The population of French India in 1954 was approximately 321,000; 5,000 adult French 
Indians and 2,100 children applied for French citizenship, which nonetheless was a much lower figure 
than the Ministry’s anticipated 25,000 potential applicants.24 Annoussamy advanced several reasons 
to explain why more French Indians had not expressed an interest in gaining French citizenship. 
Firstly, there was a lack of information regarding the option. Indeed, the de jure transfer took place 
                                                          
22 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Treaty between the Republic of France and India Establishing 
Cession by the French Republic to the Indian Union of the French Establishments in India’, op.cit., p. 508. 
23 Blanchy, op.cit., p. 262. 
24 Michalon, ‘L’aventure ambiguë’, op.cit., p. 170; Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer à Mr le Président du Conseil, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangères, a/s Établissements français dans l’Inde (questions relatives à la nationalité), 3 Septembre 1954, 
AD, Inde française, Vol. 79: Nationalité; Représentation Française, Note sur les options de nationalité française, 
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without pomp, and although the Treaty was published by decree in the Journal Officiel of 25 
September 1962, published in Paris, there was no publication in the official gazette of Pondichéry. An 
earlier announcement had been made in 1956, but apart from a notice in the hall of the French 
consulate, the option of retaining French nationality only became known by word of mouth.25 
Secondly, since India did not allow dual citizenship, French citizens who chose to remain in former 
French India would have to apply for permanent residency in India and deal with cumbersome 
bureaucracy.26 Some also believed that by becoming French citizens they would automatically forego 
their Indian nationality; civil servants even thought that they might have to migrate to France, a 
country that remained very unfamiliar to them.27 Finally, applicants had to provide documents, such 
as the birth certificate of their grandfather, which could be difficult to obtain.28 Although these three 
reasons are convincing, Annoussamy does not mention that the Ministry’s policy goal, as discussed 
earlier, was intentionally to limit the number of optants. With less than a third (including children) of its 
projected number applying for French nationality – a figure that represents just above 2% of the 
French Indian population – the Ministry more than achieved that goal. The Treaty also produced 
some interesting outcomes, especially amongst former French Indian politicians. For example, 
Edouard Goubert became an Indian national, while Saravane Lambert chose to remain French.29  
While Paul Michalon asserts that the French nationality option allowed France to leave with 
some dignity after the shambles of the negotiations and the Kijeour Congress, and Annoussamy 
                                                          
25 Annoussamy, L’intermède,  op.cit., p. 313.  
26 Annoussamy, ‘The Merger’, op.cit., p. 72. 
27 Dassaradanayadou, op.cit., p. 71. 
28 Ibid. 
29 While Weber mentions that Lambert was born in Indochina, the Assemblée nationale’s website cites the former deputy 
as born in Pondichéry, Weber, Pondichéry et les comptoirs de l’Inde après Dupleix, op.cit., p. 405; Assemblée nationale, 
Biographies des députés de la IVe république, <http://www.assemblee-
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deplores the shortcomings of the nationality option,30 I would argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was more interested in cultural diplomacy and retaining French dignity through the establishment of a 
research institute than it was in offering French nationality to a large number of French Indians with 
the financial burden this would bring. Records at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that the 
Ministry’s main concern was the protection of a very small minority of French Indians who had shown 
allegiance to France. Indeed, 95% of the applicants were renonçants, which is hardly surprising since 
the nationality clause was primarily designed for them. It was easier for renonçants to obtain their 
grandfather’s birth certificate, as they and their ancestors had more dealings with civil records than 
uneducated and unregistered peasants; the acte de renonciation, for example, was recorded in the 
civil registry at the town hall.31 Furthermore, the Trait d’Union commented on the ongoing debate 
regarding the issue of nationality, hence educated renonçants had more opportunities to keep 
informed on the evolution of the option.  
Most importantly, renonçants had also organised in small committees, such as the Comité de 
défense des intérêts français de l’Inde française, headed by Ramassamy Ayer, Patriotes de l’Inde 
française, chaired by Arthur Annasse, the Amis de la Langue et de la culture française, chaired by a 
lawyer named Mr Rassendren, and the Groupement représentatif des Intérêts pondichériens. These 
groups lobbied deputies, published letters in French newspapers, and wrote to the Ministry of 
Overseas France and the Ministry of External Affairs to alert the French public and the legislators of 
their plight.32 Annasse followed in the footsteps of his maternal and paternal grandfathers, who had 
worked in the 1880s for French Indians in the colonial administration to be given the same rights as 
                                                          
30 Michalon,  ‘L’aventure ambiguë’, op.cit., p. 169; Annoussamy, ‘The Merger’, op.cit., pp. 71-2. 
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32 Ramassamy Ayer wrote ‘Le sort dramatique des Établissements de l’Inde’ in Climats 14-20 October 1954; Annasse 
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French nationals. Their lobbying in Paris eventually led to the provision of an acte de renonciation in 
1881.33 Annasse himself had learned his skills as an activist while working in Indochina during the 
Second World War. In February 1942, he challenged a Vichy decree that stopped the payment of the 
expatriation allowance granted to French Indian civil servants working in Indochina.34 Some other 
organisations disappeared soon after the Kijeour Congress, such as the Parti Francophile de Karikal. 
There was little difference between the aims of these organisations, and they all largely consisted of 
French-educated magistrates, teachers, and retirees from the armed forces and administration, all of 
whom felt they had been abandoned by the French government. They relentlessly challenged the 
Kijeour decision, advocated their rights as renonçants, fought for dual nationality, demanded the non-
ratification of the Treaty unless amendments regarding nationality were considered, and requested 
freedom of circulation within India and recognition of their professional qualifications by the Indian 
government.35 Overall, through their lobbying activities, they benefited the most from the French 
nationality option. 
Above all, the nationality issue signals the non-discriminatory nature of Indian nationality, 
since it was extended to all who were born in the comptoirs without distinction based on culture, 
religion, or even past political allegiance. The fact that 98% of former French Indians became Indian 
nationals indicates the success of India’s integration policy and the failure of France’s mythical 
mission civilisatrice; it also highlights the limited impact of her assimilation policy and the 
shortcomings of a Constitution that was unable to maintain the French nationality granted to French 
Indians in 1946. India’s welcome inclusion of former French Indians not only testifies to Nehru’s 
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commitment to them as new Indian nationals but also contrasts tellingly with France’s poor treatment 
of her overseas nationals. Indeed, Nehru’s two visits to Pondichéry in 1955 can be viewed as proof of 
India’s pledge to the population of the French Indian territories. 
 
 Nehru’s visits to the French Establishments 
Nehru’s first visit to Pondichéry on 16 January 1955 marked a turning-point in the history of 
the former administrative centre, and sealed the disjunction between past anti-colonial feelings and 
forward-looking nationalistic feelings. Although France was still the official sovereign power, French 
India was already officially referred to as the ‘French Establishments’ and was unofficially called ‘the 
State of Pondicherry’. Both French and Indian national symbols were used during the festivities; the 
French and Indian flags flew next to one another at the Collège Français, and students sang both the 
Indian and French national anthems. The Trait d’Union reported that the Prime Minister reviewed the 
float that would, for the first time, represent the state of Pondicherry at the official parade marking the 
celebration of Indian Republic Day on 26 January.36 The model, which symbolised Pondichéry’s 
historical links with France and Western civilisation, was a replica of a Greco-Latin building with no 
reference to Tamil culture (Fig. 15). The participation of Pondichéry to the ritual of national 
commemoration served to consolidate national feelings and to welcome French Indians within the 
national community.37  After the transfer, Indian authorities referred to ‘Pondichéry’ in its anglicised 
form of ‘Pondicherry’. 
 
 
                                                          
36 Trait d’Union, January 1955. 
37
 Roy, Beyond Belief, op.cit., p. 73. 
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Figure 15: Float representing the State of Pondicherry at the national celebration of Indian Republic 
Day on 26 January 1955. Source: Service d’Information de l’Etat de Pondichéry, Nouvel État de Pondichéry, 
évènements marquants et progrès économiques et social depuis le transfert de facto, Associated Printers, 
Madras, 1956, AD, Vol. 339 : Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
 
 
 
The Prime Minister’s visit to Pondichéry so close to Republic Day celebrations seems to have 
been a tactical decision to assert the national significance of the merger of the former French 
comptoirs into India, and to help anchor French India within the concept of India as a unified nation   
After all, Republic Day in India is a celebration of the ascent of the country to Independence and the 
introduction of its own constitution in 1950. It also commemorates the declaration of Purna Swaraj 
(total self-rule) on 26 January 1930, when at the Lahore session of the INC Gandhi declared, ‘We will 
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be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence’.38 The day was observed year after year, 
and assumed an importance unequalled by any other national event; it was a day of commemoration 
in honour of all those who had served and sacrificed for the cause of Swaraj (self-rule).39 Srirupa Roy 
mentions that in post-colonial India, the commemoration served as an instrument in nation-building 
process that proclaimed ‘the unity in diversity’ of the Indian nation.40 In his ‘A Settlement in Friendship 
Speech’, delivered in English, Nehru declared: 
 
My coming here today after a number of years has brought many memories to me. … What 
has happened here is of a much larger significance than the mere size of Pondicherry might 
indicate. From the point of view of India, it is a certain step forward in her political revolution. 
The big step was taken when India became free after an agreement with the British 
government. This is another step forward, however small … resolved by peaceful means not 
war. … In dealing with this question of Pondicherry, we have achieved a settlement in 
friendship and cooperation with the French government, leaving no problem behind, not even 
bitterness. That is the civilised way of dealing with problems. The uncivilised way is that of 
war, even though the so-called advanced countries may fight. Thus, while Pondicherry may 
be a very small part of India, Pondicherry has now become a symbol of friendly solution by 
negotiated settlement between nations. This settlement has truly brought joy and happiness 
to me, because I have laboured throughout my life for a certain objective in India. I have 
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seen that objective fulfilled in a large measure, and as more fulfillment comes to it naturally I 
rejoice. And my joy has been much greater because of the manner of doing it. You may 
remember that our great leader Mahatmaji [Gandhi] always laid stress on the manner of 
doing things, on the means employed. It is good to have a right objective, to have right ends 
in view, but he always said that it is more important to adopt right methods and right 
means.41  
 
When the Prime Minister mentions that his visit brought back memories, he is referring to his 
previous visit in October 1936 when, as president of the All-India National Congress, he had been 
invited during his election campaign in the south of India to speak in Pondichéry.42 His visit coincided 
with a particularly violent anti-colonial and social struggle, which featured striking students (22 
September 1936) and textile workers (1935-37) demonstrating for better school facilities and 
improved working conditions. The struggle peaked with the gunning down of twelve strikers by 
French forces on 30 July 1936, a tragedy that would be commemorated every year thereafter.43 
Subbiah, the leader of the French Indian Communist Party, recalled in his memoirs that ‘Nehru had 
started to address the crowd in French, but that after a few minutes he switched over to English, as 
he was told that for people of Pondicherry French or English did not make any difference as they 
were mainly Tamil speaking people; subsequently his speech was translated in Tamil by a local 
                                                          
41 Trait d’Union, January 1955; Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘A settlement in friendship from speech at a reception at Pondicherry, 
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42 Subbiah, op. cit., pp. 105-08.  
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orator’.44 This anecdote shows that Nehru had very little knowledge of French India’s particularities at 
the time of his first visit in 1936.  
However, Nehru’s personal experience in the national movement allowed him to link 
Pondichéry’s political struggle with India’s fight for freedom, which he described as a ‘revolution’. His 
use of ‘we’ acts as a means to unify French Indians with other Indians into one nation without any 
distinction based on language or religion, and thus reinforced the nationalist precept of the Indian 
nation based on diversity and unity.45 He praises the skilfulness of Indian political leaders in 
negotiating without recourse to violence and notes that India used civilised methods in opposition to 
the uncivilised ways of advanced countries. In this way Nehru turns the old, assumed dichotomies of 
Occident/Orient and civilisation/barbarism upside down, suggesting that the Orient acts peacefully 
while the Occident has a history of violence that is especially linked to its colonial history.46 Here 
again the Prime Minister reiterates the moral success of satyagraha as the means to achieve self-
determination, and India’s commitment to a policy of non-violence as epitomised by Gandhi. He also 
hints that similar peaceful negotiations could resolve the other colonial problem, Portuguese India. 
Furthermore, by recalling that India ‘had become free after an agreement with the British agreement’, 
Nehru reiterates that France had been only a subordinate colonial power in India when it persisted in 
challenging the notion of self-determination. While in the pre-1947 era visits from distinguished 
nationalist leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru raised the spirits of residents and encouraged the 
message of freedom, Nehru’s equally important subsequent visit strengthened the bonds between 
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 Roy, Beyond Belief, op.cit., p.77. 
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New Delhi (represented by its highest official) and the geographically peripheral enclaves where 
uncertainty about the future, especially the future of French Indian culture, still prevailed.47  
The Prime Minister’s second visit occurred on 4 October 1955, nine months after his first visit 
and one year after the de facto transfer. While the purpose of this visit was ‘to measure [the] progress 
of the new State of Pondicherry’,48  the timing of the visit, ahead of the first anniversary of the de 
facto agreement, reinforced the interest that New Delhi had in the new State. The number of officials 
accompanying the Prime Minister was increased for this visit, giving it a far more official tone that the 
preceding one. They included Shri T.T. Krishnamachari (the Minister of Commerce and Industry), 
Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri (the Minister of Railways), M. Kamaraj Nadar (the Prime Minister of 
Madras), and Indira Gandhi (the Prime Minister’s daughter). Nehru took the opportunity to send a 
national and international message by inviting the French Indian population ‘to work hard for the 
benefit of India, to increase the standard of living of our country and for peace in the world’, an 
invitation that revealed the Prime Minister’s vision of India’s economic and political success becoming 
a model for peace and freedom at large.49 This call for increased productivity had the benefit of 
creating a bond between French Indians and other Indians, all labouring and engaged in a common 
goal. Indeed, India would invest a great deal of money to guarantee peace in the comptoirs and to 
prove that India, as a national and regional leader, could outperform the French in managing the 
territories.   
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Economic progress and development  
The population of French India, however, was somewhat uneasy about being administered 
by a government that had imposed restrictions and greatly inconvenienced daily lives in the years 
leading up to the de facto transfer.50 Moreover, the territories had been handed over without proper 
consultation. Thus the government had to do more than just make a declaration that it wanted 
Pondichéry to be on par with the rest of the nation. It really had to convince the population that there 
were overwhelming advantages to being a part of greater India. The Indian government stated its 
promise in the introduction of the State of Pondicherry annual report of the year 1956-57:  
The main concern of the government is to improve the living standard of the population by 
improving all resources and erect a new State that would guarantee the wellbeing of the population, 
and give a real signification to the political freedom that it has just acquired. 51 
 
The statement hinted that the previous administration had kept French India in a state of poverty and 
oppression. It was now up to the Indian government to outdo the French in ensuring economic 
freedom alongside political freedom, as such it legitimised the state’s authority and emphasised its 
role in the provision of state-led development.52  
In order to win over French Indian hearts, the Indian Government introduced generous 
development schemes that produced excellent results in providing employment and an economic 
impetus. These schemes also attracted a large number of people from other parts of India, since a 
suitably qualified workforce was lacking in the former French enclaves. Indeed, the 1956-57 report 
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mentioned that, due to a lack of specialised labour, some projects could not be accomplished.53 The 
government blamed the delays, at least partially, on the previous colonial administration’s inability to 
train an adequate labour force. The delay, however, would only be a setback, and the earmarked 
funds were to be used for the realisation of the specified projects the following year. The economy 
was stimulated by lowering taxable business income by 50% and customs duties by 5%, and by 
increasing the number of import licences. Social relations were taken into consideration with the 
opening of an unemployment office, which registered 530 jobless workers within the first six weeks. A 
State Emergency Relief Organisation was also set up. But the main economic improvement would be 
the reconstruction of the pier. The previous slow and labour-intensive system of using small boats to 
transport goods to the beach (as shown in Figures 16 and 17) allowed only two tons to be 
disembarked at one time. The new pier would achieve a figure of up to 1,500 tons. 
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Figure 16: Bags of rice ready for exportation are being loaded by local labour onto small ships. The 
bags will then be transhipped onto large vessels waiting beyond the sandbar which made anchoring near the 
beach impossible. Source: Douglas Gressieux, Les comptoirs de l’Inde: Pondichéry, Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon et 
Chandernagor: mémoire en images, p. 103. 
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Figure 17: Embarking an automobile onto the beach of Pondichéry seemed a very perilous task. Source: 
Douglas Gressieux, Les comptoirs de l’Inde: Pondichéry, Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon et Chandernagor: 
mémoire en images, p. 22. 
 
 
 
Mechanisms put in place by the Government included the setting up of local and regional 
committees to assess economic and social needs. Technicians were also provided to assist these 
committees in determining the most pressing and realisable projects. Veterinary services were set 
up, fertilisers were donated to peasants, and new methods to improve rice production were 
introduced. Eleven cooperatives of weavers were also organised. The scale of the state-led 
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developmental projects in Pondichery embodied Nehru’s vision of the ‘state as the authoritative 
problem solver of the needy nation’.54  
In its ten-year anniversary special edition, published on 10 and 25 November 1964, the Voix 
nouvelle: Organe politique et culturel (a bi-monthly newspaper focusing on cultural and political 
issues) proudly listed the extent of the projects achieved within the first decade under the aegis of the 
Indian government.55 The largest improvement was the increased supply of power, with the cost of 
power being halved overall.56 Power supply increased eleven-fold from 3,555 million Kwh in 1954 to 
41,613 million Kwh in 1964, and the number of villages that received electricity increased from forty-
two in 1954 to 175 in 1964.57 Even Gandon, the Représentant Français in Pondichéry, noted during 
his visit to Yanaon in 1956 that electricity had reached the town three months earlier, but that, 
surprisingly, the residence of the Indian administrator had yet to enjoy this benefit. This might indicate 
that the government prioritised the needs of the many over the comfort of the local government 
official, or perhaps that technical difficulties prevented the residence from receiving the power 
supply.58 Moreover, the number of electrified wells increased from 267 to 2,342; state revenue was 
one and a half times greater than a decade previously; production of food grew by 40%; the number 
of asphalted roads quadrapled; expenditure in public health went up fivefold; seven primary health 
centres were set up; and the number of veterinary centres increased from two to eleven.59 Although 
the newspaper does not provide qualitative details, this still represents an impressive ten-year 
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achievement, especially since France remained the legal sovereign power over the territories until 
1962.60  
 
Dual sovereignty  
Because of the delayed ratification of the Treaty of Cession by the French Parliament, the 
most striking and certainly unusual consequence of the de facto transfer was that the French 
Establishments were burdened with dual sovereignty. The particularities of this situation emanated 
from two factors: the French government was willing to satisfy Indian claims by immediately abiding 
by the Kijeour Congress results, but at the same time French authorities needed time to deal with 
legislative requirements. For the Treaty to gain effect, the French Parliament would have to pass a 
law approving the Treaty’s ratification and then have it published in the Journal Officiel in Paris. 
Indian officials believed that the de jure transfer would occur within a couple of months, while the 
Indian daily Amrita Bazar Patrika (ABP) accurately predicted that the finalisation of the Treaty would 
most probably take much longer since, it said, the French moved very slowly.61 While the ABP 
seemed to be referring to France’s protracted decision to end her colonial presence in Asia, the delay 
was actually caused by a number of factors related to colonial administration which led to a change in 
the constitution and a debate over the constitutionality of the de jure transfer. As a result, French 
Indians were forced to endure another eight years of French sovereignty.  
French India was technically the first overseas territory to leave the French Union. When 
France signed the October 1954 agreement, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had just been given 
independence, but they were considered by the French Constitution to be ‘Associated States’ rather 
than territories. By the time the Treaty was ratified in 1962, France had experienced a series of 
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colonial crises, including the Suez crisis (1956) and the Algerian war (1954–1962), and most of 
France’s overseas territories had gained independence. First came the Protectorates of Tunisia and 
Morocco in 1956, followed in 1960 by Afrique Occidentale Française (Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, 
Upper Volta, Niger, Guinea in 1958, Ivory Coast, Dahomey), Afrique Equatoriale Française (Congo, 
Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad), and the Mandates of Togo and Cameroon. Madagascar 
also gained independence in 1960, followed by Algeria in 1962.62 The Comoros Islands (except 
Mayotte), Djibouti, and the New Hebrides (becoming Vanuatu) remained French until they gained 
independence in 1975, 1977, and 1980, respectively. Only a few scraps of France’s extensive 
colonial empire scattered across the globe would remain, including the overseas departments 
(Départements d’Outre-Mer – DOMs) and the overseas territories (Territoires d’Outre-Mer -TOMs).63  
The process of ratifying of the Treaty of Cession was delayed by the dismantlement of the 
French Union and the Algerian crisis, which led to the promulgation of the Fifth Republic with General 
de Gaulle becoming president in 1958, but also by debates amongst French deputies over the validity 
of the agreement.64 Indeed, the Treaty was deemed unconstitutional because it did not comply with 
the conditions of Article 27 of the 1946 constitution, which stipulated, firstly, that a territorial cession 
could not be granted unless the affected population had given its consent, and secondly that treaties 
were only valid after a law had endorsed their ratification.65 French deputies disputed the process by 
which French Indian elected representatives had voted in favour of merger with India while the 
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population of French India had been denied the right to express its opinion via referendum. It is worth 
noting that the dispute over the legality of the Franco-Indian Treaty was not unique; during the same 
period two other international agreements were deemed unconstitutional: the Franco-Ethiopian 
agreement of 16 January 1954, which ceded a substantial area of the Somali coast to Ethiopia, and 
the Franco-Vietnamese convention of 16 August 1955 regarding nationality. Both had been agreed 
without the prior consultation of the population and the ratification of the French Parliament.66 
French deputies disputed the handover of French India’s administration to the Indian 
authorities because the Treaty had not yet been ratified. A report on the Treaty of Cession of the four 
southern French territories submitted in March 1958 by Said Mohamed Cheikh, deputy for the 
Comoros, stated that the de facto transfer was void because it had effectively given power to the 
Indian authorities to administer the French Indian territories before the French Parliament had 
endorsed the Treaty. The deputy pointed out that the Treaty had never been published in the Journal 
Officiel de la République Française, nor presented to the salle des traités of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Furthermore, it had not been recorded by the services responsible for publishing all 
agreements, conventions, or any other letters testifying that an inter-governmental agreement had 
taken place. The lack of due process undermined the validity of the Treaty.67  
In addition, deputies were reluctant to sign off the demise of a colony that was older than 
Nice and Savoy.68 However, the French government had recognised that refusing to ratify the Treaty 
would only result in another diplomatic crisis with the Indian government, which the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had commended on many occasions for its patience and understanding and for 
adopting a neutral stand over the Algerian problem. In fact, Nehru always promoted diplomatic 
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negotiations over the use of force to resolve the Algerian issue.69 In addition, economic and cultural 
relations had grown significantly between India and France, and the French government was aware 
that non-ratification could jeopardise future deals.70 Indeed, the number of French missions 
responsible for sending engineers to India had risen from three in 1956 to fifteen in 1957 and twenty-
one in 1958, while the number of Indian students benefiting from scholarships to study science and 
technology in France had grown from seven in 1956 to eighty-three in 1958.71 Furthermore, the 
period that de Gaulle inaugurated with his presidency was one of economic growth for France, and 
the government’s focus had changed from maintaining the old empire (which was in any case now 
facing dismantlement) to establishing France’s leadership of Europe and employing an independent 
nuclear deterrent as a means to promote national greatness, as well as efforts to retain ties with the 
now independent former colonies in Africa despite decolonisation.72  
The delay also reflected the discrepancy that existed between the realities of French India, 
which Ostrorog insisted no longer existed, and the myth of French India that retained its hold on the 
mind of certain French deputies influenced by the French Indian lobby, which was represented by 
small committees for the defence of French Indian interests.73 Alfred Jacobson, conseiller de l’Union 
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Française, compiled a report in February 1957 (on behalf of the Commission of Foreign Relations for 
the Assemblée de l’Union Française, or AUF) in which he advised against the ratification.74 The 
deputies of the AUF admitted that the Treaty signalled a break with the purpose of the French Union, 
and could also serve as an example for a neighbouring territory to claim sovereignty over a small 
French overseas entity, or in the case of the Comoros Islands facilitate the separation of the island 
groups into two distinct political entities. Thus, instead of supporting the ratification of the Treaty, the 
deputies promised to ‘continue to fight for patriotism and defend the interests of the overseas 
territories which had put their trust in the AUF’.75  
While the deputies of the AUF rejected the proposal to ratify the Treaty on 1 March 1957, the 
promulgation of the Fifth Republic in October 1958 along with the ensuing decolonisation of France’s 
colonial empire helped overcome the problem of the Franco-Indian Treaty of Cession. The French 
Union, created after the war in 1946, was replaced by the Communauté – the adjective ‘Française’ 
was removed – that was mandated in the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958), and which 
offered overseas territories the choice of remaining linked to France or gaining independence.76 As 
former overseas territories choose to leave the Communauté and following the independence of 
Algeria in July 1962, French India was no longer considered an isolated issue whose cession could 
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threaten the Communauté. Instead, it had become part of a broader decolonisation process that the 
French Assembly was now readily prepared to deal with. The cession of French India was ratified on 
13 July 1962 by the French Parliament and the law approved by the Senate on 23 July 1962 despite 
further debates in the Assembly opposing the ratification.77 
While French deputies debated the validity of the Treaty of Cession, Indian authorities 
quickly implemented a series of measures to take over the administration of former French India. The 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1947 gave the Indian Ministry of External Affairs the legal means to 
administer the Establishments, and under the same Act two notifications, the French Establishments 
(Administration) Order 1954 and the French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order 1954, issued 
on 21 October 1954 and 30 October 1954, respectively, had the effect of extending Indian laws over 
the new State. Under the Indian Constitution the French Indian territories became a ‘part C’ state 
centrally administered by New Delhi. According to Annoussamy, the government of India disliked the 
former colonial French name, ‘the French Establishments in India’; under the French Establishments 
(change of name) order 1954, the name was changed to French Establishments.  
These decisions were aimed at instigating the erasure of colonial memory and reinforcing the 
establishment of the Indian nation, a trend that would continue well after the ratification. While names 
associated with religious sites, such as mosques, churches, and temples maintained their original 
French Indian names, large thoroughfares were given the names of famous national figures like 
Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and Lal Bahadu Shastri (the second Prime Minister of India). The names of 
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famous local men (for example, Goubert and Sri Aurobindo) were used to replace existing street 
names such as rue Dumas, rue Dupleix, rue Surcouf, rue Labourdonnais, and rue Suffren.78 The 
change of rue Dupleix to Nehru Road is quite revealing; the name of the famous Indian freedom 
fighter who became the first Prime Minister of India replaced that of the hero who epitomised French 
colonial presence in India. The famous promenade Cours Chabrol became Goubert Avenue (also 
referred to as Beach Road). Statues of French colonial figures were moved to make way for statues 
of local heroes. The statue of Dupleix, for example, was relocated from its prominent waterfront 
location in square Dupleix (renamed Nehru Place) to the garden of the French Consulate-General, 
then later to the southern extremity of Goubert Avenue. A statue of Gandhi was erected opposite the 
old pier on Republic Day, 1965. By contrast, the statue of Jeanne d’Arc still stands where it always 
did, opposite Notre-Dame des Anges; perhaps a French female national figure burnt at the stake by 
the British in the fifteenth century or that she was a religious figure (St Joan), seemed less 
challenging to the new nation than French male colonial figures.79  
The move to eliminate evidence of the colonial presence had already been felt in Yanaon 
during the March 1954 riots, when street names were ‘rebaptised’ during a spontaneous attack 
against colonial authorities by the local population.80 Similarly, students in Chandernagor requested 
that the names of ‘Dupleix’ and ‘de Bussy’ be removed from the local schools, and that the statue of 
                                                          
78 Deloche, <http://www.ifpindia.org/ecrire/upload/digital_database/Site/Pondi/data/index1.html>, viewed 30 December 
2012, unpaginated. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Armand Gandon,  Représentant Français à Pondichéry à Mr Christian Belle Ministre plénipotentiaire, chargé d’affaires, 
28 septembre 1956, a/s visite à Yanaon, AD, Vol. 339: Ex-établissements français situation générale. 
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Dupleix be replaced by ‘the effigy of Kanai Lall Dutt, a local martyr and a pioneer of the nationalist 
movement’.81  
The French government never interfered with any Indian government decisions concerning 
the administration of the French Establishments. Ostrorog praised the excellent relations between 
France and India, and remarked that despite India’s leadership in the Afro-Asia bloc, she never took 
an adverse position towards France, especially regarding the Algerian issue.82 Likewise Nehru 
declared a few days after the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Rajya Sabha (Upper 
House): 
 
The transfer has been pending for a large number of years, and most of us and many 
Members of this House must have felt frustrated at the long delay in this transfer. Ultimately 
this transfer has taken place. We realised then and we do now that France was going 
through a difficulty period attended by big constitutional changes, and therefore although we 
pressed for it, we did not wish to say or do anything which might injure our relations with 
France. I am glad that the policy of patience pursued by us has led to a successful result. 
Pondicherry and the other former French Settlements are now part of India … the main thing 
is that we have achieved our objective in accordance with our policy and practice, peacefully 
and without injuring in any way our relations with France, and I should like to express my 
appreciation of the French government and specially of its eminent Present, General de 
Gaulle.83   
                                                          
81 Mr René Kolb-Bernard, Consul Général de France à Calcutta à Mr Henri Roux, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, a/s 
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82 Ostrorog, op.cit., p. 161. 
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Both representatives congratulated each other on their mutual co-operation, their non-interference 
policy, and the peaceful completion of the issue. Rather unusually, French citizens residing in French 
India were entitled to vote in Indian elections until 1965, when their right was revoked.84 The inter-
governmental agreement of 1954 was mutually respected and the ratification created the Union 
Territory of Pondicherry in 1962, another step in the unstoppable process of integration. 
 
The Union Territory of Pondicherry 
Nearly eight years after the de facto agreement, the Treaty of Cession was finally expedited 
by de Gaulle shortly after he had signed off on the independence of Algeria (3 July 1962).85 The 
ratification granted full sovereignty to India over the French Indian enclaves of Pondichéry, Karikal, 
Mahé, and Yanaon. Chandernagor had been ceded by the Treaty of Cession of the Territory of the 
Free Town of Chandernagore on 2 February 1951, and by the Chandernagor (Merger) Act, 1954, 
which came into force on 2 October 1954 making this former enclave part of the District of Hoogly of 
the State of West Bengal.86 The exchange of instruments between the governments of India and 
France took place on 16 August 1962, which meant that the French Establishments officially became 
Indian on that day. Nine days later, the Indian parliament approved the Constitution (Fourteenth 
Amendment) Act 1962, which provided for the four former southern French Indian territories to 
become the Union Territory of Pondicherry (UTP, Map 16). The Act was then added to the First 
                                                          
84 Ramassamy, op.cit., pp. 222, 242. 
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Schedule of the Constitution.87 By the time of the de jure transfer, the ‘part C’ designation for states 
had been replaced by ‘Union Territories’, which were administered by a Lieutenant-Governor 
appointed by New Delhi. He was assisted by an elected legislative assembly and appointed council 
of ministers, all members of the legislative assembly.88 The administration of the former French 
Indian territories was thereby centralised. While in the past local affairs could be resolved between 
the French Commissaire de la République and the conseil du gouvernement, now any differences 
between the Lieutenant-Governor and the council of ministers was referred to New Delhi for a 
decision.89  
There are three other important points to make about the inauguration of the UTP. Firstly, the 
Indian government chose to retain the name of the former colonial administrative centre, albeit in its 
anglicised spelling, for the new Union Territory of Pondicherry. Providing a link between the recent 
colonial past and the newly merged Indian state would maintain some of the cultural particularities of 
French India. Although the Treaty did not specifically indicate that the state should be named after 
the largest and most important of the four enclaves, nevertheless the concern of the population over 
the loss of its French Indian traits had to be taken into consideration. Secondly, the Constitution 
(Fourteenth Amendment) Act 1962 provided a different spelling for three of the former French 
enclaves: Pondichéry was now Pondicherry, Mahé became Mahe, and Yanaon, Yanam. A bill to 
rename Pondicherry’s spelling to Puducherry was approved in 2006.90 
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Map 16: The Union Territory of Pondicherry, 2005. The four former French Indian enclaves are shown in 
blue capital letters. Source: Government of Puducherry, Department of Science, Technology and Environment, 
State of Environment Report 2005. 
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Most importantly, the UTP kept the same disparate and truncated shape as French India, 
even though out of the four southern comptoirs, Mahe and Yanam were the smallest and least 
French. Despite their distant locations in relation to Pondicherry, when officially referring to them and 
the state they are associated with, the town’s names are written as ‘Mahe, Pondicherry’ and ‘Yanam, 
Pondicherry’. Rather than clearing the colonial slate and taking the opportunity to amalgamate or 
consolidate the former French Indian communes, most of which were surrounded by existing Indian 
territory, the government of India maintained the geographical oddities that had resulted from Franco-
British colonial rivalries. Slight name changes aside, the boundaries of the communes of Pondicherry, 
Mahe, Karraikal, and Yanam remained the same. In comparison, Chandernagor was totally 
integrated into the state of West Bengal following the Treaty of Cession in 1951. This difference can 
be explained by the fact that the conditions that led to the merging of Chandernagor and of the 
southern comptoirs into the Union of India were very different. Chandernagor voted in a referendum 
to merge with the Indian Union, while this option was never submitted to the population of the four 
southern enclaves; instead, elected representatives voted at Kijeour on behalf of the population. For 
this reason, the government of India had chosen to retain aspects of French India in the southern 
comptoirs, even if this appeared anomalous.  
The Act also instituted a number of constitutional and legislative measures regarding the 
management of the new state. The Pondicherry (Administration) Act 1962 provided, inter alia, for the 
continuance of existing officers and laws, and for the extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court of 
Madras to Pondicherry. The Citizenship (Pondicherry) Order, 1962 conferred Indian citizenship on all 
persons born in the Union Territory except those who opted to retain their French nationality before 
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15 February 1963.91 The Pondicherry (Laws) Regulation, 1963, promulgated on 18 July 1963, 
extended 160 central enactments to the Union Territory of Pondicherry.92 The administrative control 
of Pondicherry and Goa, where Indian forces marched in and evicted the Portuguese in December 
1961, was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 1 September 1964, after previously being 
entrusted to the Ministry of External Affairs.93 Compared to the former French Indian territories which 
formed UTP, Goa was granted statehood in 1987. The post-French Indian world was struck a further 
blow when the Legislative Assembly of Pondicherry decided on 3 April 1965 that English, Tamil, 
Malayalam, and Telugu would be concurrent official languages alongside French.94  
In the meantime, Franco-Indian relations were strengthened with the signing of a nuclear co-
operation agreement during the 1965 visit to India of the French Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou; 
other agreements were established between 1974 and 1976 under Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.95 
Finally, a mixture of demographic integration and internal migration facilitated the political and social 
integration of French India. A generous government investment policy fostered economic 
improvement, which in turn resulted in a migratory movement from greater India. Whatever French 
Indian culture might have remained was thereby further dissolved. French India, in other words, had 
experienced the same fate as other Indian communities who feared the loss of their local identity as a 
result of merging within the Indian state in 1947.  
Curiously, when in 1978 the Prime Minister of India supported a proposal by the Union 
exchequer to reduce expenditure in UTP by merging the former comptoirs with their respective 
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contiguous states, it met with sharp opposition from the population that had settled in them after the 
transfer.96 They fought to maintain their special status as the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Above 
all, the intensity of the opposition and its organisation reflected pre-1954 hostilities. An Anti-Merger 
Conference was organised in Pondicherry, bringing together members of the Communist, Congress, 
Muslim League, and Kazaham (Dravidian movement) groups under the leadership of the old CPI 
leader, Subbiah. This time the old pre-1954 veterans all came under one banner to ensure that UTP 
remained a distinct state within the Union of India. Hartals, demonstrations, and a boycott of the 
Republic day celebration (26 January) were called for. Clashes with police resulted in twenty-five 
demonstrators being shot dead; many others were injured and more than four hundred were arrested 
in relation to this new anti-merger movement.97 The legacy of French Indian merger politics was still 
present in the state of UTP.  
The level of opposition eventually forced the Indian government to abandon the proposal. 
The participation of post-1954 migrants demonstrated that they had benefited from the economic 
development promoted by the Indian government, and that they were unwilling to support a decision 
that might affect their prosperity. In a twist of fate, those who had fought the hardest for the 
maintenance of French culture to be included in the conditions of the Treaty had either left for France 
or become part of a dwindling community engulfed by the ever-increasing number of migrants (which 
grew by 30% every ten years).98 Apart from the maintenance of colonial names, truncated territorial 
vestiges, and some economic advantages which new residents were ready to fight for, the former 
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98 Annoussamy, L’intermède, op.cit., p. 182; Michalon, ‘Des Indes françaises aux Indiens français’, op.cit., pp. 251-2; 
Michalon,  ‘L’aventure ambiguë’, op.cit., pp. 174-6. 
 
 365 
 
French territories known as UTP had fully become part of the Indian nation. Above all, while French 
India had represented a bulwark against the British in India, the extension of Indian laws modelled on 
the British legal framework finally erased the particular status of French India. The whole process 
brought French India into a system that was dominated by a British legacy that finally put to an end to 
the Franco-British rivalry that began in the seventeenth century. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the provisions of the French constitution, which stipulated that French nationality was 
extended to overseas subjects, French Indians had to apply to remain French. Only a few decided to 
do so. The nationality issue has shown that for all its universal principles, France’s citizenship was 
closely linked to cultural and social belonging, with renonçants constituting the largest group of those 
who opted to be French. While some authors have interpreted the small proportion of optants as a 
sign of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ failure to adequately facilitate the process, in fact the result 
stemmed from a conscious policy of limiting citizenship to a small minority. While it cannot be said 
that most of the population made a conscious choice not to opt for French citizenship, cumbersome 
Indian administrative procedures seemed to have helped deter anyone who was undecided. While 
Nehru’s visits to Pondichéry helped anchor French India within the image of a national India, the 
economic stimulus provided by generous governmental schemes ensured the fast and successful 
integration of the former French Indian territories. Even the dual sovereignty that marked French 
India during this period did not hinder her evolution, which culminated in the creation of the Union 
Territory of Pondicherry. Although the geographical aspects of former French India were maintained, 
less permanent features were removed in an effort to erase the colonial past.  
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Conclusion 
Remembering French India 
The end of French India and how it was perceived can be illustrated by the way India and 
France each chose to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the transfer of the French Indian 
territories to India. France offered little in the way of tribute as the event passed remarkably 
unnoticed in the press; former colonial powers do not reminisce on their losses against 
determined nationalist forces. Instead, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France acknowledged the 
historic date of 1 November 1954 by compiling a selected bibliography of works on Franco-Indian 
relations between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ‘golden age’ of the Compagnie 
des Indes and a period of French colonial history associated with grandeur and influence on the 
subcontinent.1 The gesture demonstrates the on-going interest that this particular period had 
generated amongst historians, archivists, writers, administrators, and travellers, in contrast to the 
lack of concern for the modern era from the end of Napoleon’s regime (1815) to the French 
withdrawal from the comptoirs (1954), and the following decades. Yet again, the BNF’s decision 
served to downplay France’s role as a subordinate colonial power in India with French India 
consisting of only five minuscule, defenceless, scattered, and non-contiguous territories flanked 
on the periphery of the much larger and imposing British India, a constant reminder of France’s 
secondary position on the subcontinent. The move also helped minimise the question of the 
dependency of the French territories on British India for their mere survival, and continued to 
promote French influence in India while, in fact, France’s presence had been largely constrained 
by the strict conditions imposed by the Franco-British Treaty of Paris (1814).  
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The persistence of this belief in a grand French India demonstrates the potency of a 
myth, constructed after France’s defeat in 1763, that aimed at depicting French colonialism as a 
better option to the British alternative. This myth emerged as part of the formation of a French 
national identity defined in opposition to Britain. Above all, the focus in 2004 on the earlier period 
marked by Franco-British colonial rivalries completely missed an opportunity to reflect on the 
occasion it aimed to celebrate, - the fiftieth anniversary of France’s withdrawal from India -, to 
ponder on the reasons why France remained in India after the British had left, and to evaluate the 
effect of the withdrawal on Indo-French relations since the transfer. Indeed, France overlooked a 
chance to celebrate more recent Franco-Indian relations epitomised since 1958 by the signing of 
many trade, technical, and economic co-operation agreements.2  
The government of the Union Territory of Puducherry (UTP) waited until 16 August 2012 
to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the merger of the French Indian territories with the Republic of 
India, and on that day former French Indian freedom fighters were honoured.3  In UTP, 16 August 
is observed as the ‘Independence Day’ of Pondicherry even though the French Indian territories 
never became independent but were incorporated into an already established Indian state.4  This 
perspective emphasises the success of an Indian nationalist movement that defeated European 
powers by negotiation, as was the case for Britain and France, and by force, as exemplified by 
the expulsion of the Portuguese from Goa in December 1961; the overall result asserts a policy of 
state integration that had underpinned the rise of the Indian nation-state. However, the recent 
suggestion by New Delhi - under the influence of the Viduthalai Kaala Makkal Iyyakkam, a 
movement striving for the cause of the people who opted for Indian citizenship at the time of the 
merger of Puducherry with the Indian Union - to move the Independence Day of Puducherry (16 
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August) to 1 November and to turn 16 August into ‘Republic Day’ in UTP, was intended to further 
fuse the history of Pondicherry with that of the nation.5 The suggestion would see the 16 August 
commemoration follow straight on from 15 August – the national holiday that commemorates 
India’s Independence from Britain - as official Republic days that mark the nation.  The change 
hints that India is still in the process of inventing her traditions, writing her history of gaining the 
enclaves’ independence from France, and wanting to celebrate both transfer dates as a liberation 
from the French colonial yoke. The demand, headed by a movement supporting those who 
claimed allegiance to India, demonstrates that issues over adherence to the national group that 
had dominated the period between 1947 and 1962 are still very much at play today.6 Celebrating 
the two transfer dates as national victories reasserts the defeat inflicted on the old colonial power, 
minimises the role of those who might have showed loyalty to France, and serves to reinforce the 
political bonds of the former French territories with New Delhi and the nation it represents. 
The discrepancy in the celebratory dates between France (1 November 1954/2004) and 
India (16 August 1962/2012) reflects how a significant event that links the history of nationalism 
and decolonisation is remembered differently by observers and participants, and how it is 
manipulated to suit a national narrative. For France, the physical withdrawal and the handover of 
the administration to the central government of New Delhi on 1 November 1954 was the final 
stroke, while for India the full procedure was only completed with the exchange of the diplomatic 
instruments (1962), thus emphasising India’s regard for due process. However, by officially 
commemorating the end of French India on 1 November 1954, France has overlooked the period 
of dual sovereignty that affected French Indians for eight years, a rather unusual situation caused 
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by endless debates and subsequent delays in the French Parliament where deputies questioned 
the validity of a cession that had been agreed to by elected representatives rather than by the 
eligible voting population. They also pondered a withdrawal that occurred before the Treaty of 
Cession was signed, hence challenging the legitimacy of the handover. But these details of 
jurisprudence disguised the fact that French India was at the heart of France witnessing the end 
of her empire. The fact that the de facto and de jure transfers were sandwiched between the loss 
of Indochina (1954) - marking the end of formal French influence in Asia - and the independence 
of Algeria (1962) makes the cession of the French Indian territories very much a part of France’s 
post-war process of decolonisation, even though the transfer and the events leading to it did not 
arouse public interest as did other major colonial issues. French deputies, like French politicians 
and administrators, had quite some difficulty consenting to the cession of one of France’s oldest 
colonies, and one that had provided such an important and continuous link between the first 
colonial domain acquired under the Ancien Régime and the Fourth Republic. Indeed, French 
India had been part of France for longer than Nice, Savoy, and Corsica. But compared to the 
painful end of French Algeria, which attracted a significant number of gestures and the building of 
‘sacred sites’ to address the issue of the Algerian syndrome, the small size of the French Indian 
territories, the historic link with France which set them apart from other colonies, and the rather 
peaceful way the transfer occurred did not produce the same historical opportunities to reconsider 
Franco-Indian relations in the postcolonial present, and indeed only deepened the sense of 
amnesia that shrouds the French Indian territories.7  
While India is still finalising the ways by which to remember the end of France’s 
presence, France continues to represent French India in the old familiar terms. Nostalgia for the 
bygone times of the Compagnie des Indes persists unabated, as illustrated by the commentaries 
in a leaflet on an exhibition of the Compagnie des Indes that states: ‘What would you not give 
                                                          
7 Aldrich, ‘The Colonial Past and the Postcolonial Present’, op.cit., pp. 334-56. 
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today to admire, just for a few moments, the stern and sails of one of the ships of the Compagnie 
des Indes, passing by Groix Island [an island off the coast of the port of Lorient], off [to India] to 
fulfil infinite promises’.8 The comment evokes the success of Dupleix and exudes images of 
adventure and exoticism associated with India, themes abundantly used by colonial novelists and 
reporters to justify France’s presence in India, and to maintain the illusion of her influence. But as 
in the past, France still has difficulty even providing accurate records of what exactly French India 
consisted of, and the names of the French Indian territories have now been relegated to a distant 
colonial memory, if not oblivion, as testified by the revamped website of the National Archives of 
Overseas France. It proudly lists the ‘French colonial empires’ and with the help of an interactive 
map, the viewer can easily locate and read a note on each of the former French overseas 
territories and colonies. However when viewed in March 2012, the website had omitted to list 
French India, an oversight that was rectified a few weeks later.9  The section dedicated to French 
India now mentions that it consisted of five districts and eight loges and lists them as Balassore 
(Balasore), Cassimbazar (Kassimbazar, Kasim Bazar), Yougdia (Jugdea), Dacca, Patna, 
Masulipatnam (Mazulipatnam), Calicut, Surate (Surat) and the Iskitipitch (Iskitippah) islands.10 
The actual number listed is nine, not eight.  
In addition, the website wrongly indicates that the ‘English reoccupied the trading stations 
on several occasions between 1778 and 1883 [sic],’ when in fact the Treaty of 1814 settled 
Anglo-French relations in India and established the particularities of French India in terms of 
                                                          
8 ‘Que ne donnerait-on pas aujourd’hui pour voir encore, quelques instants seulement, s’éloigner dans le contre jour 
de l’île de Groix, la poupe et le gréement d’un vaisseau pavoisant aux armes de la Compagnie des Indes et aux 
flancs chargés de promesses infinies.’ Quoted in Musée de la Compagnie des Indes de Lorient, Exposition de 
Lorient à l’Orient (2011), no pagination, 
<http://musee.lorient.fr/fileadmin/Ville_de_Lorient/Musee/Musee_expos/DP_De_Lorient_a_lOrient_2011.pdf>, 
viewed 2 February 2014. 
9 Archives Nationales d’outre-mer, Empires Coloniaux Français, 
<http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/anom/fr/Presentation/Empires-coloniaux-francais.html>,  viewed 22 
March 2012. 
10 Archives Nationales d’outre-mer, Empires Coloniaux Français, 
<http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/anom/fr/Presentation/Empires-coloniaux-francais-12.html>, viewed 4 
April 2012. 
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defence and borders. Even if British assistance was at times required to maintain order in the 
territories – at best a sign of collaboration between two colonial archrivals - and border disputes 
continued to strain Franco-British relations, the Treaty sealed the end of armed hostilities 
between the two colonial powers. The confusion over the number of French Indian loges and 
when the French Indian territories were retroceded demonstrates the elusiveness of these distant 
lands, historical remains in which the French government still attaches great pride, though the 
national repository of colonial archives does not seem capable to this day of providing their exact 
location and historical particularities.  
While the cataloguing of these former colonial lands is still blurry, the website - like the 
maps, reports, colonial literature, and the Exposition coloniale of 1931 - epitomises a modern 
means by which France continues to project the familiar concept of her former, even if rather 
small, presence in India, whose purpose is meant to preserve a colonial memory for national 
aggrandisement and to inform unaware French people of France’s glorious epoch in India. 
Through this means France maintains her grip on her former colonial space, and perpetuates the 
vision of a long-lasting French Indian empire, with the effect that the colonial past endures, even if 
most of it is fictional. Indeed, on the website, there are no details on the territorial and cultural 
characteristics of French India. It is still viewed as a single entity - referred as Inde française - 
where the intricacies of the non-contiguous territories, their size, historical specificities, and 
regional variations are omitted; meanwhile, the contemporary period is totally overlooked. The 
mention in one caption of the website that French India was granted important republican 
institutions such as the right to elect a deputy and a senator indicates great pride in the French 
republican values and the métropole’s commitment to incorporating the colony into France.  
At the same time, viewers of the website are reminded that French India rallied to de 
Gaulle in 1940, a point that signals the devotion of French India to the motherland and testifies to 
the ‘Frenchness’ of French Indians and their adherence to the idea of parliamentary democracy 
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and freedom. The image depicts a motherland that extended her arms out to French India, while 
French India rushed into her arms to support France when her institutions were under threat.  But 
yet again, the history of French Indian opposition to French colonialism, triggered by the 
introduction of the principles of equality which threatened the hierarchical order of French Indian 
society, is unacknowledged. Similarly, the reasons why French India decided to rally to de Gaulle 
are not clarified as a decision that was based on a desire to support Britain rather than to show 
unconditional allegiance to de Gaulle. Indeed, given the Lilliputian size of the French Indian 
territories, it was almost inconceivable for them not to follow British India in 1940, a forewarning 
that at independence in 1947 France should have considered taking the same step as Britain and 
withdraw. However, France’s determination to salvage a pre-war empire in a new post-war 
colonial framework ultimately denied cession to even the smallest of her territories.  
Maintaining a vision of French India as it had once been in the past, and defining French 
India in relation to British India, limited France’s grasp of the potency of a nationalist movement 
that was determined to rid India of any foreign presence and did not shy away from using 
coercive means to achieve its aim.  The bickering over imaginary borders that divided French 
India and British India did not sustain the challenge emerging from a resolute anti-colonial 
movement that spread across the region claiming territorial sovereignty and demanding 
independence. The rise of political awareness did not operate within the colonial framework 
based on the belief that French colonialism was better, instead it focused on a common socio-
political purpose to build a new independent nation. It is this discrepancy between India’s 
determination to be independent and France’s upholding of a vision of bygone times – a vision 
that had helped define French national identity at home and abroad as a grand nation - that 
produced a clash when India became independent and claimed sovereignty over the tiny French 
Indian territories, a point that French officials were unwilling to reflect on during the occasion of 
the golden jubilee. 
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Although the old vision of French India continues to arouse nostalgia, interest for the 
‘real’ French India of the comptoirs is, as in the past, generally scant. Since 1954 France has paid 
little attention to the comptoirs. André Lewin, former French ambassador to India (1987-1991), 
admitted that while he visited Pondichéry and Karikal on many occasions, and was the first 
French ambassador to visit Mahe after the transfer, he unfortunately never set foot in Yanam. He 
conceded France’s ‘certain oubli’ (definite neglect) of the comptoirs, a point reiterated twenty 
years later in a 2012 Le Monde article entitled ‘Ces Français oubliés de Pondichéry’.11 The 
website of Les Comptoirs de l’Inde: Association culturelle et centre de documentation sur l'Inde 
mentions that despite 800 museums in France dedicated to history, there is none devoted to the 
300-year French presence in India;  only the museum of the Compagnie des Indes in Lorient 
continues to echo early Franco-Indian relations. Created in 1992, the association is committed to 
promoting the history of French India and Francophonie in India, as well as acting as a window to 
the past and the present.12  With the rapid growth of India’s middle class, which values an 
education in English, it is difficult to foresee great success for the association’s aims, and the 
extent of its influence in India and in France will probably remain very limited.   
Another link between France and the former comptoirs is represented by the French 
nationals of ethnic Tamil origin (Franco-Tamils) - that is, those who chose to become French 
citizens in 1962-3. However, since the 1970s their numbers have been dwindling; in 1999, a 
report by the French Senate stated that the number of registered Franco-Pondicherians was 
8,146, or approximately 1.11% of Pondicherry’s total population (in 2001) of 735,332.13  The 
                                                          
11 André Lewin, ‘Quel avenir pour les Français des anciens comptoirs de l’Inde?’, CIDIF, lettre No. 7 (24 Janvier 
1992), <http://cidif.go1.cc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1574:quel-avenir-pour-les-francais-des-
anciens-comptoirs&catid=10:lettre-nd7&Itemid=3>, viewed 17 February 2014; Le Monde, ‘Ces Français oubliés de 
Pondichéry’, 29 August 2012, < http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2012/08/29/ces-francais-oublies-de-
pondichery_1752747_3216.html>, viewed 13 February 2014. 
12  Les Comptoirs de l’Inde: Association culturelle et centre de documentation sur l’Inde, 
<http://www.comptoirsinde.org/>, viewed 16 February 2014. 
13 Sénat, Rapports d’information 476 (98-99), op.cit.; Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the 
Registrar General & Census Commissioner,  <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/pca/SearchDetails.aspx?Id=707703>, 
viewed 13 February 2014. 
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Senate report mentioned that 6,500 were ‘inactifs’ - meaning retirees, the unemployed, and those 
receiving social benefits - compared to 2,403 who were employed, with the largest proportion of 
them employed in the tertiary sector, 212 in industry, 473 in middle management, 41 in 
construction,  29 in agriculture, and 27 in religious activities.14 Since 1999, the proportion of the 
Franco-Tamil population has now decreased to 0.69% of the population of Pondicherry (city), 
partly because of a 30% increase in the total population of Pondicherry (city), which according to 
the census of 2011 now numbers 950,289. 15   If we were to base the calculations on the 
population of the Union Territory of Puducherry (which stands at 1,244,464), the rate of Franco-
Tamils would be even lower.16 The decrease in the population of Franco-Tamils is also due to the 
overall aging of the entire population, which means a higher death rate and a lower birth rate, and 
the tendency for young Franco-Tamils to leave for France. While the number of Franco-Tamils is 
growing smaller in Pondicherry, where traditionally their number was greater than in other parts of 
French India, and those remaining are described by the French authorities as well integrated with 
the rest of the population, the number of Franco-Pondicherians in France is currently estimated at 
70,000 or ten times greater that the number of Franco-Tamils living in South India. This in fact 
represents a thriving community living in France that has developed over a couple of generations, 
and which is keeping a link to the old roots through the setting up of associations that promote 
French Indian culture in France.17   
Despite the dwindling number of Franco-Tamils in Pondicherry, they continue to arouse 
resentment from the local population due to the generous welfare benefits that they still receive 
from France and which represent an income higher than that of a professional working in 
                                                          
14 Sénat, Rapports d’information 476 (98-99),  op.cit. 
15 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, op.cit.;  Le 
Monde, 29 August 2012, op.cit.; Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & 
Census Commissioner, op.cit. 
16  Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 
Provisional Population, Puducherry UT, <http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/data_files/puducherry/Figure%20at%20a%20Glance%20Puducherry-2011.pdf>, viewed 17 February 2014. 
17 Pairaudeau mentions that in the late 1980s there were approximately 40,000 Tamils from the former comptoirs and 
2,500 – 4,000 Indo-Vietnamese, ‘Via l’Indochine’, op.cit., p. 25; Sénat, Rapports d’information 476 (98-99),  op.cit.  
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Pondicherry. Payment of benefits are indeed remitted in Euros and the great disparities between 
the French and Indian costs of living means that those receiving benefits form the single 
wealthiest group in local society. In his study of the Franco-Tamil community, William Miles has 
remarked that for them ‘wealth is not linked to labour, it is linked to [French] citizenship.’18 This 
state of affairs has attracted criticism from Indians and Indian authorities, as it sets Franco-Tamils 
apart from the local population, while France looks down on Pondicherians, declaring that ‘their 
only “raison d’être’’ is to wait for a certificate of citizenship’ so that they can also enjoy the 
monetary benefits that being French would grant them.19 Thus, Pondicherians are portrayed by 
the French authorities as unhappy with their fate and desperate to enjoy the welfare entitlements 
associated with French citizenship.20  
This thesis has contributed to the history of French colonisation and decolonisation by 
highlighting the uniqueness of French India in the empire and in the post-war era because of its 
specific temporal and spatial factors. Withdrawal from one of the smallest and the oldest 
overseas territories posed a challenge partly because of France’s historical presence in India and 
the disparity between the territories, and partly because of the historical dimensions of Franco-
British relations in India, which resulted in France’s special status in India as a subordinate 
coloniser. France’s colonial discourse was defined by her own colonial failures in India, which 
helped create the vision of French India as greater than it really was. The study has also brought 
to light the importance of regional variations within the entity referred to as French India, and, in 
particular, exposed the case of Chandernagor in opposition to the other four southern territories 
that would form the Union Territory of Pondichery, making the decolonisation of French India 
atypical. Like other anomalous annexations such as Macau, Hong Kong, and Zanzibar, the new 
                                                          
18 Miles, op.cit., p. 125. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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Union Territory of Pondicherry enjoyed a ‘particular’ status within the nation, a direct effect of its 
colonial past, which also raised the issue of citizenship.  
What my analysis of the decolonisation of French India in this thesis shows is that the 
transfer of sovereignty did not create for a clean slate, but instead promoted the allocation of 
preferential treatments, often in the form of financial aid, in order to smother any discontent. My 
analysis highlights that territorial oddities, such as the non-contiguous parcels of the UTP, were 
never incorporated into the neighbouring states, and that they still retain the territorial pecularities 
that characterised them while under French control. They now look like vestiges of a colonial 
past. But this distinction also points to the difficulties posed by India’s nation-building process. 
The merger of foreign possessions required a considerable amount of negotiating and was 
entangled with internal (Jammu-Kashmir) and external (Indochina) factors influencing the 
diplomatic process. While images and representations of French India helped shape national 
identities, voices emerging from opposition in the form of regionalism and sub-nationalism 
threatened the nation-state’s goals. Finally, this study has also pointed out that because the 
merger of these small territories was carried out in a rather peaceful manner, the particularities of 
the event have been left unacknowledged in the history of decolonisation, if not altogether 
forgotten, thus contributing to France’s colonial amnesia about her long presence in India.  
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Glossary of non-English terms  
 
Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF): consisted of present-day Congo, Gabon, Central African 
Republic  and Chad 
Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF):  consisted of present-day Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, 
Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Benin (former Dahomey). 
Arrack: distilled alcoholic drink made of coconut palm tree 
Ashram: a hermitage, spiritual retreat 
Bibliothèque nationale de France: French National Library 
Brahmins: the first group in the hierarchy of castes, they are scholars and priests 
Charkha: spinning wheel, symbol of Gandhi’s independent movement  
Cipahi: sepoy, term given to the local French police after the 1857 Mutiny 
Collège: establishment that provides secondary education (first cycle) 
Comptoirs: outposts, territories, enclaves 
Créole or métis: mixed blood person 
Darbar, Durbar: the official reception of the native ruler or British viceroy or British ruler 
Département: administrative division of France created after the 1789 Revolution 
DOM-TOM: départements d’outre-mer – territoires d’outre-mer, French overseas departments 
and territories were created in 1946. 
École: school 
École de droit: Law school 
École de médecine: School of Medicine  
Église: church 
Les Établissements français de l’Inde: official name of French India or French Indian 
Establishments 
Dhoti: cloth draped around the lower part of the male, from waist to fee 
Factorerie: office or warehouse of former colonial power  
Goonda: criminal, thug 
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Harijan: ‘Child of God’, a term used by Gandhi for Dalits or Untouchables  
Hartal: general strike 
Jati: communities and sub-communities in India that are often associated with a tradition job, 
religion or tribe. 
Journal Officiel de l’Inde française: official gazette of French India 
Journal Officiel de la République française : official gazette of the French Republic  
Khadi, Khaddar: cloth made from homespun yarn 
Kṣatriya: the second group in the caste hierarchy, they are warriors and administrators 
La Compagnie des Indes Orientales: French East India Company 
Lok Sabha : Indian Lower House 
Loges: strips of land over which France claimed sovereignty, acquired in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century 
Lycée: establishment that provides secondary education (second cycle) leading to the 
baccalaureate 
Mala: a garland 
Mamool: traditional  
Métis or créole: mixed blood person 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
Ministère de la France d’outre-mer: Ministry of Overseas France, formerly known until 1946 as 
Ministry of Colonies 
Pandal: a tent or marquee 
Pettah: a village, often used to refer to the loges 
Préfet: the State’s representative in a department of a region 
Renonçant: a person who has renounced customary law 
Sabha: a body or an association 
Sari: draped clothing worn by women of India 
Satyagraha: truth force 
Satyagrahi: a follower of satyagraha 
Sepoy: armed forces recruited locally 
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Sūdra: the fourth and last group in the hierarchy of castes, they are craftsmen and labourers 
Swadesh: of one’s own country; swadeshi (adj.) 
Swaraj: self-rule, home rule; independence from the occupier 
Terrain: strip of land on which French colonial warehouse/s once stood 
Toddy: alcoholic drink made from palm tree 
Topi: a cap, usually referred as the Gandhian cap 
Vaiśyas: the third group in the caste hierarchy, they are merchants and farmers 
Varna: caste, consists of four main groups: Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Sūdra 
Vieilles colonies: remnants of the first French colonial empire (1600 to 1814) and included 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, the Quatre Communes of Senegal, 
Île de La Réunion, and the French Indian territories. 
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Chronology 
 French India France / French Empire / 
French Union 
British India / India 
1673 Compagnie des Indes establishes 
an enclave in Pondichéry 
  
1688 François Martin obtains 
authorisation to engage in trade 
in Karikal 
 
  
1690 Chandernagor is founded 
 
  
1701 Compagnie des Indes establishes 
its headquarters in Pondichéry 
eight loges are set up and include 
Cassimbazar, Jougdia, Dacca, 
Balassore, Patna, Masulipatam 
near Yanaoun, Calicut near 
Mahé, and Surat.  
 
  
1721 Mahé is established 
 
  
1731 an enclave is created at Yanaon 
 
  
1756-1763 Seven Years’ War, Treaty of 
Paris left France with only the five 
enclaves 
 1757 Battle of Plassey, 
assertion of British commercial 
hegemony over other European 
powers 
1791  Right to elect a deputy is 
granted to the colonies 
 
30 May 
1814 
Treaty of Paris: British restored 
the loges and enclaves of every 
kind which were possessed by 
France on 1 January 1792; they 
are not to erect any fortifications 
and to maintain only such troops 
as might be necessary for police 
purposes. 
  
1815-1830  Bourbon restoration:  Louis 
XVIII rules from 1814 to 1824, 
then his younger brother 
Charles X reigns from 1824 to 
1830 
 
 
1830-1848  July Monarchy headed by 
Louis–Philippe 
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 French India France / French Empire / 
French Union 
British India / India 
   
23 July 
1840 
ordonnance organique grants 
French India first local 
representation Assemblée des 
Notables consists of nominated 
French and native members on the 
basis of land ownership. First anti-
French campaign caused by 
underrepresentation of local 
population 
 
  
1845 Karikal riots caused by interference 
with local customs, British are 
called to provide military 
assistance. 
 
  
1848-1851 Second Republic: French Indian 
men are allowed to elect a deputy, 
election takes place in 1849 but the 
seat is withdrawn  
This first exercise of the electoral 
process causes havoc in French 
India as the idea of equality 
challenges French Indian social 
hierarchies 
 
  
1857 mayor of Pondichéry presents letter 
to governor of French India 
supporting French colonialism 
 Sepoy rebellion or the ‘Mutiny’  
 
1858   British East India Company 
dissolved; British Crown takes 
over India 
1860s-
1880s 
 Start of the French conquest of 
Indochina 
 
1871  decree of 1 February calls for the 
election of a deputy – maintenance 
of the college system based on two 
lists of electors. 
 
Third Republic is proclaimed, 
lasts until 1940 
 
1874 decree of 24 February calls for the 
election of a senator 
  
1877   Queen Victoria proclaimed 
Empress of India 
1880 introduction of new 
administrative system 
based on communes and local 
councils 
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 French India France / French Empire / 
French Union 
British India / India 
1880-1907 Chanenougam ‘King of French 
India’, the leader of the Sūdra and 
a strong partisan of preserving 
traditional Indian social organisation 
  
1885   First meeting of the Indian 
National Congress 
 
1905-1911   Swadeshi movement in Bengal 
opposes the partition of Bengal 
by the British Indian government 
 
1909   1909 Morley-Minto Reforms in 
British India allowed a restricted 
suffrage to elect a number of 
men to British Indian legislative 
assemblies 
 
1911   capital of British India is moved 
from Calcutta to New Delhi 
 
1919   Government of India Act 1919 
removes the sex disqualification 
and awards women with 
sufficient property the right to 
vote and, later, the right to stand 
for election or nomination 
 
1919   Rowlatt Satyagraha, anti-British 
campaign organised by Gandhi 
against the  Rowlatt Bills 
 
March 
1930 
  Salt Satyagraha, anti-British 
campaign headed by Gandhi 
May 1936 
– Oct 1938 
 Front Populaire: new coalition 
government dominated by 
Socialists 
 
June 1936  Accord Matignon: a set of 
agreements which included the 
legal right to strike, the right to 
organise in unions, wage 
increases, holiday pay, a 
reduction of the working week 
to forty hours, and collective 
bargaining 
 
30 July 
1936 
La fusillade de Pondichéry 
(Pondichéry Shooting Day), 
twelve dead due to police 
repression after French Indian 
workers went on strike 
demanding the same rights that 
their co-workers in France 
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Sept. 
1939-May 
1940 
French India France / French Empire / 
French Union 
 
‘Phoney war” (drôle de guerre) 
 
British India / India 
June 1940  Defeat of France – occupation 
by German armed forces 
 
18 June 
1940 
 Charles de Gaulle’s speech on 
BBC calling for continued 
resistance to the Germans 
 
20 June 
1940 
Chandernagor rallies to de 
Gaulle, followed six weeks later 
by the other enclaves 
  
8 August 
1942 
  ‘Quit India’ campaign is 
launched by Gandhi and the INC  
 
Nov 1943-
25 July 
1944 
Deiva Zivaratinam sent as the 
French Indian delegate to the 
Assemblée constituante 
provisoire in Algiers  
  
Jan-Feb 
1944 
 Brazzaville conference  
6 June 
1944 
 D-Day invasion of Normandy 
coast 
 
 
25 Aug 
1944 
 Liberation of Paris 
 
 
8 May 
1945 
 Victory Day marks the end of 
WWII 
Sétif repression (Algeria) 
 
23 August 
1945 
decree removes the two-list 
system in French India and 
introduces a ‘universal’ suffrage 
that includes French Indian 
women 
  
October 
1946 
 Second Referendum: 
Constitution of Fourth Republic 
narrowly accepted, French 
Union replaces the former 
colonial empire 
 
1946  Lebanon and Syria granted 
independence 
Starts of the Indochina war 
(December) 
 
 
1947  End of tripartism with the 
expulsion of the Communist 
ministers  
Madagascar insurrection 
(March-July 1947) 
Clement Attlee announces in 
February that Britain will 
withdraw from India  
15 Aug1947   India becomes independent, 
with Nehru as Prime Minister 
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 French India France / French Empire / 
French Union 
British India / India 
 
28 Aug 1947 
 joint Franco-Indian declaration 
expressing desire to amicably 
settle the future of enclaves 
 
6 Oct 1947 eight loges are returned to India   
20 Jan Chandernagor claims right to 
secede 
  
30 Jan 1948   assassination of Gandhi 
1 April 1948   denunciation of Customs Union 
Agreement 
18 June 
1948 
 French Overseas Ministry 
announces in French national 
assembly that government will 
grant right to self-determination 
 
18 
September 
  Hyderabad joins the Indian 
Union after a five-day armed 
campaign 
19 June 
1949 
referendum of Chandernagor, 
votes to join the Union 
  
January 
1950 
  Constitution of the Republic of 
India is proclaimed 
2 Feb  1951 Cession Treaty of 
Chandernagor is signed  
  
May 1954  French defeat at Dien Bien 
Phu, Indochina 
 
31 July 1954  move towards autonomous 
status for Tunisia  
recognised by Mendès-France 
 
21 Oct 1954 Franco-Indian convention, de 
facto transfer of French 
enclaves 
  
 
1 Nov 1954 De facto transfer of the four 
southern French Indian 
establishments 
 India’s French Establishments 
(change of name) order, 1954 
changes the name of the 
enclaves to the State of 
Pondicherry 
November  Start of Algerian war 
 
 
20 March 
1955 
inauguration of the Institut 
Français de Pondichéry 
 
  
28 May 1956 Treaty of Cession signed by 
France and India, India ratifies 
the Treaty two days later 
  
July 1962  following the Evian accord of 
March, a referendum is held on 
1 July which approves the 
independence of Algeria 
 
July 1962  French Parliament ratifies the 
Treaty of Cession 
 
16 August de jure transfer of French Indian 
enclaves 
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